Eswaran v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Eswaran v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 496  

File number: QUD 401 of 2024
Judgment of: LONGBOTTOM J
Date of judgment: 16 May 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for judicial review of a migration decision – Where the Minister exercised the power under s 501BA(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) –Whether the migration decision is attended by jurisdictional error because the exercise of the power in s 501BA(2) is constrained by an implied time limit with which the Minister failed to comply – Whether the Minister was required to consider the effect of any delay between the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and the migration decision in making a decision under s 501BA(2) – Whether the Minister’s satisfaction that the migration decision was in the “national interest” was supported by logical grounds – Application for judicial review dismissed.
Legislation:

Constitution s 75

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 19

Immigration Act 1949 (Cth) s 4

Maritime Powers Act 2013 (Cth) ss 31, 32, 72

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 42, 65, 501, 501A, 501BA, 501CA

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 2.52(2)(b)

Cases cited:

ABT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2020) 269 CLR 439; [2020] HCA 34

AQM18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 FCR 424; [2019] FCAFC 27

AQM18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 944

Archer v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 471

Bidjara Aboriginal Housing & Land Co Ltd v Indigenous Land Corporation (2001) 106 FCR 203; [2001] FCA 138

BMF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1530

Chapman v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 24

CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor (2015) 225 CLR 514; [2015] HCA 1

Folkhard v Metropolitan Railway Co (1873) L.R. 8 C.P. 470

Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 263 CLR 1; [2017] HCA 33

GRCF v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 415

KDSP v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2020) 279 FCR 1; [2020] FCAFC 108

Koon Wing Lau v Calwell (1949) 80 CLR 533

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; [1986] HCA 40

Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs v EVE21 [2023] FCAFC 91

Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs v Thornton (2023) 276 CLR 136; [2023] HCA 17

Minogue v Victoria (2018) 264 CLR 252; [2018] HCA 27

Morgan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 266

NRFX v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 300 FCR 582; [2023] FCAFC 187

Pearson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] FCAFC 203

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476; [2003] HCA 2

Plaintiff S4/2014 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor (2014) 253 CLR 219; [2014] HCA 34

SZTAL v Minister…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCA 496
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Eswaran v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs concerns an application for judicial review of a decision made under section 501BA(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The applicant, Eswaran, challenged the Minister’s decision to cancel his visa on the basis of jurisdictional error, arguing that the exercise of the power under section 501BA(2) was constrained by an implied time limit, which the Minister failed to comply with. Additionally, Eswaran contended that the Minister should have considered the effect of any delay between the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and the migration decision. The applicant also questioned whether the Minister’s satisfaction that the cancellation was in the "national interest" was supported by logical grounds.

The central legal issues in the case revolved around whether the Minister’s decision to cancel Eswaran’s visa was flawed by an implied time limit, and whether the Minister was required to consider the delay in making the decision. The court also needed to determine if the Minister’s satisfaction that the cancellation was in the national interest was adequately reasoned. The court examined the statutory provisions and relevant case law, particularly focusing on the application of the “ordinary rule” as articulated in Koon Wing Lau v Calwell, to ascertain whether an implied time limit existed for exercising the power under section 501BA(2).

In its reasoning, the court concluded that there was no jurisdictional error in the Minister’s decision. The court found that the statutory provisions did not imply a time limit for the exercise of the power under section 501BA(2), and thus the argument for an implied time limit failed. The court further held that the Minister was not required to consider the delay in making the decision, and the Minister’s satisfaction that the cancellation was in the national interest was supported by logical grounds. The court dismissed the application for judicial review, finding no merit in the applicant’s grounds of review.

The final orders of the court were that the originating application for a review of the migration decision be dismissed and that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceedings, to be agreed or assessed. This decision underscores the stringent requirements for judicial review of migration decisions under the Migration Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The originating application for a review of a migration decision is dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceedings, to be agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 501BA of the Act is engaged when the Tribunal decides to revoke a cancellation decision (revocation decision) and provides as follows:501BACancellation of visa – setting aside and substitution of non-adverse decision under section 501CA(1) This section applies if:(a) a delegate of the Minister; or(b) the ART;makes a decision under section 501CA (the original decision) to revoke a decision under subsection 501(3A) to cancel a visa that has been granted to a person.Action by Minister—natural justice does not apply(2) The Minister may set aside the original decision and cancel a visa that has been granted to the person if:(a) the Minister is satisfied that the person does not pass the character test because of the operation of:(i)paragraph 501(6)(a), on the basis of paragraph 501(7)(a), (b) or (c); or(ii) paragraph 501(6)(e); and(b) the Minister is satisfied that the cancellation is in the national interest(3) The rules of natural justice do not apply to a decision under subsection (2).Minister’s exercise of power(4)The power under subsection (2) may only be exercised by the Minister personally.Decision not reviewable by application under Part 5(5) A decision under subsection (2) is not reviewable by application under Part 5.Note: For notification of decisions under subsection (2), see section 501G. The Court has jurisdiction to review a decision of the Minister under s 501BA(2) of the Act on the grounds of jurisdictional error: Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476; [2003] HCA 2 at [76] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ) with respect s 75(v) of the Constitution; see also at [3], [5] and [37] (Gleeson CJ) and at [160]-[163] (Callinan J). GROUNDS OF REVIEWGround One By his first ground of review, the applicant contends that the 501BA decision is attended by jurisdictional error because s 501BA(2) of the Act is constrained by an implied time limit – that the power be exercised within a reasonable time – with which the Minister failed to comply. The source of the implied time limit is said to be the “ordinary rule” expressed by Dixon J in Koon Wing Lau v Calwell (1949) 80 CLR 533, that where no time is specified in a statute for doing an act authorised or required by the statute, the act must be done within a reasonable time. Koon Wing Lau Koon Wing Lau relevantly involved a challenge to the validity of certain deportation orders made under the Immigration Act 1949 (Cth). By s 4(1) of the Immigration Act, the Minister could issue “a certificate of exemption in the prescribed form authorising the person named in the certificate (being a prohibited immigrant or an immigrant who may be required to pass the dictation test) to enter or remain in” Australia. Sub-section 4(4) relevantly provided that:Upon the expiration or cancellation of any such certificate the Minister may declare the person named in the certificate to be a prohibited immigrant and that person may thereupon be deported from the Commonwealth in pursuance of an order of the Minister.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

An issue arising in the proceeding was whether after the expiration or cancellation of a certificate under s 4(4) the Minister may, without any limitation of the time that elapses, make a declaration that a person is a prohibited immigrant and order their deportation. Justice Dixon answered that question at 573-574 as follows:The word “upon” in the expression “upon the expiration or cancellation” does not, I think, mean immediately upon and, as the Supreme Court of New South Wales has decided, it does mean “after”: Ex parte Lesiputty; Re Murphy [(1947) 47 S.R. (N.S.W.) 483; 64 W.N. 113]But, in accordance with the ordinary rule, that must be taken to mean within a reasonable time after the expiration and cancellation of the certificate of exemption. What is a reasonable time will depend upon all the facts, including the conduct of the person named in the certificate. It does not necessarily mean that by successfully evading the authorities for a long period of time, he can escape from the operation of sub-s (4). But the operation of sub-s. (4) is limited to a reasonable time after the expiry or cancellation of the certificate. (Emphasis added) Justice Dixon did not identify the source of the “ordinary rule”, but Williams J stated (at 590):I agree with the Supreme Court in Lesiputty’s Case that “upon” means “after” but it does not, in my opinion, mean an indefinite time afterwards but within a reasonable time afterwards: Folkhard v Metropolitan Railway Co. The Minister may make the declaration upon either the expiration or cancellation of the certificate. Presumably a certificate would not have been cancelled except for good cause and with a view to a declaration being made. I think that the sub-section means that the declaration must be made immediately or within a reasonable time after the expiration or cancellation of the certificate (Citations omitted) The parameters of the “ordinary rule” are not further elucidated by the reasons for judgment in Koon Wing Lau or the decision of Folkhard v Metropolitan Railway Co (1873) L.R. 8 C.P. 470 to which Williams J referred in the passage above. The applicant instead principally relies on two decisions, said to be illustrative of the respect in which the rule is to be applied: CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor (2015) 225 CLR 514; [2015] HCA 1 and KDSP v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2020) 279 FCR 1; [2020] FCAFC 108. CPCF The issue in CPCF was the scope of the power in s 72(4) of the Maritime Powers Act 2013 (Cth) to detain a person intercepted on a vessel in Australia’s contiguous zone and take them to another country irrespective of whether Australia had an agreement with that country to receive the person. The resolution of that question, for Kiefel and Keane JJ, required consideration of the application of the “ordinary rule” stated in Koon Wing Lau to s 72(4) of the Maritime Powers Act. Sub-section 72(4) provided: A maritime officer may detain the person and take the person, or cause the person to be taken, to a place (the destination).