Renton v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Renton v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCA 931

File number(s): NSD 1037 of 2020
Judgment of: WHEELAHAN J
Date of judgment: 10 August 2021
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review of a decision of the Minister under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) not to revoke the cancellation of the applicant’s visa – where the visa was mandatorily cancelled pursuant to s 501(3A) of the Act because the applicant did not pass the character test – where the applicant pleaded guilty and was convicted of two child pornography offences and sentenced to a term of imprisonment – whether the Minister made a finding, for which there was no evidence, that the applicant had psychological sexual issues relating to children – whether that finding was legally unreasonable – whether the applicant was denied procedural fairness because the Minister’s finding of psychological sexual issues was not obviously open on the material – whether the Minister took into account an irrelevant consideration, being that the applicant received a 25% discount on his sentence in consequence of his guilty pleas – the finding of psychological sexual issues was open on the material and not legally unreasonable – in consequence, no denial of procedural fairness – the matter of a discount on the applicant’s sentence was not an irrelevant consideration – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed with costs.
Legislation:

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 476A(1)(c), s 499, ss 501(3A), (5), (7), s 501CA, s 501CA(4), s 501G(1)(e)

Migration Reform (Transitional Provisions) Regulations 1994 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Australian Retailers Association v Reserve Bank of Australia [2005] FCA 1707; 148 FCR 446

Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576

Federal Broom Co Pty Ltd v Semlitch (1964) 110 CLR 626

Hands v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 225; 267 FCR 628

Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission v May [2016] HCA 19; 257 CLR 468

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; 162 CLR 24

Minister for Home Affairs v Omar [2019] FCAFC 188; 272 FCR 589

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32; 207 ALR 12

Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383

Picard v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1430

R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; ex parte 2HD Pty Ltd (1979) 144 CLR 45

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; 228 CLR 152

Tame v New South Wales [2002] HCA 35; 211 CLR 317

Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Division: General Division
Number of paragraphs: 42
Date of hearing: 28 July 2021
Counsel for the Applicant: Dr J Donnelly
Solicitor for the Applicant:  Scott Calnan
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Details
Case
[2021] FCA 931
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Renton v Minister for Home Affairs is a judicial review case concerning the decision of the Minister for Home Affairs under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) not to revoke the cancellation of the applicant's visa. The applicant, who had been convicted of two child pornography offences, argued that the Minister's decision was legally unreasonable and denied procedural fairness. The applicant contested several findings made by the Minister, including that he had psychological sexual issues relating to children, that the Minister did not consider the applicant's guilty pleas adequately, and that the Minister took into account an irrelevant consideration when considering the applicant's sentencing discount.

The central legal issues were whether the Minister's finding of psychological sexual issues was supported by evidence, whether the Minister's finding was legally unreasonable, whether the applicant was denied procedural fairness, and whether the Minister took into account an irrelevant consideration. The applicant argued that there was no expert evidence to support the Minister's finding of psychological sexual issues, and that the finding was not obviously open on the material. Additionally, the applicant argued that the Minister's consideration of the sentencing discount was irrelevant to the risk assessment and that this constituted a material error.

The court found that the Minister's finding of psychological sexual issues was open on the material and not legally unreasonable, and therefore, there was no denial of procedural fairness. The court also held that the matter of a discount on the applicant's sentence was not an irrelevant consideration and did not constitute a jurisdictional error. Consequently, the application for judicial review was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The final orders of the court included granting leave to the applicant to file and serve an amended originating application, amending the respondent's name to "Minister for Home Affairs", dismissing the application, and ordering the applicant to pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave be given to the applicant to file and serve an amended originating application in the form annexed to the affidavit of Ziaullah Zarifi filed on 8 April 2021.

2. The applicant is excused from the requirement to file and serve an amended originating application, and the form of amended originating application contained within the annexure referred to above and filed with the court stand as the applicant’s amended originating application.

3. The name of the respondent be amended to “Minister for Home Affairs”.

4. The application be dismissed.

5. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Following the acceptance of a referral from the court by pro bono counsel, the applicant relied on an amended application which at the hearing he was given leave to file and serve. The amended application advanced four grounds of review, accompanied by particulars. I will summarise the grounds of the application, and the arguments that were advanced in support of them.Ground 1 (no evidence) The first ground of the application was that the Minister had made findings for which there was no evidence. The applicant drew attention to the Minister’s findings at [33], to which I have referred above, including that the applicant had failed to acknowledge he has “psychological sexual issues relating to children”. The applicant claimed that there was no expert evidence before the Minister that supported this finding: the only expert evidence before the Minister demonstrated that the applicant had no diagnosed psychiatric disorder, which was consistent with the applicant’s representation to the Minister that he had not been diagnosed with a psychological condition. Counsel for the applicant submitted that the word “psychological” was not an ordinary term, but rather a topic which required fairly probative evidence before a finding of psychological issues could be made, which probative evidence was lacking in this case. The applicant claimed that this finding was a critical step along the path to reaching the ultimate conclusion as to whether or not to revoke the original decision to cancel the applicant’s visa, because the Minister relied upon the finding in assessing the applicant’s prospects of reoffending in the Australian community and evaluating the assessment of weight to be given to that consideration. Counsel for the applicant submitted that for these reasons the Minister’s error was material, because without the impugned finding, the Minister might realistically have come to a different conclusion concerning the risk assessment that was undertaken.Ground 2 (procedural fairness) The applicant claimed that he was denied procedural fairness because the psychological sexual finding in [33] of the Minister’s reasons would not obviously have been open on the known material, again noting that there was no relevant expert evidence before the Minister. The applicant claimed that he should have been advised of the proposed adverse conclusion before the decision was made, and the failure to do so amounted to a denial of procedural fairness.Ground 3 (irrelevant consideration) The applicant claimed that the Minister took into account an irrelevant consideration when having regard to his plea of guilty, in the terms set out in [38] of the Minister’s statement of reasons, which I have set out above. The applicant claimed that to take account of the fact that he had received a 25% discount in sentencing from the court was to take into account an irrelevant consideration. Counsel for the applicant submitted that it was not clear how the discount in sentencing was relevant to the risk assessment undertaken by the Minister for the purposes of s 501CA(4) of the Act, which was in particular concerned with the risk of recidivism. Counsel also submitted that the Minister did not make clear how the discount in sentencing was relevant to the prospects of the applicant reoffending in Australia. Counsel submitted that had the Minister not had regard to the sentencing discount, the Minister might have given more favourable weight to the applicant’s guilty plea when undertaking the risk assessment exercise, and that the error was therefore material.Ground 4 (legal unreasonableness)

Decision

Reasons for decision

The separate statements provided by the applicant’s daughter, former partner, friend, former housemates, and cousin, painted a positive picture of the applicant. All described the applicant’s close relationship with his daughter, giving examples of their observations of the applicant as a good and loving father. Generally, the statements suggested that the applicant was of good character and, acknowledging the seriousness of the offences, they expressed surprise at his offending. The applicant’s daughter, aged 17 at the time of the statement, described the emotional hurt of being separated from him temporarily during his imprisonment, and potentially permanently if he were to be deported. The applicant’s former partner noted that he may have suffered from depression following a redundancy and being unable to find a job. In his subsequent letter to the Department, the applicant stated that he did not seek out full time employment so that he could be available to support his daughter. The Minister’s decision The Minister was not satisfied that the applicant passed the character test, due to his substantial criminal record. This was not disputed by the applicant. The Minister then considered whether he was satisfied that there was another reason the original decision should be revoked, but concluded that he was not. The Minister’s statement of reasons for the decision not to exercise the revocation power summarised, in bullet point form, the substance of the applicant’s representations and supporting documents, and proceeded to consider matters under three sub-headings: extent of impediments if removed; strength, nature and duration of ties; and protection of the Australian community. The statement of reasons attached 14 documents described as “relevant material”. These were the nine documents constituting the applicant’s representations (see [7]-[8] above), the letter and two documents which were provided by the Department to the applicant on 25 November 2018 (see [8] above), the applicant’s “movement records” and the cancellation notice of 8 August 2018. Whilst acknowledging the absence of a support network and personal difficulties for the applicant arising from this, the Minister stated that the difficulties the applicant would face if returned to the United Kingdom would not be insurmountable because of the broadly similar culture and society of the United Kingdom and Australia. In respect of the applicant’s ties to Australia, including his family, the Minister stated –18. I acknowledge that Mr RENTON has family and social ties to Australia. Mr RENTON's close family in Australia consists of his daughter [redacted] and his cousin Lynne Gothard, whom he regards more as a sister. Ms Gothard submits that ‘it will kill’ Mr RENTON and his family ‘if he is taken away from us’.19. I find that Mr RENTON has contributed positively to the community through his long term employment in transportation, music and administration and his volunteer work for the Museum of Fire, the Salvation Army and his daughter's school. I find that Mr RENTON has been making a positive contribution for over 40 years to the community and I have taken this into account.20.I have considered the effect of non-revocation upon Mr RENTON’s immediate family in Australia and accept that those persons would experience emotional hardship, particularly his daughter [redacted]. I find that Mr RENTON has been making a positive contribution for over 40 years to the community and I have taken this into account and also recognise the effect of non-revocation for family members in Australia.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicant claimed that he was denied procedural fairness because the psychological sexual finding in [33] of the Minister’s reasons would not obviously have been open on the known material, again noting that there was no relevant expert evidence before the Minister. The applicant claimed that he should have been advised of the proposed adverse conclusion before the decision was made, and the failure to do so amounted to a denial of procedural fairness.Ground 3 (irrelevant consideration) The applicant claimed that the Minister took into account an irrelevant consideration when having regard to his plea of guilty, in the terms set out in [38] of the Minister’s statement of reasons, which I have set out above. The applicant claimed that to take account of the fact that he had received a 25% discount in sentencing from the court was to take into account an irrelevant consideration. Counsel for the applicant submitted that it was not clear how the discount in sentencing was relevant to the risk assessment undertaken by the Minister for the purposes of s 501CA(4) of the Act, which was in particular concerned with the risk of recidivism. Counsel also submitted that the Minister did not make clear how the discount in sentencing was relevant to the prospects of the applicant reoffending in Australia. Counsel submitted that had the Minister not had regard to the sentencing discount, the Minister might have given more favourable weight to the applicant’s guilty plea when undertaking the risk assessment exercise, and that the error was therefore material.Ground 4 (legal unreasonableness) The ground of legal unreasonableness was also directed to the Minister’s reference at [33] of his reasons to the applicant’s failure to acknowledge that he had “psychological sexual issues relating to children”, and there was substantial, if not total overlap between this ground and the first ground alleging absence of evidence. The applicant claimed that there was no probative material in the nature of expert evidence that the Minister could rationally rely upon to make a finding that the applicant had psychological sexual issues relating to children, and that the error was material. Counsel for the applicant submitted that without expert evidence demonstrating that the applicant had a psychological or psychiatric illness or disorder, it was not open for the Minister to find that the applicant had psychological sexual issues relating to children. Counsel for the applicant submitted that in the absence of evidence, the Minister was not qualified to make the impugned finding. Counsel submitted that the remarks of the sentencing judge which expressed a desire that the applicant undertake some psychiatric help to ensure that he never came back before the court again, suffered from a similar defect, namely that the only expert evidence before the sentencing judge demonstrated that the applicant did not have a psychiatric disorder. Counsel submitted that the passing remark of the sentencing judge was not coextensive with a professional opinion that the applicant had psychological sexual issues relating to children, and that in the circumstances it was not permissible for the Minister to make any such finding.Analysis