FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
James v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 410
File numbers: NSD 156 of 2017 Judge: ROBERTSON J Date of judgment: 20 April 2017 Catchwords: MIGRATION – judicial review of Minister’s decision not to revoke decision to cancel visa – whether Minister failed to have regard to correct legal principle in assessing the applicant’s criminality and sentences passed upon him – whether the exercise of power by the Minister was legally unreasonable – whether the Minister denied the applicant procedural fairness Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 501(3A), 501CA
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 4.12
Cases cited: Commissioner for ACT Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd [1994] FCA 1074; 49 FCR 576
Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; 159 CLR 550
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332
Moana v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 54; 230 FCR 367
Date of hearing: 20 April 2017 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 49 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Ms A Mitchelmore Solicitor for the Respondent: Mills Oakley ORDERS
NSD 156 of 2017 BETWEEN: SIDNEY JASON JAMES
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent
JUDGE:
ROBERTSON J
DATE OF ORDER:
20 APRIL 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application filed in NSD 56 of 2017 stand as the application in NSD 156 of 2017.
2.Grant leave to the applicant, if so advised, to amend his application within 21 days to add a ground in or substantially in the following form:
Ground 6
The decision of the respondent was invalid because s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), on which it depended, was itself invalid as purporting to confer judicial power on the respondent Minister, contrary to Ch III of the Constitution.
3.Pursuant to s 477A of the Migration Act, an extension of time to make that amendment be granted.
4.Grounds 1-5 of the application be heard separately from questions arising from Ground 6, if the applicant amends pursuant to orders 2 and 3.
5.In so far as it concerns Grounds 1-5, the application be dismissed.
6.If the applicant amends his application pursuant to orders 2 and 3, any questions arising from Ground 6 be stood over until two weeks after the determination of Falzon v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, No S31 of 2017, by the High Court of Australia.
7.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed, of the application in so far as it concerns Grounds 1-5.
8.Costs be otherwise reserved.
9.Liberty to apply on 24 hours notice.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ROBERTSON J:
Introduction
This application, under s 476A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), is for judicial review of the decision…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 410
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the Minister was required to consider the applicant’s upbringing and its impact on his criminality, and whether the Minister’s decision not to revoke the visa cancellation was legally unreasonable. The court held that the Minister was not required to consider the applicant’s upbringing as a mandatory relevant consideration in the exercise of the discretionary power in s 501CA(4). The court also found that the Minister’s decision not to revoke the visa cancellation was not legally unreasonable as it fell within the broad discretion conferred by s 501CA(4).
The court dismissed the application in so far as it concerned Grounds 1-5 and ordered that the application be dismissed. If the applicant amends his application as per the orders, any questions arising from Ground 6 will be stood over until two weeks after the determination of Falzon v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, No S31 of 2017, by the High Court of Australia. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the application in so far as it concerned Grounds 1-5, with costs otherwise reserved.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application filed in NSD 56 of 2017 stand as the application in NSD 156 of 2017.
2. Grant leave to the applicant, if so advised, to amend his application within 21 days to add a ground in or substantially in the following form:
Ground 6
The decision of the respondent was invalid because s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), on which it depended, was itself invalid as purporting to confer judicial power on the respondent Minister, contrary to Ch III of the Constitution.
3. Pursuant to s 477A of the Migration Act, an extension of time to make that amendment be granted.
4. Grounds 1-5 of the application be heard separately from questions arising from Ground 6, if the applicant amends pursuant to orders 2 and 3.
5. In so far as it concerns Grounds 1-5, the application be dismissed.
6. If the applicant amends his application pursuant to orders 2 and 3, any questions arising from Ground 6 be stood over until two weeks after the determination of Falzon v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, No S31 of 2017, by the High Court of Australia.
7. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed, of the application in so far as it concerns Grounds 1-5.
8. Costs be otherwise reserved.
9. Liberty to apply on 24 hours notice.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter was initially brought before the Federal Court of Australia as an application for judicial review of the Minister's decision. The applicant filed an application seeking to challenge the Minister's decision not to revoke the visa cancellation decision. The application was subsequently amended, and the case was heard on the amended application. The court considered the Minister's reasons for decision, which included a detailed statement of reasons explaining why the visa cancellation decision should not be revoked. The applicant argued that the Minister failed to have regard to certain legal principles and that the decision was legally unreasonable and denied him procedural fairness.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As to ground 5, the Minister submitted that he was not required to give the applicant an opportunity to comment on his conclusion that the cumulative effect of his criminality placed considerable burden on Australian legal and law enforcement institutions and accompanying financial cost.ConsiderationGround 1 By this ground, in my opinion, the applicant seeks impermissibly in judicial review proceedings to convert mere fact-finding and discretionary evaluation into legal principle. This may be seen in the proposition in paragraph a. of the particulars: “Once a decision-maker selects a particular matter for consideration, he or she is bound to consider that matter properly.” There is then a reference in particular d. to the respondent being required to have regard to the correct legal principle which is said to be that profound deprivation and disadvantage of an offender as a child/or teenager does not necessarily diminish over time. This may be an attempt to import a mandatory relevant consideration into the discretion in s 501CA(4), but no legal basis for so doing is disclosed. In my opinion, the principle is not a mandatory relevant consideration in the exercise of the broad discretionary power in s 501CA(4). The Minister was not here purporting to apply any legal principle from criminal sentencing and was not required to do so. In my opinion, the Minister was making a judgment as to whether the adverse effect of the applicant’s upbringing excused him from responsibility for, or diminished his responsibility for, his actions as an adult. The Minister was considering risk to the Australian community. Part of that consideration was whether the applicant tended to minimise his responsibility for his offending. That in turn was a basis for the Minister’s conclusion at [72] that the applicant may continue offending. The Minister was not engaged in criminal sentencing. This ground does not demonstrate legal error on the part of the Minister.Grounds 2 and 3 By these grounds the applicant seeks to give an alternative legal characterisation to the consequence of the Minister’s failure to have regard to the “correct legal principle” alleged in ground 1. It appears that legal unreasonableness is raised and, perhaps, a misconstruction of the expression “risk of harm to the Australian community”. As to the former, I see no basis on which it could be said that the process of reasoning did not fall within the broad discretion conferred by s 501CA(4) or as legally unreasonable within the principles in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332. As I have said in relation to ground 1, the Minister was considering risk to the Australian community and, in that context, whether the applicant may continue offending. As to the latter, the “risk of harm to the Australian community” is a mandatory consideration: Moana v Minister for Immigration and Border Control [2015] FCAFC 54; 230 FCR 367, but it is not a statutory expression so as ordinarily to found a claim that misconstruction would demonstrate relevant legal error.