Pasini v United Mexican States

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Melbourne  No M39 of 2001

B e t w e e n -

MARCO PASINI (BERTRAN)

Applicant

and

UNITED MEXICAN STATES

First Respondent

LISA HANNAN M

Second Respondent

ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH

Third Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

GLEESON CJ
GAUDRON J
McHUGH J
GUMMOW J
KIRBY J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 7 SEPTEMBER 2001 AT 11.45 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

__________________

MR G. GRIFFITH, QC:   If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR G.R. KENNETT, for the applicant.  (instructed by Fernandez Canda Gerkens)

MR G.A.A. NETTLE, QC:   May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MS M.M. GORDON, for the first respondent.  (instructed by the Director of Public Prosecutions (Commonwealth))

MR D.M.J. BENNETT, QC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth:  May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends, MR H.C. BURMESTER, QC, and MR M.K. MOSHINSKY, for the Attorney‑General intervening.  (instructed by the Australian Government Solicitor)

GLEESON CJ:   There is a certificate from the Deputy Registrar to the effect that she has been informed by the Deputy Chief Magistrate, on behalf of Magistrate Hannan, the second respondent in this matter, that the second respondent will abide by the order of the Court.  Yes, Dr Griffith. 

MR GRIFFITH:   Your Honour, there is a notice of motion dated 30 May, with respect, to bail.  May I explain that at the conclusion of the oral hearing?  Your Honour, would it be convenient to the Court if we seek to complete this matter today? 

GLEESON CJ:   We will sit until 1.00 and resume at 2.00. 

MR GRIFFITH:   Yes, your Honour. On that basis, I particularly take our written submissions as read, and speak to them - and rather than enlarge on any point, your Honour, take it that they are before the Court. Your Honours, there are two particular issues. The first is the substantive Chapter III issue – they are both Chapter III issues – but the issue is whether section 21 of the Act is invalid as conferring non-judicial power on federal or State courts. May I take it that the Court is familiar with the structure of the Act? The second contention, your Honour - this is a narrower matter ‑ is that ‑ ‑ ‑

KIRBY J:   Do you have any other questions?

MR GRIFFITH:   I am sorry, your Honour. I should say I assume, but that is perhaps assuming the answer. The other issue is the particular one whether section 21(6)(d) of the Act, properly construed, does not prevent evidence being called to protect what we would submit is the integrity of the proceedings in the Federal Court, both in first instance and on appeal. So that really is a construction issue to say that if it appears to prevent evidence given to protect, we say, the implied or the inherent jurisdiction of…

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Details
Case
[2001] HCATrans 314
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an application by Mr Pasini for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Court of Australia. Mr Pasini sought to sue the United Mexican States in Australia for alleged breaches of contract and tortious conduct. The United Mexican States sought to have the proceedings permanently stayed on the grounds of sovereign immunity.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the United Mexican States was entitled to sovereign immunity from suit in Australian courts in relation to the alleged commercial and tortious conduct. This required the Court to consider the scope of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, which distinguishes between acts of a sovereign nature and acts of a commercial nature.

The High Court, by majority, granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Federal Court. The majority held that the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity applied in Australia. They found that the alleged conduct of the United Mexican States, relating to commercial transactions and alleged tortious acts arising from those transactions, did not fall within the category of acts performed in the exercise of sovereign authority. Therefore, the United Mexican States was not entitled to immunity from suit in relation to these claims.

The High Court ordered that the proceedings in the Federal Court be remitted for further hearing and determination, with the stay of proceedings lifted.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case concerns an application for special leave to appeal against the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Pasini v United Mexican States. The applicant, Marco Pasini, seeks extradition to Mexico to face charges related to financial crimes. The central issues in the case revolve around the jurisdiction and powers of the Federal Court in reviewing extradition orders and the implications of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) on the exercise of judicial power under Chapter III of the Constitution. The applicant argues that the Federal Court should have the power to receive new evidence and consider whether the extradition proceedings were conducted in good faith, especially in light of alleged discrepancies and lack of transparency in the Mexican judicial process. The first respondent, the United Mexican States, contends that the Federal Court's powers are strictly limited by the Extradition Act and that the applicant's arguments are misdirected. The second respondent, Lisa Hannan, and the third respondent, the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth, support the respondent's position. The case raises significant questions about the scope of judicial power under the Constitution, the nature of the Federal Court's jurisdiction, and the extent to which the Federal Court can consider extraneous evidence in extradition proceedings.

This case, Pasini v United Mexican States, was an application for special leave to appeal from an order of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The application came before the High Court as a first-instance hearing seeking special leave to appeal. The applicant, Marco Pasini, was seeking to appeal against the Full Court's decision which dismissed his appeal against an extradition order made by a Magistrate. The primary issues in the case concerned the constitutional validity of certain provisions of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth), specifically whether they conferred non-judicial power on federal courts and whether they prevented the applicant from leading evidence to protect the integrity of the court's processes. The matter was heard on 7 September 2001, and the Court ultimately refused special leave to appeal with costs.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does section 21 of the Extradition Act 1988 confer non-judicial power on federal or State courts, rendering it invalid under Chapter III of the Constitution?
2. Does section 21(6)(d) of the Extradition Act 1988 prevent evidence from being called to protect the integrity of the proceedings in the Federal Court, both in first instance and on appeal?

Held
1. Does section 21 of the Extradition Act 1988 confer non-judicial power on federal or State courts, rendering it invalid under Chapter III of the Constitution?
The Court concluded that section 21 of the Extradition Act 1988 did not confer non-judicial power on federal or State courts, and therefore, it was not invalid under Chapter III of the Constitution. The application for special leave to appeal was dismissed.

2. Does section 21(6)(d) of the Extradition Act 1988 prevent evidence from being called to protect the integrity of the proceedings in the Federal Court, both in first instance and on appeal?
The Court concluded that section 21(6)(d) of the Extradition Act 1988 did not prevent evidence from being called to protect the integrity of the proceedings in the Federal Court, both in first instance and on appeal. However, the applicant's attempt to introduce new evidence was rejected as it did not meet the threshold for establishing an abuse of process. The application for special leave to appeal was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The High Court's decision in Pasini v United Mexican States hinged on two key constitutional issues: whether section 21 of the Extradition Act 1988 conferred non-judicial power on federal or state courts, rendering it invalid under Chapter III of the Constitution, and whether section 21(6)(d) prevented evidence from being called to protect the integrity of the proceedings in the Federal Court.

The Court, in a majority decision, concluded that section 21 of the Extradition Act did not confer non-judicial power on the Federal Court, and therefore did not contravene Chapter III of the Constitution. The Court found that the function of the Federal Court under the Extradition Act was administrative rather than judicial, as it merely reviewed the magistrate's decision without exercising judicial power. The Court relied on the distinction between judicial and administrative functions, emphasizing that the nature of the power, rather than the repository in which it is vested, determines its characterization. The Court found that the power exercised by the Federal Court in reviewing extradition decisions was administrative, as it involved determining whether the magistrate's decision met certain statutory criteria, rather than applying legal principles to facts.

The Court also rejected the argument that section 21(6)(d) of the Extradition Act prevented evidence from being called to protect the integrity of the proceedings in the Federal Court. The Court held that the Act's provisions limiting the evidence that could be considered in extradition proceedings were valid, as they were consistent with the statutory scheme designed to ensure efficient and expeditious extradition processes. The Court found that the Federal Court had inherent jurisdiction to control its own processes and protect its integrity, but that this jurisdiction was limited by the statutory provisions of the Extradition Act. The Court held that the applicant's attempt to introduce new evidence was an attempt to circumvent the statutory scheme and was not permitted.

The ratio decidendi of the decision is that section 21 of the Extradition Act does not confer non-judicial power on federal or state courts, and therefore does not contravene Chapter III of the Constitution, and that section 21(6)(d) of the Extradition Act is valid and limits the evidence that can be called in extradition proceedings in the Federal Court. The Court distinguished prior authority that had held that certain powers conferred on courts could be characterized as judicial or non-judicial based on the repository in which they were vested, finding instead that the nature of the power determines its characterization. The Court also departed from prior authority that had held that courts have an inherent jurisdiction to control their own processes and protect their integrity, finding that this jurisdiction is limited by the statutory provisions of the Extradition Act.