AFX17 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AFX17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 807

File number: NSD 550 of 2020
Judge: FLICK J
Date of judgment: 10 June 2020
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – consideration of application for protection visa – whether delay unreasonable

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – privative clause decision – jurisdiction

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – mandamus – discretionary refusal of relief

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – submission that an earlier decision is plainly wrong and should not be followed – principles to be applied    

Legislation: Migration Act1958 (Cth) ss 5, 5E, 36, 65, 476A, 474, 501, 501A
Cases cited:

Akpata v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 65

AMQ18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 27, (2019) 268 FCR 424

BAL19 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 2189

BFW20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 562

BMF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1530

Bray v Hoffman-La Roche Ltd [2003] FCAFC 153, (2003) 130 FCR 317

Fountain v Alexander (1982) 150 CLR 615

Mehmood v Attorney-General (Cth) [2013] FCA 287, (2013) 217 FCR 544

Mirvac Homes (NSW) Pty Limited v Airservices Australia (No 1) [2004] FCA 109

Thornton v Repatriation Commission (1981) 52 FLR 285

Date of hearing: 4 June 2020
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 67
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms M Yu
Solicitor for the Applicant: Human Rights for All
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr G Kennett SC with Mr G Johnson
Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 550 of 2020
BETWEEN:

AFX17

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FLICK J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 JUNE 2020

THE COURT DECLARES THAT:

1.The Respondents have failed to make a decision with respect to the Applicant’s application for a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) visa within a reasonable time.

AND THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave is granted to the Applicant to amend the Originating Application in the form dated 3 June 2020, subject to Particular (xiii) to Ground 1 being amended to read “… the Applicant was provisionally assessed as meeting all the criteria for the grant of a Safe Haven Enterprise visa”.

2.Leave is reserved to the parties to apply for further orders to give effect to the reasons of the Court in the present proceeding.

3.The Respondents are to pay the costs of the Applicant, either as agreed or taxed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

FLICK J:

  1. The Applicant in the present proceeding, identified by the pseudonym AFX17, is from Iran.  He arrived in Australia by boat in July 2013.  Although initially detained in immigration detention, he was granted a bridging visa and was released in August 2013.

  2. Over…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 807
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

AFX17 sought judicial review of a decision by the Minister for Home Affairs to refuse to grant a visa under section 501A(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The applicant argued that the Minister's decision was unreasonable and that sections 501 and 501A(2) did not empower the refusal of his visa application. The applicant also sought a declaration that the Minister failed to make a decision within a reasonable time and a writ of mandamus to compel the Minister to determine his visa application.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the Minister's decision to refuse the applicant's visa application was lawful. In particular, the Court had to determine whether sections 501 and 501A(2) empowered the Minister to refuse the visa application, or whether the refusal was only permissible if certain criteria were met. The Court also had to consider whether the Minister's delay in making a decision was unreasonable.

The Court found that sections 501 and 501A(2) did not empower the Minister to refuse the applicant's visa application. The Court held that the mandatory criteria in section 36(1C) of the Migration Act precluded the Minister from relying on sections 501 or 501A(2) as a basis for refusing a protection visa application. The Court also found that the Minister's delay in making a decision was unreasonable.

The Court granted the applicant's application for judicial review and issued a writ of mandamus requiring the Minister to determine the applicant's visa application according to law. The Court also declared that the Minister's refusal of the applicant's visa application was unlawful. The Court reserved leave to the parties to apply for further orders to give effect to the reasons of the Court in the present proceeding.

In summary, the Court held that the Minister's decision to refuse the applicant's visa application was unlawful because it was based on an incorrect interpretation of the Migration Act. The Court also found that the Minister's delay in making a decision was unreasonable. The Court granted the applicant's application for judicial review and issued a writ of mandamus requiring the Minister to determine the applicant's visa application according to law.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave is granted to the Applicant to amend the Originating Application in the form dated 3 June 2020, subject to Particular (xiii) to Ground 1 being amended to read “… the Applicant was provisionally assessed as meeting all the criteria for the grant of a Safe Haven Enterprise visa”.

2. Leave is reserved to the parties to apply for further orders to give effect to the reasons of the Court in the present proceeding.

3. The Respondents are to pay the costs of the Applicant, either as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 501A(1) and (2) provide as follows: Refusal or cancellation of visa – setting aside and substitution of non-adverse decision under subsection 501(1) or (2) (1) This section applies if: (a) a delegate of the Minister; or (b) the Administrative Appeals Tribunal; makes a decision (the original decision): (c)not to exercise the power conferred by subsection 501(1) to refuse to grant a visa to the person; or (d)not to exercise the power conferred by subsection 501(2) to cancel a visa that has been granted to a person; whether or not the person satisfies the delegate or Tribunal that the person passes the character test and whether or not the delegate or Tribunal reasonably suspects that the person does not pass the character test. It was these provisions, and related provisions, which were considered in BAL19. As explained by Rares J in BAL19, the application then before the Court was:[1]… an application for Constitutional writ relief in respect of the decision that the first respondent, the Minister for Home Affairs, made personally on 12 July 2019 to refuse to grant a temporary protection (class 785) visa to the applicant in exercise of his power under s 501(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), even though the Minister accepted that Australia owed the applicant non-refoulement obligations.(emphasis in original).No difference was there sought to be drawn between “s 501 and its analogues in Pt 9” of the Migration Act: [2019] FCA 2189 at [3]. Both ss 501 and 501A are to be found within Pt 9. Although the source of power being invoked in BAL19 was s 501 – and the power in the present case being s 501A(2) – that distinction assumes no relevance to the issues agitated and resolved in BAL19. Of present relevance is the manner in which Rares J in BAL19 resolved what he characterised as the “inconsistency issue”. The question was whether s 36(1C) of the Migration Act “displaced” or “precluded” the Minister from relying upon s 501(1) as a basis for refusing to grant a protection visa. Section 36(1C) assumed relevance in the reasoning in BAL19 because it was a new provision introduced by way of legislative amendment in 2014 and subsequent to previous decisions which had concluded that s 501 could be relied upon when refusing a protection visa: e.g., Akpata v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 65 at [114]-[115] per Lander J (Carr and Sundberg JJ agreeing). In BAL19 it was concluded that s 501 could not be relied upon when deciding a protection visa application. In BAL19 the Minister’s argument was summarised as follows: The inconsistency issue …(a) The Minister’s submissions [57]The Minister argued that s 36(1C) did not displace, as a source of power to refuse or cancel a protection visa, the availability of s 501 and its analogues. He contended that, although a person might meet all the criteria for a visa in s 36, the Minister was not bound to grant the visa under s 65(1)(a) unless, relevantly, s 501 prevented its grant, in the sense that the Minister (or a delegate) had made a decision in exercise of the power in s 501 to refuse it.Although it is somewhat extensive, it is at least convenient to set forth some of the “Consideration” given by Rares J to this contention because of the submission made in the present case that the relevant conclusion in BAL19 was “plainly wrong” and should not be followed. Many of the arguments relied upon by Senior Counsel in advancing that submission to this Court were the same as the arguments considered, resolved and rejected in BAL19. Although extensive, the “Consideration” given to the Minister’s submission in BAL19 thus proceeded (in part) as follows (without alteration): (b) Consideration[61]The criterion in s 36(1C) is both specific and substantively narrower than the discretions created by s 501 and its analogues in Pt 9 of the Act under which the Minister has a variety of discretions to refuse to grant or to cancel a visa of a person who does not satisfy the Minister that he or she passes the character test (as defined in s 501(6)). Hence, the discretionary power to refuse a visa under s 501(1) is unconstrained, except by the subject matter, scope and purpose of the Act, once the person has not satisfied the Minister that he or she passes the character test: cf. Reg v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte 2HD Pty Ltd (1979) 144 CLR 45 at 49 per Stephen, Mason, Murphy, Aickin and Wilson JJ. Other provisions, such as s 501(3), create additional criteria that, for example, require the Minister also to be satisfied that the refusal to grant, or the cancellation of, a visa is in the national interest. And, s 501(1), together with its analogues, appear to apply generally as a power exercisable in respect of all categories of visa.[62]In addition, the character test prescribes criteria that could include those amounting to a “particularly serious offence” as defined in s 5M. But the character test also includes much less serious situations. For example, s 501(7)(c) and (d) include within the definition of “substantial criminal record” one or more sentences to a term of, or totalling, 12 months imprisonment or more, and s 501(6)(d)(ii) and (11) refer to a risk of a person harassing or molesting another even though the conduct does not include actual or threatened violence. [63]However, s 36(1C) creates a specific criterion for one class of visa, namely a protection visa, that contains disqualifying grounds. Those grounds in s 36(1C) are much more restrictive than those available under s 501(1) (and its analogues) in the event that a person does not pass, or does not satisfy the Minister that he or she passes, the character test. In particular, s 36(1C) is not a discretionary power. The Minister, relevantly under s 36(1C)(b), must have objectively reasonable grounds to consider that a person, first, has not been convicted of a particularly serious offence and, secondly, is not a danger to the Australian community. In contrast, the aspect of the character test in s 501(6)(d)(v), which the Minister found the applicant had not satisfied him that he (the applicant) passed, cast an onus on the applicant to satisfy the Minister of a negative state of affairs. Yet, s 36(1C)(b) prescribed a mandatory criterion for a protection visa that the applicant here satisfied. [64]In enacting s 36(1C), the Parliament determined, consistently with Art 33(2) of the Refugees Convention, that a person would be eligible to be granted a protection visa if he or she is not a person whom the Minister considers, on reasonable grounds, to be a danger to the Australian community on the premise that the person had been convicted of a particularly serious crime. The criterion in s 36(1C)(b) required the existence of reasonable grounds for the Minister to consider that the person was actually (as opposed to the criterion in s 501(6)(d)(v) of there being a risk that he or she would represent) a danger to the Australian community, and that could occur only in the context of the Minister having reasonable grounds to consider that the person had been convicted of a particularly serious crime. [65]The particular importance of s 36(1C)(b) is that it gives effect to the Parliament’s stipulation that a person whom the Minister does not have reasonable grounds to consider had been convicted of a particularly serious crime, was eligible to be granted a protection visa, regardless of the danger he or she may be to the Australian community. The legislative purpose of that stipulation was to ensure that such a person would not be refouled (subject, of course, to other protective criteria in s 36(1B), (1C)(a) and (2)), despite the danger he or she may be to the Australian community, because that person, in those prescribed circumstances, consistently with Art 33(2) of the Refugees Convention, was not to be exposed to the real chance of persecution of which he or she had a well-founded fear. [66]In contrast, s 501(6)(d)(v) provided that a person did not pass the character test if there were a risk that he or she would represent a danger to the, or a segment of the, Australian community. That criterion operated by reference to the existence of a (i.e. any) risk that the person would represent a danger to the whole, or a segment of the, Australian community without any additional qualification of a past conviction or the existence of reasonable grounds to consider the existence of the risk. [67]There would be no intelligible statutory purpose for the mandatory criterion for a grant of a protection visa in s 36(1C), reflecting as it does the Parliament’s interpretation of Art 33(2) of the Refugees Convention, if the Minister were free to apply a less stringent criterion under s 501(1) and its analogues, involving his exercising a very broad discretion, to refuse to grant the very same visa: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v DB Management Pty Ltd (2000) 199 CLR 321 at 338 [34]-[35] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ. [68]That raises the question whether the Minister can use the general power in s 501(1) or its analogues in Pt 9 of the Act to refuse to grant or to cancel a protection visa, on a basis other than that specifically provided in s 36(1C). Ordinarily, general provisions conferring a power in an Act will not apply to another power that the Act confers that also prescribes the conditions for its exercise. Gavan Duffy CJ and Dixon J held in Anthony Hordern & Sons Ltd v The Amalgamated Clothing and Allied Trades Union of Australia (1932) 47 CLR 1 at 7 (and see too: David Grant & Co Pty Ltd (receiver appointed) v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 184 CLR 265 at 276 per Gummow J, with whom Brennan CJ, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ agreed at 269):When the Legislature explicitly gives a power by a particular provision which prescribes the mode in which it shall be exercised and the conditions and restrictions which must be observed, it excludes the operation of general expressions in the same instrument which might otherwise have been relied upon for the same power.(emphasis added)[69]The Parliament enacted ss 36(1C) and 197C, as part of a suite of measures in the 2014 Amendments, to define Australia’s non-refoulement obligations and their limits. Importantly, a person who satisfied the criterion in s 36(1C), together with the other criteria prescribed in s 36 and any relevant regulation, was entitled, as of right, to be granted a protection visa under s 65(1)(a), unless, relevantly, s 501 “prevented” its grant (s 65(1)(a)(iii)). As I explained (in respect of the analogous s 501A) in Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v CPJ16 [2019] FCA 2033 at [82]-[87], s 501(1) does not prevent the grant of a visa within the meaning of s 65(1)(a)(iii); it creates a discretionary power to refuse one in certain defined circumstances. [70]The criteria that s 36(1C)(b) prescribes require the Minister to act on “reasonable grounds” in considering whether a person is a danger to the Australian community, if, and only if, the Minister also considers on reasonable grounds that the person has been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime. That is, the Minister can only act under s 36(1C)(b) if facts exist which are sufficient to induce a reasonable person in the position of the Minister to consider that the applicant for the protection visa has been so convicted and also is a danger to the Australian community: George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104 at 112 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ; Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206 at 244-245 per Lord Atkin. [71]Importantly, s 36 does not provide that an applicant for a protection visa who satisfies the criteria in s 36(1B), (1C) and (2) may nevertheless be refused the visa under s 501(1). If that were the intention of the Parliament, then the specific and narrow criteria in s 36(1B) and (1C) that give statutory effect to Australia’s non-refoulement obligations would have no useful function since these could be overridden in every protection visa application by the use of the general power in s 501(1), regardless that the different criteria in s 36(1B) and (1C) had been met. And, equally, s 197C could then apply to a person who actually met the criteria in s 36(1B) and (1C) that the Parliament specifically enacted as objective preconditions for the grant of a protection visa, if the Minister were free to use a different power with different and less stringent standards (namely, that in s 501(1) or an analogue) in a manner that would put Australia in breach of its international obligations under Arts 32 and 33(2) of the Refugees Convention. Justice Rares concluded as follows: [88]I am of opinion that, since the 2014 Amendments, s 501(1) is not, and is not intended or expressed to be, relevant to determining whether or not a person, in accordance with ss 35A(6) and 36, is entitled to (or may be refused) under s 65(1) a protection visa as a refugee (as now defined in the Act) or to whom Australia otherwise owes protection obligations. Rather, s 36(1C) is a specific criterion applicable only to an applicant for a protection visa and it precludes the Minister using s 501(1) or its analogues as a basis to refuse to grant a protection visa: …

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The 2 June 2020 letter advising the Applicant of consideration being given to the setting aside of the October 2018 decision of the Tribunal and the refusal to grant a protection visa application was expressed (in part) as follows: Dear [AFX17]Notice of intention to consider setting aside the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and refusing to grant a visa under s501A(2) of the Migration Act 1958Purpose of this noticeOn 19 December 2016, you applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) visa. On 8 August 2018, a delegate of a Minister administering the Migration Act 1958 (the Act) refused to grant you a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) visa under s501(1) of the Act. On 23 October 2018, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) made a decision not to exercise the power conferred by s501(1) to refuse to grant your visa (original decision).On 26 February 2020, you were notified that the Minister had set aside the 23 October 2018 decision of the AAT and refused to grant your visa under s501A(2) of the Act. On 16 March 2020, you filed an application for judicial review of the Minister’s decision. On 26 March 2020, the Department withdrew from those proceedings, enlivening the original decision of the AAT.The purpose of this notice is to inform you that the Minister for Home Affairs will personally consider whether to set aside the decision of the AAT dated 23 October 2018 and refuse to grant you a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) visa under s501A(2) of the Act. It was on the following day that the Amended Originating Application was filed in this Court. As amended the Originating Application details the claim and relief sought by the Applicant as follows: Details of claimOn the grounds stated in the statement of claim, accompanying affidavit and other document prescribed by the Rules, the Applicant applies for the following relief under section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903, and claims:1.A declaration that the Respondents failed to make a decision with respect to the Applicant under ss 47 and 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) within a reasonable time.2.A writ of mandamus issue to the Respondents requiring the Respondents or their delegate/s to determine according to law the Applicant’s application for a safe haven enterprise visa made on or about 19 September 2016 on the basis that ss 501(1) and 501A(2)(a) of the Act do not empower the refusal of the application.3.There be liberty to the Applicant to apply to vary order 2 to provide for a period within which the Respondents are required to determine the Applicant’s application.4.Such other relief as this Court considers just.5.Costs.The reference to an application made on “19 September 2016”, it would appear, may be a mistake as that the application was made in December 2016. But nothing turns on the precise date. The Grounds relied upon, as amended, were expressed as follows: Ground One1.The Respondents failed to make a decision in respect to the Applicant under ss 47 and 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) within a reasonable time.…Ground Two2.Sections 501 and 501A(2)(a) of the Act do not empower the refusal of the Applicant’s visa application.…Extensive Particulars are also set forth in respect to each of these two Grounds. Sections 501(1) and 501A(2) & BAL19