MIGRATION – appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court (now the Federal Circuit and Family Court) – application for safe haven enterprise visa – where Immigration Assessment Authority affirmed a decision of the delegate of the Minister not to grant appellant a visa – whether the primary judge erred in failing to give proper reasons and engage with the appellant’s submissions – whether the primary judge erred in failing to find jurisdictional error on the part of the Authority – Held: appeal dismissed.
Legislation:
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5H(1), 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa)
Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs:
91
Date of hearing:
4 February 2022
Counsel for the Appellant:
Mr G Schipp
Solicitors for the Appellant:
Australian Presence Legal
Counsel for the First Respondent:
Mr A Chan, solicitor, Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent:
The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs
ORDERS
SAD 161 of 2021
BETWEEN:
AHN19
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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The appellant, a 39-year-old Tamil from the Northern Province of Sri Lanka, sought judicial review of the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority to affirm the Minister’s delegate’s refusal of their application for a safe haven enterprise visa. The appellant had arrived in Australia as an unlawful maritime arrival and claimed to fear harm due to their perceived affiliation with opposing political groups in Sri Lanka. The appellant’s claims were based on two statutory declarations, documentary material, and an interview. The appellant alleged that they were at risk because their family members were suspected LTTE members or supporters, leading to their arrest, detention, and mistreatment by the Sri Lankan authorities. They also claimed that their registration as a UPFA candidate in a local council election in 2011 led to further harassment and threats from both Sri Lankan authorities and LTTE supporters.
The legal issues in the case centered around whether the primary judge erred in failing to provide adequate reasons and properly engage with the appellant’s submissions, and whether the primary judge erred in not finding a jurisdictional error on the part of the Authority. The appellant argued that the Authority failed to consider all the evidence regarding the likelihood of post-election harassment and misunderstood the nature of the appellant’s claims. They further contended that the Authority did not examine the relevant country information about political violence and instead focused on a general reduction in election-related violence.
The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Authority had considered the appellant’s claims in detail and made factual findings based on the evidence presented. The court held that the Authority’s findings were supported by the evidence and that the appellant’s claims were not credible. The court also found that the primary judge had adequately considered the appellant’s submissions and provided sufficient reasons for their decision. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The name of the first respondent be changed to “Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs”.
2. The notice of appeal be amended to delete the reference to January 2020 in ground 1(b) and insert in lieu thereof January 2010.
3. The appeal be dismissed.
4. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal to be fixed by lump sum by a Registrar, if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
In addition to the appeal book, the appellant relied on an affidavit of their solicitor, which annexed further consolidated written submissions on which the appellant had relied before the primary judge which they contend were not considered by the primary judge. Following the hearing, the appellant supplemented their submissions by providing additional evidentiary references. The parties did not include certain of the country information referred to in argument in the appeal book. BACKGROUND The appellant is a 39 year old Tamil from the Northern Province of Sri Lanka, and is of the Hindu faith. On 10 September 2012, the appellant arrived in Australia as an unlawful maritime arrival. On 1 May 2016, the appellant applied for a SHEV. The appellant’s claims for protection were made in: (1) two statutory declarations, dated 1 May 2016 and 13 April 2018 respectively; (2) various supporting documentary material, including letters from the appellant’s relatives and documents regarding the appellant’s alleged involvement in an election in Sri Lanka; and (3) an interview conducted with an officer of the Department of Home Affairs on 16 April 2018. As mentioned, the appellant claims to fear harm due to their perceived affiliation with opposing political groups in Sri Lanka. The appellant fears harm from Sri Lankan authorities, including the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) and CID, if returned due to being suspected as a supporter of the LTTE and for having a perceived familial connection to the LTTE. The appellant also fears harm from the opposing end of the political spectrum from LTTE supporters due to their registration as a candidate for the UPFA, an anti-LTTE political group, in a local council election in 2011. The appellant claimed that they were at risk because the appellant’s family members were suspected to be LTTE members or supporters. In the appellant’s first statutory declaration, they claimed that their father (and whole family) were suspected of being involved in a bombing perpetrated on behalf of the LTTE in 1993, and that their father spent time in prison as a result. The appellant claims that one of their brothers, referred to as “V”, was abducted and is missing. Further, that the appellant’s other brother, “TK”, joined the LTTE in 2006 as a freedom fighter and was subsequently killed in a war between the LTTE and SLA. By reason of these familial links, the appellant claims that their family was deemed to be supporters of the LTTE by the Sri Lankan authorities. The appellant claims that the SLA arrested the appellant in September 2008 and they were sent to the Poonthottam Detention Camp, where they remained until January 2010. While imprisoned, the appellant claims they were beaten, interrogated and lost weight. Following the appellant’s release, the appellant says that they worked for the Co-operative Society (CS), an organisation under LTTE control, to distribute relief supplies. From around January 2011, the appellant claims that CID officers visited the CS office at least once a week, and questioned them about LTTE supporters in their area and threatened them. As mentioned, in about March 2011, in an effort to avoid further adverse attention from the Sri Lankan authorities, the appellant, acting on advice received from local elders, registered as a UPFA candidate in the local council election. The appellant says that after they did this, the CID enquiries stopped.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
For the reasons which follow, the appeal must be dismissed. EVIDENCE In addition to the appeal book, the appellant relied on an affidavit of their solicitor, which annexed further consolidated written submissions on which the appellant had relied before the primary judge which they contend were not considered by the primary judge. Following the hearing, the appellant supplemented their submissions by providing additional evidentiary references. The parties did not include certain of the country information referred to in argument in the appeal book. BACKGROUND The appellant is a 39 year old Tamil from the Northern Province of Sri Lanka, and is of the Hindu faith. On 10 September 2012, the appellant arrived in Australia as an unlawful maritime arrival. On 1 May 2016, the appellant applied for a SHEV. The appellant’s claims for protection were made in: (1) two statutory declarations, dated 1 May 2016 and 13 April 2018 respectively; (2) various supporting documentary material, including letters from the appellant’s relatives and documents regarding the appellant’s alleged involvement in an election in Sri Lanka; and (3) an interview conducted with an officer of the Department of Home Affairs on 16 April 2018. As mentioned, the appellant claims to fear harm due to their perceived affiliation with opposing political groups in Sri Lanka. The appellant fears harm from Sri Lankan authorities, including the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) and CID, if returned due to being suspected as a supporter of the LTTE and for having a perceived familial connection to the LTTE. The appellant also fears harm from the opposing end of the political spectrum from LTTE supporters due to their registration as a candidate for the UPFA, an anti-LTTE political group, in a local council election in 2011. The appellant claimed that they were at risk because the appellant’s family members were suspected to be LTTE members or supporters. In the appellant’s first statutory declaration, they claimed that their father (and whole family) were suspected of being involved in a bombing perpetrated on behalf of the LTTE in 1993, and that their father spent time in prison as a result. The appellant claims that one of their brothers, referred to as “V”, was abducted and is missing. Further, that the appellant’s other brother, “TK”, joined the LTTE in 2006 as a freedom fighter and was subsequently killed in a war between the LTTE and SLA. By reason of these familial links, the appellant claims that their family was deemed to be supporters of the LTTE by the Sri Lankan authorities. The appellant claims that the SLA arrested the appellant in September 2008 and they were sent to the Poonthottam Detention Camp, where they remained until January 2010. While imprisoned, the appellant claims they were beaten, interrogated and lost weight. Following the appellant’s release, the appellant says that they worked for the Co-operative Society (CS), an organisation under LTTE control, to distribute relief supplies. From around January 2011, the appellant claims that CID officers visited the CS office at least once a week, and questioned them about LTTE supporters in their area and threatened them. As mentioned, in about March 2011, in an effort to avoid further adverse attention from the Sri Lankan authorities, the appellant, acting on advice received from local elders, registered as a UPFA candidate in the local council election. The appellant says that after they did this, the CID enquiries stopped.
Decision
Reasons for decision
The appellant’s application for a SHEV was refused by the delegate and the Authority subsequently affirmed the delegate’s decision. The appellant filed an application for judicial review in the Circuit Court, which was amended twice, and ultimately dismissed.THE AUTHORITY’S DECISION The Authority began by noting that the appellant’s representative had made additional written submissions to which the Authority had had regard in its entirety: A [3]. The Authority summarised in detail the appellant’s claims for protection as articulated in the appellant’s two written statements in 2016 and 2018 and in the appellant’s SHEV interview in 2018: A [4]. The Authority made factual findings at A [5] to [20]. Critically, the Authority found:(1)The appellant had established the appellant’s Sri Lankan identity, ethnicity, employment and residential history as per the appellant’s claims: A [5];(2)The appellant had familial links to the LTTE through the appellant’s father and brothers and in addition, as a Tamil resident in an LTTE controlled area, the appellant had assisted and otherwise co-operated with the LTTE, including holding a managerial position with the CS in relation to the distribution of supplies for and on behalf of the LTTE: A [6];(3)The appellant faced some problems from the Sri Lankan authorities as a result of the appellant’s family’s links and the appellant’s work with the CS: A [7];(4)The appellant was separated from the appellant’s family upon entering the Poonthottham detention camp in 2008 and was interrogated about the appellant’s family’s LTTE connections and the appellant’s own support of the LTTE. The appellant suffered mistreatment, which may have amounted to serious harm in this period. The appellant was not charged with any offences and was released to re-join the appellant’s family in the other section of the camp, although the appellant was subjected to reporting requirements until the appellant left the camp in January 2010: A [8];(5)After a period of resettling and returning to work at the CS, the appellant faced harassment and repeated enquiries from the authorities, including the CID: A [9]; (6)The appellant tried to change the CID’s perception of the appellant by running as a UPFA candidate in the 2011 local election: A [9];(7)The appellant faced problems as a result of the appellant’s political activity, including from pro-Tamil groups who considered the appellant’s UPFA association was a betrayal: A [10]; (8)Although the appellant claimed to have been kidnapped and taken to a remote location, the appellant’s evidence about this was vague and was not supported by a letter from the appellant’s mother in which she outlined the troubles the appellant had faced. Accordingly, the Authority did not accept this claim: A [10];(9)The appellant was variously interrogated about the appellant’s and the appellant’s family’s LTTE links and the appellant’s association with the UPFA and ultimately was threatened to stop their electoral campaign, which they did: A [10];(10)Once the appellant stopped campaigning, the appellant faced no further threats of actual harm from any political factions or their thugs or supporters: A [11]; (11)The authorities did not detain the appellant again after 2008: A [12];(12)The appellant’s claims that the appellant faced further threats and problems from other political factions and from the authorities after the election and before leaving Sri Lanka were not credible. Critically, the appellant’s claim that they were prompted to flee Sri Lanka because the CID escalated its concerns about the appellant to the TID resulting in the TID requiring the appellant to report to the “Fourth Floor” for investigation, causing the appellant to believe that the appellant would be tortured and held indefinitely or killed was not accepted for a number of reasons (A [11] to [17]) including that:(a)The appellant’s evidence was “considerably vague”, there were no claimed examples of any attempts on the appellant’s life and no evidence to support any actual threats or harm after the election arising from the appellant’s political involvement: A [11]; (b)The authorities did not detain the appellant again (the last time being in 2008), nor did they formally arrest them, charge them, impose any further reporting requirements on them or send them for rehabilitation. The Authority found it implausible that the authorities would have made sustained and repeated enquiries about the appellant and the appellant’s family throughout 2011 and 2012 but not take any formal action. Further, the appellant had provided inconsistent responses in relation to the presence of the CID in the appellant’s village and the monitoring of the CS during this period: A [12];(c)The Authority did not accept the appellant’s claim that the appellant faced further problems from CID and TID after the appellant left the CS and joined the AGA, noting that the position with the AGA was in local government administration and that even after changing jobs the appellant stayed in the Mullativu district and remained living in the same house: A [13] to [14]; (d)The Authority considered that the appellant’s actions in taking a local government job were incongruous with the appellant’s claims that they were a person of adverse interest to government authorities: A [14];(e)The Authority considered that the appellant’s delay in raising the claim that they were required to report to the TID in Colombo weighed adversely against the appellant’s credibility: A [15] to [16];(13)The appellant’s claims that they continued to be of adverse interest after leaving Sri Lanka on the basis of enquiries directed to the appellant’s family members were subject to material discrepancies and vagaries. Whilst the Authority was willing to accept that the appellant’s absence was noticed by officers making routine registration or other general enquiries, it did not accept that such enquiries were directed to the appellant’s family members because of an LTTE related or other adverse security profile: A [18] to [19]. The Authority did not accept that the appellant’s brother, TH, was arrested, faced problems from the authorities or was living in hiding: A [19];(14)The Authority did not accept that the appellant left Sri Lanka as a person wanted by the authorities: A [20]. The Authority found that the appellant was not a person of adverse interest to the claimed agents of harm in Sri Lanka: A [20].
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Even if an error does not constitute jurisdictional error, the writs of certiorari and mandamus are still available where an inferior court fails to provide procedural fairness: Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala [2000] HCA 57; 204 CLR 82 at [5], [33], [58], [168] to [170] (Gaudron and Gummow JJ, Gleeson CJ and Hayne J agreeing). CONSIDERATION The appellant’s counsel addressed the grounds orally in reverse order. It is convenient to adopt the same approach. There is, in any event, substantial overlap between the two grounds.Ground 2 By ground 2, the appellant contends that the primary judge “failed to determine that the [Authority] acted without jurisdiction regarding” a number of particularised claims. The particulars to ground 2 are interrelated and overlap in part. The grounds of review before the primary judge numbered 1 to 4 translate to particulars (a) to (d) of appeal ground 2.Particular (a) - failure to give requisite consideration to all of the evidence re likelihood of post-election harassment The first particular raised by the appellant as ground 2(a), and as review ground 1 below, is that the Authority failed to give intellectual consideration and consider all the evidence in relation to the likelihood of post-election harassment of the appellant, including by considering of the country information. The appellant contends that the Authority’s findings at A [11], A [23] and A [24], in relation to the post-election harassment which the appellant claims to have experienced, demonstrate that the Authority misunderstood the nature of the appellant’s claim. The appellant submits that the Authority erred by considering the general reduction in politically-related violence against Tamils over time instead of considering the appellant’s distinct experience of being harassed by both sides of the political spectrum. The appellant submits that the Authority erred in reasoning that the appellant’s involvement in the 2011 election would not be problematic for them because of an asserted reduction in violence post-2011, when the Authority should have instead focussed on the personal circumstances of the appellant, being that of a Tamil who was involved in elections on the part of an anti-Tamil group, a fact which was the subject of record and available for anyone to access. The appellant submits that the Authority did not examine the relevant country information about political violence, and instead referred to the delegate’s decision as to reduction in election related violence in several subsequent elections. The appellant submits that the appellant has not stated that they will participate in future elections, but rather that they face ongoing risks as a result of their earlier involvement in the 2011 election. In addition, the appellant submits that the evidence the appellant proffered as to the appellant’s experience of harassment following the 2011 election was not given sufficient weight by the Authority. The appellant points to their mother’s assertion that the CID harassed them after the election and their own assertion that they experienced post-election harassment, which they say was continuous from the CID, EPDP and pro-LTTE groups.