Creamer v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Creamer v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 269

File number VID 281 of 2017
Judge: MURPHY J
Date of judgment: 9 March 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for judicial review of Minister’s decision not to revoke cancellation of visa – Applicant convicted of defensive homicide – whether Minister took into account an irrelevant consideration by considering the cost of the Applicant’s incarceration –whether Applicant denied procedural fairness by consideration of the cost of the Applicant’s incarceration – whether the Minister failed to consider the true nature and extent of the cost of the Applicant’s incarceration – whether the Minister misunderstood the remarks of the sentencing judge and the Court of Appeal – whether the Minister’s reasoning process involved legal unreasonableness – application dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Crimes Act 1958 (Vic)

Cases cited:

Akpata v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 65

Applicants M1015/2003 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1309

ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 250 FCR 109; [2016] FCAFC 174

Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280; [1993] FCA 456

Dunn v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1328

James v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 410

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; [1986] HCA 40

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437; [2014] FCAFC 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS (2014) 309 ALR 67; [2014] FCAFC 16

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594; [2011] HCA 1

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; [2010] HCA 16

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99; [2013] FCA 317

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259; [1996] HCA 6

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Nystrom (2006) 228 CLR 566; [2006] HCA 50

Mrayhej v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) (2015) 147 ALD 434; [2015] FCA 691

Picard v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1430

Re Minister forImmigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1; [2003] HCA 6

Renzullo v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 412

Salahuddin v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 141

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 109 FCR 152; [2001] FCA 389

Te Puke v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 230 FCR 499; [2015] FCA 398

Date of hearing: 25 September 2017
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 114
Counsel for the Applicant:
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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 269
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Creamer sought a judicial review of the Minister's decision not to revoke the cancellation of her visa, which was cancelled due to her conviction for defensive homicide. The applicant contended that the Minister's decision involved jurisdictional error in considering the cost of her incarceration as an irrelevant consideration, failing to provide procedural fairness, and misunderstanding the remarks of the sentencing judge and the Court of Appeal. The Minister argued that the Court of Appeal's reasons were correctly considered and that the error did not reach the level of jurisdictional error.

The court held that the Minister's misstatement of the Court of Appeal's reasons was not material and did not rise to the level of jurisdictional error. The court noted that the Court of Appeal and the sentencing judge rejected most of the applicant's exculpatory evidence, and the court's reasoning was consistent with the Crown submission. The court also held that the Minister had a broad discretion to determine relevant factors in making a decision under s 501CA(4) of the Act.

The application was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The Applicant pay the Respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In the application Ms Creamer seeks orders to set aside the Minister’s decision on the basis of jurisdictional error. For the reasons I explain it is appropriate to dismiss the application.THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Ms Creamer was born in South Africa and is 60 years old. While living in South Africa in her thirties she began a relationship with Mr David Creamer, and she married him in 1997. In early 2000 Mr Creamer moved to New Zealand. Ms Creamer joined him in New Zealand eight months later and subsequently became a citizen of that country. In April 2006 Mr Creamer left New Zealand for Australia and Ms Creamer followed him in May 2007 at which time she was 49 years old. On 12 December 2007 Ms Creamer was granted a Class TY Subclass 444 Special Category (Temporary) visa. On 2 February 2008 Ms Creamer killed Mr Creamer by repeatedly hitting him about the head with a type of club and stabbing him once in the abdomen. She initially denied any involvement in his death and was not arrested and charged with murder until 29 April 2009. She was remanded into custody from that date. Following a jury trial in the Supreme Court of Victoria in which Justice Coghlan presided, the jury acquitted Ms Creamer of the charge of murder but found her guilty of defensive homicide. On 20 April 2011 Coghlan J sentenced Ms Creamer to 11 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of seven years. Ms Creamer appealed her sentence on the ground that it was manifestly excessive. Her appeal was dismissed by the Victorian Court of Appeal on 16 August 2012. In this application Ms Creamer relied on both Coghlan J’s sentencing remarks and the Court of Appeal’s reasons. It is necessary to deal with those remarks in some detail but for the present it suffices to note that the Court of Appeal characterised her offence as a “serious example of defensive homicide” that only fell outside of the parameters of murder “by a narrow margin” and noted that she had provided false evidence in “an unsuccessful attempt to reduce her moral culpability”. On 11 April 2016, while Ms Creamer remained in prison, a delegate of the Minister cancelled her visa under s 501(3A) of the Act and advised her of that by letter dated the same day. The letter informed her that under s 501(CA)(4) she could make representations to the Minister requesting revocation of the decision to cancel her visa. The letter enclosed: (a)a copy of the Ministerial direction titled Direction No 65: Visa refusal and cancellation under s 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under s 501CA (Direction 65); and(b)copies of various documents relating to Ms Creamer which were in the possession of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (the Department) at the time of the visa cancellation decision, being:(i)the sentencing remarks of Coglan J dated 20 April 2011;(ii)the judgment of the Court of Appeal dated 16 August 2012 (Weinberg JA, Bongiorno JA and T Forrest AJA agreeing);(iii)a file note dated 11 April 2016;(iv)the judgment of the Supreme Court of Victoria dated 7 October 2009, regarding bail (Whelan J);(v)the judgment of the Court of Appeal dated 7 December 2009, regarding bail (Warren CJ, Redlich and Bongiorno JJA);(vi)the judgment of the Supreme Court of Victoria on 11 November 2015, regarding compensation under the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) (Beale J)(vii)a National Police Certificate dated 14 November 2012; and(viii)an undated Personal Details Form and Authority to Release Information.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Minister’s reasons said (at [46]) under the subheading “Risk to the Australian community”:Ms Creamer appealed her 11 year sentence on the ground of ‘manifest excess’ due to multiple mitigating factors. Amongst these she stated her offer to plead guilty and domestic violence should have carried greater weight. The appeal court noted Ms Creamer’s plea of guilty was at odds with the fact that she ‘regularly introduced new evidence of an exculpatory nature that she had never previously mentioned’. The appeal court noted the sentencing Judge had viewed the domestic violence primarily as Ms Creamer being ‘simply overwhelmed by the events surrounding her and her husband’. The appeal court dismissed Ms Creamer’s appeal.(Emphasis added.)Ms Creamer’s submissions Ms Creamer relied upon the highlighted passage above and submitted that the Minister wrongly blended two discrete elements of the Court of Appeal’s reasons. The first is that the Court of Appeal rejected Ms Creamer’s submission that the sentencing judge should have given more weight to her offer to plead guilty to either manslaughter or defensive homicide before the trial. The second is that the Court of Appeal’s reasons recited the prosecution submission that Ms Creamer had not been a credible witness at trial and that she “regularly introduced new evidence of an exculpatory nature that she had never previously mentioned”. Ms Creamer submitted that the Court of Appeal:(a)did not expressly or otherwise adopt the Crown’s submission in that regard; and(b)did not state that Ms Creamer’s offer to plead guilty was “at odds” with anything.She argued that the Minister wrongly attributed the impugned statement to the Court of Appeal and then relied upon it in forming the conclusion that Ms Creamer was unwilling to accept responsibility for her offence, which showed legal unreasonableness.The Minister’s submissions The Minister accepted that the Court of Appeal’s reasons merely recited a Crown submission. However, the Minister denied that there was any material error in his reasons for decision. The Minister noted that the Court of Appeal found that Ms Creamer’s evidence in the course of the trial was “palpably at odds with the objective facts” and argued that the Court’s reasoning in that regard was wholly consistent with and embraced the reasoning in the Crown submission.Consideration It is common ground that the Minister incorrectly stated the Court of Appeal’s reasons. The Court of Appeal did not say that Ms Creamer “regularly introduced new evidence of an exculpatory nature that she had never previously mentioned” and it did not state that this was at odds with her guilty plea. Even so, I do not consider that misstatement to be material and am not persuaded that it rises to the level of jurisdictional error. I say this, first, because it is plain that Coghlan J and the Court of Appeal rejected most of Ms Creamer’s exculpatory evidence. Until shortly prior to the trial she had denied any involvement in her late husband’s death and her exculpatory evidence was all new. The Court of Appeal:(a)noted Coghlan J’s conclusion that Ms Creamer’s account of the circumstances surrounding the offence did not “much accord with the known facts” (at [18]);(b)said that the location of the bloodstains from her late husband’s injuries was not “at all consistent” with Ms Creamer’s version of events (at [18]);(c)noted Coghlan J’s opinion that Ms Creamer “had said a number of things which she thought would assist her case, but which were demonstrably untrue” (at [19]]);(d)noted that the pathologist’s evidence was entirely inconsistent with Ms Creamer’s account of how the deceased had met his death (at [22]);(e)noted Coghlan J’s conclusion that despite her denial, Ms Creamer was in fact fully aware that the deceased intended to go back to his former wife (at [24]);(f)said that the evidence given by Ms Creamer in the course of the trial was “palpably at odds with the objective facts” (at [31]);(g)said that there was very little in the objective evidence to support Ms Creamer’s claim that she believed she was under threat of death or really serious injury (at [48]); (h)said that Coghlan J rejected much of Ms Creamer’s account of what took place and that Ms Creamer “clearly had no basis whatever” for a belief that self-defence was warranted (at [50]); (i)noted Coghlan J’s finding that Ms Creamer’s claim that her late husband had threatened to “finish her off” was fabricated at [52]); and(j)said that Ms Creamer “gave false evidence regarding the circumstances surrounding the death of her husband in what amounted to an unsuccessful attempt to reduce her moral culpability” (at [53]).

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister has issued guidance for determining whether “another reason” exists for the purposes of s 501CA(4)(b)(ii), doing so in the form of Direction 65 made under s 499 of the Act. The purpose of Direction 65 is to provide a framework within which decision-makers are to exercise the discretion to revoke a mandatory visa cancellation under s 501CA. It is uncontentious that, where the Minister personally decides whether to cancel a visa, the Minister is not bound by Direction 65 but it provides a broad indication of the types of issues that the Minister is likely to take into account. Part C of Direction 65 identifies some matters as “primary considerations” for decision-makers and some as “other considerations”.CONSIDERATIONGrounds one, two and three of the application Grounds one, two and three of the application are interrelated. They allege:The Minister, in deciding not to revoke a decision of his delegate to cancel the Applicant’s Class TY Subclass 444 Special Category (Temporary) visa made the following jurisdictional errors:1.The Minister erred in the exercise of his jurisdiction to consider whether to revoke the cancellation of the Applicant’s visa by taking into account an irrelevant consideration, namely that the period of her incarceration has been “at considerable expense to the community”.2.The Minister failed to accord the Applicant procedural fairness by failing to notify the Applicant that he would take into consideration that “she has been incarcerated, at considerable expense to the community” and that this consideration would be used to “outweigh” her contribution to the community.3.Alternatively to grounds 1 & 2, the Minister erred in the exercise of his jurisdiction, or failed to exercise his jurisdiction, having decided to take into account the costs to the community of the Applicant’s incarceration and whether such costs outweighed her contribution to the community, he failed to consider the true nature and extent of such costs. Each of these grounds arise from the Minister’s reasons at [17] where the Minister said:Ms Creamer has resided in Australia for nine years, having arrived as an adult of 49 years. Ms Creamer committed her offence nine months after her arrival. While Ms Creamer worked in the community in administrative roles from her arrival until being remanded in custody two years later, I consider that this limited period of contributing to the community is outweighed by the much longer period since, during which she has been incarcerated, at considerable expense to the community.(Emphasis added.)Ground 1 – taking into account an irrelevant consideration Ms Creamer acknowledged that the Minister has a broad discretion to determine the considerations which are relevant factors in making a decision under s 501CA(4) of the Act. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Nystrom (2006) 228 CLR 566; [2006] HCA 50 at [128], Heydon and Crennan JJ, with whom Gleeson CJ agreed, said:Parliament has left it to the Minister to decide the matters which are relevant to whether a person who fails the character test should be permitted to remain in Australia. Considerations relevant to the exercise of the power depend on the nature, scope and purpose of the power, understood in its context in the Act. As Ministerial Direction No 21 makes clear, the Minister considers that two of the factors relevant to the exercise of the discretion are related to the protection of the Australian community and the expectations of the community.