FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Mehmood v Attorney-General of the Commonwealth [2013] FCA 287
Citation: Mehmood v Attorney-General of the Commonwealth [2013] FCA 287 Parties: TANVEER MEHMOOD v ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH, COMMONWEALTH DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS and MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP File number: NSD 398 of 2013 Judge: FLICK J Date of judgment: 4 April 2013 Catchwords: MIGRATION – cancellation of criminal justice certificate – absence of jurisdiction in Federal Court
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – hearing of objection to competency – when the objection should be resolved
Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act1977 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 32AB
Federal Court Rules 1979 Order 54 r 4
Federal Court Rules 2011 rr 31.01, 31.05, 31.21, 31.24, Div 31.3
Migration Act1958 (Cth) ss 5, 147, 162, 164, 474, 476, 476A, Pt 8Cases cited: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Zhang [2009] FCAFC 129, 179 FCR 135
Mirvac Homes (NSW) Pty Ltd v Airservices Australia (No 1) [2004] FCA 109
Parker v Antoine [2009] FCA 929
Parker v Vivian [2009] FCA 933
Zhang v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FMCA 196Date of hearing: 22 March 2013 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 22 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondents: Ms B Griffin Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 398 of 2013
BETWEEN: TANVEER MEHMOOD
ApplicantAND: ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH
First RespondentCOMMONWEALTH DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
Second RespondentMINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Third Respondent
JUDGE:
FLICK J
DATE OF ORDER:
4 APRIL 2013
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Notice of Objection to Competency filed by the Respondents on 15 March 2013 is upheld.
2.The Interlocutory Application filed by the Applicant on 12 March 2013 is dismissed.
3.The Application and Statement of Claim filed on 7 March 2013 are dismissed.
4.The Applicant is to pay the costs of the Respondents.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Order 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 398 of 2013
BETWEEN: TANVEER MEHMOOD
ApplicantAND: ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH
First RespondentCOMMONWEALTH DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
Second RespondentMINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Third Respondent
JUDGE:
FLICK J
DATE:
4 APRIL 2013
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
On 13 March 2013 this Application came before the Federal Court as a duty matter made by Mr Tanveer Mehmood.
The Originating Application and Statement of Claim filed on 7 March 2013, however, failed to clearly identify the claims being made by Mr Mehmood. With the assistance of the solicitor who appeared for the Respondents, it emerged that the Applicant sought review of:
(i)a decision made by a delegate of the Attorney-General on about 26 February 2013 cancelling the Applicant’s Criminal Justice Certificate; and
(ii)a decision made by…
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- Case
- [2013] FCA 287
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the cancellation of the Criminal Justice Certificate did not fall within any of the categories specified in section 476A(1) of the Migration Act, and therefore, it was not a "migration decision." The court further held that the submission by Mehmood that the decision was an "administrative decision" and not a "migration decision" did not alter this conclusion. Consequently, the objection to the Court’s competency to grant the relief claimed by Mehmood was upheld. The court dismissed Mehmood’s Interlocutory Application and the Application and Statement of Claim. Mehmood was ordered to pay the costs of the Respondents.
The court considered the relevant rules and statutory provisions governing judicial review of migration decisions and the process for objecting to the Court’s jurisdiction. It noted that the proper approach when a respondent objects to the Court’s jurisdiction is to first determine whether the Court has jurisdiction before proceeding further. However, the court observed that the practice of the Court has not always strictly adhered to this approach. The court concluded that the principles in Reading v AMP were applicable in this case, and found that the Court did not have jurisdiction to review the decision to cancel Mehmood’s Criminal Justice Certificate.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Division 31.3 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 applies to applications for review of a “migration decision”. Rule 31.21 provides that expressions used in that Division have the same meaning as they have in the Migration Act 1958 (‘Cth”) (“Migration Act”). Rule 31.24 provides that a notice of objection may be filed in respect to an application for review of a “migration decision”. Rule 31.24(2) and (3) are the counterpart provisions to r 31.05(2) and (3) respectively. That expression would thus include a “migration decision” as defined as follows in s 5 of the Migration Act:“migration decision” means:(a) a privative clause decision; or(b) a purported privative clause decision; or(c) a non-privative clause decision.Part 8 of the Migration Act addresses judicial review of decisions and s 474(2) defines a “privative clause decision” for the purposes of that section as follows:“privative clause decision” means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not), other than a decision referred to in subsection (4) or (5). The course to be taken when any objection to the jurisdiction of this Court is raised by a Respondent is not certain. So much was recognised by Branson J in Mirvac Homes (NSW) Pty Limited v Airservices Australia (No 1) [2004] FCA 109 where her Honour summarised the position as follows: THE PROPER APPROACH[4] Before giving consideration to the terms of the notice of objection to competency, it is appropriate to say something about the approach that the Court should take when its jurisdiction is challenged. It is clear that this Court has jurisdiction to determine that it has no jurisdiction in respect of a proceeding instituted in the Court and to dismiss the proceeding accordingly (Residual Assco Group Ltd v Spalvins [2000] HCA 33; 202 CLR 629 per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ at [14]).[5] The provisions in the Federal Court Rules for the filing and service of a notice of objection to competency is intended to encourage a respondent to inform the applicant promptly that the jurisdiction of the Court is in issue (Coal & Allied Operations P/L v Industry Research & Development Board — unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Beaumont J, 16 November 1992). The filing of a notice of objection to competency also places the Court on notice that its jurisdiction to make the orders sought by the applicant in the proceeding is challenged. The Court must then decide, before it makes the orders sought by the applicant or any substantive orders, whether it has jurisdiction to proceed (The Queen v the Judges of the Federal Court of Australia; Ex parte Western Australian National Football League (Inc) (1978) 143 CLR 190). However, whether, where the jurisdiction of the Court is challenged, the Court must defer taking any further step in the proceeding until it rules on the challenge remains, in my view, unclear.[6] In Bray v F Hoffman-La Roche [2003] FCAFC 153; 200 ALR 607 Finkelstein J at [239] expressed the view that, where an issue which is properly characterised as jurisdictional is raised, a judge is not entitled to put off his or her determination of that issue unless all steps in the proceeding are deferred pending the determination of the issue. His Honour said:… until the court’s jurisdiction has been established, the court cannot know whether it has the “right” to enter upon the inquiry. It is only when the right is established that the case can proceed.However, the practice of the Court has not always accorded with the view expressed by Finkelstein J (see Khatri v Price [1999] FCA 1289 per Katz J at [14]).[7] I have not heard argument on whether I should in this case adopt the approach suggested by Finkelstein J to be the only appropriate approach. The parties put their respective submissions to me on the assumption that the relevant principles were those collected and summarised in Reading Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Mutual Provident Society [1999] FCA 718 (‘Reading v AMP’). Reading v AMP, which sought to identify and summarise the circumstances in which an order will be made under O 29 r 2 of the Federal Court Rules, was not a case in which the jurisdiction of the Court was challenged.Appl’d: Parker v Vivian [2009] FCA 933 at [9] to [10] per McKerracher J; Parker v Antoine [2009] FCA 929 at [11] to [12] per McKerracher J.