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| IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA |
| Office of the Registry |
Melbourne No M44 of 1991 In the matter of - An application for writs of
prohibition and certiorari
against THE HONOURABLE
MR JUSTICE MICHAEL FRANCIS
MOORE (a Deputy President of
the Australian Industrial
Relations Commission
First Respondent
and
THE BUILDING WORKERS'
INDUSTRIAL UNION OF
AUSTRALIA and THE AUSTRALIANTIMBER AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES
UNION
Second and Third
Respondents
Ex parte -
DAVID INGLES PILLAR
Applicant/Prosecutor
BRENNAN J
GAUDRON J
MCHUGH J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON WEDNESDAY, 11 DECEMBER 1991, AT 11.00 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
| Pillar | 1 | 11/12/91 |
MS M.R. hICKEY: If t~~ Court plsases, I appear on b~half of
the ~rosecutor actin~ in that matter. (instructed
by Harry Nowicki & Co)
MR s.c. ROTHMAN: If the Court pleases, I appear with my
learned friend, MR K.H. BELL, for the respondent
organization. (instructed by Taylor & Scott)
BRENNAN J: I have been informed by the Registrar, who has been informed by the Australian Government
Solicitor who appears for Deputy President Moore of
the Australian Industrial Relations Commission, the
first respondent in these proceedings, that Deputy
President Moore does not wish representation to be
made on his behalf in this matter and he will abide
by any order made by the Court.
| MS HICKEY: | If the Court please. May I hand up an outline |
of argument to the Court, together with a
legislative chronology.
BRENNAN J: Would you speak into the microphone.so that you
may ba recorded?
| MS HICKE~: | Sorry, Your Honour. | Does the Court wish me to |
read the outline aloud?
| BRENNAN J: | No, w~ can read it shortly for ourselves. |
| MS HICKEYi | Thank you. |
BRENNAN J: Yes.
| MS HICKEY: | Thank you. | May I hand up to the members of the |
Bench copies of the historical Acts referred to in
the legislative chronology or extracts from them.
BRENNAN J: Thank you.
| MS HICKEY: | And if I could go first to that legislative |
chronology, the first statute in the chronology is - - -
BRENNAN J: What are we going to it for? What are we going
to look for?
| MS HICKEY: | I wish to go to the Acts Interpretation Act and |
the Judiciary Act in order to demonstrate that this
was the legislative framework or context into which
the 1904 Conciliation and Arbitration Act was
introduced. The Arbitration Act of 1904 proceeds
upon the assumption that there was this legislative
framework whereby jurisdiction was vested in State
courts in respect of criminal offences created by
the 1904 Act.
Pillar 11/12/91
| BRENNAN J: | We are concerned with section 52, are we, of the |
Act?
MS HICKEY: That is so, Your Honour, yes.
| BRENNAN J: | Now, a particular construction has been placed |
on section 52. Do you wish to address the question of the construction of section 52 as a matter of
the meaning of the words used?
| MS HICKEY: | Yes, I do, Your Honour. | We say that the |
ordinary natural meaning of…
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- Case
- [1991] HCATrans 352
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was the construction of section 52 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904. Specifically, the Court was required to determine whether the ordinary and natural meaning of the words used in section 52 encompassed criminal proceedings or proceedings for an offence under that Act. The applicants argued that the provision did not extend to criminal matters, contrasting it with other sections of the Act that dealt with penalties for breaches of awards or internal organisational rules, for which State courts were expressly conferred jurisdiction.
The applicants contended that the ordinary meaning of the words in section 52 did not include criminal offences. They further argued that the word "penalty" as used in the Act had multiple senses, including those imposed for criminal offences, breaches of awards, and by organisations on their members. While the Act expressly conferred jurisdiction on State courts for the latter two categories, the applicants sought to demonstrate through legislative history that section 52 was not rendered otiose by not referring to criminal proceedings, thereby confirming their interpretation of its natural meaning.
Background
Background to the litigation
This matter came before the High Court of Australia as an application for writs of prohibition and certiorari. The case, Re The Hon Mr Justice Moore & Ors; Ex parte Pillar, was heard by Brennan J, Gaudron J, and McHugh J. The applicant, David Ingles Pillar, sought to challenge the decision of Deputy President Michael Francis Moore of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission, who had fixed a date for the amalgamation of the Building Workers' Industrial Union of Australia and the Australian Timber and Allied Industries Union. The applicant argued that the Deputy President's decision was flawed because the charges against the unions were criminal proceedings, which should have been heard by the Federal Court of Australia, rather than the Magistrates Court at Melbourne. The matter came before the High Court following an order nisi granted by Mr Justice Dawson on 11 September 1991, which directed any further steps under Division 7 of Part IX of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) in relation to the proposed amalgamation.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does section 52(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal Court in relation to acts or omissions for which an organisation or member of an organisation is liable to be sued or proceeded against for a pecuniary penalty?
2. Does the statutory history of section 52(1) support the argument that it is confined to arbitral functions or functions closely related to arbitral functions, and not intended to apply to criminal proceedings?
3. If section 52(1) is interpreted to include criminal proceedings, does it deny any field of operation to the words "the jurisdiction of the Court in relation to an act or omission for which an organisation or member of an organisation is liable to be sued, or to be liable to be proceeded against for a pecuniary penalty"?
4. Does the ordinary meaning of the words in section 52(1) and the term "penalty" in other sections of the Act support the argument that section 52(1) is intended to apply to criminal proceedings as well as civil proceedings?
5. Is there any principle of statutory interpretation that allows the court to go beyond the ordinary meaning of the words in section 52(1) and consider its statutory history?
Held
1. The court held that section 52(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal Court in relation to acts or omissions for which an organisation or member of an organisation is liable to be sued or proceeded against for a pecuniary penalty. As a result, the Magistrates Court had no jurisdiction to hear and determine the charges laid against the Building Workers' Industrial Union of Australia (BWIU) and the Australian Timber and Allied Industries Union (ATAIU).
2. The court did not find the statutory history of section 52(1) to support the argument that it is confined to arbitral functions or functions closely related to arbitral functions, and not intended to apply to criminal proceedings. The court found that the ordinary meaning of the words in section 52(1) and the term "penalty" in other sections of the Act support the argument that section 52(1) is intended to apply to criminal proceedings as well as civil proceedings.
3. The court found that there is a field of operation for the words "the jurisdiction of the Court in relation to an act or omission for which an organisation or member of an organisation is liable to be sued, or to be liable to be proceeded against for a pecuniary penalty" in section 52(1), which defines a jurisdiction exclusive to the Federal Court. This field of operation is limited to proceedings for a pecuniary penalty for offences under the Act.
4. The court concluded that the ordinary meaning of the words in section 52(1) and the term "penalty" in other sections of the Act support the argument that section 52(1) is intended to apply to criminal proceedings as well as civil proceedings. The court found that the considerations advanced by the prosecutor do not detract from the ordinary meaning of the words.
5. The court did not find any principle of statutory interpretation that allows the court to go beyond the ordinary meaning of the words in section 52(1) and consider its statutory history. The court found that the ordinary meaning of the words and the term "penalty" in other sections of the Act support the argument that section 52(1) is intended to apply to criminal proceedings as well as civil proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The High Court of Australia was asked to determine whether section 52(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal Court in relation to acts or omissions for which an organisation or member of an organisation is liable to be sued or proceeded against for a pecuniary penalty. The Court held that it did.
The Court began by examining the language of section 52(1), which states that the jurisdiction of the Federal Court in relation to acts or omissions for which an organisation or member of an organisation is liable to be sued or proceeded against for a pecuniary penalty is exclusive of the jurisdiction of any other court. The Court noted that the ordinary meaning of the words "pecuniary penalty" includes both civil and criminal penalties.
The Court rejected the argument that the statutory history of section 52(1) supports the argument that it is confined to arbitral functions or functions closely related to arbitral functions, and not intended to apply to criminal proceedings. The Court found that the statutory history of the Act and the use of the term "penalty" in other sections of the Act support the argument that section 52(1) is intended to apply to criminal proceedings as well as civil proceedings.
The Court also rejected the argument that there is any principle of statutory interpretation that allows the Court to go beyond the ordinary meaning of the words in section 52(1) and consider its statutory history. The Court held that the ordinary meaning of the words in section 52(1) should be given effect unless there is an ambiguity or inconsistency with other provisions of the Act.
The Court concluded that section 52(1) confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal Court in relation to acts or omissions for which an organisation or member of an organisation is liable to be sued or proceeded against for a pecuniary penalty, including both civil and criminal penalties. The Court held that the Magistrates Court had no jurisdiction to hear and determine the charges laid in that Court against the Building Workers' Industrial Union of Australia and the Australian Timber and Allied Industries Union, and that the Deputy President of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission had the power to fix an amalgamation day.
The ratio decidendi of the case is that section 52(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal Court in relation to acts or omissions for which an organisation or member of an organisation is liable to be sued or proceeded against for a pecuniary penalty, including both civil and criminal penalties. The ordinary meaning of the words in section 52(1) should be given effect unless there is an ambiguity or inconsistency with other provisions of the Act. The statutory history of section 52(1) does not support the argument that it is confined to arbitral functions or functions closely related to arbitral functions, and not intended to apply to criminal proceedings.