FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BEG21 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] FCA 633
File number: WAD 101 of 2021 Judgment of: CHEESEMAN J Date of judgment: 31 May 2022 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for extension of time to seek judicial review of a decision of the Minister for Home Affairs not to revoke a visa cancellation under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where application filed over three months out of time – where the applicant is illiterate, unable to speak English and in prison – where the applicant was self-represented at the time of receiving the Minister’s decision not to revoke the visa cancellation – whether there is a reasonable explanation for the delay – whether there is prejudice to the Minister – whether the proposed grounds of review have sufficient merit to warrant the grant of an extension of time – Held: application for extension of time dismissed. Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 477A(1), 477A(2), 477A(3), 501(3A), 501CA(4), Cases cited: Bhangu v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 108
Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576
CUV18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 2009
Downing v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1684
EXT20 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] FCAFC 72
EXT20 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCA 629
Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v CTB19 [2020] FCAFC 166; 280 FCR 178
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; 206 CLR 323
MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391; 242 FCR 585
Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 17
Renton v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCA 931
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; 228 CLR 152
SZIFI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2007] FCA 63; 238 ALR 611
SZUTY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2016] FCA 289
Division: General Division Registry: Western Australia National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 69 Date of last submissions: 24 May 2022 Date of hearing: 7 September 2021 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A Aleksov Solicitor for the Applicant: Chisholm Law Counsel for the Respondent: Mr P R Macliver Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
ORDERS
WAD 101 of 2021 BETWEEN: BEG21
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
CHEESEMAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
31 MAY 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The amended application for an extension of time be dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
CHEESEMAN J:
INTRODUCTION
By his application lodged on 6 May 2021, the applicant seeks an extension of time in which to file an application for judicial review of the decision of the respondent, the Minister
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- Case
- [2022] FCA 633
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues the court had to decide were whether there was a reasonable explanation for the applicant’s delay in filing the application, whether the Minister would suffer any prejudice if the extension was granted, and whether the proposed grounds of review had sufficient merit. The court considered the factors of delay, prejudice to the Minister, and the merits of the proposed substantive application. It found that while the applicant had provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay, the proposed grounds of review did not have sufficient merit to warrant an extension of time. The court concluded that the Minister was not prejudiced by the delay and dismissed the application for an extension of time, with costs.
The Federal Court held that the applicant's proposed grounds of review lacked merit, particularly in relation to the argument that the Minister failed to afford procedural fairness by not inviting the applicant to provide further information on non-refoulement obligations. The court noted that the applicant could make a valid application for a Protection visa, which would allow him to substantiate his claims in relation to non-refoulement obligations. Consequently, the amended application for an extension of time was dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The amended application for an extension of time be dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The approach of Greenwood J in SZIFI was followed in CUV18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 2009 at [38] (Jagot J) and in Bhangu v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 108 at [36] (Moshinsky J). CONSIDERATION Length of and explanation for the delay Taking into account that the length of the delay falls short of four months and arises in circumstances where the applicant is illiterate, uneducated, without English, imprisoned and was for a substantial period, without legal representation, I am satisfied that the applicant has provided a satisfactory explanation for his delay in bringing the application. This is a factor that weighs in favour of granting an extension of time to file the application.Any prejudice to the respondent if an extension is granted The Minister does not submit that there is any prejudice flowing from the grant of an extension in the present circumstances. This is another factor that weighs in favour of granting an extension of time. The merits of the proposed substantive application The critical factor in the context of the present application is the assessment of the merits of the proposed substantive review application, noting that such assessment is undertaken in accordance with the principles summarised at [20] above. I will consider the merits of each of the proposed grounds of appeal in turn.Ground 1 – failure to afford procedural fairness By Ground 1, the applicant submits that it was a denial of procedural fairness for the Minister to conclude he was unable to make any finding in respect of whether Australia’s international non-refoulement obligations were engaged based on the limited information available without inviting the applicant to provide further information on that issue. The critical passage of the Minister’s reasons is at R[32]. It appears in context as follows (emphasis added):International non-refoulement obligations 30. As noted above, and as part of his representations seeking revocation of the original decision to cancel his visa, [the applicant] states that he would be 'in danger of prejudice and termination due to the hostilities' in Burundi and would be exposed to 'brutal retaliation by the Rebel Militia with the probability of almost imminent death' and that 'reprisal would be a certainty'. He also indicated that there is unrest and a civil war in Burundi.31. [The applicant] was born in Burundi in 1981 and as outlined by the Judge, had experienced a 'tragic and traumatic childhood' from the age of 10 when his parents and sisters were killed in the civil war.32.Insofar as [the applicant], in claiming he will face harm in Burundi, is suggesting that Australia's international non-refoulement obligations are enlivened in his case, I am unable to make any finding in this regard with the very limited information available. I consider that the information provided by [the applicant] is sparse and incomplete. 33. Moreover, I am unable to make a finding in view of the absence of independent and authoritative supporting information to support his claims with respect to prejudicial or brutal treatment, and possible death including any risk of him being targeted by the rebel militia. [The applicant] has not explained why he would be specifically targeted by the rebel militia and why his particular circumstances are such as to differentiate the risk faced by him from the general population. Since there is not enough information for me to make any findings about [the applicant]’s various claims of harm on return, both at a factual level and in terms of whether any non-refoulement obligations are engaged in this case, I have not given any weight to these claims. Having said this, I am mindful that [the applicant] is able to make a valid application for a Protection visa.34. A Protection visa application is the key mechanism provided for by the Act to enable Australia to meet its international non-refoulement obligations. In making such an application, [the applicant] will be able to substantiate his claims in relation to any such obligations, and the duty to remove him under s 198 of the Act will not apply while his visa application is being determine. 35. In saying the above, I am mindful that consideration of whether [the applicant] satisfies a Protection visa criterion under s 36(2), should he apply for such a visa at a later time, cannot be regarded as a substitute for consideration of his non-refoulement claims in the present context. In this regard, I accept that case law indicates that the issue to be determined under s 501CA(4) (that is, whether there is 'another reason' why a cancellation decision should be revoked) is less categorical than the issue of whether a person satisfies a relevant criterion under s 36(2), and that the material or representations advanced in support of a claim in the context of s 501CA are not required to meet predetermined benchmarks. Furthermore, I am mindful that Australia's international non-refoulement obligations may not be fully encompassed by the visa criteria in s 36(2). Nevertheless, [the applicant]’s claims, once substantiated, will be conclusively assessed in the context of any application for a Protection visa to the extent that those claims are relevant to the criteria for visa grant.36. Should [the applicant] choose to apply for a Protection visa, I expect that his application will be processed according to the Department's normal practice. Relevantly, I am aware that the Department's practice in processing Protection visa applications is to consider the application of the protection-specific criteria before proceeding with any consideration of other provisions that could result in the Protection visa being refused, including character-related criteria. To reinforce this practice, a Ministerial direction has been given under s 499 of the Act (Direction 75) which, among other things, requires that decision-makers who are considering an application for a Protection visa must first assess whether the refugee and complementary protection criteria are met before considering other relevant matters.37. I have also considered and taken into account the possibility that at that time a Minister may personally consider [the applicant]’s Protection visa application, rather than a delegate. In such a case, the Minister would not be bound by Direction 75 and would not necessarily determine whether non-refoulement obligations are owed in respect of [the applicant]. However, such a situation would only arise in the unlikely event that a Minister determines to depart from the usual practice regarding the processing of Protection visa applications and determines further to depart from the policy approach set out in Direction 75. I nevertheless acknowledge the slight possibility that [the applicant]’s claims regarding non-refoulement obligations may not be considered, even if he applies for a Protection visa.38. Further, I am aware that even if the process set out in Direction 75 is followed, that does not mean [the applicant] will be granted a Protection visa as long as he is found to enliven a non-refoulement obligation that is reflected in the Protection visa criteria. I am cognisant of the possibility that, even if found to enliven such an obligation, [the applicant] may be refused a Protection visa because he is excluded under other relevant provisions such as those relating to character. In the event that his Protection visa application is refused, the duty to remove him as soon as reasonably practicable will arise, notwithstanding any non-refoulement obligation.