FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BKS18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1731
File number: WAD 106 of 2018 Judge: BARKER J Date of judgment: 13 November 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for extension of time to apply for judicial review – where applicant’s Class XB, Subclass 200 Refugee (Permanent) visa cancelled on character grounds pursuant to s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection refused to revoke visa cancellation – whether Assistant Minister fell into jurisdictional error – whether Assistant Minister failed to consider a reason put forward in support of revocation which constituted a denial of procedural fairness – whether Assistant Minister failed to properly complete his statutory task – whether Assistant Minister misunderstood legal consequence of non-revocation decision – operation of s 197C and s 198 of the Act – whether Ministerial Direction 75 does not guarantee non-refoulement obligations will be assessed in a subsequent protection visa application as it does not bind the Minister – different nature of decisions under s 65 and s 501CA(4) – whether “practical injustice” as applicant deprived opportunity to have non-refoulement representations considered at stage of weighing up and discretion – application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 36(1C), 65, 65(1)(a)(ii), 195A, 197AB, 197C, 198, 499, 501, 501(3A), 501CA(4)
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment on Punishment. Opened for signature 10 December 1984. 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987)
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Opened for signature 28 July 1951. 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954) Art 33
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Opened for signature 16 December 1966. 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976)
Cases cited: Ali v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 650
AQM18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 944
BCR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 248 FCR 456; [2017] FCAFC 96
DMH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 253 FCR 576; [2017] FCA 448
DOB18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1523
Goundar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1203
Greene v Assistant Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 919
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BHA17 [2018] FCAFC 68
NKWF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 409
Picard v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1430
Steyn v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1131
Date of hearing: 13 September 2018 Registry: Western Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 120 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr HW Glenister Solicitor for the Applicant: Cathal Smith Legal Pty Ltd Counsel for the Respondent: Ms CR Walsh Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
WAD 106 of 2018 BETWEEN: BKS18
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
Respondent
JUDGE:
BARKER J
DATE OF…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1731
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that while the application was not dismissed on account of delay, the proposed ground of review lacked merit. The Assistant Minister had considered the applicant's representations and the documents submitted in support of those representations. However, the Assistant Minister concluded that the applicant represented an unacceptable risk to the Australian community and that the protection of the community outweighed other considerations. The court held that the Assistant Minister's decision was not affected by jurisdictional error or procedural unfairness, as he had considered the relevant factors and the legal obligations applicable to the decision.
The court also found that the Assistant Minister did not misunderstand the legal consequence of non-revocation, as the applicant would be deported as soon as reasonably practicable. The court further held that the differing nature of the assessment of a protection visa application, as opposed to the weighing of a discretion to revoke the cancellation of the applicant’s visa, did not affect the Assistant Minister's decision. Finally, the court held that Ministerial Direction 75 did not guarantee that non-refoulement obligations would be assessed in a subsequent protection visa application, as it did not bind the Minister.
The application was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs, to be assessed if not agreed. This decision underscores the importance of considering all relevant factors and legal obligations in making decisions under the Migration Act, and highlights the limited scope for judicial intervention in such decisions.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs, to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Assistant Minister concluded, at [68], that in reaching his decision about whether he was satisfied that there was another reason why the delegate’s decision should be revoked, that he considered that the applicant:represents an unacceptable risk of harm to the Australian community and that the protection of the Australian community outweighed any other considerations as described above. These include his relatively lengthy residence, international non refoulement obligations, familial ties to Australia and the hardship [the applicant] and his family will endure in the event the original decision was not revoked. (Emphasis added.) It will be noted that while the Assistant Minister, at [16] of his reasons, said it was unnecessary to determine whether non‑refoulement obligations were owed, as their existence or otherwise could be determined on a protection visa application, if made, at [68] he appears to have taken them into account. I do not think the Assistant Minister, in so stating intended to resile from his earlier statement that the question of non‑refoulement could be considered at the time a protection visa application was made. He was simply observing that notwithstanding that Australia may owe the applicant such an obligation, it did not persuade him that he should revoke the decision to cancel the visa.SHOULD THE APPLICATION BE DISMISSED BY REASON OF DELAY? The applicant filed an application for an extension of time to seek judicial review in this Court on 22 March 2018. By his accompanying affidavit made 15 March 2018, the applicant states in regard to the extension of time application:1. I … affirm I am the applicant and I swear this affidavit in support of my application for an extension of time to file my Form 70 originating application for review of migration decision, and for an extension of time in which to file this document.2. I am a sentenced prisoner at Acacia Prison. English is not my first language. I am very frightened to return to South Sudan.3. I did contact Legal Aid for assistance with these forms. They got back to me and I tried to fill them in but I didn’t know where to file them. I tried to file them but I think I only filed the waiver of fees form. I find it very difficult to understand what to do. Legal Aid did write me an email but I couldn’t get help at the prison to get the forms to the Court. Following preliminary orders made by the Court, the applicant appointed a pro bono lawyer on 17 July 2018. On 27 August 2018, the applicant filed an amended application for judicial review which outlines the following particularised ground of review:1. The Assistant Minister denied the Applicant procedural fairness, constructively failed to exercise his jurisdiction, or otherwise failed to carry out his statutory task, by failing to consider a ‘reason’ claimed by the Applicant as to why the decision to cancel his visa should be revoked. Further or alternatively, the Assistant Minister failed to take into account the Act and its operation in making his decision, or misunderstood the Act and its operation in making his decision.ParticularsI. At [13]-[14] of his reasons, the Assistant Minister noted the representations made by the Applicant as to the dangers he would face if returned to South Sudan. These representations were put forward by the Applicant as a reason why the decision to cancel his visa should be revoked (CB 89-90, 98, 107, 117, 129-133).II. At [15] of his reasons, the Assistant Minister stated that the practice of his Department was to process protection visa applications by assessing protection specific criteria before assessing other criteria. There is a direction under s 499 of the Act (Direction 75) requiring decision makers to process protection visa applications in this manner.III. At [16] of his reasons, the Assistant Minister considered that it was unnecessary for him to consider whether non-refoulement obligations were owed to the Applicant as the Applicant was able to make a valid protection visa application and the existence or otherwise of non-refoulement obligations owed to him would be determined in the course of that application.IV. The Assistant Minister failed to take into account that, firstly, Direction 75 is not binding on the Minister, secondly, that the legal consequence of non-revocation of the cancellation of the Applicant’s visa was that he would be deported as soon as reasonably practicable, and, thirdly, the differing nature of the assessment of a protection visa application as opposed to the weighing of a discretion to revoke the cancellation of the Applicant’s visa.