AQM18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AQM18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 27

Appeal from: AQM18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 944
File number: VID 829 of 2018
Judges: BESANKO, WHITE AND THAWLEY JJ
Date of judgment: 22 February 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from the Federal Court of Australia dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Minister to exercise the power in s 501A(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the Minister misunderstood the operation of ss 198 and 197C – whether the Minister erroneously understood that the appellant would not be refouled under s 198 of the Act – whether the primary judge erred in concluding that the Minister’s decision did not occur outside of a reasonable time
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 36(2C), 48A, 48B, 65, 195A, 197AB, 197C, 198, 417, 476A, 501, 501A, 501E

Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth)

Cases cited:

AQM18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 944

Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63

BMF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1530

Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1

DMH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 253 FCR 576

FRH18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1769

Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298

Koon Wing Lau v Calwell (1949) 80 CLR 533

SZSSJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 234 FCR 1

Thornton v Repatriation Commission (1981) 52 FLR 285

Water Board v Moustakas (1988) 180 CLR 491

Date of hearing: 12 November 2018
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 132
Counsel for the Appellant: Ms GA Costello and Mr M Guo
Solicitor for the Appellant: WLW Migration Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr CJ Tran
Solicitor for the Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers

ORDERS

VID 829 of 2018
BETWEEN:

AQM18

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Respondent

JUDGES:

BESANKO, WHITE AND THAWLEY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

22 FEBRUARY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed. 

2.The cross-appeal be allowed.

3.The decision of the primary judge be set aside and in lieu thereof:

(a)the application be dismissed; and

(b)the applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

4.Unless either party applies within 7 days for a different order with respect to costs, the appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal and cross-appeal.

5.The parties file a joint submission indicating any redactions that should be made to the Court’s reasons for judgment (or competing submissions if agreement is not reached) on or before 12 noon on Tuesday, 26 February 2019.  The Court will then consider publishing a redacted form of its reasons.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BESANKO AND THAWLEY JJ:

  1. On 9 January 2018, the Minister for Home Affairs…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCAFC 27
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The cross-appeal in AQM18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved a challenge by the appellant, a national of [redacted], against the Minister's decision to refuse her application for a Protection visa under s 501A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appellant, who had been sentenced in Victoria for multiple criminal offences, applied for a Protection visa following her release from prison. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal had previously found that Australia owed the appellant protection obligations under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act, but the delegate of the Minister refused her application on character grounds. On review, the Second Tribunal set aside the delegate's decision, but the Minister subsequently exercised his power under s 501A(2) to set aside the Second Tribunal’s decision and refuse the visa. The cross-appeal focused on whether the Minister misunderstood the operation of ss 198 and 197C of the Act, specifically whether he erroneously believed the appellant would not be refouled under s 198 in breach of Australia's international non-refoulement obligations.

The court had to determine if the Minister correctly understood the legal consequences of his decision, particularly in light of the appellant's non-refoulement obligations. The primary judge had concluded that the Minister misunderstood the effect of a refusal of a Protection visa, but the cross-appeal contended otherwise. The court examined the Minister's reasons, particularly paragraphs [86] and [87], to assess his understanding. While paragraph [86] accurately summarised the statutory scheme, the court found that paragraph [87] indicated the Minister believed the appellant would not be refouled under s 198, which was legally incorrect. This misunderstanding was pivotal in the court's reasoning.

The court held that the primary judge did not err in concluding that the Minister's decision did not occur outside a reasonable time. The cross-appeal was allowed on the basis that the Minister misunderstood the consequences of his decision, leading to the conclusion that the Minister's reasons did not reflect a correct understanding of the legal framework. The appeal was dismissed, and the decision of the primary judge was set aside. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal and cross-appeal. The parties were also directed to submit any redactions they considered necessary for the Court’s reasons for judgment before a specified date.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The cross-appeal be allowed.

3. The decision of the primary judge be set aside and in lieu thereof:

(a) the application be dismissed; and

(b) the applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

4. Unless either party applies within 7 days for a different order with respect to costs, the appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal and cross-appeal.

5. The parties file a joint submission indicating any redactions that should be made to the Court’s reasons for judgment (or competing submissions if agreement is not reached) on or before 12 noon on Tuesday, 26 February 2019. The Court will then consider publishing a redacted form of its reasons.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons which follow:(1)the cross-appeal should succeed;(2)the appeal should be dismissed;(3)the notice of contention and proposed amended notice of contention do not need to be considered.BACKGROUND The appellant is a citizen of [redacted]. She was arrested on [redacted] during an investigation by Victoria Police into a [redacted]. The appellant and her partner were identified as [redacted]. In [redacted], the appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for four years and three months for [redacted] offences. She pleaded guilty to three charges of [redacted]. She also pleaded guilty to a summary offence of dealing with property suspected of being the proceeds of crime. The County Court of Victoria’s reasons for sentence stated at [redacted]:[redacted] The appellant applied for a protection visa on [redacted]. Her application was refused by a delegate of the Minister. She sought review in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. On [redacted], the Tribunal (First Tribunal) found that the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) was satisfied. Its decision was in the following terms:The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration and directs that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm. On remittal, a delegate of the Minister refused her protection visa application on character grounds pursuant to s 501(1) of the Act. The appellant again applied for review. The Tribunal (Second Tribunal) set aside the delegate’s decision and substituted for it a decision that the discretion in s 501(1) to refuse the appellant’s visa on character grounds should not be exercised. On 9 March 2017, the Minister gave notice to the appellant that he was considering setting aside the Second Tribunal’s decision and refusing to grant her a visa pursuant to s 501A(2) of the Act. The appellant’s representative made submissions on behalf of the appellant, the last of which was made on 13 April 2017. On 9 January 2018, the Minister decided to exercise the power in s 501A(2) to set aside the decision of the Second Tribunal and refuse her application for a protection visa. In making that decision, and as discussed in further detail below, the Minister considered Australia’s international non-refoulement obligations which the first Tribunal had found Australia owed to the appellant.THE CROSS-APPEAL The cross-appeal centres on three paragraphs of the Minister’s decision:86.I am aware that the statutory consequence of a decision to refuse [the appellant]’s application for a Protection visa is that, as an unlawful non-citizen, [the appellant] would become liable to removal from Australia under s198 of the Act as soon as reasonably practicable, and in the meantime, detention under s189. I am also aware that s197C of the Act provides that for the purposes of s198, it is irrelevant whether Australia has non-refoulement obligations in respect of an unlawful noncitizen.87.I am also mindful that at the time of the insertion of s197C in the Act, the Government indicated that Australia will continue to meet its international non-refoulement obligations through other mechanisms and not through the removal powers in s198. These mechanisms included the use of the Minister's personal non-compellable powers in the Act, including the power in s195A under which I may grant a visa to a person who is in immigration detention if I think it is in the public interest to do so. I am aware that the potential for using s195A in order to meet Australia's international non-refoulement obligations is pertinent to [the appellant]’s case and this potential is encompassed in my consideration of alternative management options in relation to her.88.I have had regard to the existence of non-refoulement obligations in this case and I have carefully weighed this factor against my finding that it is in the national interest to refuse her application for a protection visa having regard to the seriousness of her criminal history and past involvement in organised criminal activity.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The primary judge did not err in concluding that there was not unreasonable delay.CONCLUSION The following orders should be made:(1)The appeal be dismissed. (2)The cross-appeal be allowed. (3)The decision of the primary judge be set aside and in lieu thereof:(a)the application is dismissed; and(b)the applicant pay the respondent’s costs.(4)Unless either party applies within 7 days for a different order with respect to costs, the appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal and cross-appeal.(5)The parties file a joint submission indicating any redactions that should be made to the Court’s reasons for judgment (or competing submissions if agreement is not reached) on or before 12 noon on Tuesday, 26 February 2019. The Court will then consider publishing a redacted form of its reasons. This appeal arises from a decision of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection under s 501A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) to refuse to grant the appellant a Protection visa. Factual setting The appellant is a [redacted] year old national of the [redacted]. She entered Australia in [redacted] Visa (having visited here on several occasions previously). On [redacted], the appellant was sentenced in the County Court of Victoria for multiple [redacted] related offences. A sentence of imprisonment of four years and three months with a non‑parole period of two years and three months was imposed. The sentencing Judge indicated that, had it not been for the appellant’s undertaking to assist authorities in the prosecution of other offenders, the sentence would have been for imprisonment for eight years and six months with a non‑parole period of six years and six months. By reason of time spent in custody before sentence, the appellant became eligible for parole on [redacted], and she was released from prison on that day. The appellant’s visa had been cancelled on [redacted]. Accordingly, on her release from prison, the appellant was immediately taken into immigration detention, where she has been held ever since. On [redacted], the appellant applied for a Protection visa. That application was refused by a delegate of the Minister. However, on [redacted], the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the First Tribunal) remitted the application for reconsideration. It was not satisfied that the appellant is a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) of the Act but was satisfied that Australia had protection obligations to her under s 36(2)(aa). It considered that the appellant’s cooperation with the police and prosecuting authorities meant that, if she were returned to [redacted], there was a real risk that she would be “arbitrarily deprived of her life” by people belonging to the [redacted] in retribution for her having given evidence against them. The Tribunal noted that this risk had been recognised in Australia because the appellant had been offered protection through a Witness Protection Program. The formal order of the First Tribunal was:The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration and directs that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Counsel for the Minister submitted that, apart from the content of [86]‑[87] of the reasons, a number of matters indicated that, contrary to the conclusion of the Judge, the Minister had made his decision on the basis of a correct understanding of the legal consequences of his decision and, in particular, that the Minister had understood that the effect of his decision would be subject to immediate removal from Australia. These were:(1)the summary of relevant aspects of the statutory scheme contained in [86] of the reasons was accurate;(2)the Minister had included the non‑refoulement obligations as a countervailing factor against the national interest in refusing a Protection visa. The submission was that there had been no need to do so had the Minister understood that the appellant would not be refouled in any event;(3)the Minister’s reasons are different from the template reasons which were the subject of the decision in DMH16. The evidence showed that much of the time which elapsed after the delivery of judgment in DMH16 on 3 May 2017 until the Minister made his decision was attributable to the Department’s consideration of the implications of that decision. In that circumstance, one would not readily infer that the Minister had made the same error as identified in DMH16, namely, misunderstanding the effect of a refusal of a Protection visa; and(4)the fact that the Minister’s reasons do not include consideration of indefinite detention is an indication that he must have understood that s 197C required refoulement.Consideration of the cross-appeal The first of the matters submitted by counsel should be accepted. Paragraph [86] of the Minister’s reasons does summarise accurately relevant aspects of the statutory scheme. The appellant’s argument that the Minister’s use of the words “become liable to” indicated an understanding by the Minister only that she would be “at risk” of removal is not persuasive. In context, the term “liable to” in [86] means “subject to”, in the sense of a legal obligation. I agree that this points against the Minister having had the misunderstanding attributed to him by the primary Judge. As to the second matter, the inclusion of non‑refoulement obligations as a countervailing factor is consistent with the Minister having a correct understanding. However, it is not decisive as it may indicate only that this was one matter, perhaps an important matter, which the Minister regarded as bearing on the decision. As to the third matter, I agree that it is natural to expect that the Minister had sought to avoid repeating the same error as identified in DMH16. The question remains, however, as to whether the Minister achieved that objective. The fourth matter to which counsel referred is consistent with the Minister having had a correct understanding but is, in some respects, a “boot straps” submission. In my view, the more critical matter is the understanding of what the Minister said in [86]‑[87] of his reasons. The primary Judge’s finding that the Minister had misunderstood the consequences of a refusal of a Protection visa turned principally on the first sentence in [87]. His Honour regarded that sentence as indicating an understanding of the Minister that a non‑citizen would not be refouled under s 198 in breach of Australia’s international non‑refoulement obligations, when, in law, that would be the effect of s 198 following his refusal of a Protection visa.