FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AQM18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 27
Appeal from: AQM18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 944 File number: VID 829 of 2018 Judges: BESANKO, WHITE AND THAWLEY JJ Date of judgment: 22 February 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from the Federal Court of Australia dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Minister to exercise the power in s 501A(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the Minister misunderstood the operation of ss 198 and 197C – whether the Minister erroneously understood that the appellant would not be refouled under s 198 of the Act – whether the primary judge erred in concluding that the Minister’s decision did not occur outside of a reasonable time Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 36(2C), 48A, 48B, 65, 195A, 197AB, 197C, 198, 417, 476A, 501, 501A, 501E
Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth)
Cases cited: AQM18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 944
Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63
BMF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1530
Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1
DMH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 253 FCR 576
FRH18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1769
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298
Koon Wing Lau v Calwell (1949) 80 CLR 533
SZSSJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 234 FCR 1
Date of hearing: 12 November 2018 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 132 Counsel for the Appellant: Ms GA Costello and Mr M Guo Solicitor for the Appellant: WLW Migration Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: Mr CJ Tran Solicitor for the Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers ORDERS
VID 829 of 2018 BETWEEN: AQM18
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent
JUDGES:
BESANKO, WHITE AND THAWLEY JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
22 FEBRUARY 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The cross-appeal be allowed.
3.The decision of the primary judge be set aside and in lieu thereof:
(a)the application be dismissed; and
(b)the applicant pay the respondent’s costs.
4.Unless either party applies within 7 days for a different order with respect to costs, the appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal and cross-appeal.
5.The parties file a joint submission indicating any redactions that should be made to the Court’s reasons for judgment (or competing submissions if agreement is not reached) on or before 12 noon on Tuesday, 26 February 2019. The Court will then consider publishing a redacted form of its reasons.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BESANKO AND THAWLEY JJ:
On 9 January 2018, the Minister for Home Affairs…
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- Case
- [2019] FCAFC 27
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine if the Minister correctly understood the legal consequences of his decision, particularly in light of the appellant's non-refoulement obligations. The primary judge had concluded that the Minister misunderstood the effect of a refusal of a Protection visa, but the cross-appeal contended otherwise. The court examined the Minister's reasons, particularly paragraphs [86] and [87], to assess his understanding. While paragraph [86] accurately summarised the statutory scheme, the court found that paragraph [87] indicated the Minister believed the appellant would not be refouled under s 198, which was legally incorrect. This misunderstanding was pivotal in the court's reasoning.
The court held that the primary judge did not err in concluding that the Minister's decision did not occur outside a reasonable time. The cross-appeal was allowed on the basis that the Minister misunderstood the consequences of his decision, leading to the conclusion that the Minister's reasons did not reflect a correct understanding of the legal framework. The appeal was dismissed, and the decision of the primary judge was set aside. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal and cross-appeal. The parties were also directed to submit any redactions they considered necessary for the Court’s reasons for judgment before a specified date.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The cross-appeal be allowed.
3. The decision of the primary judge be set aside and in lieu thereof:
(a) the application be dismissed; and
(b) the applicant pay the respondent’s costs.
4. Unless either party applies within 7 days for a different order with respect to costs, the appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal and cross-appeal.
5. The parties file a joint submission indicating any redactions that should be made to the Court’s reasons for judgment (or competing submissions if agreement is not reached) on or before 12 noon on Tuesday, 26 February 2019. The Court will then consider publishing a redacted form of its reasons.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Counsel for the Minister submitted that, apart from the content of [86]‑[87] of the reasons, a number of matters indicated that, contrary to the conclusion of the Judge, the Minister had made his decision on the basis of a correct understanding of the legal consequences of his decision and, in particular, that the Minister had understood that the effect of his decision would be subject to immediate removal from Australia. These were:(1)the summary of relevant aspects of the statutory scheme contained in [86] of the reasons was accurate;(2)the Minister had included the non‑refoulement obligations as a countervailing factor against the national interest in refusing a Protection visa. The submission was that there had been no need to do so had the Minister understood that the appellant would not be refouled in any event;(3)the Minister’s reasons are different from the template reasons which were the subject of the decision in DMH16. The evidence showed that much of the time which elapsed after the delivery of judgment in DMH16 on 3 May 2017 until the Minister made his decision was attributable to the Department’s consideration of the implications of that decision. In that circumstance, one would not readily infer that the Minister had made the same error as identified in DMH16, namely, misunderstanding the effect of a refusal of a Protection visa; and(4)the fact that the Minister’s reasons do not include consideration of indefinite detention is an indication that he must have understood that s 197C required refoulement.Consideration of the cross-appeal The first of the matters submitted by counsel should be accepted. Paragraph [86] of the Minister’s reasons does summarise accurately relevant aspects of the statutory scheme. The appellant’s argument that the Minister’s use of the words “become liable to” indicated an understanding by the Minister only that she would be “at risk” of removal is not persuasive. In context, the term “liable to” in [86] means “subject to”, in the sense of a legal obligation. I agree that this points against the Minister having had the misunderstanding attributed to him by the primary Judge. As to the second matter, the inclusion of non‑refoulement obligations as a countervailing factor is consistent with the Minister having a correct understanding. However, it is not decisive as it may indicate only that this was one matter, perhaps an important matter, which the Minister regarded as bearing on the decision. As to the third matter, I agree that it is natural to expect that the Minister had sought to avoid repeating the same error as identified in DMH16. The question remains, however, as to whether the Minister achieved that objective. The fourth matter to which counsel referred is consistent with the Minister having had a correct understanding but is, in some respects, a “boot straps” submission. In my view, the more critical matter is the understanding of what the Minister said in [86]‑[87] of his reasons. The primary Judge’s finding that the Minister had misunderstood the consequences of a refusal of a Protection visa turned principally on the first sentence in [87]. His Honour regarded that sentence as indicating an understanding of the Minister that a non‑citizen would not be refouled under s 198 in breach of Australia’s international non‑refoulement obligations, when, in law, that would be the effect of s 198 following his refusal of a Protection visa.