Picard v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Picard v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1430

Citation: Picard v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1430
Parties: COLIN DAVID PICARD v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
File number: TAD 45 of 2015
Judge: TRACEY J
Date of judgment: 16 December 2015
Catchwords: MIGRATION – judicial review of Minister’s decision under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) not to revoke delegate’s decision to cancel applicant’s visa for failure to pass the character test – where applicant serving a sentence of imprisonment – whether applicant denied procedural fairness – whether Minister obliged to put to the applicant the Australian Crime Commission’s opinion that the Rebels Motor Cycle Club had links to organised crime in Australia - whether Minister obliged to put to the applicant reason for refusal of revocation included possibility that applicant intends to ride with those with links to organised crime
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 499, 501(3A), 501(6)(a), 501(7)(c), 501CA(2), 501CA(3), 501CA(4), 501CA(4)(b)(ii), 501CA(5)
Cases cited: Applicants M1015/2003 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1309 – cited
Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576 – cited
Minister for Immigration and Border Protectionv WZARH [2015] HCA 40 – cited
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1 – cited
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Palme (2003) 216 CLR 212 – cited
Somaghi v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1991) 31 FCR 100 – cited
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural andIndigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 – cited
VHAP of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 80 ALD 559 – cited
Waniewska v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1986) 70 ALR 284 – cited
Date of hearing: 2 December 2015
Place: Melbourne
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 49
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr JM Forsaith
Solicitor for the Applicant: Nicholas WJ Rolfe & Associates
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr GA Hill
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

TASMANIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

TAD 45 of 2015

BETWEEN:

COLIN DAVID PICARD
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent

JUDGE:

TRACEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

16 DECEMBER 2015

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

TASMANIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

TAD 45 of 2015

BETWEEN:

COLIN DAVID PICARD
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent

JUDGE:

TRACEY J

DATE:

16 DECEMBER 2015

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the respondent Minister not to revoke a decision of his…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1430
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Picard v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved Mr. Picard, who challenged the Minister's decision under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) not to revoke a delegate's decision to cancel his visa for failing the character test. Mr. Picard was serving a sentence of imprisonment at the time of the decision. The dispute centred on whether Mr. Picard was denied procedural fairness by the Minister, specifically whether the Minister was obliged to inform him of the Australian Crime Commission’s opinion that the Rebels Motor Cycle Club had links to organised crime in Australia and the reason for refusal of revocation, which included the possibility that Mr. Picard intends to ride with those linked to organised crime.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Minister was required to provide Mr. Picard with certain information before making a decision not to revoke the cancellation of his visa, and whether the failure to do so constituted a denial of procedural fairness. The court had to consider the obligations imposed by the statutory framework, particularly s 501CA(3) of the Act, which requires the Minister to provide a person whose visa has been cancelled with written notice of the cancellation decision and particulars of the relevant information. The court also needed to determine the scope and content of the obligation to accord procedural fairness in the context of the statutory provisions.

The court concluded that the Minister was not required to inform Mr. Picard of the Australian Crime Commission’s opinion or the reason for refusal of revocation. The statutory framework under s 501CA(3) obligates the Minister to provide information that would be the reason, or part of the reason, for making the cancellation decision, which is person-specific and not general information. The court found that the statutory language did not impose an obligation on the Minister to provide information that might be relied upon in deciding whether to revoke a cancellation decision. Given that the cancellation decision was based on objectively ascertainable facts, the Minister's discretion under s 501CA was not subject to the procedural obligations that would apply in other contexts.

The application was dismissed, and Mr. Picard was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the application. The court's reasoning underscored the limited scope of the procedural fairness obligations in this context, focusing on the specific statutory obligations rather than broader principles of natural justice.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Mr Picard was serving a sentence of imprisonment and had his visa cancelled under section 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) for failing to pass the character test. He was subsequently given the opportunity to apply for revocation of the cancellation decision under section 501CA(4) of the Act. He submitted a written application for revocation, attaching character references and addressing the issues identified in the Ministerial Direction. The Department acknowledged receipt of his submissions and advised him that it had obtained additional information which was potentially relevant to his application. This included a Prison Conduct Report from the Tasmanian Prison Service. Mr Picard argued that the Minister was obliged to advise him of this material and to afford him the opportunity of commenting on it.

The case involves a judicial review of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection's decision not to revoke a delegate's decision to cancel Mr Picard's visa for failure to pass the character test. Mr Picard had requested revocation of the cancellation decision and provided written submissions and character references. The Department responded by providing additional information, including a Prison Conduct Report, which Mr Picard argued he had not been given the opportunity to comment on. The matter came before the court for judicial review of the Minister's decision.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The letter advised Mr Picard of his right to make representations pursuant to s 501CA(4). A copy of the section was provided to him. Mr Picard was advised that:“How to request revocation of the original decision to cancel your visaIf you decide to request revocation you can write to us with the reasons why you think the original decision should be revoked using the attached Revocation Request Form. Direction 65 – Visa refusal and cancellation under s501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under s501CA (the Direction) identifies issues that are relevant to the revocation consideration. You should address each paragraph in PART C of the Direction that is relevant to your circumstances. A copy of the Direction is enclosed for your information.If the decision-maker is a delegate of the Minister, the delegate is bound by the Direction. If the Minister makes a revocation decision personally, he or she is not required to give consideration to the Direction, though it provides a broad indication of the types of issues that he or she may take into account in determining whether or not to revoke the original decision.You can provide any other information that you feel the decision-maker should take into account, including letters of support from your family, friends, employers or others.” Direction 65 was a Ministerial Direction given under s 499 of the Act. It identified a range of matters which, if relevant in a particular case, were to be brought into account in determining how the discretion, provided for in s 501CA(4), should be exercised. Delegates exercising the Minister’s power under s 501CA(4) were required to comply with the Direction but it did not bind the Minister himself. The Direction identified a number of primary considerations which were to be taken into account in dealing with applications made under s 501CA(4). They included the protection of the Australian community, the nature and seriousness of the criminal conduct engaged in by the visa holder and the risk to the Australian community should the visa holder commit further offences or engage in other serious misconduct. Mr Picard responded to the invitation to apply for revocation of the cancellation decision. He did so in writing on 27 January 2015. He attached a number of character references. In his written submissions he addressed the relevant issues identified in the Ministerial Direction. In doing so he submitted that he did “not constitute an unacceptable risk to the Australian community in terms of reoffending.” By letter dated 3 March 2015 the Department acknowledged receipt of Mr Picard’s submissions. It advised him that it had obtained some additional information which was potentially relevant to his application. It identified a series of documents including a Prison Conduct Report from the Tasmanian Prison Service dated 7 January 2015. Copies of all these documents (including the Prison Conduct Report) were sent to Mr Picard under cover of the letter. He was “invited to comment on this information and any other matter you want the decision-maker to take into account.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Picard submitted that the information which, he said, had not been provided to him constituted adverse conclusions which were not obviously open on the material made available to him and was material adverse to his interests. As a result the Minister was obliged to advise him of this material and to afford him the opportunity of commenting on it.CONSIDERATION The purpose served by the imposition, on decision-makers, of an obligation to accord procedural fairness to those who may be affected by their decisions is the avoidance of “practical injustice”: see Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1 at 14 (Gleeson CJ). The guiding principle is one of fairness: see VHAP of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 80 ALD 559 at 566 (Allsop J, with whom Gyles and Conti JJ agreed on this point). Judgments about practical justice and fairness fall to be made in the circumstances of individual cases. As Weinberg J said in Applicants M1015/2003 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1309 at [54]:“Whether or not there has been a denial of procedural fairness in any given case is largely dependent upon the particular facts of that case. Where the decision-maker has relied upon adverse information, without providing any opportunity to comment upon it, the question whether the decision is vitiated will depend upon a range of factors. These include the importance of the material to the ultimate decision, as well as the nature of that material. Some information is purely factual and entirely incontrovertible. There may simply be no answer to it. Other information may involve a combination of fact and opinion, and may be contentious. In relation to information of that kind, the denial of the opportunity to comment upon it may give rise to procedural unfairness. Moreover, some matters are so blindingly obvious as not to require any comment or submission. In such cases, the fact that there has been no opportunity to comment will be of little or no significance.” The content of the obligation in any given case is to be determined having regard to the statutory context in which the relevant decision falls to be made: see SZBEL at 161, 162. Section 501(3A) of the Act requires the Minister to cancel a visa if he (or his delegate) is satisfied that the holder does not pass the character test and is serving a sentence of imprisonment. As a result the reasons for a cancellation decision can be (as they were in the present case) very shortly stated. There is no need for the decision-maker to have regard to any discretionary considerations. In this context s 501CA is an ameliorative provision: it requires the Minister to invite representations from the person whose visa has been cancelled about the revocation of the cancellation decision and confers on the Minister a discretion to revoke the cancellation. Under s 501CA(3) the Minister is required to provide a person whose visa has been cancelled under s 501(3A) with written notice of the cancellation decision and particulars of “the relevant information” relating to the making of that decision. Such “relevant information” is defined, in s 501CA(2), to be information which the Minister considers “would be the reason, or part of the reason for making the [cancellation] decision” and which “is specifically about the [holder of the visa] or another person and is not just about a class of persons of which the person or other person is a member.” The obligation thus relates to information bearing on the decision to cancel, not information on which the Minister might rely in deciding whether or not to revoke the cancellation decision. This is a somewhat strange provision given that the cancellation will have occurred because the Minister (or his delegate) will have been satisfied of two objectively ascertainable facts. It may be that the draftsman intended that the Minister should advise the visa holder about information on which he might be minded to rely in deciding to reject an application for revocation. If that was the intention it is not reflected in the language of s 501CA(2). The information must be person-specific rather than general information relating to a class of person of which the visa holder is a member.