FPU18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FPU18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1606

File number: VID 1041 of 2017
Judge: MOSHINSKY J
Date of judgment: 26 October 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – mandatory cancellation of applicant’s visa under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – decision by Minister under s 501CA of the Act not to revoke the cancellation decision – whether Minister failed to respond to a clearly articulated argument – whether the Minister failed to give proper, genuine or realistic consideration to an issue – whether the Minister denied the applicant procedural fairness – application allowed
Legislation:

Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 501, 501CA

Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)

Cases cited:

BZD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 94

Coker v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 929

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389

Picard v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1430

Date of hearing: 26 June 2018
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 58
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms GA Costello
Solicitor for the Applicant: WLW Migration Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr R Knowles
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

VID 1041 of 2017
BETWEEN:

FPU18

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Respondent

JUDGE:

MOSHINSKY J

DATE OF ORDER:

26 OCTOBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The decision of the respondent made on 16 August 2017 not to revoke the decision to cancel the applicant’s visa be set aside.

2.The respondent determine the applicant’s application for revocation of the decision to cancel his visa pursuant to s 501CA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) according to law.

3.Subject to paragraph 4, the respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the proceeding, to be fixed by way of a lump sum.

4.If either party seeks a variation of the costs order in paragraph 3 or the directions in paragraph 5 to 8 below, they may give notice in writing to the Court and the other party within three business days.

THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:

5.Within 14 days, the parties file any agreed proposed minute of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the applicant’s costs.

6.In the absence of any agreement pursuant to paragraph 5 of these orders, within 21 days the applicant file and serve an affidavit constituting a Costs Summary in accordance with paragraphs 4.10 to 4.12 of the Court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS).

7.Within a further 14 days, the respondent file and serve any Costs Response in accordance with paragraphs 4.13 to 4.14 of the Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS).

8.In the absence of any agreement having been reached within a further 14 days, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the applicant’s costs be referred to a Registrar for determination.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1606
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court, FPU18 has sought judicial review of a decision by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection not to revoke the cancellation of his visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The applicant contends that the Minister failed to respond to a submission he made, did not give proper, genuine or realistic consideration to his submission, and did not afford him procedural fairness by considering an issue he was not on notice of. The court was required to determine whether the Minister's decision was procedurally unfair, whether he gave proper, genuine or realistic consideration to the applicant's submission, and whether he failed to notify the applicant of an issue in the review.

The court rejected the first two grounds of review, finding that the Minister had responded to the applicant's submission and had given proper, genuine and realistic consideration to it. However, the court found that the Minister had denied the applicant procedural fairness by considering a risk of "hands on" offending, an issue the applicant was not on notice of. The Minister had relied on reports from Dr Allnutt, which discussed a single group of sexual offenders, but these reports did not address the risk of "hands on" offending by the applicant. As such, the Minister's decision was flawed and the court set it aside.

The court ordered that the Minister determine the applicant's application for revocation of the decision to cancel his visa according to law. The court also ordered the Minister to pay the applicant's costs of the proceeding, to be fixed by way of a lump sum. If either party seeks a variation of the costs order, they may give notice in writing to the Court and the other party within three business days. If the parties do not agree on the costs within 35 days, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the applicant's costs will be referred to a Registrar for determination.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The decision of the respondent made on 16 August 2017 not to revoke the decision to cancel the applicant’s visa be set aside.

2. The respondent determine the applicant’s application for revocation of the decision to cancel his visa pursuant to s 501CA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) according to law.

3. Subject to paragraph 4, the respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the proceeding, to be fixed by way of a lump sum.

4. If either party seeks a variation of the costs order in paragraph 3 or the directions in paragraph 5 to 8 below, they may give notice in writing to the Court and the other party within three business days.

THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:

5. Within 14 days, the parties file any agreed proposed minute of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the applicant’s costs.

6. In the absence of any agreement pursuant to paragraph 5 of these orders, within 21 days the applicant file and serve an affidavit constituting a Costs Summary in accordance with paragraphs 4.10 to 4.12 of the Court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS).

7. Within a further 14 days, the respondent file and serve any Costs Response in accordance with paragraphs 4.13 to 4.14 of the Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS).

8. In the absence of any agreement having been reached within a further 14 days, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the applicant’s costs be referred to a Registrar for determination.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case revolves around the mandatory cancellation of the applicant's visa under section 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection made a decision not to revoke the cancellation under section 501CA of the Act, which the applicant challenges. The applicant argued that his rehabilitation would be better in Australia than in New Zealand, the risk of possessing child pornography in the Australian community would not be lessened by his removal to New Zealand, and deporting him would not protect the Australian community. The Minister considered the submission but rejected it primarily because the applicant was assessed as being at the lower end of the spectrum for "hands on offending," in addition to his child pornography offences. The applicant was not on notice that the Minister would consider "hands on" offending as a basis for rejecting his submissions.

The applicant applied to the Court for judicial review of the Minister's decision not to revoke the visa cancellation. The Court considered the application on its merits, reviewing the Minister's decision against the statutory requirements for procedural fairness and proper consideration of the applicant's submissions. The applicant's grounds for review were assessed, and the Court examined the Minister's response to the applicant's arguments and the basis for his decision. The Court concluded that while the Minister addressed the applicant's submissions and gave proper consideration, there was a denial of procedural fairness in considering "hands on" offending without proper notice to the applicant.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 16 August 2017, the Minister again decided not to revoke the cancellation decision. I will refer to this decision not to revoke the cancellation decision as the Decision. The Minister signed a statement of reasons for the Decision on the same day (the Statement of Reasons). In the course of considering the “Risk to the Australian community”, the Minister referred to the submission outlined above. The Minister rejected the submission principally on the basis that the applicant had been assessed by Dr Allnutt as at the lower end of the spectrum, not only for child pornography offences “but also for ‘hands on offending’”. The applicant has applied to this Court for judicial review of the Decision. By his amended originating application for review of a migration decision, the applicant relies on three grounds. In summary, the grounds are as follows:(a)the Decision was affected by procedural unfairness, in that the Minister failed to respond to a clearly articulated argument in respect of the applicant’s future risk of reoffending – the argument was to the effect that his rehabilitation would be better in Australia than in New Zealand; the risk of possessing child pornography on the Australian community would not be lessened by his removal to New Zealand, and therefore deporting the applicant would not protect the Australian community;(b)the Minister did not give proper, genuine or realistic consideration to the issue of the applicant’s future risk of reoffending in relation to the protection of the Australian community in light of the evidence before him and the applicant’s submissions made to him, and thereby failed to carry out his statutory task; and(c)the Minister failed to notify the applicant of an issue in the review, or failed to draw his attention to a dispositive issue that was not obviously known, being that the Minister would consider the risk of the applicant sexually offending against children in a “hands on” way, rather than reoffending by possessing further child pornography; the Minister thereby denied him procedural fairness. For the reasons that follow, my conclusions in relation to the grounds raised by the applicant are as follows:(a)I reject the first and second grounds of review. The Minister was aware of the relevant submission made by the applicant and addressed the submission in the Statement of Reasons. The Minister gave proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the submission in the sense discussed in the cases. Accordingly, these grounds do not establish a denial of procedural fairness or a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction.(b)In relation to the third ground, I consider this ground to be made out. The principal basis upon which the Minister rejected the applicant’s submission outlined above was that there was a risk of the applicant committing “hands on” offending. But none of the applicant’s offences involved “hands on” offending and there was no suggestion that the applicant had ever engaged in such conduct. The applicant was not on notice that the Minister would be considering such offending. Although the Minister relied on statements in Dr Allnutt’s reports, these statements appear to be directed to a single group of sexual offenders (relating to both child pornography and hands on offending) and arguably were not intended to address the risk that the applicant might engage in “hands on” offending. In the circumstances, it was a denial of procedural fairness for the Minister to rely on the risk that the applicant might engage in “hands on” offending as the basis for rejection of his submissions relating to the risk to the Australian community.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court's decision hinged on the principles of procedural fairness and the consideration of relevant submissions by the Minister. Regarding the first and second grounds, the court noted that the Minister had indeed been aware of and addressed the applicant's submissions in the Statement of Reasons. The Minister's rejection of the submission was based on the applicant being assessed by Dr Allnutt as at the lower end of the spectrum for both child pornography offences and "hands on offending." The court found that the Minister had given proper, genuine, and realistic consideration to these submissions, as discussed in relevant case law. Therefore, these grounds did not demonstrate a denial of procedural fairness or a failure to exercise jurisdiction.

On the third ground, the court examined whether it was procedurally fair for the Minister to rely on the risk of "hands on" offending as a basis for rejecting the applicant's submissions. The court found that the applicant's previous offences did not involve "hands on" offending, and there was no evidence suggesting the applicant had engaged in such conduct. The court held that it was a denial of procedural fairness for the Minister to consider a risk that the applicant was not on notice of and that the applicant's submissions had not alerted the Minister to. This conclusion was based on the principle that a decision-maker must consider only those issues that are properly before it and provide the affected party with an opportunity to respond to those issues. The court found that the Minister's reliance on the risk of "hands on" offending, without proper notice to the applicant, breached this principle. This ground established a denial of procedural fairness. The ratio decidendi of this case is that a decision-maker must ensure that the affected party is aware of and can respond to all material issues considered in the decision-making process, especially when those issues have the potential to significantly impact the outcome.