FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Picard v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1430
Citation: Picard v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1430 Parties: COLIN DAVID PICARD v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION File number: TAD 45 of 2015 Judge: TRACEY J Date of judgment: 16 December 2015 Catchwords: MIGRATION – judicial review of Minister’s decision under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) not to revoke delegate’s decision to cancel applicant’s visa for failure to pass the character test – where applicant serving a sentence of imprisonment – whether applicant denied procedural fairness – whether Minister obliged to put to the applicant the Australian Crime Commission’s opinion that the Rebels Motor Cycle Club had links to organised crime in Australia - whether Minister obliged to put to the applicant reason for refusal of revocation included possibility that applicant intends to ride with those with links to organised crime Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 499, 501(3A), 501(6)(a), 501(7)(c), 501CA(2), 501CA(3), 501CA(4), 501CA(4)(b)(ii), 501CA(5) Cases cited: Applicants M1015/2003 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1309 – cited
Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576 – cited
Minister for Immigration and Border Protectionv WZARH [2015] HCA 40 – cited
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1 – cited
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Palme (2003) 216 CLR 212 – cited
Somaghi v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1991) 31 FCR 100 – cited
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural andIndigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 – cited
VHAP of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 80 ALD 559 – cited
Waniewska v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1986) 70 ALR 284 – citedDate of hearing: 2 December 2015 Place: Melbourne Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 49 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr JM Forsaith Solicitor for the Applicant: Nicholas WJ Rolfe & Associates Counsel for the Respondent: Mr GA Hill Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
TASMANIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
TAD 45 of 2015
BETWEEN: COLIN DAVID PICARD
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent
JUDGE:
TRACEY J
DATE OF ORDER:
16 DECEMBER 2015
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
TASMANIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
TAD 45 of 2015
BETWEEN: COLIN DAVID PICARD
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent
JUDGE:
TRACEY J
DATE:
16 DECEMBER 2015
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the respondent Minister not to revoke a decision of his…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 1430
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the Minister was required to provide Mr. Picard with certain information before making a decision not to revoke the cancellation of his visa, and whether the failure to do so constituted a denial of procedural fairness. The court had to consider the obligations imposed by the statutory framework, particularly s 501CA(3) of the Act, which requires the Minister to provide a person whose visa has been cancelled with written notice of the cancellation decision and particulars of the relevant information. The court also needed to determine the scope and content of the obligation to accord procedural fairness in the context of the statutory provisions.
The court concluded that the Minister was not required to inform Mr. Picard of the Australian Crime Commission’s opinion or the reason for refusal of revocation. The statutory framework under s 501CA(3) obligates the Minister to provide information that would be the reason, or part of the reason, for making the cancellation decision, which is person-specific and not general information. The court found that the statutory language did not impose an obligation on the Minister to provide information that might be relied upon in deciding whether to revoke a cancellation decision. Given that the cancellation decision was based on objectively ascertainable facts, the Minister's discretion under s 501CA was not subject to the procedural obligations that would apply in other contexts.
The application was dismissed, and Mr. Picard was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the application. The court's reasoning underscored the limited scope of the procedural fairness obligations in this context, focusing on the specific statutory obligations rather than broader principles of natural justice.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case involves a judicial review of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection's decision not to revoke a delegate's decision to cancel Mr Picard's visa for failure to pass the character test. Mr Picard had requested revocation of the cancellation decision and provided written submissions and character references. The Department responded by providing additional information, including a Prison Conduct Report, which Mr Picard argued he had not been given the opportunity to comment on. The matter came before the court for judicial review of the Minister's decision.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Picard submitted that the information which, he said, had not been provided to him constituted adverse conclusions which were not obviously open on the material made available to him and was material adverse to his interests. As a result the Minister was obliged to advise him of this material and to afford him the opportunity of commenting on it.CONSIDERATION The purpose served by the imposition, on decision-makers, of an obligation to accord procedural fairness to those who may be affected by their decisions is the avoidance of “practical injustice”: see Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1 at 14 (Gleeson CJ). The guiding principle is one of fairness: see VHAP of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 80 ALD 559 at 566 (Allsop J, with whom Gyles and Conti JJ agreed on this point). Judgments about practical justice and fairness fall to be made in the circumstances of individual cases. As Weinberg J said in Applicants M1015/2003 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1309 at [54]:“Whether or not there has been a denial of procedural fairness in any given case is largely dependent upon the particular facts of that case. Where the decision-maker has relied upon adverse information, without providing any opportunity to comment upon it, the question whether the decision is vitiated will depend upon a range of factors. These include the importance of the material to the ultimate decision, as well as the nature of that material. Some information is purely factual and entirely incontrovertible. There may simply be no answer to it. Other information may involve a combination of fact and opinion, and may be contentious. In relation to information of that kind, the denial of the opportunity to comment upon it may give rise to procedural unfairness. Moreover, some matters are so blindingly obvious as not to require any comment or submission. In such cases, the fact that there has been no opportunity to comment will be of little or no significance.” The content of the obligation in any given case is to be determined having regard to the statutory context in which the relevant decision falls to be made: see SZBEL at 161, 162. Section 501(3A) of the Act requires the Minister to cancel a visa if he (or his delegate) is satisfied that the holder does not pass the character test and is serving a sentence of imprisonment. As a result the reasons for a cancellation decision can be (as they were in the present case) very shortly stated. There is no need for the decision-maker to have regard to any discretionary considerations. In this context s 501CA is an ameliorative provision: it requires the Minister to invite representations from the person whose visa has been cancelled about the revocation of the cancellation decision and confers on the Minister a discretion to revoke the cancellation. Under s 501CA(3) the Minister is required to provide a person whose visa has been cancelled under s 501(3A) with written notice of the cancellation decision and particulars of “the relevant information” relating to the making of that decision. Such “relevant information” is defined, in s 501CA(2), to be information which the Minister considers “would be the reason, or part of the reason for making the [cancellation] decision” and which “is specifically about the [holder of the visa] or another person and is not just about a class of persons of which the person or other person is a member.” The obligation thus relates to information bearing on the decision to cancel, not information on which the Minister might rely in deciding whether or not to revoke the cancellation decision. This is a somewhat strange provision given that the cancellation will have occurred because the Minister (or his delegate) will have been satisfied of two objectively ascertainable facts. It may be that the draftsman intended that the Minister should advise the visa holder about information on which he might be minded to rely in deciding to reject an application for revocation. If that was the intention it is not reflected in the language of s 501CA(2). The information must be person-specific rather than general information relating to a class of person of which the visa holder is a member.