FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
EGH19 v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2) [2021] FCA 903
Table of Corrections 10 August 2021 In paragraph 53, “provided to the applicant’s representatives” has been replaced with “provided to the applicant”. ORDERS
NSD 261 of 2021 BETWEEN: EGH19
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
GRIFFITHS J
DATE OF ORDER:
5 AUGUST 2021
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The respondent’s decision dated 23 February 2021 be set aside.
2.The applicant’s application for a protection visa be remitted for reconsideration according to law.
3.The respondent pay the applicant’s costs, as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32…
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- Case
- [2021] FCA 903
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court identified several key legal issues, primarily whether the Minister had failed to meaningfully engage with the psychologist’s report and the applicant’s submissions on the risk of recidivism, and whether this constituted a failure to carry out his statutory task. The court noted that the Minister’s reasons for refusal did not explicitly address the risk of recidivism as set out in the applicant’s submissions, leading to concerns that the Minister had not engaged in the requisite active intellectual process. The court considered relevant legal principles, emphasizing the importance of giving meaningful consideration to claims that have been squarely raised and clearly articulated, and the need to maintain the distinction between judicial review and merits review.
The court concluded that the Minister’s reasons reflected a fundamental misunderstanding of the reports on the risk of recidivism and failed to engage in an active intellectual process. The court held that the Minister’s failure to meaningfully consider the psychologist’s report and the applicant’s submissions rendered the decision legally unreasonable. As a result, the Minister’s decision was set aside, and the matter was remitted for reconsideration according to law. The court also ordered that the Minister pay the applicant’s costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The respondent’s decision dated 23 February 2021 be set aside.
2. The applicant’s application for a protection visa be remitted for reconsideration according to law.
3. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs, as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
To avoid adding unnecessarily to the length of these reasons for judgment, I will not separately summarise the parties’ respective submissions on these grounds. Instead, I will address the primary relevant submissions in my reasons for judgment below. Consideration and determination It is convenient to deal with the two grounds of review in turn. (a) Failure to carry out statutory task The core of this ground is that the Minister failed to discharge his statutory task because he failed actively to engage in the requisite active intellectual process with respect to the expert psychologist’s report obtained by the applicant from Mr Patrick Sheehan relating to the risk of the applicant re-offending. Detailed submissions were made by the applicant on the significance of this report and a full copy was provided to the Department and was placed before the Minister. It is notable that while the Minister’s statement of reasons refers in a few paragraphs to Mr Sheehan’s report, nowhere in that statement did the Minister explicitly address the submissions on the risk of recidivism as set out in the submissions dated 23 November 2020. (i) Some relevant legal principles summarised It is convenient to set out in full my summary in the first EGH19 judgment at [51] of the relevant principles relating to a claim that a decision-maker has failed meaningfully to engage with a substantial claim or submission (see also SZSSC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 863 at [75]-[81] per Griffiths J) (emphasis in original):51 The relevant primary principles may be summarised as follows.(a)Careful attention must be paid to the relevant statutory provisions applicable to the decision which is the subject of challenge. Some of the cases referred to above relate to different Ministerial powers under the [Migration Act], including ss 501A(2), 501CA(3), 501CA(3A) and 501CA(4). Some of those powers make explicit reference to an applicant’s statutory entitlement to make representations to the Minister as to why a particular decision should be revoked. There is no express reference to “representations” in s 501(1). It is indisputable, however, as is made explicit in the heading to the sub-section, that the exercise of the Minister’s power under that provision is subject to the requirements of natural justice (in contrast with the position under s 501(3)). Natural justice requires the Minister to provide a person such as the applicant here with an opportunity to respond to a proposal to refuse to grant a visa under s 501(1), including by making submissions or representations. In those circumstances, I consider that the general principles outlined in cases relating to “representations” also apply generally to the exercise of power under s 501(1). (b)The material provided by the applicant as part of his or her natural justice rights in the s 501(1) decision-making process plays an important part in the Minister’s determination of whether or not he or she should exercise the power under that provision to refuse to grant a person a visa if the Minister is not satisfied that the person passes the character test. The Minister is obliged to give meaningful consideration to a submission which is squarely raised or clearly articulated. (c)Whether a claim has been squarely raised or clearly articulated will depend upon the facts and circumstances of an individual case. A claim or submission which is unsupported by any other material and is essentially a bare assertion is unlikely to constitute a claim or submission which has been squarely raised or clearly articulated. (d)In assessing whether this particular type of jurisdictional error has been established, it is critical to bear in mind the need to maintain the distinction between review of legality and merits review. This was emphasised by the Full Court in AXT19 at [56]:56.Considerable caution needs to be exercised in resolving an argument that a claim has been made in sufficiently clear terms that it should in turn be considered by the Tribunal. The greater the degree of clarity in which a claim has been made and advanced for consideration, the greater may be the need for the Tribunal to consider the claim in clear terms. Conversely, the more obscure and less certain a claim is said to have been made, the less may be the need for the Tribunal to consider the claim. The need for caution arises lest a reviewing Court is propelled from its sole task of undertaking judicial review and into the murky waters of impermissible merits review. The task of a court undertaking judicial review is not to elevate a statement that may have been made in passing by a claimant into a clearly articulated claim in need of resolution. For a Court undertaking judicial review to engage in such a process has all the dangers of the Court resolving a different factual case to the one advanced to the Tribunal and thereby trespassing into merits – and not judicial – review.(e)Careful consideration must also be given to the individual facts and circumstances of a particular case in determining whether or not the decision-maker has engaged in an active intellectual process and meaningfully considered a claim or submission which has been squarely raised. Some of the considerations which may be relevant to that assessment were identified by the Full Court in EVK18. They include whether the decision-maker’s reasons indicate that:(i)the decision-maker has not merely repeated the relevant claim, but has gone further and demonstrated an understanding of the factual basis upon which the claim has been made;(ii)the use of terms in a statement of reasons such as “acknowledge”, “note” and “I have taken into account” need to be read in context with a view to assessing whether they simply repeat the claim or submission which has been made or rather whether they are to be understood as an acceptance by the decision-maker that there is a factual substance to the claim or submission.(f)Although each case necessarily turns upon its own particular facts and circumstances, it may be noted, again by way of general guidance, that in EVK18 the Full Court explained at [35] why it was satisfied that the Assistant Minister there had engaged in an active intellectual process and that his reasons were more than a mere repetition of a claim. Rather, the use of terms there such as “acknowledge” and “I have taken into account”, when read in context, went beyond simply repeating the claim made and were to be understood as the Assistant Minister accepting that there was factual substance to the claim. The Full Court concluded at [35] as follows:… Such consideration of the materials of relevance to the claim in respect to “mental health” goes well beyond, for example, those statements of reasons to be found in other cases which merely summarise the claims made and thereafter make no attempt to go back and try to relate those claims to the materials relied upon and to each of the matters raised for consideration. The variety of references to the materials or relevance to the Appellant’s “mental health” expose an active consideration of the relevance of those claims to the matters otherwise required to be taken into account. (g)In GBV18 at [32(d)] the Full Court reaffirmed the Chief Justice’s important observations in an earlier case, which in their terms are directed to s 501 generally and not merely to s 501CA(3) (emphasis added):The decision-maker’s obligation to engage in an active intellectual process with significant and clearly expressed relevant representations made in response to an invitation under s 501CA(3)(b) is consistent with the observations of the Chief Justice in Hands v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 225; 364 ALR 423 at [3] (with whom Markovic and Steward JJ agreed) (emphasis in original): By way of preliminary comment, it can be said that cases under s 501 and the question of the consequences of a failure to pass the character test not infrequently raise important questions about the exercise of Executive power. Among the reasons for this importance are the human consequences removal from Australia can bring about. Public power, the source of which is in statute, must conform to the requirements of its statutory source and to the limitations imposed by the requirement of legality. Legality in this context takes its form and shape from the terms, scope and policy of the statute and fundamental values anchored in the common law: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1 at 5 [9]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 357 ALR 408 at 423 [59]. The consequences of these considerations are that where decisions might have devastating consequences visited upon people, the obligation of real consideration of the circumstances of the people affected must be approached confronting what is being done to people. This obligation and the expression of its performance is not a place for decisional checklists or formulaic expression. Mechanical formulaic expression and pre-digested shorthand expressions may hide a lack of the necessary reflection upon the whole consideration of the human consequences involved. Genuine consideration of the human consequences demands honest confrontation of what is being done to people. Such considerations do not detract from, indeed they reinforce, the recognition, in an assessment of legality, that those entrusted with such responsibility be given the freedom of lawful decision-making required by Parliament. (h)Another important guideline is that identified by the Full Court in GBV18 at [32(e)] regarding the need, at least in some cases, for the decision-maker to make specific findings of fact as part of the process of giving meaningful consideration to a claim (or submission) which has been clearly articulated:(e) Giving meaningful consideration to a clearly articulated and substantial or significant representation on risk of harm independently of any claim concerning Australia’s non-refoulement obligations, may require the decision-maker to do more than simply acknowledge or note that the representations have been made. As stated at Omar at [39], depending on the nature and content of the representations, the decision-maker “may be required to make specific findings of fact, including on whether the feared harm is likely to eventuate, by reference to relevant parts of the representations in order that this important statutory decision-making process is carried out according to law”.(i)It is not suggested that the Minister must always make findings of fact in respect of every claim or contention of a person in the applicant’s position. That is made clear in binding authorities such as Minister for Home Affairs v Buadromo[2018] FCAFC 151 at [46]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Maioha [2018] FCAFC 216 at [41] and Minister for Home Affairs v Ogawa [2019] FCAFC 98 at [103]. (j)A finding that a decision-maker has not engaged in a meaningful or active intellectual process will not lightly be made (Carrascalao at [48]). As has been emphasised, each case necessarily turns on its own facts and circumstances. Moreover, in accordance with well-established authorities, a statement of reasons is not to be read with an eye finely attuned to the detection of error (noting, however, the need not to overstate that principle, as observed by Bell P and Payne JA recently in Ballas v Department of Education (State of NSW) [2020] NSWCA 86 at [79] and [80]).