BMF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BMF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1530

File numbers: VID 546 of 2016
VID 547 of 2016
Judge: BROMBERG J 
Date of judgment: 16 December 2016
Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – unreasonable delay in making a decision – Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), ss 7(1), 16(3) – where the Act requires the Minister to either approve or refuse to approve an application for citizenship – where the Act does not specify a time limit for performance of the duty – whether “unreasonable delay in making the decision” within meaning of s 7 ADJR Act; relevant question is whether by reference to the statutory scheme in which the decision‑making power is found there has been, in all of the circumstances, delay in making the decision which is not justified – where delay arises out of periods of inactivity the Minister has the onus of providing a meaningful explanation for the inactivity – where only part of a fourteen-month period of inactivity is satisfactorily explained – whether balance of unexplained inactivity amounts to unreasonable delay – unreasonable delay made out

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – legal unreasonableness – Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), ss 5(2)(g), 16(1) – where applicant failed to respond to an invitation to provide further identity documentation within the 35 days specified by the delegate – where the delegate made a decision to refuse the application on the 36th day without recourse to the applicant or his legal representatives – whether the delegate’s exercise of discretion to finalise the decision was legally unreasonable – whether such legal unreasonableness amounted to a jurisdictional error – whether the delegate’s failure to make inquiries of the applicant’s legal representatives amounted to legal unreasonableness and/or a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction or a breach of procedural fairness – the delegate’s failure to make inquiries amounts to jurisdictional error – whether jurisdictional error rendered the decision nugatory for all purposes and to be regarded as no decision at all

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – procedural fairness – Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), ss 5(1)(a), 16(1) – whether statutory scheme evinces an intention to curtail the content of procedural fairness – whether applicant given opportunity to respond to issues critical to the decision – whether the identification of an issue at a high level of generality is sufficient – whether applicant given opportunity to respond to adverse information – whether opportunity should have been afforded for applicant to respond to what delegate regarded as prior inconsistent statements – the delegate failed to afford procedural fairness – whether relief should be refused on the basis of the rule in Stead – no basis for considering that affording procedural fairness would have been futile

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – discretion to exercise jurisdiction and grant relief – Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), ss 10(2)(b)(ii), 16(1) – where a decision is made which had been the subject of an application for failure to make a decision – whether…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1530
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In BMF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicants, F and G, challenged the decisions of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to refuse their applications for Australian citizenship. The applicants argued that the Minister's delay in making these decisions was unreasonable, and that the refusal decisions were legally unreasonable and violated procedural fairness. They sought orders to set aside the refusal decisions and for the Minister to reconsider their applications. The Minister contended that the refusal decisions were valid and that the relief sought should be dismissed on discretionary grounds.

The court examined several key legal issues: whether there was an unreasonable delay in the Minister's decision-making, whether the refusal decisions were legally unreasonable and constituted jurisdictional errors, and whether procedural fairness was observed. The court held that there was indeed unreasonable delay, as the Minister had failed to justify the inactivity during part of the fourteen-month period. Additionally, the court found that the delegate's failure to make inquiries of the applicant’s legal representatives constituted a jurisdictional error. Consequently, the refusal decisions were deemed invalid and to be regarded as no decisions at all.

Given that the refusal decisions were found to be invalid, the court held that the Minister was yet to determine the applicants' citizenship applications. The court found no basis to refuse the relief sought on discretionary grounds, as the proceedings were sufficiently advanced. The court ordered that the refusal decisions be set aside, and directed the Minister to make a new decision on the applicants' citizenship applications within a specified timeframe. The Minister was also ordered to pay the applicants' costs of the proceeding.

Orders

Orders of the court

2. The decision of the delegate of the Respondent made on 15 July 2016 to refuse to approve the applicant’s application to become an Australian citizen be set aside with effect from the date of the decision.

3. On or before 28 February 2017, or such later date as may be agreed between the parties, the Respondent make a decision under s 24(1) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) to approve or refuse to approve the applicant becoming an Australian citizen.

4. The Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs of the proceeding.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

F and G, the applicants, had lodged applications for Australian citizenship under the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth). Following the lodgement of their applications, both F and G were invited to provide further identity documentation. Neither responded within the specified 35 days. Subsequently, on 15 July 2016, a delegate of the Minister made a decision to refuse G's citizenship application on the grounds that the delegate was not satisfied of G's identity and that G was not of good character. On 20 July 2016, a similar decision was made in respect of F, with the sole ground being that the delegate was not satisfied of F's identity. Both applicants sought judicial review of these decisions, contending that the refusal decisions were tainted by jurisdictional error and thus invalid. They further sought orders for the Minister to approve or refuse their citizenship applications anew.

The applicants, F and G, filed proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia seeking judicial review of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection's decisions to refuse their citizenship applications. The proceedings were brought under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act). The applicants contended that the decisions to refuse their citizenship applications were legally unreasonable, violated procedural fairness, and amounted to jurisdictional errors. The Minister, on the other hand, argued that the refusal decisions were valid and that the proceedings should be dismissed on discretionary grounds, including lack of utility.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 20 July 2016, some 8 weeks after F’s proceedings were commenced, a delegate of the Minister decided to refuse his application for citizenship. That decision (“F’s refusal decision”) was made on the basis that the delegate was not satisfied of F’s identity as required by s 24(3) of the Act. On 15 July 2016, some 7 weeks after G’s proceeding was instituted, a delegate of the Minister made a decision (“G’s refusal decision”) refusing G’s citizenship application because first, the delegate was not satisfied of the applicant’s identity as required by s 24(3), and second, the delegate was not satisfied that G was of good character as required by s 24(1A) in combination with s 21(2)(h) of the Act. Shortly after the refusal decisions were made, both F and G amended their applications to seek additional orders that the refusal decisions be set aside. They rely upon s 5 of the ADJR Act to raise a number of challenges including legal unreasonableness and various failures by the delegate to accord procedural fairness. In each case, it is contended that the refusal decision is tainted by jurisdictional error and, at law, is no decision at all. On that basis, F and G contended that the Minister is yet to determine whether to approve or refuse their citizenship applications and therefore they continue to press their claims for orders requiring the Minister to determine those applications. Whilst the Minister accepted that the determination of F and G’s citizenship applications were delayed, the Minister denied that there was unreasonable delay. The Minister contended that the applications have now been determined and that the refusal decisions are valid and effective. Accordingly, the Minister contended that the relief sought should be declined including because the proceedings have no utility and should be dismissed on discretionary grounds. There are common issues raised by each proceeding particularly in relation to whether there was unreasonable delay. The two proceedings were heard concurrently and evidence in one was received as evidence in both. These reasons commence by setting out the terms of relevant statutory provisions which will later be considered. I will then consider:(i)Whether there has been unreasonable delay in the Minister determining F and G’s citizenship applications; (ii)Whether F’s refusal decision is invalid and to be regarded as no decision at all;(iii)Whether G’s refusal decision is invalid and to be regarded as no decision at all;(iv)Whether the relief sought should be refused on discretionary grounds. RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS So far as is relevant, s 24(1) of the Act requires the Minister to either approve or refuse to approve an application made under s 21 of the Act. The Minister must not approve an application unless he is satisfied of the identity of the person (s 24(3)). Moreover, the Minister must not approve an application unless he is satisfied of the person’s eligibility for Australian citizenship (s 24(1A)). An applicant will only be eligible for Australian citizenship if the Minister is satisfied that the person is of good character (s 21(2)(h)).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined the issue of whether there had been unreasonable delay in the Minister determining F and G’s citizenship applications. The court held that the relevant question was whether, by reference to the statutory scheme in which the decision-making power is found, there had been delay in making the decision which is not justified. The court noted that the Minister had the onus of providing a meaningful explanation for periods of inactivity. In this case, only part of a fourteen-month period of inactivity was satisfactorily explained, and the balance of unexplained inactivity amounted to unreasonable delay. Therefore, the court held that the unreasonable delay was made out.

Next, the court considered whether F’s refusal decision was invalid and to be regarded as no decision at all. The court found that the delegate’s failure to make inquiries of the applicant’s legal representatives amounted to jurisdictional error. The court held that such jurisdictional error rendered the decision nugatory for all purposes and to be regarded as no decision at all.

In relation to G’s refusal decision, the court reached the same conclusion, finding that the delegate’s failure to make inquiries of the applicant’s legal representatives also amounted to jurisdictional error, rendering G’s refusal decision invalid and to be regarded as no decision at all.

Lastly, the court considered whether the relief sought should be refused on discretionary grounds. The court noted that the proceedings had been sufficiently advanced and there was no cause to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction and/or grant relief. The court held that there was no basis for considering that affording procedural fairness would have been futile and that the decision to grant relief would not be contrary to public policy.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that unreasonable delay in making a decision and jurisdictional error due to failure to afford procedural fairness can render a decision invalid and to be regarded as no decision at all. The court applied the principles established in prior authority and found no need to depart from or distinguish prior cases. The court followed the rule in Stead, which held that there is no basis for considering that affording procedural fairness would have been futile.