FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
EGH17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 308
File number(s): SYG 1376 of 2022 Judgment of: JUDGE LAING Date of judgment: 27 April 2023 Catchwords: MIGRATION – costs – application seeking an order requiring the Minister to make a decision on the applicant’s protection visa application within a specified period – where the application in these proceedings was dismissed by consent after the visa was granted – dispute as to costs. Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 417, 501, 501A
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) sch 2 and 4
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 214
Legislation: AQM18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 27; (2019) 268 FCR 424
ASP15 v Commonwealth [2016] FCAFC 145; 248 FCR 372
CGP21 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FedCFamC2G 11
EGH19 v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2) [2021] FCA 903
EGH19 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 692
ENT19 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] FCA 694
Love v Commonwealth [2020] HCA 3; (2020) 270 CLR 152
Re Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (Cth); Ex Parte Lai Qin [1997] HCA 6; (1997) 186 CLR 622
Thornton v Repatriation Commission [1981] FCA 76; (1981) 52 FLR 285
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 54 Date of hearing: Determined on the papers Place: Sydney Date of last submissions: 3 February 2023 Counsel for the Applicant: Dr J Donnelly Solicitor for the Applicant: Zarifi Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr B Kaplan Solicitor for the First Respondent Australian Government Solicitor Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
SYG 1376 of 2022 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: EGH17
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
order made by:
JUDGE LAING
DATE OF ORDER:
27 April 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The proceedings be finalised on the basis that each party bears their own costs.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE LAING
INTRODUCTION
These proceedings were commenced on 13 September 2022, by way of an application seeking that a writ of mandamus issue requiring the respondent to make a decision on the applicant’s protection visa application within 14 days of the orders sought.
On 26 October 2022, the applicant was granted a protection visa. The parties agreed that the substantive application was therefore nugatory and ought to be dismissed. An order was…
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- Case
- [2023] FedCFamC2G 308
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the applicant or the Minister was entitled to an award of costs, potentially on an indemnity basis, given that the substantive application had been rendered nugatory by the grant of the protection visa. Both parties argued that they clearly would have succeeded had the matter proceeded to a full hearing. The court had to determine the merits of these arguments while acknowledging the limited evidentiary basis upon which the court could make such a determination. The court considered the arguments put forward by both parties and the affidavits filed in support of their respective positions, but noted that the full merits of the substantive application had not been tested and that the court’s decision on costs was therefore limited by the nature of the submissions and evidence provided.
The court decided that neither party had clearly demonstrated that they would have succeeded in the substantive matter, and thus neither was entitled to an award of costs on an indemnity basis. The court acknowledged the complexity of determining whether unreasonable delay had occurred and recognised that a full hearing would have been required to properly assess the evidence and submissions. The court noted that the submissions on costs were relatively brief and did not provide additional insight beyond what had already been canvassed in the earlier submissions. Ultimately, the court found that the matter did not warrant an award of costs to either party. The court ordered that the costs of the proceedings be shared equally between the parties, reflecting the balanced nature of the submissions and the limited evidence upon which a decision on costs could be made.
The court's final order was that the costs of the proceedings be shared equally between the applicant and the Minister. This outcome reflects the court's conclusion that neither party had clearly demonstrated that they would have succeeded had the matter proceeded to a full hearing, and thus neither was entitled to an award of costs on an indemnity basis. The court's decision also recognises the limited nature of the submissions and evidence provided on the issue of costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In relation to the applicant’s criticisms regarding the affidavit relied upon by the Minister more generally, the Minister submitted that they were misconceived. The Minister emphasised that this evidence was provided in support of an application for costs, not a trial on the substantive matter. The applicant could have sought further information or documents before the date for written submissions, had he wished. The Minister submitted that it was unnecessary to have adduced evidence for the purposes of the costs dispute of the kind that would be required upon a final hearing of a substantive matter.CONSIDERATION Both parties sought to persuade the Court that they clearly would have succeeded in this matter, such that it would be appropriate to award costs in their favour (potentially on an indemnity basis). The difficulty with this is that determination of whether a writ such as that sought by the applicant ought to be issued is a serious, factually driven process. It is one that would have required the Court to have considered carefully all evidence of the circumstances relevant to determining whether or not unreasonable delay occurred. Had this matter proceeded to determination at final hearing, leave to rely upon more fulsome evidence than that which is presently before the Court would most likely have been sought. Such evidence would likely have been tested at hearing. The Court would also have had the benefit of submissions made at hearing. Elaboration could have been sought regarding the parties’ submissions. There also appears to be, potentially, some dispute between the parties as to the date from which unreasonableness was to be assessed. As noted above, the Minister submitted by reference to CGP21 that the relevant time for assessment was after the date that the Tribunal published its reasons for setting aside the fourth refusal decision and up to the date that proceedings were commenced. The applicant appears to have contemplated a broader factual inquiry, although did not deal with CGP21 or otherwise expressly grapple with authorities on the time for assessment in his submissions. Those submissions were filed after the Minister’s submissions in accordance with a schedule agreed between the parties. This is a matter, however, that could have been explored more fulsomely with the parties had a full and final hearing on the merits of the application occurred. It is possible that, after such a hearing, I may have accepted the Minister’s submission that, in all of the circumstances of this case, the relief sought by the applicant ought not to have been granted. It is also possible that the applicant may have persuaded me, after more fulsome testing of the evidence and submissions, that the application ought ultimately to have succeeded. As events have rendered full determination on the merits unnecessary, however, the Court has had more limited assistance from the parties. In addition to the affidavit filed in support of the originating application, two reasonably concise affidavits have been filed in support of the submissions on costs. Those submissions were relatively brief. An example of the brevity of those submissions is provided at [12] of the applicant’s submissions, where the applicant submitted that: “Thirdly, on the question of costs, the applicant relies upon the supporting evidence filed in these proceedings and the unreasonableness of the respondent’s conduct”. However, no additional indication was given as to what, if any, additional matters that the applicant wished for the Court to take into account, beyond those matters which had been canvassed earlier in the applicant’s submissions and which have been summarised above.