AQM18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AQM18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 944

File number: VID 146 of 2018
Judge: MOSHINSKY J
Date of judgment: 21 June 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection visa – where the Administrative Appeals Tribunal found that the applicant was a person in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations under s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the First Tribunal Decision) – where the Tribunal subsequently found that the discretion in s 501(1) to refuse the applicant’s visa on character grounds should not be exercised (the Second Tribunal Decision) – where the Minister exercised the power in s 501A(2) to set aside the Second Tribunal Decision and to refuse the applicant’s application for a protection visa – whether decision of the Minister affected by jurisdictional error on the basis that it was not made within a reasonable time – whether the Minister misunderstood the legal consequences of a decision to refuse the applicant a visa – whether the Minister failed to afford natural justice by making decision on a basis not disclosed to the applicant – whether the Minister’s decision was affected by apprehended bias
Legislation:

Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth)

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 136

Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36, 189, 195A, 197AB, 197C, 198, 499, 501, 501A

Cases cited:

ASP15 v Commonwealth (2016) 248 FCR 372

Bidjara Aboriginal Housing and Land Company Ltd v Indigenous Land Corporation (2001) 106 FCR 203

BMF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1530

Coco v R (1994) 179 CLR 427

Commonwealth v Fernando (2012) 200 FCR 1

Cotterill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 240 FCR 29

Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163

DMH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 253 FCR 576

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcty (2000) 205 CLR 337

Kardas v Australian Securities Commission (1998) 53 ALD 303

Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531

Koon Wing Lau v Calwell (1949) 80 CLR 533

Madafferi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) 118 FCR 326

McGovern v Ku-ring-gai Council (2008) 72 NSWLR 504

NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 220 FCR 1

NBNB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 220 FCR 44

NKWF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 409

Re Bolton; Ex parte Beane (1987) 162 CLR 514

Re Federal Commissioner of Taxation; Ex parte Australena Investments Pty Ltd (1983) 50 ALR 577

Re Patterson; Ex parte Taylor (2001) 207 CLR 391

Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425

Thornton v Repatriation Commission (1981) 52 FLR 285; 35 ALR 485

Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41

Wei v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1991) 29 FCR 455

Date of hearing: 26 April 2018
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number…
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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 944
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the applicant, AQM18, sought a judicial review of a decision by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to set aside a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and refuse her application for a protection visa. The applicant argued that the Minister's decision was made without jurisdiction, that the Minister misunderstood the legal consequences of refusing her a visa, that the Minister failed to afford natural justice by making a decision on a basis not disclosed to the applicant, and that the decision was affected by apprehended bias. The court was required to determine whether the Minister's decision was affected by jurisdictional error, whether the Minister misunderstood the legal consequences of a decision to refuse the applicant a visa, whether the Minister failed to afford natural justice, and whether the Minister's decision was affected by apprehended bias.

The court found that the Minister's decision was not made within a reasonable time and was therefore affected by jurisdictional error. The court also found that the Minister misunderstood the legal consequences of a decision to refuse the applicant a visa, as he did not consider the potential for using alternative management options to meet Australia's non-refoulement obligations in respect of the applicant. The court further found that the Minister failed to afford natural justice by making a decision on a basis that was not disclosed to the applicant, as he did not consider the applicant's co-operation with police and undertaking to give evidence for the prosecution. Finally, the court found that the Minister's decision was not affected by apprehended bias.

The court allowed the application for judicial review, set aside the Minister's decision, and remitted the matter to the Minister for reconsideration according to law. The court also ordered that the respondent pay the applicant's costs of the proceeding, subject to certain conditions. The reasons for the court's decision were to remain confidential to the parties to the proceeding until further order, and the parties were directed to file and serve a short submission as to the redactions that should be made to the court's reasons for judgment.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be allowed.

2. The decision of the respondent dated [redacted] be set aside.

3. The matter be remitted to the respondent for reconsideration according to law.

4. Subject to paragraph 5, the respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the proceeding, to be taxed if not agreed.

5. If either party seeks a variation of the costs order in paragraph 4, the party may within seven days give written notice to the Court and the other party. The Court will then make directions for the determination of the issue on the papers.

6. Until further order, on the ground that it is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, the reasons of the Court of the date of these orders are to remain confidential to the parties to the proceeding.

7. Within seven days, each party file and serve a short submission (or a joint submission) as to the redactions that should be made to the Court’s reasons for judgment. The Court will then publish a redacted form of its reasons.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

I indicated that I would defer ruling on this evidentiary issue and would include my ruling and reasons in my judgment. Neither party had any difficulty with this approach. In my opinion, it is appropriate to limit the use to be made of the statement in [56] of the Department’s Submission such that it is not received as truth of the proposition that the Minister had been invited to consider alternative management options, but only for the fact that this statement was made in the Department’s Submission. To the extent that the statement suggests that such an invitation had been made prior to the Department’s Submission, there is a danger that it may be unfairly prejudicial to the applicant or may be misleading or confusing. However, this ruling does not preclude the Minister from contending that the Department’s Submission itself constituted an invitation to consider alternative management options.Background factsThe applicant’s convictions On [redacted], the applicant was convicted of the following [redacted] charges (on an indictment): [redacted]. The applicant was also convicted of [redacted]. The circumstances of the offending were described in the reasons for sentence of the sentencing judge. The judge considered the offending to be “objectively most serious” and stated that it was “manifestly obvious” that such offending would customarily result in a substantial prison sentence. However, his Honour considered that “one salient feature” spared the applicant from serving such a lengthy prison sentence. This concerned the applicant’s co-operation with police (both Victoria Police and the Australian Federal Police) and undertaking to give evidence for the prosecution, as described in [25]-[27] of the reasons for sentence. The sentencing judge stated that the effect of the applicant’s undertaking was that she had implicated [redacted] other offenders and it was proposed that she would be called as a Crown witness in [redacted] trials that would be variously conducted in [redacted]. The sentencing judge stated that the overall value of the applicant’s evidence could only be regarded as high. His Honour also stated that, although the value of the applicant’s evidence varied between co-offenders, in respect of a number of individual accused, the applicant’s evidence was “of the highest value”. The sentencing judge stated that the assistance that the applicant had provided, coupled with her undertaking to give evidence in forthcoming trials, demanded “a very considerable sentencing discount”. Taking into account the applicant’s early guilty pleas and these matters, the applicant was sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of [redacted] in respect of the [redacted] charges on the indictment. [Redacted]. On [redacted], the applicant was released on parole, and taken into immigration detention.The applicant’s application for a protection visa On [redacted], the applicant applied for a protection visa. On [redacted], a delegate of the Minister refused her application for a protection visa.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On [redacted], the Minister decided to exercise the power in s 501A(2) to set aside the Second Tribunal Decision and refuse the applicant’s application for a protection visa (the Decision). The Minister provided a statement of reasons of the same date (the Statement of Reasons). In relation to international non-refoulement obligations, the Minister accepted that, in the First Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal had found that Australia had non-refoulement obligations towards the applicant. The Minister also stated that:(a)He was aware that the statutory consequence of a decision to refuse the applicant’s application for a protection visa was that she would become liable to removal from Australia under s 198 of the Migration Act as soon as reasonably practicable and, in the meantime, detention under s 189.(b)He was also aware that s 197C of the Migration Act provided that, for the purposes of s 198, it was irrelevant whether Australia had non-refoulement obligations in respect of an unlawful non-citizen.(c)He was also mindful that, at the time of insertion of s 197C in the Migration Act, the Government had indicated that Australia would “continue to meet its international non-refoulement obligations through other mechanisms and not through the removal powers in s198”.(d)These mechanisms included the use of the Minister’s personal non-compellable powers in the Migration Act, including the power in s 195A, under which the Minister could grant a visa to a person who was in immigration detention if the Minister considered it to be in the public interest to do so.(e)The potential for using s 195A in order to meet Australia’s international non-refoulement obligations was pertinent to the applicant’s case, and “this potential is encompassed in my consideration of alternative management options in relation to her”. It was common ground at the hearing before me that the expression “alternative management options” encompasses:(a)the exercise of power in s 195A, which is the Minister’s discretionary power to grant a person in immigration detention a visa, even if they have not applied for one; this power is sometimes used by the Minister to grant a bridging visa or a temporary safe haven visa; the effect of this is to permit the grantee to be lawfully in the community because he or she will be the subject of the visa; and(b)the exercise of the power in s 197AB to make a residence determination; the effect of this is, in simple terms, to require a person to live at a particular address outside of closed detention. Although the Statement of Reasons referred to the potential for using alternative management options to meet Australia’s non-refoulement obligations in respect of the applicant, on the same day that he made the Decision the Minister indicated that he did not require a submission on alternative management options. The present proceeding is an application for judicial review of the Decision. By her amended originating application, the applicant relies on the following grounds:(a)the Decision was made without jurisdiction because the purported exercise of the power under s 501A(2) was not done within a reasonable time;(b)the Minister failed to consider the correct operation of s 197C;(c)the Minister failed to afford the applicant natural justice, by making a decision on a basis that was not disclosed to the applicant prior to the Decision; and(d)the Decision was affected by apprehended bias, in that the Minister prejudged the matter.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Tribunal concluded, that, having regard, in particular, to the principles referred to in Direction 65 and the findings made in relation to those principles, the preferable decision was that the application for the visa not be refused.The Minister’s consideration of exercising the power in s 501A(2) On [redacted], the Department wrote to the applicant giving notice of an intention to consider refusal of her visa application under s 501A(2) of the Migration Act. It is convenient to set out the relevant parts of s 501A at this stage. Section 501A relevantly provides:501ARefusal or cancellation of visa—setting aside and substitution of non-adverse decision under subsection 501(1) or (2)(1) This section applies if:(a) a delegate of the Minister; or(b) the Administrative Appeals Tribunal;makes a decision (the original decision):(c)not to exercise the power conferred by subsection 501(1) to refuse to grant a visa to the person; or(d)not to exercise the power conferred by subsection 501(2) to cancel a visa that has been granted to a person;whether or not the person satisfies the delegate or Tribunal that the person passes the character test and whether or not the delegate or Tribunal reasonably suspects that the person does not pass the character test.Action by Minister—natural justice applies(2) The Minister may set aside the original decision and:(a) refuse to grant a visa to the person; or(b) cancel a visa that has been granted to the person;if:(c)the Minister reasonably suspects that the person does not pass the character test (as defined by section 501); and(d)the person does not satisfy the Minister that the person passes the character test; and(e)the Minister is satisfied that the refusal or cancellation is in the national interest.…Minister’s exercise of power(5)The power under subsection (2) or (3) may only be exercised by the Minister personally.(6)The Minister does not have a duty to consider whether to exercise the power under subsection (2) or (3) in respect of the original decision, whether or not the Minister is requested to do so, or in any other circumstances.Decision not reviewable under Part 5 or 7(7) A decision under subsection (2) or (3) is not reviewable under Part 5 or 7. The letter dated [redacted] outlined the effect of s 501A, a copy of which was attached to the letter. The letter also included a description of the term “national interest”, referring to Madafferi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) 118 FCR 326 and Re Patterson; Ex parte Taylor (2001) 207 CLR 391 at [83]. The letter invited the applicant to comment or provide information on whether she passed the character test and on whether or not the Minister should exercise the discretion to refuse the application for a visa. A copy of Direction 65 was enclosed. The letter stated:When the Minister makes a decision personally, he or she is not required to give consideration to Direction 65, though it provides a broad indication of the types of issues that he or she may take into account.