EGH19 V Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

EGH19 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 692

File number: NSD 1773 of 2019
Judge: GRIFFITHS J
Date of judgment: 25 May 2020
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – judicial review of a decision by the Minister under s 501(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa on the basis that the Minister was not satisfied that the applicant passes the “character test” – hearing and determination of a separate question  as to whether ground 1 of the further amended originating application should be upheld  – whether the Minister failed to carry out the required statutory task by failing to engage in an active intellectual way with the submissions and the evidence provided by the applicant in relation to the risk of harm that he faced if returned to his country of origin – whether the Minister failed to make relevant and specific findings underpinning his conclusion that non-refoulement obligations existed – whether the Minister addressed the applicant’s submissions regarding complementary protection at a level of generality, which failed to meet the requirements of a meaningful consideration of those submissions – extension of time granted – separate question answered “Yes” – Minister’s decision set aside and the applicant’s application for a protection visa remitted for reconsideration according to law
Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 25D

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5(1), 5J, 36(2)(aa), 36(2A), 65, 501(1), 501(3A), 501(6), 501(7), 501A(2), 501CA(3), 501CA(3A), 501CA(4) and 501CA(4), 501G

Migration Amendment (Complementary Protection) Bill 2011 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Splendido [2019] FCAFC 132

AXT19 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 32

BAL19 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 2189

Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 107; 252 FCR 352

CCF20 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 676

EVK18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 49

GBV18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 17

Minister for Home Affairs v Buadromo [2018] FCAFC 151 Minister for Home Affairs v Ogawa [2019] FCAFC 98

Minister for Home Affairs v Omar [2019] FCAFC 188; 373 ALR 569

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Maioha [2018] FCAFC 216

SYLN v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCA 1986

Date of hearing: 12 May 2020
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 74
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr N Poynder
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr B Lim
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 1773 of 2019
BETWEEN:

EGH19

Applicant
AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

Respondent

JUDGE:

GRIFFITHS J

DATE OF ORDER:

25 MAY 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Time is extended for the applicant to rely upon the further amended originating application. 

2.By consent, ground 1 of the further amended originating application be heard and determined as a preliminary and separate question…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 692
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of EGH19 v Minister for Home Affairs involved a challenge by the applicant, a non-citizen who had been convicted of murder in Australia, against the Minister’s decision under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to refuse to grant him a protection visa on the basis that he did not pass the character test. The court was required to determine whether the Minister failed to engage meaningfully with the applicant's submissions and evidence regarding the risk of harm he faced if returned to his country of origin, and whether the Minister adequately addressed the applicant’s claims about complementary protection. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia.

The court’s reasoning focused on the principles of judicial review in administrative law, particularly the obligation of the decision-maker to engage in an active intellectual process with submissions made by the applicant. The court examined the Minister's statement of reasons to determine if there was a meaningful consideration of the applicant's claims. It was found that the Minister’s consideration of the applicant’s risk of arbitrary deprivation of life was inadequate, as the Minister did not explicitly address the specific nature of the risk as articulated by the applicant and accepted by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. Furthermore, the Minister’s reasons did not reflect a thorough consideration of the applicant’s individual circumstances, including his particular vulnerability and the systemic breakdown of law enforcement in his country of origin.

The court concluded that the Minister’s decision was flawed due to a failure to engage meaningfully with the applicant’s submissions and evidence. The Minister’s decision to refuse the applicant a protection visa was set aside, and the matter was remitted for reconsideration according to law. The court also ordered that the Minister pay the applicant’s costs related to the hearing and determination of the separate question. The parties were granted liberty to apply to relist the matter for hearing and determination of another ground of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Time is extended for the applicant to rely upon the further amended originating application.

2. By consent, ground 1 of the further amended originating application be heard and determined as a preliminary and separate question pursuant to rule 30.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the separate question being whether ground 1 of the further amended originating application should be upheld.

3. The answer to the separate question is “Yes”.

4. The Minister’s decision dated 11 September 2019 is set aside.

5. The applicant’s application for a protection visa is remitted for reconsideration according to law.

6. The Minister pay the applicant’s costs with respect to the hearing and determination of the separate question, as agreed or taxed.

7. The parties have liberty to apply on the giving of 48 hours’ notice to have the matter relisted concerning the hearing and determination of ground 2 of the further amended originating application.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

A hearing in relation to ground 1 was conducted on 12 May 2020 via Microsoft Teams in response to the constraints imposed upon physical attendance in Court by the COVID-19 pandemic. Summary of background matters Before outlining the applicant’s migration history, it is convenient to describe his criminal record. Having regard to s 91X of the Act, I will redact references to the applicant’s name and other matters which might disclose his identity, including his country of origin. In July 2005, when the applicant was barely 16 years old, he was convicted of one count of murder. In November 2006, he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 22 years with a non-parole period of 15 years and 6 months. On appeal, on 8 November 2013, this sentence was quashed and replaced with a sentence of a term of imprisonment of 17 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 12 years and 6 months. The following summary of background facts relies heavily on findings of fact made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) in relation to the applicant’s successful review of the delegate’s original decision refusing the applicant a protection visa. The applicant, who is now 30 years old, was born overseas. He first arrived in Australia in 2000 together with his parents and two younger siblings. His older brother remains in his country of origin. The AAT noted at [44] of its reasons for decision that the applicant gave evidence that he had not had any contact with his elder brother and did not know about his current circumstances. The AAT accepted the evidence of both the applicant and his father that the applicant had had no contact with his brother while he had been incarcerated and that the prospects of him being able to call upon his brother in his country of origin were “remote” (at [98]). The family returned to that country in 2002 but then came back to Australia in early 2004, where the applicant has remained ever since. In January 2013, the applicant’s family in Australia (apart from himself) applied for protection visas. In brief, the applicant’s father, who was the primary applicant, stated that he and his family would suffer significant harm in their country of origin, including because there had been ethnic clashes between the father’s tribe and people from other parts of that country. The applicant himself was not included in that protection visa application. The AAT noted at [27] that this was because, as the applicant understood, his father was afraid that the applicant’s criminal history would have an adverse effect on the rest of the family’s application. The family’s protection visa application succeeded after the then Refugee Review Tribunal determined on 6 June 2014 that there was a real chance that the primary applicant would suffer serious harm in his home town because of his membership of a particular social group, namely his membership of a particular tribe and the inter-tribal or ethnic-based violence in the relevant area of the country of origin.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The AAT’s core reasoning on this matter is reflected in [126] to [128] of its reasons for decision (footnotes omitted, identifying information redacted and emphasis added):126.Having regard to these authorities, the commentary in the Complementary Protection Guidelines and the ordinary meaning of the words, we find that arbitrary deprivation of life can encompass the situation where an applicant's life is in danger because of his or her particular circumstances in circumstances where there is widespread violence and systemic breakdown of law enforcement, even where the danger is posed by a non-state actor. As such, the Guidelines recognise that there are two elements that must be satisfied. Firstly, there must be widespread violence and systemic breakdown of law enforcement. Secondly, the real risk of harm must relate to the applicant's particular circumstances.127.In the present case, the country information before us supports a conclusion that there are widespread conditions of violence and a systemic breakdown of law enforcement in [country of origin], and in particular [a city]. This is evidenced by a substantial body of independent information about the high level of violent crime in [country of origin]. 128.On the basis of this evidence, we find that the applicant faces a real risk of arbitrary deprivation of life and that this risk is faced by the applicant personally, and therefore s.36(2B)(c) (which provides that there is taken not to be a real risk that an applicant will suffer significant harm in a country if 'the real risk is one faced by the population generally and is not faced by the applicant personally') does not apply. In SZSPT v MIBP, the Federal Court reasoned that the ‘faced personally’ element of this qualification requires the individual to face a risk of differential treatment, or because of characteristics that distinguish them from the general populace. In the present case we take into consideration the following in respect of the applicant's particular circumstances. His medical condition is not the key driver; it is merely one of the factors that contribute to his particular circumstances and to his potential vulnerability to being killed by criminals, or possibly tribal rivals, in the settlements. In addition to this we have considered his association with his father, possible notoriety from his own criminal conviction in Australia, and social isolation as a result of lack of family or [redacted] support. These factors individually and cumulatively distinguish the applicant from the population generally and the real risk of arbitrary deprivation of life is one that is faced by the applicant personally on account of his particular circumstances. The AAT remitted the matter for reconsideration with a direction that the applicant satisfied s 36(2)(aa) insofar as “there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm”.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Sub-section 65(1) relevantly provides:65 Decision to grant or refuse to grant visa(1)Subject to sections 84 and 86, after considering a valid application for a visa, the Minister:(a) if satisfied that:(i)the health criteria for it (if any) have been satisfied; and(ii)the other criteria for it prescribed by this Act or the regulations have been satisfied; and(iii)the grant of the visa is not prevented by section 40 (circumstances when granted), 91W (evidence of identity and bogus documents), 91WA (bogus documents and destroying identity documents), 91WB (applications for protection visas by members of same family unit), 500A (refusal or cancellation of temporary safe haven visas), 501 (special power to refuse or cancel) or any other provision of this Act or of any other law of the Commonwealth; and(iv)any amount of visa application charge payable in relation to the application has been paid;is to grant the visa; or[Notes omitted]. Sub-sections 501(1), (6) and (7) of the Act relevantly provide:Refusal or cancellation of visa on character grounds Decision of Minister or delegate – natural justice applies (1)The Minister may refuse to grant a visa to a person if the person does not satisfy the Minister that the person passes the character test. Note: Character test is defined by subsection (6).…Character test (6) For the purposes of this section, a person does not pass the character test if: (a)the person has a substantial criminal record (as defined by subsection (7)); or…Substantial criminal record (7)For the purposes of the character test, a person has a substantial criminal record if:…(c)the person has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more; or… Although ground 1 refers to the Minister’s statutory task under s 65 of the Act, it is plain that the applicant also challenged the Minister’s related statutory function under s 501(1) and the hearing was conducted on that basis. Relevant caselaw summarised The relevant primary legal principles relating to a claim of jurisdictional error because of a decision-maker’s failure meaningfully to engage with a claim or submission are set out in cases such as Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 107; 252 FCR 352, Omar, GBV18, AXT19, EVK18 and SYLN v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCA 1986 at [106] to [110] per Griffiths J, and the other relevant authorities referred to in those cases. The relevant primary principles may be summarised as follows.(a)Careful attention must be paid to the relevant statutory provisions applicable to the decision which is the subject of challenge. Some of the cases referred to above relate to different Ministerial powers under the Act, including ss 501A(2), 501CA(3), 501CA(3A) and 501CA(4). Some of those powers make explicit reference to an applicant’s statutory entitlement to make representations to the Minister as to why a particular decision should be revoked. There is no express reference to “representations” in s 501(1). It is indisputable, however, as is made explicit in the heading to the sub-section, that the exercise of the Minister’s power under that provision is subject to the requirements of natural justice (in contrast with the position under s 501(3)). Natural justice requires the Minister to provide a person such as the applicant here with an opportunity to respond to a proposal to refuse to grant a visa under s 501(1), including by making submissions or representations. In those circumstances, I consider that the general principles outlined in cases relating to “representations” also apply generally to the exercise of power under s 501(1). (b)The material provided by the applicant as part of his or her natural justice rights in the s 501(1) decision-making process plays an important part in the Minister’s determination of whether or not he or she should exercise the power under that provision to refuse to grant a person a visa if the Minister is not satisfied that the person passes the character test. The Minister is obliged to give meaningful consideration to a submission which is squarely raised or clearly articulated. (c)Whether a claim has been squarely raised or clearly articulated will depend upon the facts and circumstances of an individual case. A claim or submission which is unsupported by any other material and is essentially a bare assertion is unlikely to constitute a claim or submission which has been squarely raised or clearly articulated. (d)In assessing whether this particular type of jurisdictional error has been established, it is critical to bear in mind the need to maintain the distinction between review of legality and merits review. This was emphasised by the Full Court in AXT19 at [56]:56.Considerable caution needs to be exercised in resolving an argument that a claim has been made in sufficiently clear terms that it should in turn be considered by the Tribunal. The greater the degree of clarity in which a claim has been made and advanced for consideration, the greater may be the need for the Tribunal to consider the claim in clear terms. Conversely, the more obscure and less certain a claim is said to have been made, the less may be the need for the Tribunal to consider the claim. The need for caution arises lest a reviewing Court is propelled from its sole task of undertaking judicial review and into the murky waters of impermissible merits review. The task of a court undertaking judicial review is not to elevate a statement that may have been made in passing by a claimant into a clearly articulated claim in need of resolution. For a Court undertaking judicial review to engage in such a process has all the dangers of the Court resolving a different factual case to the one advanced to the Tribunal and thereby trespassing into merits – and not judicial – review.(e)Careful consideration must also be given to the individual facts and circumstances of a particular case in determining whether or not the decision-maker has engaged in an active intellectual process and meaningfully considered a claim or submission which has been squarely raised. Some of the considerations which may be relevant to that assessment were identified by the Full Court in EVK18. They include whether the decision-maker’s reasons indicate that:(i)the decision-maker has not merely repeated the relevant claim, but has gone further and demonstrated an understanding of the factual basis upon which the claim has been made;(ii)the use of terms in a statement of reasons such as “acknowledge”, “note” and “I have taken into account” need to be read in context with a view to assessing whether they simply repeat the claim or submission which has been made or rather whether they are to be understood as an acceptance by the decision-maker that there is a factual substance to the claim or submission.(f)Although each case necessarily turns upon its own particular facts and circumstances, it may be noted, again by way of general guidance, that in EVK18 the Full Court explained at [35] why it was satisfied that the Assistant Minister there had engaged in an active intellectual process and that his reasons were more than a mere repetition of a claim. Rather, the use of terms there such as “acknowledge” and “I have taken into account”, when read in context, went beyond simply repeating the claim made and were to be understood as the Assistant Minister accepting that there was factual substance to the claim. The Full Court concluded at [35] as follows: …Such consideration of the materials of relevance to the claim in respect to “mental health” goes well beyond, for example, those statements of reasons to be found in other cases which merely summarise the claims made and thereafter make no attempt to go back and try to relate those claims to the materials relied upon and to each of the matters raised for consideration. The variety of references to the materials or relevance to the Appellant’s “mental health” expose an active consideration of the relevance of those claims to the matters otherwise required to be taken into account. (g)In GBV18 at [32(d)] the Full Court reaffirmed the Chief Justice’s important observations in an earlier case, which in their terms are directed to s 501 generally and not merely to s 501CA(3) (emphasis added):The decision-maker’s obligation to engage in an active intellectual process with significant and clearly expressed relevant representations made in response to an invitation under s 501CA(3)(b) is consistent with the observations of the Chief Justice in Hands v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 225; 364 ALR 423 at [3] (with whom Markovic and Steward JJ agreed) (emphasis in original): By way of preliminary comment, it can be said that cases under s 501 and the question of the consequences of a failure to pass the character test not infrequently raise important questions about the exercise of Executive power. Among the reasons for this importance are the human consequences removal from Australia can bring about. Public power, the source of which is in statute, must conform to the requirements of its statutory source and to the limitations imposed by the requirement of legality. Legality in this context takes its form and shape from the terms, scope and policy of the statute and fundamental values anchored in the common law: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1 at 5 [9]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 357 ALR 408 at 423 [59]. The consequences of these considerations are that where decisions might have devastating consequences visited upon people, the obligation of real consideration of the circumstances of the people affected must be approached confronting what is being done to people. This obligation and the expression of its performance is not a place for decisional checklists or formulaic expression. Mechanical formulaic expression and pre-digested shorthand expressions may hide a lack of the necessary reflection upon the whole consideration of the human consequences involved. Genuine consideration of the human consequences demands honest confrontation of what is being done to people. Such considerations do not detract from, indeed they reinforce, the recognition, in an assessment of legality, that those entrusted with such responsibility be given the freedom of lawful decision-making required by Parliament. (h)Another important guideline is that identified by the Full Court in GBV18 at [32(e)] regarding the need, at least in some cases, for the decision-maker to make specific findings of fact as part of the process of giving meaningful consideration to a claim (or submission) which has been clearly articulated:(e)Giving meaningful consideration to a clearly articulated and substantial or significant representation on risk of harm independently of any claim concerning Australia’s non-refoulement obligations, may require the decision-maker to do more than simply acknowledge or note that the representations have been made. As stated at Omar at [39], depending on the nature and content of the representations, the decision-maker “may be required to make specific findings of fact, including on whether the feared harm is likely to eventuate, by reference to relevant parts of the representations in order that this important statutory decision-making process is carried out according to law”. (i)It is not suggested that the Minister must always make findings of fact in respect of every claim or contention of a person in the applicant’s position. That is made clear in binding authorities such as Minister for Home Affairs v Buadromo [2018] FCAFC 151 at [46]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Maioha [2018] FCAFC 216 at [41] and Minister for Home Affairs v Ogawa [2019] FCAFC 98 at [103]. (j)A finding that a decision-maker has not engaged in a meaningful or active intellectual process will not lightly be made (Carrascalao at [48]). As has been emphasised, each case necessarily turns on its own facts and circumstances. Moreover, in accordance with well-established authorities, a statement of reasons is not to be read with an eye finely attuned to the detection of error (noting, however, the need not to overstate that principle, as observed by Bell P and Payne JA recently in Ballas v Department of Education (State of NSW) [2020] NSWCA 86 at [79] and [80]). Application of the principles to this case

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The key relevant features of the Minister’s statement of reasons are as follows:(a)In concluding that the applicant did not pass the character test, the Minister stated at [6] that, on 10 November 2006, the applicant was convicted of murder and sentenced to 17 years and 6 months imprisonment. This is factually incorrect because this was the sentence imposed not in November 2006 but rather on 8 November 2013 when the Court of Criminal Appeal replaced the trial judge’s sentence (see [11] above), but the applicant did not contend that this of itself amounted to jurisdictional error. (b)Having found that the applicant did not pass the character test and “having assessed the information set out in the attachments”, the Minister then considered whether or not to exercise his discretion to refuse to grant a protection visa. The Minister stated at [10] that in considering the exercise of his discretion, he took “into account factors that I considered weighed against and in favour of refusing [the applicant’s] visa application”. (c)The Minister then considered various factors, including protecting the Australian community, the nature of the applicant’s criminal conduct, the risk the applicant posed to the Australian community, the expectations of the Australian community, and “other considerations”, which included international non-refoulement obligations. (d)Under the heading “Risk to the Australian Community”, the Minister took into account matters relating to the applicant’s criminal conduct, as well as his conduct while imprisoned and in immigration detention. (e)The Minister’s consideration of international non-refoulement obligations contains the following relevant passages (without alteration, save for redacting the applicant’s name, country of origin and other identifying information):42.I accept that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal has found that [the applicant] is a person in respect of whom Australia has non-refoulement obligations.43.I note that [the applicant’s] submission include that if he is removed to [country of origin], there is a risk that he would suffer the types of harm described in his protection claims.44.[The applicant] states that is (sic) refugee claims are analogous to that of his father's claims. [The applicant] states that he was born and raised in [country of origin] until arriving in Australia when his father was studying in [a city in Australia]. Having resigned from his job to undertake studies, [the applicant] states his father and balance of his family have no ties to [country of origin], with no home or job to return to. Because of this [the applicant] states that he would suffer hardship. He also states that the security situation is deplorable with high incidence of crime and disease. As a member of the [a particular] tribe, [the applicant] states that there have been clashes between tribes and as an educated person he would be targeted by this. [The applicant] also states his health would suffer as a result of returning to [country of origin] as well as his limited chance of gaining employment. [The applicant] has supplied independent evidence of the current situation in [country of origin] to support his claims.45.[The applicant] fears clan-based fighting because his father received death threats in the past from foreigners and local politicians. Furthermore [the applicant’s] health also places him at risk as he requires vital medication and regular medical check-ups after one-third of his pancreas was removed in 2007.…49.I have had regard to the existence of non-refoulement obligations in this case and have carefully weighed this factor against the seriousness of [the applicant’s] criminal offending in the making of my decision whether to refuse to grant him a Protection visa. It is notable that although there is a reference in [43] of the Minister’s statement of reasons to the applicant’s submission that there was a risk that he would suffer “the types of harm described in his protection claims” if he were returned to his country of origin, nowhere in the Minister’s statement of reasons is there any explicit and direct reference to the fact that the applicant claimed, and the AAT had accepted, that the risk was that he would be arbitrarily deprived of his life. (f)It is desirable to set out [63] to [70], which record the Minister’s conclusions (without alteration, save for redacting the applicant’s name, and noting that the reference to “(Name)” in [63] is in the original): 63.I considered all relevant matters including (1) an assessment against the character test as defined by s501(6) of the Act and (2) all other evidence available to me, including information provided by, or on behalf of (Name). 64.I concluded that [the applicant] does not pass the character test and he has not satisfied me that he passes the character test.65.[The applicant] has committed a very serious crime, that of murder, which is of a violent nature. Non-citizens who commit such an offence should not generally expect to be permitted to remain in Australia.66.I find that the Australian community could be exposed to significant harm should [the applicant] reoffend in a similar fashion. I could not rule out the possibility of further offending by [the applicant]. The Australian community should not tolerate any further risk of harm.67.I found the above consideration outweighed the countervailing considerations in [the applicant’s] case, including international non-refoulement obligations, impact on family members and impact on victims. I have also considered the length of time [the applicant] has made a positive contribution to the Australian community and or the consequences of my decision for his family members.68.I am cognisant that where significant harm could be inflicted on the Australian community, even strong countervailing considerations are insufficient for me not to refuse the visa. This is the case even applying a higher tolerance of criminal conduct by [the applicant], than I otherwise would, because he has lived in Australia for most of his life.69.In reaching my decision I concluded that [the applicant] represents an unacceptable risk of harm to the Australian community and that the protection of the Australian community outweighed any countervailing considerations above. 70.Having given full consideration to all of these matters, I decided to exercise my discretion to refuse to grant [the applicant’s] application for a Protection (Class XA) visa under s 501(l) of the Act. (g)Bearing in mind that the copy of the Minister’s statement of reasons in the Court Book is a copy of the original document which was placed before the Minister and signed and dated by him, it is evident that the Minister made no amendments to the document. More significantly, however, it is evident from [63] of the Minister’s statement of reasons that the draft statement provided to the Minister for his review and consideration was signed by him without an apparent appreciation that the applicant’s name had not been inserted in the pro forma paragraph. This is not a case of the applicant’s name being deliberately redacted because his name appears many times in other parts of the statement of reasons. No explanation was provided to the Court as to why the template paragraph was not adjusted to refer to the applicant personally. This does not reflect well on the thoroughness of the Minister’s consideration of the applicant’s individual circumstances or on the care taken by those responsible for preparing the draft statement of reasons, particularly in a matter which has such grave consequences for the applicant and his family. That is not to suggest, however, that this error alone gave rise to jurisdictional error. Nor did the applicant contend that to be the case. Consideration and determinationRelevant legislation