McCutcheon v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

McCutcheon v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 828

File number: VID 16 of 2018
Judge: KERR J
Date of judgment: 6 June 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for review of a decision of the Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection not to revoke a visa cancellation decision – whether Minister gave proper, genuine and realistic consideration to representations made by or on behalf of the applicant – decision quashed and remitted
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 501, 501C, 501CA
Cases cited:

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184, (2003) 236 FCR 593

Buadromo v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1592

Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 456; (1993) 43 FCR 280

Isley v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 632

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLSP [2010] FCAFC 108; (2010) 187 FCR 362

Picard v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1430

Date of hearing: 29 May 2018
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 102
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr M Kenneally
Solicitor for the Applicant: WLW Migration Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms C Symons
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

VID 16 of 2018
BETWEEN:

ROBERT JAMES MCCUTCHEON

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Respondent

JUDGE:

KERR J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 JUNE  2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Respondent’s decision refusing to revoke the visa cancellation decision be quashed.

2.The matter be remitted to the Respondent for redetermination according to law.

3.The Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs in accordance with Sch 3 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

KERR J:

  1. This is an application for review of a decision of the Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the Minister) made pursuant to s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Migration Act) not to revoke a visa cancellation decision.

  2. Mr McCutcheon is a national of the United Kingdom who has resided in Australia since 1978, when he was 11 years old. On 28 September 2011 Mr McCutcheon was convicted of six counts of rape and a count of false imprisonment in the County Court of Victoria. He was sentenced to a total effective sentence of eight years’ imprisonment.

  3. Mr McCutcheon’s Class BF Subclass 155 Resident Return visa (the visa) was mandatorily cancelled by a delegate of the Minister on 15 September 2016 pursuant to s 501(3A) of the Migration Act (the cancellation decision). Mr McCutcheon’s visa was cancelled because the delegate was not satisfied that he passed the character test as set out in s 501(6)(a) of the Migration Act on the basis that he had a substantial criminal record, defined…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 828
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of McCutcheon v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection arose in the Federal Court of Australia, where the applicant sought judicial review of the Minister's decision not to revoke a visa cancellation. The primary issue before the court was whether the Minister had properly, genuinely, and realistically considered the representations made by or on behalf of the applicant when making the decision. The court examined the reasoning provided by the Minister and the statutory obligation to provide reasons for the decision, as outlined in the Migration Act.

The court delved into the principles of judicial review, particularly focusing on the need for decision-makers to provide comprehensive and carefully considered reasons for their decisions. The court highlighted that while a reviewing court should not overly scrutinise the reasons for a decision in the absence of true legal error, it must also be vigilant in detecting any failure to give proper consideration to central submissions made by the applicant. The court referred to previous decisions such as Baudromo and Soliman v University of Technology, Sydney, to underscore the importance of meaningful and substantial consideration of the applicant's case.

In its reasoning, the court found that the Minister had not provided adequate reasons for the decision, leading to the conclusion that the decision-making process had not been properly conducted. The court noted that the statutory obligation to provide reasons in the Migration Act required a higher degree of scrutiny. The court was particularly critical of the use of formulaic or stock standard reasons, which were insufficient to demonstrate genuine consideration of the applicant's submissions. The failure to address certain key issues raised by the applicant led the court to infer that these issues had been overlooked.

The court ultimately quashed the Minister's decision and remitted the matter for redetermination, emphasizing the importance of careful and responsible consideration in decisions impacting individuals' lives. The court also ordered the Minister to pay the applicant's costs, in accordance with the Federal Court Rules. This decision underscores the necessity for decision-makers to provide detailed and thoughtful reasons, particularly in cases where significant personal consequences are involved.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Respondent’s decision refusing to revoke the visa cancellation decision be quashed.

2. The matter be remitted to the Respondent for redetermination according to law.

3. The Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs in accordance with Sch 3 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves a challenge by the Applicant, McCutcheon, against a decision made by the Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection not to revoke a visa cancellation decision. The Applicant, an Australian citizen, sought to challenge the decision on the grounds that the Minister did not give proper, genuine, and realistic consideration to representations made by or on behalf of the Applicant. The Applicant's visa cancellation was based on character grounds, and he had submitted various representations to the Minister in support of his visa not being revoked.

The Applicant had a criminal history, including convictions for drug trafficking and other related offences. Despite this, he had lived in Australia for a significant portion of his life, and his family resided in the country. The Applicant argued that the Minister failed to consider his personal circumstances and the representations made on his behalf, which included his efforts to rehabilitate and his contributions to the community.

The matter came before the court as an application for review of the decision made by the Assistant Minister. The Applicant sought judicial review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). Prior to this application, the Applicant had already exhausted the internal review process available under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The case was heard by Flick J, who was bound to apply the relevant case law in reaching a decision. The Minister appealed the decision, but the focus of the hearing was on whether the Minister gave proper consideration to the Applicant's representations.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Minister gave proper, genuine, and realistic consideration to the representations made by or on behalf of the Applicant.
2. Whether the reasons provided by the Minister for not revoking the visa cancellation decision were sufficient and complied with the statutory obligation under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

Held
1. Whether the Minister gave proper, genuine, and realistic consideration to the representations made by or on behalf of the Applicant: The court concluded that the Minister did not give proper, genuine, and realistic consideration to the representations made by the Applicant. The result was the quashing of the decision and its remittal for redetermination.
2. Whether the reasons provided by the Minister for not revoking the visa cancellation decision were sufficient and complied with the statutory obligation under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth): The court concluded that the reasons provided by the Minister were insufficient and did not comply with the statutory obligation under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). This was also part of the basis for quashing the decision and remitting the matter for redetermination.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I proceed on the conventional basis that, while not strictly binding, as single judge of this Court, in comity, I should apply Baudromo as the considered reasoning of another single judge of the Court unless persuaded Flick J’s reasoning was clearly wrong. Notwithstanding the Minister’s appeal the Minister did not submit I should reach that high degree of satisfaction. I do not.Consideration I therefore will decide the present matter on the basis that Flick J correctly summarised the relevant case law in Buadromo at [25] to [31] as follows:25Care must nevertheless be taken to ensure that the findings and reasons of the Assistant Minister are not construed with an eye attuned to the detection of legal error where none truly exists: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 271 to 272 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ.26The eyes of a reviewing court should nevertheless “not be so blinkered as to avoid discerning an absence of reasons or reasons devoid of any consideration of a submission central to a party’s case”: Soliman v University of Technology, Sydney [2012] FCAFC 146 at [57], (2012) 207 FCR 277 at 295 to 296 per Marshall, North and Flick JJ. See also: 4nature Inc v Centennial Springvale Pty Ltd [2016] NSWLEC 121 at [150], (2016) 218 LGERA 289 at 333 per Pepper J. Whether the reasons for decision expose a proper consideration of submissions advanced nevertheless forever remains a conclusion to be drawn by reference to the reasons in fact provided: cf. Sevdalis v Director of Professional Services Review [2017] FCAFC 9 at [33] per Tracey, Pagone and Markovic JJ. 27The use of “stock standard” or “formulaic” reasons, in particular, cannot be invoked by a decision-maker with a view to shielding a reasoning process from scrutiny: Berryman v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 616 at [24], (2015) 235 FCR 429 at 437 per Flick J; Roesner v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 132 at [40] per Allsop CJ, Flick and Griffiths JJ; Malek Fahd Islamic School Ltd v Minister for Education and Training (No 2) [2017] FCA 1377 at [48] per Griffiths J. Recitations, for example, that particular matters have been “noted” or “considered” does not preclude an analysis as to whether such matters have been given such consideration as is required by law.28Although a reviewing Court should not unfairly parse and analyse a statement of reasons with a view to determining error where none truly exists, a reviewing Court should equally not be hesitant to grant relief where legal error is exposed.29The more so is this the case where, as in the present case, there is a statutory duty to provide reasons: Migration Act s 501G(1)(e). 30Useful guidance as to the ability to draw inferences from a failure to make express findings of fact in a statement of reasons is to be gleaned from the following observations of French, Sackville and Hely JJ in Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184, (2003) 236 FCR 593 at 604 to 605:[47] The inference that the Tribunal has failed to consider an issue may be drawn from its failure to expressly deal with that issue in its reasons. But that is an inference not too readily to be drawn where the reasons are otherwise comprehensive and the issue has at least been identified at some point. It may be that it is unnecessary to make a finding on a particular matter because it is subsumed in findings of greater generality or because there is a factual premise upon which a contention rests which has been rejected. Where however there is an issue raised by the evidence advanced on behalf of an applicant and contentions made by the applicant and that issue, if resolved one way, would be dispositive of the Tribunal’s review of the delegate’s decision, a failure to deal with it in the published reasons may raise a strong inference that it has been overlooked.In commenting upon these observations, Griffiths J in Malek Fahd Islamic School Ltd v Minister for Education and Training (No 2) [2017] FCA 1377 said:[42] There is one important qualification. It relates to the need for greater caution in drawing inferences from omissions in a statement of reasons which has been voluntarily provided by a decision-maker and not in discharge of a statutory obligation to do so. The High Court’s decision in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; 206 CLR 323 (Yusuf) highlights the importance of paying close regard to the precise terms of a statutory provision, such as s 430(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which imposes a statutory obligation on a decision-maker to provide a written statement which sets out various matters and not just the reasons, such as a requirement to set out the findings on any material questions of fact. The precise terms of such a statutory obligation necessarily provide a critical framework in determining, for example, what legal significance should attach to the failure of such a decision-maker to make findings on every matter of fact which is objectively material to its decision. Caution is required in drawing adverse inferences from omissions in a statement of reasons which is volunteered by a decision-maker and absent any immediate legal obligation to do so because there is no detailed legal framework of the kind which operated in cases such as Yusuf and WAEE (and see also s 25D of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)).Reasons and findings were, of course, required to be provided in the present case. 31The degree of care with which a statement of reasons may be scrutinised depends in large part upon the statutory context in which reasons are to be given and the degree of care with which it may be expected that the reasons are prepared. Part of that statutory context in the present case is the volume of decisions to be made and the necessity to assess both disputed factual claims and competing policy considerations. Part of that statutory context, however, is that decisions such as the present impact fundamentally upon the life of a claimant and their immediate family. Part of that statutory context is also the fact that the Legislature has entrusted the making of the present class of decisions to the Minister personally. It is to be expected that such reasons have been carefully thought through and with an appropriate sense of responsibility as to the manner in which decisions impact upon – after all – an individual.