LGC24 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

LGC24 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 253

File number(s): NSD 1869 of 2024
Judgment of: OWENS J
Date of judgment: 26 March 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for mandamus – whether decision to grant or refuse a protection visa has been unreasonably delayed – where proceedings commenced nine days after the applicant provided her response to Notice of Intention to Consider Refusal – whether permissible to have regard to events subsequent to the commencement of proceedings – where application said to be simple – where issues relevant to application said to have been the subject of earlier consideration in connection with an application for a different visa – whether referral of application to Minister to consider personal decision gave rise to unreasonable delay – application dismissed
Legislation:

Constitution s 75(v)

Criminal Code (Cth) s 400.9(1A)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37M

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(1C), 36(2), 36(2)(a), 36(2)(b)(i), 56, 476A(1)(c), 476A(2), 499, 501(1), 501(7)(c), 501A(3)

Federal Court Rules2011 (Cth) rr 8.05(2)(a), 8.05(4)

Cases cited:

AFX17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 807

AQM18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 FCR 424; [2019] FCAFC 27

ASP15 v Commonwealth (2016) 248 FCR 372; [2016] FCAFC 145

Bethell v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 661

Bethell v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 83

BMF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1530

CGP21 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FedCFamC2G 11

CWE22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 1461

DFE16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCA 1151

KDSP v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2020) 279 FCR 1; [2020] FCAFC 108

KDSP v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] HCA 24

P&C Cantarella Pty Ltd v Egg Marketing Board (NSW) [1973] 2 NSWLR 366

Patrick v Australian Information Commissioner (2024) 304 FCR 1; [2024] FCAFC 93

Plaintiff S297/2013 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 255 CLR 179; [2014] HCA 24

R v Building Controller, Ex parte Marinov (1981) 36 ACTR 13

Thornton v Repatriation Commission (1981) 52 FLR 285; [1981] FCA 71

Tran v Commonwealth [2021] FCA 580

Aronson M, Groves M, Weeks G, Judicial Review of Administrative Action and Government Liability (7th ed, Thomson Reuters, 2022)

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 57
Date of hearing: 10 March 2025
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr P Berg
Solicitor for the Applicant: Milojkovic Visa & Migration Legal Services
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr BD Kaplan and Ms H Hofmann
Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 1869 of 2024
BETWEEN:

LGC24

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

OWENS J

DATE…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCA 253
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, LGC24, sought a writ of mandamus against the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, arguing that the decision to grant or refuse a protection visa had been unreasonably delayed. The application was dismissed by the Federal Court. The key legal issues were whether the applicant could rely on events subsequent to the commencement of proceedings to argue unreasonable delay and whether the referral of the application to the Minister for a personal decision constituted unreasonable delay.

The court held that the applicant could not rely on events subsequent to the commencement of proceedings to argue unreasonable delay. The applicant's contention that the decision should have been simple was rejected because the applicant had not demonstrated that the Minister's actions involved unreasonable delay. The court noted that the applicant's own lawyers required 21 days to respond to a discrete topic, which was inconsistent with the applicant's claim of unreasonable delay by the Minister. The court also found that the referral of the application to the Minister did not constitute unreasonable delay because it was necessary to consider the applicant's personal circumstances.

The court concluded that the applicant had not discharged the burden of proof to demonstrate unreasonable delay in the Minister's decision-making process. Therefore, the application for mandamus was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondents' costs.

The final orders of the court were to dismiss paragraph 5 of the Originating Application dated 20 December 2024 with costs and for the parties to contact the court to arrange for the listing of the balance of the Originating Application for case management.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Paragraph 5 of the Originating Application dated 20 December 2024 be dismissed with costs.

2. The parties contact my chambers to arrange for the listing of the balance of the Originating Application for case management.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

None of that is to deny, as the respondents submitted, that there should be a proper basis for seeking relief in the nature of mandamus at the time proceedings are commenced. But it is not immediately clear to me why an applicant could not commence proceedings on the basis of a bona fide contention that there had been unreasonable delay, and, even if that case were not accepted, still obtain relief on the basis of an alternative case relying on subsequent events. THE FACTS The applicant read one affidavit, being that of her instructing solicitor, Wendy Milojkovic, affirmed on 12 February 2025. That affidavit identified various events connected with the applicant’s applications for both a skilled visa and a protection visa. The respondents read three affidavits from two deponents. (a)Ms Tracey Malone, the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Character and Cancellation Branch, in the Character Cancellation and Case Resolution Division, in the Immigration Compliance Group, of the Department of Home Affairs, affirmed two affidavits. Ms Malone gave evidence about the Department’s procedures for processing protection visa applications, insofar as they are relevant to the applicant’s case. She also gave evidence about the particular steps taken in connection with the consideration of the applicant’s application.(b)Ms Hervee Dejean, the lawyer at the Australian Government Solicitor with carriage of these proceedings on behalf of the respondents, affirmed one affidavit, deposing to certain communications dated between 12 February 2025 and 5 March 2025 between the respondents or their lawyers, and the applicant’s lawyers. No deponent was cross-examined, and no submission was made that I should not accept the evidence they gave. There was no inconsistency between any of the affidavits read in the proceedings. I accept all of the evidence contained in the affidavits, even where I have not specifically referred to some aspect of it in my reasons. It is important to be clear about the relevance of events prior to 11 December 2024, when the applicant submitted her response to the “Notice of Intention to Consider Refusal” (or NOICR in the argot of the Department) that had been issued to her in connection with her application. The applicant did not submit that any act or omission before that date gave rise to delay, let alone unreasonable delay. The relevance of those matters to the applicant’s argument was said to be that they provide the foundation for her submission that only a very short period of time was required in order to make a decision after 11 December 2024. As I outlined at the beginning of these reasons, the first relevant visa for which the applicant applied was a skilled visa. The path along which that application travelled is said to be relevant to these proceedings because its determination has also involved the exercise of discretions connected with the fact that the applicant does not pass the character test. In particular:(a)On 8 December 2023, a delegate of the Minister refused the application in an exercise of the discretion conferred by s 501(1) of the Migration Act. In considering whether to exercise that discretion, the delegate was required to comply with “Direction No. 99 — Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA” (a direction given by the Minister pursuant to s 499 of the Migration Act). (I pause to interpolate that Direction No. 99 has now been replaced with Direction No. 110. It was not in dispute that there are differences between the two Directions, including that Direction No. 110 gives greater emphasis to considerations relating to the safety of the community.) The delegate provided written reasons which set out the various considerations to which regard had been had, and the reasoning process by which they were evaluated. The applicant did not refer me to any particular aspect of the delegate’s reasons. Rather, I understand the applicant to rely on the fact that the reasons as a whole constitute a detailed articulation of the facts and issues arising in connection with the exercise of the character discretion in her case. The applicant plainly does not agree with the decision that the delegate made, but says that these reasons are “helpful”, as a distillation of the relevant facts and issues, and that they (especially when considered in light of later considerations of the same issues) contribute to making the decision in relation to her protection visa application a “simple” one.(b)The applicant sought review of that decision in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. A “Statement of Facts, Issues, and Contentions” was filed on behalf of the Minister in the Tribunal on 1 March 2024. The applicant relies on the fact that this document sets out a reasoned articulation of the contentions open to the Minister in relation to the exercise of the character discretion concerning the applicant, made in light of the delegate’s decision. In other words, this document represents a second careful consideration, this time by the Minister’s legal representatives, of the manner in which the character discretion should be exercised in relation to the applicant. Once again, the applicant plainly disagrees with the conclusion for which the document contends; but says it is another “helpful” analysis that renders the protection visa decision a “simple” one.(c)The Tribunal gave its decision, in favour of the applicant, on 27 March 2024. Again, the applicant says that this is a “helpful” document contributing to the simplicity of the decision in relation to the protection visa. The applicant submitted that this document is particularly helpful because it addresses the submissions put on behalf of the Minister in the Tribunal. The applicant pointed to paragraph [22] of the Tribunal’s decision, which addressed a submission set out in paragraph [26] of the Minister’s “Statement of Facts, Issues, and Contentions”. The Minister had submitted that there was no evidence that the applicant had undertaken any rehabilitative programs or courses, or psychological support, to address her offending behaviour. The Tribunal, however, did not regard the absence of such evidence as being of any significance in the circumstances of the applicant’s particular offending. The applicant says that it is this kind of deliberation by the Tribunal that is particularly “helpful”.(d)On 5 June 2024, the Minister exercised his power under s 501A(3) of the Migration Act to set aside the Tribunal’s decision and refuse to grant the applicant a skilled visa. In making that decision, the Minister was not bound by Direction No. 99 and, in any event, the discretion was to be exercised having regard to a different criterion, namely, the Minister’s assessment of the national interest. Nonetheless, the applicant relied on the Minister’s reasons for his decision as representing yet another prior consideration of the applicant’s circumstances in connection with a discretion to refuse her a visa in light of her failure to pass the character test. To put the matter plainly, the effect of the applicant’s contentions was that all the thinking and consideration that needs to be done has, in substance, already been done.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

I have already recorded that the applicant’s solicitor was not able to provide any submission concerning the District Court sentencing remarks within the stipulated 14-day period, and requested a seven-day extension. The fact that the applicant’s own lawyers required 21 days within which to consider and respond on a discrete topic might be thought to be inconsistent with the applicant’s case that the time taken by the respondents to consider her application generally involves unreasonable delay. At the very least, though, the period from the issuance of the natural justice letter to the date upon which the applicant provided a response must be excluded from the period of alleged unreasonable delay. As for the subsequent period, the response was, in accordance with the extended deadline, due by 5 March 2025. In circumstances where I do not know whether a response was provided on that date, or indeed at all, and if it was, in what terms, but where I do know that the applicant considered that she needed 21 days to prepare it, I would not regard the applicant as having discharged her burden of proof as to the demonstration of unreasonable delay in relation to the period of time from 5 March 2025 to today.CONCLUSION For these reasons, I am not persuaded that there has been any unreasonable delay in the failure to determine the applicant’s application by 20 December 2024, or in the alternative, up until today. It follows that I refuse the applicant’s claim insofar as it seeks a writ of mandamus. No party submitted that costs should not follow the event, and I would order that the applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the claim for mandamus. The parties should contact my chambers to arrange for the balance of the Originating Application to be listed for case management before me on a convenient date.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Returning to the key events in the consideration of the applicant’s application following remittal:(a)Arrangements were made to obtain information of various kinds from a number of sources, including the applicant herself, the Law Enforcement Liaison Unit within the Character and Cancellation Branch (CACB) of the Department, the Australian Federal Police, and the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission. In light of the fact that the applicant does not contend that any act or omission prior to 11 December 2024 caused or contributed to any unreasonable delay, it is not necessary to set out all of the dates upon which those requests were made, and upon which information was supplied in response to them. I will simply record, by way of example, that the request made of the applicant, pursuant to s 56 of the Migration Act, was made on 25 September 2024, and the response to that request was received on 19 October 2024.(b)On 8 November 2024, a PODM in the NAFS team made an assessment that the applicant satisfied the criterion in s 36(1C) of the Migration Act. On that same day, NAFS referred that assessment to VACCU for an assessment under s 501 of the Migration Act.(c)On 12 November 2024, an officer within VACCU informed NAFS that it had determined that the applicant may be liable for refusal of her visa application under s 501(1) of the Migration Act, and that VACCU would be issuing a NOICR to the applicant.(d)The NOICR was issued on 13 November 2024. The applicant provided a response to the notice on 11 December 2024, which totalled some 164 pages. (e)That response was considered by VACCU, which, on 17 December 2024 provided a “refusal consideration submission package” to the “CACB Response Taskforce Team” (which is responsible for handling priority assessments).(f)On 20 December 2024, the applicant commenced these proceedings.(g)On 23 December 2024, Ms Malone affirmed her first affidavit. The final paragraph of that affidavit stated that it was “expected that a delegate will be able to consider the case early in the new year 2025”. That expectation was confirmed the following day, on 24 December 2024, at the first return of these proceedings before another judge of the Court.(h)The Department had a “shut-down” period from 24 December 2024 to 2 January 2025, but even upon reopening, staffing levels were lower than usual, owing to people taking leave. (i)On 13 January 2025 a Departmental case officer within CACB completed a draft refusal consideration statement of reasons. On that same day, the draft was, in accordance with the Department’s standard procedures, provided to a manager for quality assurance. That manager reviewed the draft and, in conjunction with a case officer, revised it. The draft was sent to a character delegate of the Minister for consideration on 23 January 2025.(j)The character delegate determined, on 24 January 2025, that the applicant may be of personal interest to the Minister, and asked that a submission be escalated to the Minister to enable the Minister to consider the exercise of available personal discretionary powers.(k)On 28 January 2025, the Department requested a copy of the sentencing remarks in relation to the applicant’s criminal conviction from the District Court of New South Wales.(l)On 31 January 2025, before the sentencing remarks had been received, a submission on the applicant’s matter was sent to the Minister. This step was taken without waiting for the sentencing remarks because it was not known how long it would take for the District Court to be able to provide them.(m)On 6 February 2025, the District Court provided the sentencing remarks and, as a result, on 12 February 2025, the Ministerial submission was recalled, so that it could be updated in light of the content of that document.(n)In addition, it was necessary to provide the applicant with natural justice in relation to the new information in the sentencing remarks. As such, also on 12 February 2025, a letter was sent to the applicant’s solicitor inviting comment on the new information, and requesting a response within 14 days (that is, by 26 February 2025).(o)On 26 February 2025, the applicant’s solicitor sought a seven-day extension within which to reply to the natural justice letter (that is, to 5 March 2025). The requested extension was granted on 27 February 2025. The evidence did not disclose whether any response had been provided, and if it had, on what date.(p)On 2 March 2025, the applicant’s lawyers wrote to VACCU contending that the applicant had not been provided with natural justice, and requesting certain categories of documents be provided to her. In oral submissions, it was stated that this contention relates only to the extent that a personal decision by the Minister is in contemplation. In other words, if a Ministerial delegate were to make the decision, then the applicant accepts that she has been provided with natural justice (and thus that the delegate may proceed to make a decision).CONSIDERATION