FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Parker v Antoine [2009] FCA 929
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – judicial review – application brought pursuant to Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review)Act 1977 (ADJR Act) to review conduct of respondent – objection to competency of application – whether conduct for the purpose of making a decision to which the ADJR Act applies – meaning of ‘decision’ under ADJR Act – whether substantive determination – whether applicant has standing to bring application
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 3, 3(d), 5, 6, 8
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 264
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) s 353-10Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321
Bray v F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd (2003) 130 FCR 317
Electricity Supply Assn of Australia Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (2001) 113 FCR 230
Evans v Friemann (1981) 35 ALR 428
Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99
Guss v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2006) 152 FCR 88
Hutchins v Commissioner of Taxationn (1996) 65 FCR 269
Khatri v Price (1999) 95 FCR 287
Mirvac Homes (NSW) Pty Limited v Airservices Australia (No 1) [2004] FCA 109
R v Federal Court of Australia; Ex parte WA National Football League (1979) 143 CLR 190
Residual Assco Group Ltd v Spalvins (2000) 202 CLR 629
Salerno v National Crime Authority (1997) 75 FCR 133
Social Services, Director-General of v Chaney (1980) 31 ALR 571ANDREW STEPHEN PARKER v GEORGE ANTOINE
WAD 78 of 2008
MCKERRACHER J
25 AUGUST 2009
PERTH
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
WAD 78 of 2008
BETWEEN: ANDREW STEPHEN PARKER
ApplicantAND: GEORGE ANTOINE
Respondent
JUDGE:
MCKERRACHER J
DATE OF ORDER:
25 AUGUST 2009
WHERE MADE:
PERTH
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The respondent’s objection to competency be upheld.
2.The claim be dismissed.
3.The applicant is to pay the costs of the respondent to be taxed if not agreed.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
WAD 78 of 2008
BETWEEN: ANDREW STEPHEN PARKER
ApplicantAND: GEORGE ANTOINE
Respondent
JUDGE:
MCKERRACHER J
DATE:
25 AUGUST 2009
PLACE:
PERTH
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
The applicant seeks review of the respondent’s conduct under s 6 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act). The conduct in question is that of the respondent, an employee of the Australian Taxation Office (ATO).
The applicant has issued four other sets of proceedings against individual officers of the ATO. The events with which each proceeding is concerned are related. The reasoning on determination of each proceeding is also similar.
The respondent objects to the competency of the application on the basis that the action the subject of the application was not conduct for the purpose of making a decision under an enactment to which the ADJR Act…
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- AGLC
- Parker v Antoine [2009] FCA 929
- Case
- [2009] FCA 929
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the actions of the respondent constituted a 'decision' within the meaning of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (ADJR Act). It considered whether the conduct in question was a reviewable decision under s 3 of the ADJR Act, which defines 'decision to which this Act applies' but excludes certain decisions, including those related to tax assessments or disallowing objections to tax assessments. The court determined that the conduct in question did not constitute a decision of a reviewable nature under the ADJR Act. The court reasoned that the actions did not represent a final or operative determination, nor did they affect Parker's legal rights and obligations in a direct sense. Moreover, even if there were grounds for review, such a claim should have been brought by Ivyside Pty Ltd, not Parker personally.
The court ultimately upheld the respondent's objection to the competency of the application, leading to the dismissal of Parker's claim. The court also ordered that Parker pay the respondent's costs, to be taxed if not agreed. This decision underscores the importance of distinguishing between preliminary actions taken in the course of statutory processes and final decisions that are subject to judicial review under the ADJR Act.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The respondent’s objection to competency be upheld.
2. The claim be dismissed.
3. The applicant is to pay the costs of the respondent to be taxed if not agreed.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: MCKERRACHER J
Indeed the High Court went on to observe that even though a decision taken may have a critical effect for the operation of the federal statute, if it is a decision made ‘dehors’ the federal statute, it would be un-reviewable. CONSIDERATION In the present circumstances, although the conduct of which complaint is made was carried out pursuant to statutory power, it does not constitute, in my view, conduct for the purpose of making a decision in the sense contemplated in s 3 of the ADJR Act or as explained by the Chief Justice in Bond 170 CLR 321. In the language of Fox ACJ in Evans v Friemann (1981) 35 ALR 428 at 431 the relevant decision or conduct did not constitute a decision which was final and conclusive for immediate purposes at least. It was not the ultimate or operative determination of an issue as distinct from the determination of issues arising in the course of making such an ultimate decision (Social Services, Director-General of v Chaney (1980) 31 ALR 571). The best guidance for this is the clear language of Mason CJ in Bond 170 CLR 321 that the decision will generally but not always entail a decision which is final or operative and determinative, at least in a practical sense and a conclusion reached that is a step along the way in the course of reasoning leading to an ultimate decision would not ordinarily amount to a reviewable decision unless the statute provided for the making of a finding or ruling on that point so that the decision, though an indeterminate decision, might accurately be described as a decision under an enactment. CONCLUSION The alleged conduct of which complaint is raised, is the unlawful placing of pressure to bear on the applicant’s physician to obtain private medical information. In my view, the alleged actions or conduct of which complaint has been raised by the applicant did not constitute a decision of a reviewable nature within the meaning of the ADJR Act and the authorities. There was no substantive determination. There was no decision having the character or quality of finality. It was not a decision which affected in any way or in any direct sense the applicant’s legal rights and obligations. Further and as a distinct ground, even if there were an appropriate basis for review, it could be advanced only by the company, Ivyside not by the applicant. However, if this were the only issue standing in the way of the competency of this application, I may have granted any application to amend the identity of the applicant, or for that matter, the respondent. The difficulty with the competency of the application however, in my view, is much more fundamental, going to jurisdiction. The respondent’s jurisdictional objection to competency must be upheld and the claim dismissed. The applicant is to pay the costs of the respondent to be taxed if not agreed.