Guss v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Guss v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2006] FCAFC 88

TAXES AND DUTIES – income tax and related legislation – Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) – prompt recovery, through estimates and payment agreements, of certain amounts not remitted – where Commissioner empowered to make estimate of amount – where making of estimate created liability upon company – where obligation imposed upon directors to cause company to pay estimate or enter administration or be wound up – where obligation enforced by penalty imposed upon directors – where Commissioner not entitled to recover penalty unless statutory notice given – whether decision to give notice reviewable under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth).

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 3, 5, 6
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) Part IV Div 9 ss 222AGA, 222AHA, 222APB, 222APC, 222APE

Attorney-General (Cth) v Queensland (1990) 25 FCR 125 cited
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 considered
Carmody v Mackellar (1997) 76 FCR 115 cited
Hutchins v Collins, Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1996) 65 FCR 269 referred to
DFCT v McArdle (2003) 53 ATR 302 cited
DFCT v Woodhams (1999) 199 CLR 370 considered
Director-General for Social Services v Chaney (1980) 31 ALR 571 referred to
Evans v Friemann (1981) 53 FLR 229 considered
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Pilnara Pty Ltd (1999) 96 FCR 82 cited
Forsyth v DCT (2004) 62 NSWLR 132 cited
Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99 considered
Guss v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2005] FCA 1499 affirmed
Industrial Equity Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1990) 170 CLR 649 considered
Pacific Century Production Pty Ltd v Watson (2001) 113 FCR 466 cited
Re Excel Finance Corporation Ltd (rec and mgr apptd); Worthley v England (1994) 52 FCR 69 cited
Ricegrowers Co-operative Mills Ltd v Bannerman and Trade Practices Commission (1982) 38 ALR 535 considered
Ross v Costigan (1982) 59 FLR 184, cited
Salerno v National Crime Authority (1997) 75 FCR 133 referred to
Scharer v State of New South Wales (2001) 53 NSWLR 299 referred to
Southern Farmers Group Limited v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (SA) (1989) 21 FCR 66 cited
Woodhams v DCT [1998] 4 VR 309 referred to

ANTONY DAVID GUSS v DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
VID 1469 OF 2005

GYLES, EDMONDS AND GREENWOOD JJ
8 JUNE 2006
SYDNEY (HEARD IN MELBOURNE)


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 1469 OF 2005

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

ANTONY DAVID GUSS
APPELLANT

AND:

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

GYLES, EDMONDS AND GREENWOOD JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

8 JUNE 2006

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY (HEARD IN MELBOURNE)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.        The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCAFC 88
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Guss v Commissioner of Taxation, the court was tasked with determining the validity of the Commissioner’s decision to issue a penalty notice to the appellant, Antony David Guss, who was the sole director of Bongania Pty Ltd. The Commissioner issued the penalty notice under section 222APE of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, following Bongania’s failure to pay an estimated tax liability. Guss challenged the validity of the penalty notice on the grounds that it was not a decision of an administrative character as required by the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977. The court needed to decide whether the penalty notice was a decision that could be reviewed under the ADJR Act and whether it was a decision of an administrative character.

The court examined whether the penalty notice constituted a decision of an administrative character by considering if it was a decision that could affect legal rights and obligations, and if it derived its capacity to do so from an enactment. The court noted that the decision to issue the penalty notice involved minimal factual determinations and did not require any assessment of competing considerations or statutory criteria. Instead, it was a straightforward verification of facts, such as whether an estimate had been made and whether Guss was a director of Bongania at the relevant time. The court concluded that the decision to issue the penalty notice did involve a determination that effectively resolved an actual substantive issue, as it led to the imposition of a penalty on Guss.

In reaching its decision, the court referred to the principles established in Griffith University v Tang, which highlighted the importance of considering whether a decision affects legal rights and obligations and whether it derives its capacity to do so from an enactment. The court found that the decision to issue the penalty notice did affect legal rights and obligations, as it imposed a penalty on Guss, and it derived its capacity to do so from the enactment under which it was made. Therefore, the court held that the penalty notice was a decision of an administrative character and could be reviewed under the ADJR Act.

Ultimately, the court dismissed Guss’s appeal and ordered that he pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal. The court’s decision confirmed that the Commissioner’s decision to issue the penalty notice was a valid decision of an administrative character that could be reviewed under the ADJR Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

At [11] his Honour said:‘[11] Part 4‑15 of Schedule 1 to the TAA (ss 250‑1 to 265‑65) (referred to in s 222ANA(4) of the ITAA) deals with “Collection and recovery of tax‑related liabilities and other amounts”. Section 255‑5 of the TAA provides:“(1) An amount of a tax‑related liability that is due and payable:(a)is a debt due to the Commonwealth and(b)is payable to the Commissioner.(2)The Commissioner … may sue in his or her official name in a court of competent jurisdiction to recover an amount of a tax‑related liability that remains unpaid after it has become due and payable.”Section 250‑10 lists various “tax‑related liabilities”. One of them is “penalty under Subdivision C of Part 9 …. 222APE”.’THE FACTS The relevant facts do not appear to be in dispute and are set out at [12] of his Honour’s reasons:‘[12] At all relevant times the applicant was the sole director of Bongania Pty Ltd. On about 24 June 2004 the respondent estimated, pursuant to s 222AGA of the ITAA, the amount of the liability of Bongania under s 16‑70 of Schedule 1 to the TAA. The respondent sent written notice of the estimate to Bongania in accordance with s 222AGB of the ITAA. Accordingly Bongania became obliged, pursuant to s 222AHA, to pay the amount of the estimate. The applicant became obliged, pursuant to s 222APB, to cause Bongania to do at least one of the things listed in s 222APB within fourteen days. He did not do so, and accordingly he became liable, pursuant to s 222APC, to pay by way of penalty an amount equal to the unpaid amount of the estimate. On or about 28 June 2004 the respondent sent written notice to the applicant in accordance with s 222APE. A covering letter informed the applicant that action to recover the penalty would be taken without further notice if, after the end of fourteen days from the date the penalty notice is given to him, the penalty had not been remitted. On 20 July 2004 the respondent instituted proceedings in the Magistrates Court of Victoria for recovery of the unpaid amount.’REASONING Before addressing the specific grounds of appeal, it is, I think, appropriate to address the argument before the Court on the hearing of the appeal going to the proper characterisation of the ‘penalty’, that is, whether it is a penalty or a tax, and the effect of a penalty notice given pursuant to s 222APE on the recipient director’s rights and obligations. While I am not sure that anything turns on this from the point of view of the resolution of the ultimate issue, the appellant argued that the penalty was, in essence, the imposition of a tax on the appellant director. The respondent, on the other hand, contended that it was a true penalty and not a tax. The issue of whether the penalty imposed by s 222AOC (the Subdivision B counterpart of s 222APC in Subdivision C) was a penalty or a tax was considered by the Victorian Court of Appeal in Woodhams v DCT [1998] 4 VR 309 and Phillips JA, with whom Tadgell JA and Batt JA agreed, concluded that it was a penalty and not a tax (at 321, 322). There is no reason to think that the same conclusion should not be reached with respect to the penalty imposed by s 222APC.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

GREENWOOD J
For the reasons identified at [6] to [8] of the reasons for judgment of Gyles J, I am not satisfied that the authorities relied upon by the primary judge establish that the decision to give the penalty notice was merely procedural or did not, having regard to what I have already said, have the capacity to affect legal rights and obligations of the parties. I am not satisfied that it is a sound approach to characterise the decision to give the penalty notice as a ‘conclusion reached as a step along the way’ in the sense contemplated by Mason CJ at 337 in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond & Ors (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 337. A ‘Decision’ of an Administrative Character Mindful of the important cautionary observations of their Honours in the joint judgment in Griffith University v Tang (supra) concerning the risks necessarily inherent in a disjunctive consideration of each element comprising the expression ‘a decision of an administrative character made or required to be made under an enactment’, it nevertheless remains important to consider the true colour of the phrase ‘decision of an administrative character’ and in particular whether the decision to give a penalty notice is a ‘decision’ for the purposes of the ADJR Act. Just as ‘decision of an administrative character’ casts light on the force to be given to the phrase ‘under an enactment’, the deliberative processes inherent in administrative decision‑making crystallising in a final and conclusive decision informs the force to be given to the notion of a ‘decision’ for the purposes of the ADJR Act. Plainly enough, the decision by the responsible officer of the respondent is a decision in the sense that the officer turned his (in this case) mind to the giving of the notice. There is no suggestion that the penalty notice is incompetent in the sense that it lacked authority. However, a question arises as to whether the decision to give the penalty notice involved a decision ‘reflecting something in the nature of a determination of an application, inquiry or dispute or, in the words of Deane J, “a determination effectively resolving an actual substantive issue”’: Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (supra) per Mason CJ at 336. Recognising that the notion of a decision for the purposes of the ADJR Act has a ‘relatively limited field of operation’ (Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond, per Mason CJ at 336), a question arises whether the decision, the subject of the present application, is a decision that attracts the operation of the ADJR Act. Only two matters were required to be determined by the decision‑maker in giving the penalty notice under ss 222APE(1). First, whether an estimate had been made by the Commissioner under ss 222AGA(1) of the ITA Act and notice of that estimate given to Bongania. Secondly, whether Mr Antony David Guss was, at the material time, a director of Bongania. Since the same decision‑maker gave both notices, he was the source of the knowledge as to the first. No further inquiry or assessment of fact was required. The determination of the material fact that Mr Guss was, at the relevant time, a director of Bongania, did not give rise to any element of analysis, weighing of competing considerations by reference to any statutory criteria, assessments of the weight or balance to be struck in examining a body of fact or contention, the assessment of the proper application of policy considerations, the evaluation of conflicting merits or other such matters. It simply involved examining the records of the Australian Securities and Investment Commission to isolate, based upon returns Bongania was required to lodge for just such a purpose, whether Mr Antony David Guss was recorded as a director of that company.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GREENWOOD J

In addressing the notion of whether a decision is ‘of an administrative character’, their Honours, Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ in the joint judgment, said this at [79] and [80]:‘[79] The decision so required or authorised must be “of an administrative character”. This element of the definition casts some light on the force to be given by the phrase “under an enactment”. What is it, in the course of administration, that flows from or arises out of the decision taken so as to give that significance which has merited the legislative conferral of a right of judicial review upon those aggrieved? [80] The answer in general terms is the affecting of legal rights and obligations. Do legal rights or duties owe in an immediate sense their existence to the decision, or depend upon the presence of the decision for their enforcement? [R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Barrett (1945) 70 CLR 141 at 154]. To adapt what was said by Lehane J in [Australian National University v Lewins (1996) 68 FCR 87 at 103], does the decision in question derive from the enactment the capacity to affect legal rights and obligations? Are legal rights and obligations affected not under the general law but by virtue of the statute? [General Newspapers Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation (1993) 45 FCR 164 at 169].’ (Emphasis added) It is important to keep in mind the precise question their Honours were seeking to elucidate in reflecting upon the ‘affecting of legal rights and obligations’ arising out of the decision. That question was whether the particular decision of the University to exclude Ms Tang, derived from the enactment (that is, Griffith University Act 1998), the capacity to affect legal rights and obligations so as to lead logically to the conclusion that the decision was ‘made under an enactment’. The conjunction of the ‘affect upon legal rights and obligations’ (or the capacity to so affect) and the derivation of that affect from an enactment under which the decision is made, gives rise to the justiciable significance contemplated by their Honours that merits a right of judicial review in those aggrieved. The answer to the question as a matter of general principle is reflected at [80] of their Honour’s reasons. At [89], their Honours said this:‘[89] The determination of whether a decision is “made … under an enactment” involves two criteria: first, the decision must be expressly or impliedly required or authorised by the enactment; and, secondly, the decision must itself confer, alter or otherwise affect legal rights or obligations, and in that sense the decision must derive from the enactment. A decision will only be “made … under an enactment” if both these criteria are met. It should be emphasised that this construction of the statutory definition does not require the relevant decision to affect or alter existing rights or obligations, and it will be sufficient that the enactment requires or authorises decisions from which new rights or obligations arise. Similarly, it is not necessary that the relevantly affected legal rights owe their existence to the enactment in question. Affection of rights or obligations derived from the general law or statute will suffice.’