FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Jackson v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 203
MIGRATION – appeal – Migration Review Tribunal - appellant applied for Family Residence Class AO visa on grounds he was a "special need relative" - appellant nominated by mother - at time of application appellant's father seriously ill but died before Tribunal's determination - Whether Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in refusing visa - where Tribunal had regard to Procedures Advice Manual as a prescriptive definition of "special need relative" - where Tribunal failed to consider disability of a family member of the nominator - where need of citizen or resident varies but corresponds at all times with one or a number of reasons identified in the definition of assistance provided to the nominator
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 476
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 39B
Migration Regulations 1994, subclass 806.213Bread Manufacturers of New South Wales v Evans (1981) 180 CLR 404 followed
British Oxygen Co Ltd v Minister of Technology [1971] AC 610 followed
Chow v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 88 followed
Lobo v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 168 cited
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Cohen (2001) 177 ALR 473 cited
Rendell v Release on Licence Board (1987) 10 NSWLR 449 followedJACKSON V MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
W 75 of 2003LEE, CARR & MOORE JJ
27 AUGUST 2003
MELBOURNE (Heard in Perth)
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
W 75 OF 2003
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
KEITH PETER JACKSON
APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGES:
LEE, CARR & MOORE JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
27 AUGUST 2003
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE (Heard in Perth)
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The appeal be allowed.
2.The orders made by this Court on 21 March 2003 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered:
“1.A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal made 28 February 2002.
2.The applicant’s application for a visa be remitted to the Tribunal for determination according to law.
3.The respondent pay the applicant’s costs.”
3. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
W 75 OF 2003
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
KEITH PETER JACKSON
APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGES:
LEE, CARR & MOORE JJ
DATE:
27 AUGUST 2003
PLACE:
MELBOURNE (Heard in Perth)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
This is an appeal from a judgment of a Judge of this Court made on 21 March 2003, dismissing the appellant’s application for judicial review under s 476 of…
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- Case
- [2003] FCAFC 203
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal erred in its interpretation of the relevant legislation and policy guidelines and whether the Tribunal's decision was legally sound. Specifically, the court had to determine if the Tribunal properly assessed whether the appellant's assistance to his parents was substantial and continuing at the time of the visa application.
The court found that the Tribunal had erred in its interpretation and application of the relevant policy guidelines. The Tribunal incorrectly treated the guidelines as determinative rather than as a guide, and did not properly consider whether the assistance provided by the appellant was substantial and continuing. The court held that the Tribunal's failure to properly consider the nature of the assistance provided constituted a jurisdictional error. The court also noted that the Tribunal's rigid application of policy without considering the specific circumstances of the case amounted to an error of law.
Accordingly, the appeal was allowed. The decision of the Tribunal was quashed, and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal for redetermination according to law. Additionally, the respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The orders made by this Court on 21 March 2003 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered:
“1. A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal made 28 February 2002.
2. The applicant’s application for a visa be remitted to the Tribunal for determination according to law.
3. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs.”
3. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Ultimately the issues in the appeal were identified in a slightly different way from the way they had been presented in the proceedings before the learned primary judge. Accordingly it is unnecessary to recount the way his Honour dealt with the issues put before him and it is sufficient to move directly to the issues raised in the appeal.Consideration of the issues in the appeal The definition of “special need relative” raises for consideration whether the nominator has a need for permanent or long-term assistance which can be provided by the relative who is willing and able to provide it. The focus of the definition is the future needs of the nominator. Additionally the assistance to be provided must be substantial and continuing. There is an obvious link drawn in the regulation between what can be provided by the relative and what is needed by the nominator: see Chow v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 88 at [22]. These matters must be addressed by reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the application as well as the circumstances existing at the time of the decision. The need for the assistance can arise either because of, amongst other things, the disability or prolonged illness of the nominator, or, amongst other things, the prolonged illness or death of a member of the family unit of the nominator. In the present case, the Tribunal was required to consider whether the appellant’s mother had a need for permanent or long-term assistance, whether the appellant was willing and able to provide it and whether the assistance would be substantial and continuing. Part of the Tribunal’s task was to consider these matters at the time of the application. The case advanced by the appellant, in relation to the circumstances existing at the time of the application involved the following facts. The appellant’s father was then seriously ill. He assisted his father by taking him to see medical specialists, helping him physically by picking him up when he fainted and trying to get him to do exercises. By doing these things for his father, the appellant relieved his mother of the burden of either doing or trying to do them herself. He then provided emotional support to his father and mother. He assisted both of them by doing domestic chores. He also provided financial support to his parents because of the significant costs associated with the medical attention his father was receiving. As is apparent from pars 35, 36 and 37 from the Tribunal’s reasons (set out above) it did not accept that the assistance actually being provided by the appellant to the nominator at the time of the application could be viewed as substantial for the purposes of the definition of “special need relative” and therefore could not sustain a conclusion that the nominator had a permanent or long-term need for assistance. In adopting this approach the Tribunal erred in one and possibly two respects. First it took the view that the terms in which the Procedures Advice Manual was expressed, excluded from consideration any assistance which might be provided by the appellant to his mother which took the form of the assistance described in par 3 of the Manual (set out by the Tribunal in [35] of its reasons). This may well have involved a misconstruction of the Manual, but in any event, by adopting this approach, the Tribunal did not consider for itself whether the assistance being provided and which might continue to be provided, was substantial. It said the assistance relied on “was of the kind excluded by the policy”. In effect, the Tribunal did not treat the Manual as a guide but rather treated it as actually determining in a prescriptive way the question the Tribunal was required to answer having regard to the definition of “special need relative”. The inflexible application of policy by a decision-maker can be characterised as a jurisdictional error: Rendell v Release on Licence Board (1987) 10 NSWLR 449; Bread Manufacturers of New South Wales v Evans (1981) 180 CLR 404, at 418, per Gibbs CJ; British Oxygen Co Ltd v Minister of Technology [1971] AC 610, at 624-626. Moreover, it can, as it did in this case, result in the Tribunal failing to address the question raised by the applicable regulation. This can constitute jurisdictional error: see Lobo v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 168 at [42] and following. As was pointed out by the Full Court in Chow v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (supra) at [28] the performance of domestic chores and the giving of companionship could constitute substantial and continuing assistance in some circumstances and it would be incorrect to say that assistance of that nature could never be substantial and continuing assistance.