FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Guss v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2006] FCAFC 88
TAXES AND DUTIES – income tax and related legislation – Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) – prompt recovery, through estimates and payment agreements, of certain amounts not remitted – where Commissioner empowered to make estimate of amount – where making of estimate created liability upon company – where obligation imposed upon directors to cause company to pay estimate or enter administration or be wound up – where obligation enforced by penalty imposed upon directors – where Commissioner not entitled to recover penalty unless statutory notice given – whether decision to give notice reviewable under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth).
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 3, 5, 6
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) Part IV Div 9 ss 222AGA, 222AHA, 222APB, 222APC, 222APEAttorney-General (Cth) v Queensland (1990) 25 FCR 125 cited
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 considered
Carmody v Mackellar (1997) 76 FCR 115 cited
Hutchins v Collins, Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1996) 65 FCR 269 referred to
DFCT v McArdle (2003) 53 ATR 302 cited
DFCT v Woodhams (1999) 199 CLR 370 considered
Director-General for Social Services v Chaney (1980) 31 ALR 571 referred to
Evans v Friemann (1981) 53 FLR 229 considered
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Pilnara Pty Ltd (1999) 96 FCR 82 cited
Forsyth v DCT (2004) 62 NSWLR 132 cited
Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99 considered
Guss v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2005] FCA 1499 affirmed
Industrial Equity Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1990) 170 CLR 649 considered
Pacific Century Production Pty Ltd v Watson (2001) 113 FCR 466 cited
Re Excel Finance Corporation Ltd (rec and mgr apptd); Worthley v England (1994) 52 FCR 69 cited
Ricegrowers Co-operative Mills Ltd v Bannerman and Trade Practices Commission (1982) 38 ALR 535 considered
Ross v Costigan (1982) 59 FLR 184, cited
Salerno v National Crime Authority (1997) 75 FCR 133 referred to
Scharer v State of New South Wales (2001) 53 NSWLR 299 referred to
Southern Farmers Group Limited v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (SA) (1989) 21 FCR 66 cited
Woodhams v DCT [1998] 4 VR 309 referred toANTONY DAVID GUSS v DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
VID 1469 OF 2005GYLES, EDMONDS AND GREENWOOD JJ
8 JUNE 2006
SYDNEY (HEARD IN MELBOURNE)
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 1469 OF 2005
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
ANTONY DAVID GUSS
APPELLANTAND:
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
RESPONDENTJUDGES:
GYLES, EDMONDS AND GREENWOOD JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
8 JUNE 2006
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY (HEARD IN MELBOURNE)
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT…
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- Case
- [2006] FCAFC 88
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the penalty notice constituted a decision of an administrative character by considering if it was a decision that could affect legal rights and obligations, and if it derived its capacity to do so from an enactment. The court noted that the decision to issue the penalty notice involved minimal factual determinations and did not require any assessment of competing considerations or statutory criteria. Instead, it was a straightforward verification of facts, such as whether an estimate had been made and whether Guss was a director of Bongania at the relevant time. The court concluded that the decision to issue the penalty notice did involve a determination that effectively resolved an actual substantive issue, as it led to the imposition of a penalty on Guss.
In reaching its decision, the court referred to the principles established in Griffith University v Tang, which highlighted the importance of considering whether a decision affects legal rights and obligations and whether it derives its capacity to do so from an enactment. The court found that the decision to issue the penalty notice did affect legal rights and obligations, as it imposed a penalty on Guss, and it derived its capacity to do so from the enactment under which it was made. Therefore, the court held that the penalty notice was a decision of an administrative character and could be reviewed under the ADJR Act.
Ultimately, the court dismissed Guss’s appeal and ordered that he pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal. The court’s decision confirmed that the Commissioner’s decision to issue the penalty notice was a valid decision of an administrative character that could be reviewed under the ADJR Act.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GREENWOOD J
In addressing the notion of whether a decision is ‘of an administrative character’, their Honours, Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ in the joint judgment, said this at [79] and [80]:‘[79] The decision so required or authorised must be “of an administrative character”. This element of the definition casts some light on the force to be given by the phrase “under an enactment”. What is it, in the course of administration, that flows from or arises out of the decision taken so as to give that significance which has merited the legislative conferral of a right of judicial review upon those aggrieved? [80] The answer in general terms is the affecting of legal rights and obligations. Do legal rights or duties owe in an immediate sense their existence to the decision, or depend upon the presence of the decision for their enforcement? [R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Barrett (1945) 70 CLR 141 at 154]. To adapt what was said by Lehane J in [Australian National University v Lewins (1996) 68 FCR 87 at 103], does the decision in question derive from the enactment the capacity to affect legal rights and obligations? Are legal rights and obligations affected not under the general law but by virtue of the statute? [General Newspapers Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation (1993) 45 FCR 164 at 169].’ (Emphasis added) It is important to keep in mind the precise question their Honours were seeking to elucidate in reflecting upon the ‘affecting of legal rights and obligations’ arising out of the decision. That question was whether the particular decision of the University to exclude Ms Tang, derived from the enactment (that is, Griffith University Act 1998), the capacity to affect legal rights and obligations so as to lead logically to the conclusion that the decision was ‘made under an enactment’. The conjunction of the ‘affect upon legal rights and obligations’ (or the capacity to so affect) and the derivation of that affect from an enactment under which the decision is made, gives rise to the justiciable significance contemplated by their Honours that merits a right of judicial review in those aggrieved. The answer to the question as a matter of general principle is reflected at [80] of their Honour’s reasons. At [89], their Honours said this:‘[89] The determination of whether a decision is “made … under an enactment” involves two criteria: first, the decision must be expressly or impliedly required or authorised by the enactment; and, secondly, the decision must itself confer, alter or otherwise affect legal rights or obligations, and in that sense the decision must derive from the enactment. A decision will only be “made … under an enactment” if both these criteria are met. It should be emphasised that this construction of the statutory definition does not require the relevant decision to affect or alter existing rights or obligations, and it will be sufficient that the enactment requires or authorises decisions from which new rights or obligations arise. Similarly, it is not necessary that the relevantly affected legal rights owe their existence to the enactment in question. Affection of rights or obligations derived from the general law or statute will suffice.’