R v Spicer; Ex parte Australian Builders' Labourers' Federation

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100 CLR 277

Solicitors for the prosecutor, C. Jollie Smith &Co. Solicitor for the respondent Chief Judge and Judges of the Com- monwealth Industrial Court and for the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth, intervening by leave, H. E. Renfree, Crown Solicitor for the Commonwealth.

Solicitors for the Commonwealth Steamship Owners' Association and other employers of the prosecutors intervening by leave, Malleson Stewart &Co., Melbourne, by Allen, Allen &Hemsley.

Solicitor for the respondent Buchan, Bruce Miles.

100 CLR 278

[ ]

THE QUEEN

SPICER AND OTHERS; Ex PARTE AUSTRALIAN BUILDERS' LABOURERS'

FEDERATION Constitutional Law (Cth.)-Industrial law-Commonwealth Industrial Court-

Statutory provisions-Industrial organisation-Rules-Allowance or disallow- ance by court-Power of court-Judicial or non-judicial-Validity-Prohibition -The Constitution (63 &64 Vict. c. 12), 88. 51 (xxxv.), (xxxix.), 76 (ii.), 77 (i.) -Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1956, S. 140.

Section 140 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1956 provides, by sub-s. (1) that the Commonwealth Industrial Court may upon its own motion or upon application made under the section, disallow any rule of an organisation which in the opinion of the court (a) is contrary to law, or to an order or award (b) is tyrannical or oppressive; (c) prevents or hinders members of the organisation from observing the law or the provisions of an order or award or (d) imposes unreasonable conditions upon the membership of any member or upon any applicant for membership, and any rule so dis- allowed shall be void. By sub-s. (2) a right is given to any member of an organisation to apply to the Commonwealth Industrial Court for the disallow- ance of a rule; and by sub-s. (3) that court is given a discretion to direct the organisation to alter the offending rule, disallowing the rule only in the event of a failure to comply with the direction.

Held by Dixon C.J., McTiernan, Kitto and Taylor JJ., Williams and Webb JJ. dissenting following Consolidated Press Ltd. v. Australian Journalists Association (1947) 73 C.L.R. 549, that the power intended to be conferred by S. 140 is not part of the judicial power and inasmuch as the Commonwealth Industrial Court is a federal court exercising the judicial power of the Com- monwealth as was decided in Seamen's Union of Australia v. Matthews (1957) 96 C.L.R. 529 the attempt by S. 140 to confer the power on that court is PROHIBITION

Upon an application made on behalf of the Australian Builders' Labourers' Federation McTiernan J., on 20th June 1957, granted an order nisi for a writ of prohibition directed to the Honourable John Armstrong Spicer, the Honourable Edward Arthur Dunphy and the

100 CLR 279

OF A. Honourable Sir Edward James Renembe Morgan, Judges of the

Commonwealth Industrial Court, and Stanley Winter-a financial member of the federation-prohibiting them and each of them

THE QUEEN

from proceeding further: 1 in the matter B 54 of 1957 in the Commonwealth Industrial Court which was in respect of an appli- cation by the said Stanley Winter under S. 140 of the Conciliation

BUILDERS' and Arbitration Act 1904-1956…

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Details
Case
[1957] HCA 81
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *R v Spicer; Ex parte Australian Builders' Labourers' Federation* involved an application for a writ of prohibition directed to the judges of the Commonwealth Industrial Court. The prohibition was sought to prevent the judges from proceeding with an application made under section 140 of the *Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1956*. This application, brought by a member of the Australian Builders' Labourers' Federation, sought to disallow certain rules of the Federation on the grounds that they were tyrannical, oppressive, and imposed unreasonable conditions on membership. The Federation argued that section 140 of the Act purported to confer non-judicial power on the Commonwealth Industrial Court, which is a federal court established under Chapter III of the Constitution, and that this conferral was therefore invalid.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether section 140 of the *Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1956*, which empowered the Commonwealth Industrial Court to disallow rules of an industrial organisation under certain conditions, conferred judicial power or non-judicial power. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the power to disallow rules based on criteria such as being "tyrannical or oppressive" or imposing "unreasonable conditions" was a valid exercise of judicial power that could be vested in a federal court. This question arose in the context of the Commonwealth Industrial Court being constituted as a federal court exercising the judicial power of the Commonwealth, as previously determined by the High Court.

The majority of the High Court, comprising Dixon C.J., McTiernan, Kitto, and Taylor JJ., held that the power conferred by section 140 was not part of the judicial power of the Commonwealth. Their reasoning relied heavily on previous decisions of the Court, particularly *Consolidated Press Ltd. v. Australian Journalists Association*, which had characterised similar powers under earlier legislation as non-judicial. The majority found that despite the transfer of this power to the newly constituted Commonwealth Industrial Court, which was established to exercise judicial power, the nature of the power itself remained non-judicial. They noted that the criteria for disallowance were vague and administrative in nature, and that the court's ability to act on its own motion and the discretionary language used in the section further indicated a non-judicial character. Consequently, the attempt to vest this non-judicial power in a federal court was deemed invalid.

The Court made absolute the order nisi for a writ of prohibition. This meant that the judges of the Commonwealth Industrial Court were prohibited from further proceeding with the application to disallow the rules of the Australian Builders' Labourers' Federation under section 140 of the *Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1956*. The effect of this decision was to invalidate section 140 of the Act as an unconstitutional conferral of power.

Background

Background to the litigation

In the case of R v Spicer; Ex parte Australian Builders' Labourers' Federation, the Australian Builders' Labourers' Federation applied to the Commonwealth Industrial Court for the disallowance of certain rules under Section 140 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1956. The rules in question were claimed to be tyrannical, oppressive, and imposed unreasonable conditions upon the membership. The Commonwealth Industrial Court had the power to disallow any rule of an organisation if it was contrary to law, tyrannical or oppressive, prevented or hindered members from observing the law, or imposed unreasonable conditions upon the membership. The case raised the question of whether Section 140 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act was valid and if the power it conferred was judicial or non-judicial. The majority of the High Court held that Section 140 was invalid as it attempted to confer non-judicial power on the Commonwealth Industrial Court, which was established under Chapter III of the Constitution to exercise judicial power. The Court distinguished between judicial and administrative functions, finding that the power to disallow rules was more appropriate for administrative performance.

The matter came before the High Court of Australia as an application for a writ of prohibition. This application was made on behalf of the Australian Builders' Labourers' Federation against the judges of the Commonwealth Industrial Court and a member of the Federation. The application sought to prohibit the court from proceeding with an application to disallow certain rules of the organisation on the grounds that those rules were tyrannical, oppressive, and imposed unreasonable conditions upon its members. The Commonwealth Industrial Court had been granted an interim order for a writ of prohibition by McTiernan J. on 20th June 1957, prohibiting the judges of the court and the member from further proceedings in the matter. The central issue in the case was whether Section 140 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1956, which empowers the Commonwealth Industrial Court to disallow certain rules of an organisation, is valid and whether the power conferred by this section is part of the judicial power of the Commonwealth as required by the Constitution. The case relied on prior decisions such as Consolidated Press Ltd. v. Australian Journalists' Association and Australian Commonwealth Shipping Board v. Federated Seamen's Union of Australasia, which had established that certain powers conferred on the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration were not part of the judicial power of the Commonwealth. The application was heard by a full bench of the High Court, which ultimately decided that Section 140 was invalid as it attempted to confer a non-judicial power on the Commonwealth Industrial Court.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does Section 140 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1956 confer a valid power upon the Commonwealth Industrial Court?
2. Is the power conferred by Section 140 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1956 a judicial power or a non-judicial power?
3. If the power conferred by Section 140 is non-judicial, is it still valid for the Commonwealth Industrial Court to exercise this power?
4. Should the decision in Penton v. Australian Journalists' Association (1947) 73 CLR 549 be applied to the present case, and if so, how does it affect the validity of Section 140?
5. Does the Commonwealth Industrial Court have the jurisdiction to disallow rules of an organisation under Section 140 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1956?

Held
1. Does Section 140 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1956 confer a valid power upon the Commonwealth Industrial Court?
The court concluded that Section 140 does not confer a valid power upon the Commonwealth Industrial Court.

2. Is the power conferred by Section 140 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1956 a judicial power or a non-judicial power?
The court concluded that the power conferred by Section 140 is a non-judicial power.

3. If the power conferred by Section 140 is non-judicial, is it still valid for the Commonwealth Industrial Court to exercise this power?
The court concluded that it is not valid for the Commonwealth Industrial Court to exercise this non-judicial power.

4. Should the decision in Penton v. Australian Journalists' Association (1947) 73 CLR 549 be applied to the present case, and if so, how does it affect the validity of Section 140?
The court concluded that the decision in Penton v. Australian Journalists' Association should be applied to the present case, and it affects the validity of Section 140 by establishing that the power is non-judicial and therefore invalid for the Commonwealth Industrial Court to exercise.

5. Does the Commonwealth Industrial Court have the jurisdiction to disallow rules of an organisation under Section 140 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1956?
The court concluded that the Commonwealth Industrial Court does not have the jurisdiction to disallow rules of an organisation under Section 140.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court in R v Spicer; Ex parte Australian Builders' Labourers' Federation determined that Section 140 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1956 confers a power upon the Commonwealth Industrial Court, but this power is not a judicial power and is therefore invalid. The Court distinguished the power in Section 140 from the judicial power of the Commonwealth Industrial Court, emphasizing that the power to disallow rules of an organisation is not part of the judicial power of the Commonwealth. This conclusion was based on the reasoning that the power is essentially administrative in nature, involving considerations of industrial policy and the maintenance of broad standards in organisations and their relations with their members. The Court referred to previous decisions, such as Penton v. Australian Journalists' Association, to support its finding that the power in Section 140 is non-judicial. The ratio decidendi of the case is that the Commonwealth Industrial Court cannot exercise non-judicial powers, even if those powers are conferred by statute, because it is a federal court exercising the judicial power of the Commonwealth as defined by Chapter III of the Constitution. The Court's decision aligns with the broader principle that functions which are administrative in nature cannot be vested in a federal court under Chapter III of the Constitution.