Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Hettiarchchige

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Hettiarchchige [2005] FCA 37

MIGRATION – appeal from judgment of the Federal Magistrates Court – Change in Circumstances (Residence) (Class AG) visa – definition of “special need relative” – whether breach of s 359A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) - jurisdictional error – exercise of discretion as to relief

WORDS AND PHRASES – “able”

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24, 25, 27
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 29, 31, 48, 65, 359A, 379A
Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 1.03, cl 806.211 (repealed), 806.213 (repealed), 806.221 (repealed)
Migration Amendment Regulations (No 2) 2000 (Cth)

Farrington v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2002] FCA 1013, referred to
Low v Commonwealth of Australia [2001] FCA 702, referred to
Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172, referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v JiaLageng (2001) 205 CLR 507, referred to
Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194, referred to
Narayan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1745, referred to
NAHV of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 129 FCR 214, cited
Fraser v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2000] FCA 1575, referred to
Re Drake and Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs(No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634, referred to
Wu v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2000) 105 FCR 39, discussed
Waterford v Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54, cited
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323, cited
VUAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158, applied
Xiang v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 64, applied
Chow v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 88, referred to
Jackson v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 203; (2004) 75 ALD 643, referred to

Lobo v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 200 ALR 359, referred to
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476, referred to
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte ApplicantsS134/2002 (2003) 211 CLR 441, referred to
Scargill v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 129 FCR 259, referred to
VAAC v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 129 FCR 168, referred to
Carlos v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 183 ALR 719, referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Al Shamry (2001) 110 FCR 27, applied
VAF v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 123; (2004) 206 ALR 471, applied
Ling v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004]…

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Details
Case
[2005] FCA 37
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Hettiarchchige, the Federal Magistrates Court was called upon to review a decision made by the Tribunal concerning a visa application. The respondent, who had applied for a visa under the subclass 806, argued that he was a "special need relative" of his married brother, the nominator, who was an Australian citizen. The Tribunal, however, found that the nominator's condition did not amount to a permanent or long-term need for assistance, and therefore denied the visa application. The respondent appealed this decision to the Federal Magistrates Court, which found that the Tribunal had not correctly interpreted the statutory criteria for the grant of the visa.

The central legal issue in this case was whether the Tribunal had misconstrued the statutory definition of "special need relative" and, if so, whether this misconstruction constituted a jurisdictional error. The relevant statutory provisions and regulations defined a "special need relative" as a person who required substantial and continuing assistance because of death, disability, prolonged illness, or other serious circumstances. The Tribunal had considered the evidence and found that the nominator's condition did not amount to such a need. However, the Federal Magistrates Court found that the Tribunal had misconstrued the definition and misapplied the word "able" in the statutory definition of "special need relative".

The court found that the Tribunal had not correctly considered whether the nominator's condition constituted a permanent or long-term need for assistance. In particular, the court found that the Tribunal had failed to ask the correct question when considering the nominator's need for assistance. The court noted that if the Tribunal had asked itself the right question, it might have come to a different decision. The court held that the Tribunal's misconstruction of the statutory definition amounted to a jurisdictional error, which could not be protected by the privative clause in the Act.

In light of this finding, the Federal Magistrates Court allowed the appeal and set aside the orders made by the Federal Magistrate. The court ordered that the application to the Federal Magistrates Court be dismissed with costs. The respondent's argument that the Tribunal had misconstrued the statutory definition and misapplied the word "able" was successful, and the decision of the Tribunal was found to be affected by jurisdictional error.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed with costs.

2. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the orders made by the Federal Magistrate on 13 June 2003 be set aside; and, in lieu thereof, order that the application to the Federal Magistrates Court be dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

KENNY J
As will appear hereafter, the Federal Magistrates Court also accepted the respondent’s submission that, in making its decision, the Tribunal had not complied with the relevant parts of s 359A of the Act, as it was required by law to do. This provision is set out below. the decision of the tribunal The Tribunal recorded that “[t]he application was made on the grounds that the visa applicant was a special need relative of his married brother”. The Tribunal had before it the relevant Departmental files and other material submitted on the behalf of the visa applicant, who is the respondent in this proceeding, including reports from a psychologist and a psychiatrist. The respondent, his brother (“the nominator”) and the nominator’s spouse gave evidence at a hearing held on 2 October 2002. The Tribunal commenced its discussion under the heading “Findings”, by observing:At the time the visa application was lodged, Change in Circumstance (Residence) (Class AG) contained a number of subclasses. The only subclass in respect of which any claims have been advanced is subclass 806, and then only in respect to the ‘special need relative’ ground. There is no evidence to suggest that the visa applicant meets key criteria for other subclasses or other grounds. The Tribunal found that the respondent met the criterion in clause 806.211(b), being a person to whom s 48 of the Act applied, and the criterion in clause 806.212, relating to the time of the application. The balance of its reasons were concerned with whether the respondent was a “special need relative” as defined in reg 1.03 of the Regulations, for the purposes of clauses 806.213 and 806.221. Before discussing the definition of “special need relative”, the Tribunal remarked:In this case the Tribunal did not find the evidence of the visa applicant and his witnesses to be particularly convincing. Frequently the evidence before the Tribunal was inconsistent with the claims being made by the visa applicant and the Tribunal finds that, at times, the statements of the visa applicant were inflated to advance his claims to be a special need relative. The Tribunal held that the nominator was a relative within the meaning of reg 1.03 and that he had been granted a permanent visa in October 1996 and Australian citizenship on 9 March 2000. The Tribunal accepted that, “[o]n the basis of the evidence before it … the nominator has suffered from bouts of depression”. The Tribunal observed that, “[h]aving established that a condition exists”, it was required to “identify distinctly what the nominator actually needs by way of assistance as a result of his condition”. The Tribunal noted that “the psychological and psychiatric reports submitted in support of the visa application [did] not elaborate further on the type or level of other assistance the nominator required in July 1998 or at present as a result of his condition”. The Tribunal said:The Tribunal is required to consider whether the nominator had a permanent or long-term need for assistance at the time of application in April 1998. … The Tribunal observes that despite his fears for the visa applicant’s safety in Sri Lanka, the nominator was able to travel to Sri Lanka without the visa applicant in both 1998 and 2002. He has also engaged in fulltime employment since 1997. The psychologist has stated that the only suitable treatment for the nominator’s condition is to allow the visa applicant to remain in Australia. Although it was claimed that the visa applicant faces physical harm, if not death, if returned to Sri Lanka there is little objective evidence to support this claim. The evidence is that none of the members of the visa applicant’s family in Sri Lanka has been subjected to threats of harm and the nominator has travelled there without fear or incident.The Tribunal further notes that in July 1998 there is little in terms of objective medical evidence outlining the specific type of assistance the nominator required in relation to his condition. The nominator gave evidence that he does not require assistance with administering his own medication or tasks like showering. The visa applicant gave evidence that he provided emotional [support] to the nominator and also with household chores, including taking the nominator to medical appointments. The nominator confirmed this in evidence to the tribunal. [The Procedures Advice Manual] provides the following commentary on the interpretation of special need relative:It is policy that, in the absence of other extenuating circumstances, none of the following on their own constitutes a serious circumstance, a permanent or long-term need or requires substantial and continuing assistance:·companionship of a relative·homesickness·general domestic assistance·assistance in bringing-up children·financial support·assistance in managing a family business·bereavement over death of a spouse.On the evidence before the Tribunal the primary need of the nominator appears to have been companionship, together with some domestic assistance. As noted above, PAM3 provides that in the absence of other factors, companionship of a relative and domestic household assistance does not constitute a permanent or long-term need for assistance. The Tribunal has had regard to and applied the cases of [Hussein v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1621] and [Su v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1409] in considering whether the nominator is affected by other serious circumstances. The Tribunal finds that a need for daily emotional and physical support as well as companionship is something experienced by many members of the community and does not, on its own, amount to a need for substantial assistance. Further, the Tribunal considers that feelings of disappointment on the part of Australian based relatives are not unusual when a visa application is refused. Therefore, the Tribunal finds that such feelings also do not give rise to a need for substantial assistance.On the basis of the evidence before it, the Tribunal finds that the nominator suffered from depression on an intermittent basis at the time of application. However, in the circumstances of this case the Tribunal does not accept that a condition that only arises in an intermittent fashion, upon receipt of negative news from the Department regarding a visa application, constitutes a prolonged illness within the meaning of a ‘special need relative’ as that term is defined in the Regulations. Taking into account the nominator’s age and mental state, including his fears for the visa applicant’s safety, the Tribunal finds that the nominator’s condition did not give rise to a permanent or long-term need for assistance in the terms required by regulation 1.03 at the time of application. Further, the Tribunal finds that these factors also do not cumulatively constitute a “disability” at the time of application that gave rise to a permanent or long-term need for assistance.The Tribunal accepts that the nominator and the visa applicant have a close relationship and the nominator may be more comfortable if the visa applicant remains in Australia. However, in the light of the case law cited above, the Tribunal is not satisfied that this constitutes circumstances of such seriousness as to be similar to death, disability or prolonged illness or ‘other serious circumstances’ within the definition of special need relative. The Tribunal finds that in the absence of other circumstances, the need for companionship and domestic household assistance does not constitute a serious circumstance or a permanent or long-term need requiring substantial and continuing assistance. Further, the Tribunal finds that there are no other serious circumstances affecting the nominator so as to bring the visa applicant within the definition of special need relative.For the purposes of clause 806.213 the relevant time for assessment is at the time of application and at that time the Tribunal finds that the nominator’s condition did not fall within the definition in regulation 1.03.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KENNY J

At the hearing, the respondent also sought leave to raise an additional ground to support his contention that the Tribunal’s decision involved jurisdictional error. This ground was that:[T]he decision of the [Tribunal] was made without jurisdiction or is affected by jurisdictional error because the [Tribunal] misconstrued and misapplied the word “able” in the statutory definition of “special need relative” and therefore misconstrued and misapplied subclause 806.213 of the Migration Regulations 1994.As already noted, in support of this ground, the respondent contended that the Tribunal in this case had committed the same error as in Xiang. The respondent contended that, if the Tribunal had asked itself the right question, then it might well have come to a different decision.consideration The scope of the Federal Magistrate’s review jurisdiction in this case was affected by the Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth), which inserted s 474 into the Act, as explained by the decisions of the High Court of Australia in Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 (“Plaintiff 157/2002”) and Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte ApplicantsS134/2002 (2003) 211 CLR 441. A decision that is affected by jurisdictional error does not fall within s 474, which is a privative provision: see Plaintiff S157/2002 at 506-508, 511 per Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ.Was there misconstruction of “special need relative”? The Full Court said in Lobo at 371 [43]:Where the minister misconstrues one of the criteria prescribed in the Act or regulations and, because of that misconstruction he considers that the criterion has not been satisfied, it is as though he did not consider the criterion at all. For, on the face of it, he has failed to ask the question which the Act and the regulations, upon a proper construction of the criterion, require him to ask.The question that arises first is whether the Tribunal misconstrued the criterion for the grant of the relevant visa; and, if so, whether, having regard to s 474, any misconstruction has the effect of vitiating the Tribunal’s decision. An error that has this effect is a jurisdictional error, which is not protected by s 474 of the Act: see Lobo at 376 [62] per French, Sackville and Hely JJ; also Scargill v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 129 FCR 259 at 268 [31] per French, von Doussa and Marshall JJ. The Tribunal considered the evidence and made findings by reference to the elements of the definition of “special need relative” in reg 1.03. As part of this process, in its reasons, it discussed the application of the definition to the facts of the case by reference to the following headings:Whether the visa applicant was nominated for the visa by a relative who is an Australian citizen, an Australian permanent resident or an eligible New Zealand citizen. Whether the nominator is settled and usually resident in Australia.The permanent or long-term need for assistance because of death, disability, prolonged illness or other serious circumstances.Whether the visa applicant is willing and able to provide substantial and continuing assistance to the nominator.It was under the second heading that the Tribunal found that the nominator suffered from bouts of depression. Its next step was to consider whether the nominator had a permanent or long-term need for assistance because of the nominator’s condition, and whether this condition constituted “disability, prolonged illness or other serious circumstances”.