FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Lobban v Minister for Justice [2015] FCA 1361
Citation: Lobban v Minister for Justice [2015] FCA 1361 Parties: CHRISTOPHER LOBBAN v MINISTER FOR JUSTICE File number: WAD 329 of 2014 Judge: MCKERRACHER J Date of judgment: 3 December 2015 Catchwords: EXTRADITION – review of decision to surrender under s 22 of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) – whether Minister applied the wrong test under s 22(3)(e) and s 22(3)(f) of the Act – whether the Minister should have refused to surrender the applicant under s 22(3)(e) or exercised the discretion under s 22(3)(f) of the Act because of the circumstance that if convicted of the offences in the requesting State the applicant will be at risk of being sentenced for a considerably longer time than could be reasonably anticipated if convicted for corresponding offences in Australia or Western Australia.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – whether the Minister’s decision to surrender under s 22 of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) was made as a result of an inflexible and ultra vires policy – whether the Minister’s decision to surrender under s 22 of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) was unreasonable – whether the Minister’s decision was unreasonable because the applicant could be prosecuted in Australia – whether the Minister’s decision was unreasonable because the sentence which may follow conviction of the extradition offences in the requesting State is substantially more severe than that which might be imposed if the applicant were convicted in Western Australia – whether the Minister’s decision is unreasonable because of the gravity of the effect of surrender on the applicant’s common law and treaty based rights – whether the Minister’s decision is unreasonable because the applicant has spent as much time in administrative custody awaiting extradition as he would be likely to face if imprisoned following conviction in Western Australia - whether the Minister’s decision to surrender under s 22 of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) constituted a disproportionate exercise of the power conferred by s 22 of the Act
Legislation: Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85, [1989] ATS 21 (entered into force 26 June 1987)
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, open for signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221, ETS 5 (entered into force 3 September 1953) (as amended)International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976)
Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) ss 3, 11, 12, 19, 22, 23, 45
Extradition (United States of America) Regulations (Cth) (undated, compilation prepared on 22 November 2000) reg 4, Sch 1, Sch 2
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39BCases cited: Andary v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2003] FCA 211
Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Limited v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223
Babar Ahmed v United Kingdom [2012] ECHR 609
Bruce v Cole (1998) 45 NSWLR 163
Commonwealth Minister…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 1361
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the Minister's decision to surrender was based on an inflexible policy or was otherwise unreasonable. The applicant argued that the Minister should have exercised a discretion to refuse extradition due to the excessively severe penalties he would face in the United States. The court held that the grounds for review were narrowly defined and that the court could not substitute its own decision for the Minister's. The court found that the Minister had correctly applied the law and that the decision to surrender was not unreasonable. The court dismissed the application and ordered that the applicant pay the costs of the respondent.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The Applicant pay the costs of the Respondent, to be taxed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Against that background, it is necessary to consider the arguments advanced in support of the grounds of challenge. GROUND 1: FAILURE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT A RELEVANT CONSIDERATION – ART V OF THE TREATY The effect of s 11(1) and (1C) of the Act, together with reg 4 of the US Regulations, is to make the operation of the Act in relation to the United States subject to the Treaty. The Act therefore applies subject to the necessary qualification or exception found in Art V of the Treaty. The point in time when the Act gives effect to that necessary qualification or exception is when the Minister comes under the duty in s 22 of the Act, pursuant to s 19(2)(c) of the Act, with the mechanism for doing so provided by s 22(3)(e). I have already drawn attention to the content of the Brief concerning Art V. Mr Lobban submits that the Brief to the Minister on Art V set out in the first sentence of the Brief at [31] (set out above at [22]) would have been correct in respect of the original 1976 Treaty. However, the Protocol effected a significant change to Art V. Article V of the Treaty is required to be interpreted in accordance with the principles of the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties. The most significant principles for present purposes are those in Art 31, as discussed in Minister for Home Affairs (Cth) v Zentai (2012) 246 CLR 213 (at [18]-[19]). The point made for Mr Lobban is that when the State parties agreed in 1990 to amend Art V by replacing paragraph (2) with a new paragraph, bearing in mind that the purpose of the Treaty is for extradition, they agreed to condition the (discretionary) right of the requested party to refuse surrender of one of its nationals with a duty to prosecute that national if so requested by the requesting State. Article V of the Treaty, according to Mr Lobban, gives effect to a form of an ‘extradite or prosecute’ obligation. This obligation is particularly apt at present, Mr Lobban submits. Many offences now have a multi-jurisdictional character or may be proscribed under national laws that give effect to obligations assumed under widely ratified treaties. Offences and treaties pertaining to terrorism, drug smuggling and money laundering are examples. Many bilateral and multi-lateral cooperation treaties have been entered into. Mr Lobban argues that the notion that may have underpinned the old theory of extradition law and practice, namely, territoriality of the offence and the greater interest of the requesting State in prosecuting it, no longer hold true. Rather, for present purposes, it is argued that the Brief to the Minister incorrectly advised him as to the entirety of Article V and its proper construction. He submits that had the Brief to the Minister correctly advised him, he would have known he had the discretion under the Treaty not to surrender Mr Lobban. Although in this case the United States could have required that Mr Lobban be prosecuted in Australia and Australia would have come under an obligation to do so (in respect of which see Art V of the Treaty, which is to be interpreted in accordance with the Vienna Convention, and particularly Art 26 in this instance), the object and purpose of the Treaty and the Act would not have been frustrated. On the facts of this case, Mr Lobban contends that the option to prosecute in Australia would have been a powerful consideration in favour of the Minister exercising the Treaty discretion in that way. It is submitted that, although the Minister purported to give consideration to Art V of the Treaty, in fact, he failed to do so. It was thus submitted that there was a constructive failure to exercise the duty in s 22(2) of the Act, read with subs (3)(e).