LGC24 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
[2025] FCA 253
•26 March 2025
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
LGC24 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 253
File number(s): NSD 1869 of 2024 Judgment of: OWENS J Date of judgment: 26 March 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for mandamus – whether decision to grant or refuse a protection visa has been unreasonably delayed – where proceedings commenced nine days after the applicant provided her response to Notice of Intention to Consider Refusal – whether permissible to have regard to events subsequent to the commencement of proceedings – where application said to be simple – where issues relevant to application said to have been the subject of earlier consideration in connection with an application for a different visa – whether referral of application to Minister to consider personal decision gave rise to unreasonable delay – application dismissed Legislation: Constitution s 75(v)
Criminal Code (Cth) s 400.9(1A)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37M
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(1C), 36(2), 36(2)(a), 36(2)(b)(i), 56, 476A(1)(c), 476A(2), 499, 501(1), 501(7)(c), 501A(3)
Federal Court Rules2011 (Cth) rr 8.05(2)(a), 8.05(4)
Cases cited: AFX17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 807
AQM18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 FCR 424; [2019] FCAFC 27
ASP15 v Commonwealth (2016) 248 FCR 372; [2016] FCAFC 145
Bethell v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 661
Bethell v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 83
BMF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1530
CGP21 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FedCFamC2G 11
CWE22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 1461
DFE16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCA 1151
KDSP v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2020) 279 FCR 1; [2020] FCAFC 108
KDSP v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] HCA 24
P&C Cantarella Pty Ltd v Egg Marketing Board (NSW) [1973] 2 NSWLR 366
Patrick v Australian Information Commissioner (2024) 304 FCR 1; [2024] FCAFC 93
Plaintiff S297/2013 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 255 CLR 179; [2014] HCA 24
R v Building Controller, Ex parte Marinov (1981) 36 ACTR 13
Thornton v Repatriation Commission (1981) 52 FLR 285; [1981] FCA 71
Tran v Commonwealth [2021] FCA 580
Aronson M, Groves M, Weeks G, Judicial Review of Administrative Action and Government Liability (7th ed, Thomson Reuters, 2022)
Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 57 Date of hearing: 10 March 2025 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr P Berg Solicitor for the Applicant: Milojkovic Visa & Migration Legal Services Counsel for the Respondents: Mr BD Kaplan and Ms H Hofmann Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
NSD 1869 of 2024 BETWEEN: LGC24
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
OWENS J
DATE OF ORDER:
26 MARCH 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Paragraph 5 of the Originating Application dated 20 December 2024 be dismissed with costs.
2.The parties contact my chambers to arrange for the listing of the balance of the Originating Application for case management.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
OWENS J:
This judgment concerns so much of the applicant’s case as relates to her claim for a writ of mandamus, directed to the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, that he determine her application for a class XA (subclass 866) protection visa. (Although the Minister was identified as the object of the writ in the originating application, by the time of the hearing, the applicant’s case had shifted to seeking that the writ be directed to a delegate of the Minister. Ultimately, for reasons that will become clear, I do not need to resolve the question of the appropriate person to whom the writ should be directed.) The application is brought pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred on this Court by s 476A(1)(c) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (which is, pursuant to s 476A(2) of the Migration Act, the same as the jurisdiction of the High Court under s 75(v) of the Constitution).
To place the claim in context:
(a)The applicant has commenced other proceedings in this Court that relate to her application for a skilled (provisional) (Class VC) visa. She applied for that visa on 10 January 2017. On 29 September 2017, before that application had been determined, the applicant was convicted of an offence contrary to s 400.9(1A) of the Criminal Code (Cth), namely dealing with money (less than $100,000) reasonably suspected of being proceeds of crime. She was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment, wholly suspended on various conditions. That conviction and sentence meant that she had a “substantial criminal record” within the meaning of s 501(7)(c) of the Migration Act, and on 8 December 2023 a delegate of the Minister exercised their discretion to refuse to grant the visa. Subsequent proceedings in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal were decided in the applicant’s favour, but then, on 5 June 2024, the Minister exercised his power under s 501A(3) of the Migration Act, setting the Tribunal’s decision aside, and refusing the visa application. It is that last-mentioned decision that is the subject of separate judicial review proceedings in this Court. I understand that judgment in those proceedings is presently reserved before another judge of the Court.
(b)On 19 June 2024, following the Minister’s personal decision to refuse to grant the applicant a skilled visa, the applicant was located by the Australian Border Force and placed in immigration detention at Villawood Immigration Detention Centre.
(c)The following day, on 20 June 2024, the applicant, along with her husband and minor child, applied for a class XA (subclass 866) protection visa. Those applications were refused by a delegate on 27 June 2024. An application to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal succeeded on the basis that the minor child, but not her parents, had a well-founded fear of persecution and satisfied the criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act. Because the applicant and her husband were members of the same family unit as her minor child, they satisfied the criterion in s 36(2)(b)(i) of the Migration Act. As a result, on 9 September 2024, all three applications were remitted for reconsideration.
(d)Various steps (described below) were taken to progress the consideration of the applicant’s application, but no decision had been made by 20 December 2024, and it was on that day that the applicant commenced these proceedings. By her originating application, the applicant sought both a writ of habeas corpus (directed to securing her release from Villawood Immigration Detention Centre) and a writ of mandamus (directed to obliging the Minister to determine her application for a protection visa).
On the urging of all parties, on 7 February 2025, I ordered that the claim for mandamus be heard separately from and in advance of the claim for habeas corpus.
Also on 7 February 2025, I made orders requiring the applicant to file points of claim by 10 February 2025, with the intent that that document would identify with precision the basis upon which the applicant contended a writ of mandamus should issue. I did so because the originating application did not articulate any basis upon which it was contended a writ of mandamus should issue, and the affidavit that had been filed with the application, presumably in purported compliance with rr 8.05(2)(a) and 8.05(4) of the Federal Court Rules2011 (Cth), did not seem to me to be entirely satisfactory.
The document that was filed in consequence of that order was entitled “Statement of Claim” and, after listing a series of events under the heading “Chronology”, articulated the following six matters (identified as “particulars”), which I quote:
1.The protection visa decision is attended by unreasonable delay.
2.The protection visa decision is a simple one. The AAT has directed the Respondent that the Applicant is owed protection obligations, since September 2024.
3.The remaining s 501 character consideration is of a single conviction, 8 years in the past.
a)That conviction is at the minimum to engage a character discretion to refuse under s 501(6)(a), being 12 months’ imprisonment sentence, wholly suspended.
b)The conviction is not in a class of offences of special concern in MD no. 110.
c)There are no adverse considerations independent of that conviction.
d)There are many considerations favouring the applicant.
4.The s 501 discretion to refuse a visa has already been litigated in the recent past, March 2024. The Respondent should not be delayed by considering the matter anew.
a)The primary refusal decision in 2024 had many reasons for the decision.
b)The Respondent’s case to the AAT abandoned numerous reasons stated in the primary decision and was on a narrower basis.
c)The AAT considered the Respondent’s case and made the correct and preferable decision in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
5.The consideration of the s 501 discretion has some differences between the protection visa application and the earlier skilled visa application. However, those differences are either negligible or favour the Applicant.
6.On 11 December 2024, the Respondent received the last material from the Applicant. Being, the Applicant’s response to the Notice of Intention to Consider Refusal. The Applicant’s case for a favourable exercise of the s 501 discretion has only grown stronger since March 2024. There have been no adverse circumstances since the AAT’s favourable decision in March 2024.
The applicant’s case, as articulated on 10 February 2025, thus identified unreasonable delay on the part of the Minister in determining the protection visa application as the fundamental basis upon which the entitlement to mandamus depended. The existence of unreasonable delay was said to arise from the “simple” nature of the application, as well as the fact that the issues arising in connection with the possible exercise of the discretion under s 501 of the Migration Act had, in substance, already been litigated in connection with a different visa application. The applicant did not identify the precise point in time at which the Minister’s failure to determine the application was said to involve unreasonable delay, but the overwhelming inference (confirmed by the applicant in oral submissions) was that it was at some point between 11 December 2024 (which was the last date upon which the applicant submitted material she wished the Minister to take into account in making his decision) and 20 December 2024 (which was the date she commenced these proceedings seeking mandamus).
The applicant filed written submissions on 6 March 2025. Those submissions advanced a significantly wider case than that articulated in the applicant’s points of claim. Those submissions appeared to rely solely on circumstances post-dating the commencement of proceedings. The critical matter upon which the applicant’s case now fastened was the fact that on 24 January 2025, an officer of the Department of Home Affairs determined that the application should be referred for possible decision by the Minister personally. One aspect of the case advanced in writing (but withdrawn at the commencement of the hearing before me) involved inviting the Court to infer that this course had been taken in order to facilitate an unreasonable decision that could not be reviewed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. Another possible reading of the submissions (also withdrawn during the hearing), was that the decision to refer the matter for the Minister’s personal consideration was itself an independent decision susceptible to judicial review. Otherwise, the new case seemed to be that the decision to refer the matter to the Minister was unnecessary or inappropriate in light of the objective features of the application, had necessarily prolonged the decision-making process, and had thus given rise to unreasonable delay.
When counsel opened the applicant’s case before me on 10 March 2025, the case acquired yet a further dimension. It was submitted that a delegate of the Minister had in fact reached the point of having, in their own mind, finally determined what the fate of the visa application would be in “mid-January”. Having acquired that state of mental certainty, it was said that the subsequent decision to refer the matter to the Minister necessarily involved unreasonable delay.
The respondents objected to the applicant having leave to run any case beyond that articulated in the points of claim. I did permit the applicant to run the case that had been advanced in the written submissions (excluding those paragraphs withdrawn by counsel at the hearing before me). That is to say, I permitted a case to be run that located unreasonable delay in the objective circumstances of the referral of the application to the Minister. While the respondents said that they might have put on further evidence about the Departmental policy framework governing the referral of applications for personal decision by the Minister, and other evidence about the particular circumstances in which this application came to be referred, I was not persuaded that the respondents would suffer unfair prejudice if they had to meet that aspect of the case on the basis of the existing evidence.
I considered, however, that the same could not be said in relation to the aspect of the case articulated for the first time in the applicant’s oral opening involving contentions about the subjective state of mind of a delegate within the Department. Not being on notice of that case, the respondents had not had any opportunity to make inquiries as to relevant circumstances, let alone consider whether to put on evidence to meet such a case. It thus seemed to me that if I permitted the applicant to run that aspect of her case, the Minister would suffer substantial prejudice. Given that fact, the very late stage at which the issue was raised, and the ample opportunity that the applicant had had to provide notice of the way in which she put her case, I was not persuaded that it was consistent with the overarching purpose enshrined in s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) to permit the applicant to raise this new issue. I was confirmed in that view by the fact that it appeared to me that the case was, in any event, largely speculative. The applicant had no direct evidence to support the finding for which she contended, and appeared hopeful that cross-examination of the deponent of an affidavit filed by the respondents might fill the gap.
GOVERNING PRINCIPLES
It is not in dispute that if “a person makes a valid visa application, the Minister has a duty pursuant to s 47 and s 65 of the Act to consider and decide whether to grant, or whether to refuse to grant, the visa to the person”: CWE22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 1461 at [56], per Wigney J. It is equally uncontroversial that the Minister must perform that duty within a reasonable time, the determination of which must be made “having regard to the circumstances of the particular case within the context of the decision-making framework established by the Act”: Plaintiff S297/2013 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 255 CLR 179; [2014] HCA 24 at [37], per Crennan, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ; ASP15 v Commonwealth (2016) 248 FCR 372; [2016] FCAFC 145 at [20], per Robertson, Griffiths and Bromwich JJ; CWE22 at [57], per Wigney J.
The test for determining whether an inferred “reasonable time” limit for making an administrative decision has been exceeded was authoritatively stated in Thornton v Repatriation Commission (1981) 52 FLR 285 at 292; [1981] FCA 76 (applied in the particular context of decisions in relation to applications for protection visas in, for example, ASP15 at [23], per Robertson, Griffiths and Bromwich JJ):
The question is whether there are circumstances which a reasonable man might consider render this delay justified and not capricious. In the first instance it is on the evidence a delay for a considered reason and not in consequence of neglect, oversight or perversity.
Unreasonable delay will not be constituted by a failure to achieve administrative and systemic perfection: see, e.g., Tran v Commonwealth [2021] FCA 580 at [41], per Jagot J; Bethell v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 661 at [47], per Rangiah J (appeal dismissed in Bethell v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 83). After referring to the “usually high threshold” for a conclusion of unreasonableness in contexts such as this, the Full Court in Patrick v Australian Information Commissioner (2024) 304 FCR 1; [2024] FCAFC 93 at [73], per Bromwich, Abraham and McEvoy JJ, said:
The question is not whether it should be expected that such processes would have been quicker, but whether, considering the circumstances of this review, in the context of the statutory scheme, this delay is unreasonable in that sense. The concept is not absolute or abstract, but rather contextual both in relation to the statute in question and the particular facts of the case at hand.
To a similar effect, in KDSP v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2020) 279 FCR 1; [2020] FCAFC 108 at [193], O’Callaghan and Steward JJ held:
In our view there is no evidence of oversight or neglect. There is no evidence of perversity or capriciousness. Rather, by happenstance, events beyond the control of the Minister’s Department … combined with events that it did control, albeit progressed at perhaps a bureaucratic pace, explain the delay here. That is very much less than an adequate outcome, especially with an appellant in detention. But, in our view, what occurred did not amount to an abuse of a power, in the required sense. In that respect, criticisms directed at showing that the Minister’s staff were too slow, or took steps that another person might consider were unnecessary … are not to the point, unless they show the presence of perversity, capriciousness, intentional oversight or neglect.
In that connection, it needs also to be kept in mind that it “is both lawful and desirable for the Department to develop policies and processes to facilitate the exercise of powers such as those under s 501 consistently with a decision under s 65”: KDSP v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] HCA 24 at [54], per Edelman J. Indeed, I would make the further observation that it is both lawful and desirable for the Department to develop policies and procedures to facilitate the making of rigorous and consistent decisions generally. Compliance with such policies and processes may perhaps create an appearance of bureaucratic complexity, with attendant effluxion of time, in relation to what is contended ought to be a simple decision. But it would be an error to consider the reasonableness of the Department’s procedures solely against the perceived demands of a single decision. As a general proposition, the justification for those procedures is found in the responsibility of the Department to assist the Minister in the discharge of his duties under the Migration Act generally.
Insofar as the burden of proof is concerned, in AQM18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 FCR 424; [2019] FCAFC 27 at [59], Besanko and Thawley JJ said:
… it was for the appellant to show that there was unreasonable delay affecting the jurisdiction to make the decision. If the appellant established a delay which called for explanation, then the persuasive onus might shift to the Minister to establish was that explanation was. In considering whether the appellant discharged her onus of establishing unreasonable delay, the evidence of each party is to be evaluated in accordance with the capacity of each to adduce evidence on the issue: Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63; 98 ER 969.
Finally, the respondents raised an issue concerning the point in time at which the applicant must demonstrate unreasonable delay. They submitted that “unreasonable delay must be established as at the date on which proceedings were commenced”. In support of that submission, the respondents relied principally on P&C Cantarella Pty Ltd v Egg Marketing Board (NSW) [1973] 2 NSWLR 366 at 381, per Mahoney J, R v Building Controller, Ex parte Marinov (1981) 36 ACTR 13 at 17-18, per Connor ACJ, and a statement in Aronson et al, Judicial Review of Administrative Action and Government Liability (7th ed, Thomson Reuters, 2022) at [16.40]. They observed that those cases, and that text, have been held to stand for the proposition in question in CGP21 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FedCFamC2G 11 at [33]-[37], per Judge Driver.
I am not convinced that the authorities relied upon do in fact support the submission advanced. The particular statement in Judicial Review of Administrative Action and Government Liability upon which reliance is placed is the penultimate sentence of the following quotation, which appears under the heading “Constructive failure to perform a duty”. The only authorities cited in support of it are Cantarella and Marinov:
A failure to perform a duty may amount to a constructive refusal to perform that duty. However, if no decision has been made which affects the plaintiff’s legal interests and insufficient time has passed to prove constructive refusal to decide by the decision-maker, mandamus will not lie. The failure must precede the commencement of the claim for mandamus. It must also continue until the moment the court gives judgment.
Unreasonable delay in making a decision is one of many circumstances from which a constructive refusal to perform a duty may be inferred. Neither Cantarella nor Marinov were cases raising any suggestion of unreasonable delay, and an appreciation of the precise basis upon which each case was brought is necessary in order to understand exactly what they hold.
In Cantarella, the plaintiff applied to have particular premises approved for the candling and grading of eggs. Following the making of the application, negotiations occurred between the plaintiff and the Egg Marketing Board, in which the latter indicated certain conditions upon which it would be minded to give its approval. Those proposed conditions being unacceptable to the plaintiff (and contended to be beyond power), proceedings were commenced seeking a writ of mandamus compelling the Egg Marketing Board to grant approval subject to alternative conditions proposed by the plaintiff.
The proceedings were thus commenced at a time before a decision had been made, and where the basis upon which mandamus was sought was not any delay in the making of the decision, but rather an apprehension that invalid conditions would be attached to any approval. The critical passage in Mahoney J’s judgment for present purposes is this (at 381):
The defendant, at the commencement of this proceeding, had not concluded its consideration of the application for approval; the plaintiff could not have forced the defendant to grant the approval, conditioned only as requested.
It may be that the defendant, by its attitude in this proceeding has indicated that it refuses or has refused the application, or that it will not grant the approval unless the plaintiff accepts the conditions which I have held the defendant has no power to require. Even if this were so, I do not think that, in the light of the events which have happened since the conditions were formulated in January 1973, the defendant would be precluded from reconsidering the form of the conditions to be imposed.
The first point made by his Honour was that before the stage is reached where there is either a decision, or a refusal to make a decision (in other words, while a decision remains appropriately under consideration), mandamus will not lie. That was the position obtaining when proceedings were commenced, and thus no entitlement to the relief claimed was made out at that point in time. His Honour then considered whether an entitlement to mandamus might have arisen by reason of events subsequent to the commencement of proceedings, including by reason of the stance taken by the defendant in conducting the litigation. In that regard, his Honour held that, even if the defendant’s defence of the proceedings evinced a sufficiently fixed view as to constitute a refusal of the application (or a grant of approval subject to invalid conditions), in the particular circumstances of the case, he would not grant mandamus.
I do not read Cantarella, therefore, as providing any support for the proposition that in cases of unreasonable delay (or indeed, more generally), a writ of mandamus could only be granted where the conditions justifying its issue were satisfied prior to the commencement of proceedings. Indeed, it seems to me that Mahoney J was prepared to assume that events subsequent to the commencement of proceedings could be relied upon to establish a constructive refusal of an application, or refusal to decide an application. To that extent, I read the decision as contrary to the submission advanced by the respondents.
In Marinov, the prosecutor on an application for a writ of mandamus complained that a licensing authority had formed the view by reference to an irrelevant consideration that the prosecutor may not be eligible for the licence for which he had applied. It was said to follow that a request for information on that topic issued to the prosecutor was not justified, and that the licence ought instead to have been granted. The substance of the submission seems to have been that by requesting information on a basis that was not justified, the licensing authority had wrongly determined to refuse the prosecutor’s application.
Acting Chief Justice Connor held that the topic upon which information had been requested could be relevant to the prosecutor’s eligibility for the licence, and that the request for information was accordingly a proper one. Whether any information provided in response to the request in fact supplied a basis upon which ineligibility might be established was a question necessarily to be determined in light of the actual decision when it was ultimately made. It followed that the prosecutor had brought proceedings focussing upon the wrong stage of the decision-making process.
It is against that background that the following passage in Connor ACJ’s reasons (at 17-18) needs to be understood:
The Building Controller, by s 17(1), is required to approve the grant of the licence and can refuse it only if, under s 17(2), he has reason to believe the applicant is not eligible. In my view the formation of such a belief does not amount to the making of a decision to refuse to grant a licence. It is but the first step in the process of doing so and, in any event, it is a step which may come to nothing. The Building Controller is required by s 17(2)(b) to give the applicant written notice of the grounds upon which he bases his belief and the applicant is given a further opportunity to establish his eligibility. It is only after the applicant’s failure to do so that the Building Controller is permitted by s 17(2) to refuse to grant the licence. As appears above, the prosecutor’s solicitors took out these proceedings and served them upon the Building Controller before the expiry of the period available to the prosecutor to establish his eligibility. I think, therefore, as submitted by Miss Vardanega on behalf of the Building Controller, that there could not at that stage have been any refusal to grant a licence to the prosecutor. There is consequently no decision upon which certiorari can operate and no refusal to make a decision to ground mandamus. The prosecutor’s solicitors struck too soon.
In context, therefore, it can be seen that Marinov does not stand for the proposition that in cases where unreasonable delay is relied upon as the basis for a writ of mandamus, the delay must have reached the critical point prior to the commencement of proceedings. The basis of the decision was the failure of the prosecutor to establish a refusal to make a decision at all, not simply prior to the commencement of proceedings.
The decision in CGP21 proceeds on the basis that the authorities just described do in fact compel the conclusion that “the relevant date for assessing whether there has been a constructive failure on the part of the respondents to perform a duty is the day on which [the] proceedings were commenced” (at [33], original emphasis). It thus appears to me not to advance the issue in any substantive way.
For completeness, I observe that this issue was raised, but not determined, in DFE16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCA 1151 at [84]-[87], per Nicholas J. His Honour did, however, observe that neither Cantarella nor Marinov concerned alleged unreasonable delay as the basis upon which mandamus was sought, and further observed that “there have been a number of cases in which delay occurring both prior to and after the commencement of the proceeding in which mandamus was sought was taken into account” (at [86], citing, by way of example, ASP15 at [48]; AFX17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 807; and BMF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1530). His Honour went on to observe, however, that in “each of those cases there was found to have been significant delay prior to the commencement of the relevant proceeding followed by further delay afterwards all of which contributed to a finding that there had been unreasonable delay by the decision-maker” (at [86]). (The respondents, for their part, point out that in none of those cases does the issue appear to have been raised.)
Ultimately, it was not necessary for Nicholas J to determine the issue because his Honour was not satisfied that there was unreasonable delay even if events after the commencement of proceedings were taken into account. As will be seen, I am in the same position. In those circumstances, and where the applicant did not advance any detailed analysis or argument to which the respondents might have replied, I am minded not to express a concluded view on the topic (even though, as will be evident from the above discussion, my inclination is not to accept the respondents’ submission).
None of that is to deny, as the respondents submitted, that there should be a proper basis for seeking relief in the nature of mandamus at the time proceedings are commenced. But it is not immediately clear to me why an applicant could not commence proceedings on the basis of a bona fide contention that there had been unreasonable delay, and, even if that case were not accepted, still obtain relief on the basis of an alternative case relying on subsequent events.
THE FACTS
The applicant read one affidavit, being that of her instructing solicitor, Wendy Milojkovic, affirmed on 12 February 2025. That affidavit identified various events connected with the applicant’s applications for both a skilled visa and a protection visa.
The respondents read three affidavits from two deponents.
(a)Ms Tracey Malone, the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Character and Cancellation Branch, in the Character Cancellation and Case Resolution Division, in the Immigration Compliance Group, of the Department of Home Affairs, affirmed two affidavits. Ms Malone gave evidence about the Department’s procedures for processing protection visa applications, insofar as they are relevant to the applicant’s case. She also gave evidence about the particular steps taken in connection with the consideration of the applicant’s application.
(b)Ms Hervee Dejean, the lawyer at the Australian Government Solicitor with carriage of these proceedings on behalf of the respondents, affirmed one affidavit, deposing to certain communications dated between 12 February 2025 and 5 March 2025 between the respondents or their lawyers, and the applicant’s lawyers.
No deponent was cross-examined, and no submission was made that I should not accept the evidence they gave. There was no inconsistency between any of the affidavits read in the proceedings. I accept all of the evidence contained in the affidavits, even where I have not specifically referred to some aspect of it in my reasons.
It is important to be clear about the relevance of events prior to 11 December 2024, when the applicant submitted her response to the “Notice of Intention to Consider Refusal” (or NOICR in the argot of the Department) that had been issued to her in connection with her application. The applicant did not submit that any act or omission before that date gave rise to delay, let alone unreasonable delay. The relevance of those matters to the applicant’s argument was said to be that they provide the foundation for her submission that only a very short period of time was required in order to make a decision after 11 December 2024.
As I outlined at the beginning of these reasons, the first relevant visa for which the applicant applied was a skilled visa. The path along which that application travelled is said to be relevant to these proceedings because its determination has also involved the exercise of discretions connected with the fact that the applicant does not pass the character test. In particular:
(a)On 8 December 2023, a delegate of the Minister refused the application in an exercise of the discretion conferred by s 501(1) of the Migration Act. In considering whether to exercise that discretion, the delegate was required to comply with “Direction No. 99 — Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA” (a direction given by the Minister pursuant to s 499 of the Migration Act). (I pause to interpolate that Direction No. 99 has now been replaced with Direction No. 110. It was not in dispute that there are differences between the two Directions, including that Direction No. 110 gives greater emphasis to considerations relating to the safety of the community.) The delegate provided written reasons which set out the various considerations to which regard had been had, and the reasoning process by which they were evaluated. The applicant did not refer me to any particular aspect of the delegate’s reasons. Rather, I understand the applicant to rely on the fact that the reasons as a whole constitute a detailed articulation of the facts and issues arising in connection with the exercise of the character discretion in her case. The applicant plainly does not agree with the decision that the delegate made, but says that these reasons are “helpful”, as a distillation of the relevant facts and issues, and that they (especially when considered in light of later considerations of the same issues) contribute to making the decision in relation to her protection visa application a “simple” one.
(b)The applicant sought review of that decision in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. A “Statement of Facts, Issues, and Contentions” was filed on behalf of the Minister in the Tribunal on 1 March 2024. The applicant relies on the fact that this document sets out a reasoned articulation of the contentions open to the Minister in relation to the exercise of the character discretion concerning the applicant, made in light of the delegate’s decision. In other words, this document represents a second careful consideration, this time by the Minister’s legal representatives, of the manner in which the character discretion should be exercised in relation to the applicant. Once again, the applicant plainly disagrees with the conclusion for which the document contends; but says it is another “helpful” analysis that renders the protection visa decision a “simple” one.
(c)The Tribunal gave its decision, in favour of the applicant, on 27 March 2024. Again, the applicant says that this is a “helpful” document contributing to the simplicity of the decision in relation to the protection visa. The applicant submitted that this document is particularly helpful because it addresses the submissions put on behalf of the Minister in the Tribunal. The applicant pointed to paragraph [22] of the Tribunal’s decision, which addressed a submission set out in paragraph [26] of the Minister’s “Statement of Facts, Issues, and Contentions”. The Minister had submitted that there was no evidence that the applicant had undertaken any rehabilitative programs or courses, or psychological support, to address her offending behaviour. The Tribunal, however, did not regard the absence of such evidence as being of any significance in the circumstances of the applicant’s particular offending. The applicant says that it is this kind of deliberation by the Tribunal that is particularly “helpful”.
(d)On 5 June 2024, the Minister exercised his power under s 501A(3) of the Migration Act to set aside the Tribunal’s decision and refuse to grant the applicant a skilled visa. In making that decision, the Minister was not bound by Direction No. 99 and, in any event, the discretion was to be exercised having regard to a different criterion, namely, the Minister’s assessment of the national interest. Nonetheless, the applicant relied on the Minister’s reasons for his decision as representing yet another prior consideration of the applicant’s circumstances in connection with a discretion to refuse her a visa in light of her failure to pass the character test. To put the matter plainly, the effect of the applicant’s contentions was that all the thinking and consideration that needs to be done has, in substance, already been done.
It was after the Minister had personally decided to refuse the applicant’s skilled visa that the applicant was taken into immigration detention, and it was shortly after that, on 20 June 2024, that she applied for a protection visa.
I have already mentioned that those applications were refused by a delegate on 27 June 2024, and that refusal was overturned by the Tribunal on 9 September 2024, with a finding that the applicant satisfied the criterion in s 36(2)(b)(i) of the Migration Act.
I will shortly set out the critical events relating to the consideration of the applicant’s application following its remittal by the Tribunal. Before doing so, however, it is convenient to quote at length the evidence of Ms Malone about the standard procedures that apply to the consideration of remitted applications. That evidence usefully describes the relevant administrative structures of the Department, and the process in accordance with which applications generally are assessed. Ms Malone said:
8.The Department’s procedures as to the processing of protection visa applications are set out in detail in the Protection Visa Processing Guidelines.
9.Where the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (and now the Administrative Review Tribunal) determines a protection visa application, the Department’s policy is to undertake the following steps:
9.1following the Tribunal’s decision, officers of the Department update the status of the case in the ICSE [Integrated Client Services Environment] system to a status of either “affirmed”, or “remitted”;
9.2if the status is “affirmed”, the matter is not referred to a Protection Obligations Decision maker (PODM), however, there are a number of other processes which may commence (for example, removal processes);
9.3if the status is “remitted”, the National Allocations and Finalisation Section (NAFS) will allocate the case to a PODM within a Protections Assessment team for consideration. If the Tribunal remits an application with a direction that the applicant meets the criteria under subsection 36(2) of the Migration Act 1958, a PODM would need to determine whether the applicant satisfies the criteria under subsections 36(1C) and 36(2C) of the Act;
9.4. if a PODM requires additional information regarding the character issues, an interview may be arranged, or a letter is sent to ascertain additional information. The delegate must comply in this respect with the Code of Procedure set out in Part 2, Div 3, Subdivision AB of the Act;
9.5. if the PODM is considering a finding that the applicant does not satisfy the criteria set out in either subsection 36(1C) or 36(2C), then the application is referred to the International Obligations and Complex Cases Section and, in some cases, the International Law & Protection Obligations Section (ILPOS), to consult and advise in respect of the complex and sensitive legal and procedural issues that arise in such applications. Subject to that consultation, the PODM may refuse the application and the applicant is then notified of the decision and the option to seek merits review;
9.6.if the PODM finds that the applicant does satisfy the criteria in subsections 36(1C) and 36(2C), the case is referred to HPOB [Humanitarian Program Operations Branch], specifically the NAFS team, to conduct checks against the criteria in Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 in relation to health, character and security requirements; and
9.7. if an assessment is made that an applicant might not meet the character requirements, the matter will be referred to the Visa Application and Character Consideration Unit (VACCU) for assessment against section 501 of the Act.
10. When a matter is referred to VACCU, the following steps are usually taken:
10.1.a referral to VACCU is received by the Decision Support Unit (DSU), who determine whether the case will be taken down a Visa Applicant Primary Assessment (VAPA) or Notice of Intention to Consider Refusal (NOICR) pathway. A VAPA pathway is where on assessment of the existing information DSU consider that the merits of a case may not warrant a full consideration eg where an applicant’s circumstances are unlikely to result in a refusal;
10.2. if a referral is on a VAPA pathway, the DSU officer will create the VAPA for consideration by the character delegate. The character delegate may either agree that a full consideration is not warranted, disagree and request a NOICR, or request additional information/escalation; and
10.3.if the character delegate agrees a full consideration is not warranted, the DSU officer who created the VAPA will then finalise the case, the matter will be referred back to NAFS and in the ordinary course a decision will be made within a matter of days.
10.4. if the character delegate decides to exercise the discretion under section 501 of the Act to refuse the visa, then the visa will be refused and will be finally determined.
Ms Malone gave further evidence that:
In addition to the usual steps taken when a matter is referred to … VACCU … the character delegate may also consider that a visa applicant may be of personal interest to the Minister. When that is the case, a submission is prepared for the Minister’s review to enable the Minister to consider the exercise of available personal discretionary powers in relation to the visa application. If the Minister decides not to consider the exercise of a personal discretionary power, the Minister will return the application to the character delegate.
In my experience, whether a matter is referred to the Minister is based on a multitude of factors. The case is initially triaged based on the severity or nature of the crimes, the risk to the community, or other cases may be referred if there has been media interest or other events that may mean it is of particular interest to the Minister.
Returning to the key events in the consideration of the applicant’s application following remittal:
(a)Arrangements were made to obtain information of various kinds from a number of sources, including the applicant herself, the Law Enforcement Liaison Unit within the Character and Cancellation Branch (CACB) of the Department, the Australian Federal Police, and the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission. In light of the fact that the applicant does not contend that any act or omission prior to 11 December 2024 caused or contributed to any unreasonable delay, it is not necessary to set out all of the dates upon which those requests were made, and upon which information was supplied in response to them. I will simply record, by way of example, that the request made of the applicant, pursuant to s 56 of the Migration Act, was made on 25 September 2024, and the response to that request was received on 19 October 2024.
(b)On 8 November 2024, a PODM in the NAFS team made an assessment that the applicant satisfied the criterion in s 36(1C) of the Migration Act. On that same day, NAFS referred that assessment to VACCU for an assessment under s 501 of the Migration Act.
(c)On 12 November 2024, an officer within VACCU informed NAFS that it had determined that the applicant may be liable for refusal of her visa application under s 501(1) of the Migration Act, and that VACCU would be issuing a NOICR to the applicant.
(d)The NOICR was issued on 13 November 2024. The applicant provided a response to the notice on 11 December 2024, which totalled some 164 pages.
(e)That response was considered by VACCU, which, on 17 December 2024 provided a “refusal consideration submission package” to the “CACB Response Taskforce Team” (which is responsible for handling priority assessments).
(f)On 20 December 2024, the applicant commenced these proceedings.
(g)On 23 December 2024, Ms Malone affirmed her first affidavit. The final paragraph of that affidavit stated that it was “expected that a delegate will be able to consider the case early in the new year 2025”. That expectation was confirmed the following day, on 24 December 2024, at the first return of these proceedings before another judge of the Court.
(h)The Department had a “shut-down” period from 24 December 2024 to 2 January 2025, but even upon reopening, staffing levels were lower than usual, owing to people taking leave.
(i)On 13 January 2025 a Departmental case officer within CACB completed a draft refusal consideration statement of reasons. On that same day, the draft was, in accordance with the Department’s standard procedures, provided to a manager for quality assurance. That manager reviewed the draft and, in conjunction with a case officer, revised it. The draft was sent to a character delegate of the Minister for consideration on 23 January 2025.
(j)The character delegate determined, on 24 January 2025, that the applicant may be of personal interest to the Minister, and asked that a submission be escalated to the Minister to enable the Minister to consider the exercise of available personal discretionary powers.
(k)On 28 January 2025, the Department requested a copy of the sentencing remarks in relation to the applicant’s criminal conviction from the District Court of New South Wales.
(l)On 31 January 2025, before the sentencing remarks had been received, a submission on the applicant’s matter was sent to the Minister. This step was taken without waiting for the sentencing remarks because it was not known how long it would take for the District Court to be able to provide them.
(m)On 6 February 2025, the District Court provided the sentencing remarks and, as a result, on 12 February 2025, the Ministerial submission was recalled, so that it could be updated in light of the content of that document.
(n)In addition, it was necessary to provide the applicant with natural justice in relation to the new information in the sentencing remarks. As such, also on 12 February 2025, a letter was sent to the applicant’s solicitor inviting comment on the new information, and requesting a response within 14 days (that is, by 26 February 2025).
(o)On 26 February 2025, the applicant’s solicitor sought a seven-day extension within which to reply to the natural justice letter (that is, to 5 March 2025). The requested extension was granted on 27 February 2025. The evidence did not disclose whether any response had been provided, and if it had, on what date.
(p)On 2 March 2025, the applicant’s lawyers wrote to VACCU contending that the applicant had not been provided with natural justice, and requesting certain categories of documents be provided to her. In oral submissions, it was stated that this contention relates only to the extent that a personal decision by the Minister is in contemplation. In other words, if a Ministerial delegate were to make the decision, then the applicant accepts that she has been provided with natural justice (and thus that the delegate may proceed to make a decision).
CONSIDERATION
The applicant’s case that the application was a “simple” one, that should have been determined before 20 December 2024 (or, in the alternative, before now), was based on the following propositions:
(a)The criminal punishment that the applicant received (i.e., a sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment) was the very minimum that met the statutory definition of a “substantial criminal record”.
(b)It is now nearly eight years since the applicant’s conviction, and in that period she has not engaged in any further offending. That is said to show that she has been rehabilitated, which is an important consideration under Direction No. 110.
(c)The issues relevant to the exercise of the s 501 discretion, and the material upon which the decision is to be made, were substantially the same for both the skilled visa and the protection visa. The fact that that material, and those issues, had already been considered in the context of the application for the former visa meant that very little time should be required in order to decide the protection visa application.
(d)To the extent that any new considerations had arisen since the determination of the skilled visa, they were all uniformly in favour of the applicant.
Overall, it was the applicant’s contention that her case was straightforward, strong, and that the bulk of the necessary analysis had already been undertaken in connection with her application for a skilled visa.
The respondents, on the other hand, sought to emphasise that the application was not as “simple” as the applicant would have it. They submitted that:
(a)The nature of the offending conduct that caused the applicant to fail the character test is only the beginning of the analysis. There are a wide range of considerations, going well beyond the nature of the offending in question, that are relevant to the exercise of the discretion under s 501 of the Migration Act.
(b)It goes without saying that a decision-maker could not simply adopt the reasoning of a prior decision-maker who considered the exercise of the s 501 discretion in relation to an application for a different visa. Even if the material upon which the decisions were to be made was precisely the same (and the respondents did not accept that it was), a decision-maker was required to undertake their own genuine consideration of the issues and come to their own view.
(c)The criteria against which the discretion is to be exercised (to the extent exercised by a Ministerial delegate) have changed since the consideration of the skilled visa (Direction No. 110 commenced on 21 June 2024). For example, unlike the prior Direction No. 99, Direction No. 110 provides that the safety of the Australian community “is the highest priority of the Australian Government” (at 8.1).
(d)It is also the case that the exercise of the discretion in the context of a different visa may give rise to different considerations. That is to say, it is possible to regard the fact that the s 501 discretion is being exercised in the context of an application for a protection visa as making relevant different matters than would be the case in the context of an application for a skilled visa, or at the very least it may affect the relative weight to be ascribed to the same factors. Further potential complexity is added by reason of the fact that the basis upon which the applicant’s protection visa application is made is by reason of her satisfaction of s 36(2)(b) of the Migration Act, rather than s 36(2)(a).
(e)The information upon which the protection visa application was to be determined was different to that by reference to which the skilled visa was to be determined. That information included material submitted as part of the 164-page response to the NOICR, dated 11 December 2024, which post-dated the Minister’s personal refusal of the skilled visa on 5 June 2024, including:
(i)A 60-page record of responses received in relation to the applicant’s application for a protection visa, commenced on 20 June 2024;
(ii)Various educational and professional certificates, issued between 6 September 2024 and 2 December 2024;
(iii)The Tribunal’s decision record dated 9 September 2024;
(iv)A National Police Check dated 17 October 2024;
(v)A statutory declaration of the applicant dated 19 October 2024, in which the applicant discussed her criminal offending, her remorse, her rehabilitation, and the support she receives from, and the contribution she makes to, the community;
(vi)A “Personal Circumstances Form” dated 28 November 2024;
(vii)A ten-page submission prepared by the applicant’s counsel, dated 11 December 2024;
(viii)A two-page “comment on information” prepared by the applicant’s counsel, dated 11 December 2024;
(ix)A ninety-odd page report of the Australian Human Rights Commission entitled “Not just an afterthought: The experience of women in immigration detention”, dated December 2024.
(f)Any decision-maker would need time to consider that new information, and assess it in light of the earlier information, and the issues generally. The significance of the new information may be observed in the fact that there is extensive consideration of it in the draft statement of reasons prepared for the Minister’s consideration (at, e.g., paragraphs [7], [24], [27]-[28], [33]-[35], [38], [40], [43]-[44], [48]-[51], [56], [62]-[65], and [69]). As outlined above, a draft of those reasons was completed by a case officer on 13 January 2025, with the document then reviewed and updated by a manager, before being sent to a character delegate on 23 January 2025 (and onwards to the Minister on 31 January 2025, before being recalled so that the draft could incorporate the subsequently-provided District Court sentencing remarks).
Even if the matter was as simple as the applicant would have it, I am not persuaded that there would have been unreasonable delay in the relevant sense in the failure to make a decision by 20 December 2024 (that is, a mere nine days after the applicant submitted her 164-page response to the NOICR). But in any event, each of the matters identified by the respondents has force and I accept them all. They put beyond doubt that a failure to make a decision within nine days of the provision of the applicant’s response to the NOICR cannot of itself be regarded as an unreasonable delay.
The evidence demonstrates that that response was considered promptly by VACCU, and that by 17 December 2024, a “refusal consideration submission package” had been provided to the “CACB Response Taskforce Team”. The expectation at that stage was that, following the Department’s standard shut-down period over Christmas and the New Year, that package would be considered by a delegate early in 2025. The standard processes calculated to ensure high-quality decision-making were (and were being) followed. A failure to deviate from those processes by reason of the asserted “simplicity” of the application (which I do not accept in any event) cannot be justified, let alone characterised as unreasonable. The fact that those processes were not completed within nine days does not strike me as remarkable. Nothing in the course of events comes even close to suggesting neglect, oversight, perversity or capriciousness. Indeed, to the contrary, it would appear that the Department engaged promptly and substantively with the material provided by the applicant. The demands of rigorous and consistent decision-making to which I have previously referred provide more than ample justification for the process followed, and the time taken, between 11 and 20 December 2024.
What, then, of the period following 20 December 2024? Once again, I am not persuaded that there has been neglect, oversight, perversity or capriciousness. The factual narrative set out above shows that work resumed on the application promptly after the Department’s shut-down period. By 13 January 2025, a draft statement of reasons had been prepared by a case officer and provided to a manager in accordance with standard Departmental practice for review. That review was concluded within ten days, and a final draft sent to a Ministerial delegate for consideration on 23 January 2025. The very next day, the delegate determined that the application may be of personal interest to the Minister, and asked for a Ministerial submission to be prepared to enable the Minister to determine whether he wished to exercise his personal discretionary powers.
Pausing there, the time period taken for each of those steps (periods ranging from one day to about a week and a half) appear, particularly in the context of what I would infer to be a busy Department, manifestly reasonable. I would be of that view, even if the matter was as simple as the applicant submitted. As it happens, I accept the respondents’ submissions concerning the additional complexity of the matter left out of the applicant’s summary. On no view were the circumstances and features of the application such that it is possible to infer from the passage of such short periods of time that there has been unreasonable delay. Indeed, once again, the fact that processes were followed to ensure rigorous and careful consideration of the relevant issues, with appropriate opportunities for checking and review, are inconsistent with the existence of neglect, oversight, perversity and capriciousness.
The applicant submitted that unreasonableness could be inferred from the fact that on 23 December 2024, Ms Malone had affirmed an affidavit in which she said that it was “expected that a delegate will be able to consider the case early in the new year 2025”, and that a similar expectation had been conveyed to this Court by the respondents’ legal representative on 24 December 2024. I do not accept that submission. I am satisfied that the evidence demonstrates that the expectation was met (that is, the application was in fact considered by a delegate in January 2025). The evidence discloses why a decision was not made in relation to the application at the time the delegate first considered it (i.e., because it was referred for the Minister’s personal consideration). For reasons to which I will now turn, I do not regard those circumstances as giving rise to any unreasonable delay.
It was perhaps the delegate’s decision to refer the application to the Minister for consideration that became the real focus of the applicant’s case. The applicant submitted that the reasons for referring her application to the Minister were “opaque”. That is true to an extent, in that the respondents did not lead evidence as to the precise subjective reasons of the delegate when he or she formed the view that this application may be of personal interest to the Minister. In light of the way in which the applicant’s case developed, that is perhaps unsurprising. But the respondents did adduce evidence of the fact that the decision to refer a matter to the Minister is “based on a multitude of factors”, and that the fundamental basis for referral is the assessment of a delegate that the matter may be of interest to the Minister. The natural inference from Ms Malone’s evidence was that the decision to refer was made in accordance with the usual practices of the Department. There was no cross-examination of Ms Malone to establish that the referral involved any departure from those practices.
In circumstances where one available pathway under the Migration Act for making decisions in relation to applications such as that in issue here is for them to be made by the Minister personally, I do not think that it can be inferred from the fact that a delegate considered that the Minister may wish to exercise his personal powers that there has been unreasonable delay. It certainly cannot be inferred from the referral of the application to the Minister that the failure to make a decision is a result of oversight, neglect, perversity or capriciousness. The decision-making framework for which the Migration Act provides includes a reasonable opportunity for the Minister or a delegate to consider the exercise of relevant powers under s 501. The referral to the Minister appears, on the evidence, to have been made in accordance with the Department’s standard processes, and there is nothing about the application which would allow an inference of unreasonableness naturally to be drawn.
Nor is there any aspect of the time taken to perform relevant steps in connection with the referral that provides a basis for a finding of unreasonable delay. Having determined on 24 January 2025 that the application should be referred to the Minister, a submission was prepared and sent up within a week (on 31 January 2025). The decision was made not to await receipt of the District Court sentencing remarks, which had been requested on 28 January 2025, on the basis that it was not known how long it would take for that Court to provide them. As it happens, they were provided on 6 February 2025, with the result that the Ministerial submission was recalled, and a natural justice letter sent to the applicant.
(I interpolate at this point that the applicant did not make any submission to the effect that the fact that the District Court sentencing remarks had not been requested until 28 January 2025 involved unreasonable delay.)
I have already recorded that the applicant’s solicitor was not able to provide any submission concerning the District Court sentencing remarks within the stipulated 14-day period, and requested a seven-day extension. The fact that the applicant’s own lawyers required 21 days within which to consider and respond on a discrete topic might be thought to be inconsistent with the applicant’s case that the time taken by the respondents to consider her application generally involves unreasonable delay. At the very least, though, the period from the issuance of the natural justice letter to the date upon which the applicant provided a response must be excluded from the period of alleged unreasonable delay. As for the subsequent period, the response was, in accordance with the extended deadline, due by 5 March 2025. In circumstances where I do not know whether a response was provided on that date, or indeed at all, and if it was, in what terms, but where I do know that the applicant considered that she needed 21 days to prepare it, I would not regard the applicant as having discharged her burden of proof as to the demonstration of unreasonable delay in relation to the period of time from 5 March 2025 to today.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, I am not persuaded that there has been any unreasonable delay in the failure to determine the applicant’s application by 20 December 2024, or in the alternative, up until today. It follows that I refuse the applicant’s claim insofar as it seeks a writ of mandamus.
No party submitted that costs should not follow the event, and I would order that the applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the claim for mandamus.
The parties should contact my chambers to arrange for the balance of the Originating Application to be listed for case management before me on a convenient date.
I certify that the preceding fifty-seven (57) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Owens. Associate:
Dated: 26 March 2025
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