FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Koranteng v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1008
File number: VID 763 of 2017 Judge: MOSHINSKY J Date of judgment: 29 August 2017 Catchwords: MIGRATION – mandatory cancellation of applicant’s visa under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – decision by Assistant Minister under s 501CA(4) of the Act not to revoke the cancellation decision – whether Assistant Minister’s decision affected by jurisdictional error – application for judicial review dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 501, 501CA Cases cited: BMX15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 244 FCR 153
BSJ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 78
Coker v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 929
Picard v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1430
Date of hearing: 21 August 2017 Date of last submissions: 25 August 2017 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 48 Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Mr N Wood Solicitor for the Respondent: Mills Oakley ORDERS
VID 763 of 2017 BETWEEN: KWAKU KORANTENG
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent
JUDGE:
MOSHINSKY J
DATE OF ORDER:
29 AUGUST 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceeding, to be taxed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MOSHINSKY J:
Introduction
The applicant, who is a national of Ghana, arrived in Australia on or about 9 September 2012 on a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) – Vocational Education and Training Sector (Subclass 572) visa. On 11 June 2014, the applicant was granted a Bridging A (Class WA) (Subclass 010) visa.
In August 2015, following a trial, the applicant was found guilty by a jury of the following offences: deprivation of liberty; sexual assault; and rape. The offences for which the applicant was convicted occurred on 3 August 2014. On 7 August 2015, a judge of the District Court of Queensland sentenced the applicant to two years’ imprisonment for the offence of rape. This sentence was to be suspended after nine months. Lesser concurrent sentences were imposed for the offences of deprivation of liberty and sexual assault.
On 27 April 2016, a delegate of the respondent (the Minister) decided to cancel the applicant’s visa under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the cancellation decision). That subsection provides that the Minister must cancel a visa that has been granted to a person if: (a) the Minister is satisfied that the person does not pass the character test because (relevantly) the person has a substantial criminal record; and (b) the person is serving a sentence of imprisonment, on a full-time basis in a custodial institution, for an offence against the law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory.…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 1008
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the principles of legal unreasonableness and jurisdictional error as outlined in relevant authorities, such as Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden. The court found that the applicant’s arguments did not establish any grounds for judicial review or jurisdictional error. While the Assistant Minister had considered the applicant’s 2 June 2016 statement and his limited mention of the victim, this did not amount to legal unreasonableness. The applicant’s recent apology to the victim by way of social media was not before the Assistant Minister and therefore not relevant to the application for judicial review. The court concluded that the Assistant Minister’s decision was within the bounds of legal reasonableness and did not suffer from jurisdictional error.
The court dismissed the application for judicial review and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceeding, to be taxed if not agreed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceeding, to be taxed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I provided an overview of ss 501(3A) and 501CA in Coker v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 929 at [42]-[44]. I refer to that discussion, without setting it out.Consideration The applicant’s submissions were, to a large extent, directed to the merits of the Decision. However, the grounds upon which the Decision can be challenged in this Court are limited to judicial review grounds, as distinct from the merits of the decision. The applicant’s submissions did not specifically address each of the particular grounds set out in his amended notice of application for judicial review, but were expressed more generally. In these circumstances, it will be convenient to set out each of the main arguments raised by the applicant followed by my consideration of the argument. The applicant first submitted that the Assistant Minister’s “assertion” that he was not remorseful was “unfair and unreasonable”. In particular, the applicant contended that: the Assistant Minister had observed in the Statement of Reasons that the applicant did not mention the victim in his 2 June 2016 statement, and had viewed that omission as an indication that his expression of remorse was self-serving; the applicant rejected this suggestion because he had stated how deeply ashamed and remorseful he was and that he accepted responsibility for his actions, noting that he understood that his actions had caused harm to another person; and to “assert that my remorse expressed is self-serving because of a non-mention of the victim is unfair and unreasonable”. The applicant also stated that, when he was charged with the offence, he was not allowed to have any contact with the victim and, therefore, was unable to offer an apology. He noted that he had recently sought to apologise to the victim by sending her a message on social media. A copy of that message was annexed to the applicant’s second affidavit. The matters raised by the applicant, as set out in the preceding paragraph, do not establish any of the grounds for judicial review relied on by the applicant, or otherwise establish jurisdictional error. As noted by the Minister in his submissions, the relevant authorities concerning the review of administrative decisions on the ground of unreasonableness were summarised by Bromberg J in BMX15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 244 FCR 153 at [14]-[17]. In particular, his Honour said at [14]:In two recent judgments, Allsop CJ, Griffiths and Wigney JJ have considered the content of the requirement that decisions be legally reasonable, which is to say that they must not be legally unreasonable. The first, Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1, contains a detailed discussion of that concept as set out in particular in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437 (see in particular Allsop CJ at [4]–[13] and Griffiths J at [52]–[62]). In the second, Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden (2016) 240 FCR 158, their Honours summarise in seven points what falls from Li, Singh, and Stretton, noting that the seven-point summary does not supplant or derogate from those cases. The seven points are these:[58]First, the concept of legal unreasonableness concerns the lawful exercise of power. Legal reasonableness, or an absence of legal unreasonableness, is an essential element in the lawfulness of decision-making.[59]Second, the Court’s task in determining whether a decision is vitiated for legal unreasonableness is strictly supervisory. It does not involve the Court reviewing the merits of the decision under the guise of an evaluation of the decision’s reasonableness, or the Court substituting its own view as to how the decision should be exercised for that of the decision maker. Nor does it involve the Court remaking the decision according to its own view of reasonableness.[60]Third, there are two contexts in which the concept of legal unreasonableness may be employed. The first involves a conclusion after the identification of a recognised species of jurisdictional error in the decision making process, such as failing to have regard to a mandatory consideration, or having regard to an irrelevant consideration. The second involves an “outcome focused” conclusion without any specific jurisdictional error being identified.…[62]Fourth, in assessing whether a particular outcome is unreasonable, it is necessary to bear in mind that within the boundaries of power there is an area of “decisional freedom” within which a decision-maker has a genuinely free discretion. Within that area, reasonable minds might differ as to the correct decision or outcome, but any decision or outcome within that area is within the bounds of legal reasonableness. Such a decision falls within the range of possible lawful outcomes of the exercise of the power.[63]Fifth, in order to identify or define the width and boundaries of this area of decisional freedom and the bounds of legal reasonableness, it is necessary to construe the relevant statute. The task of determining whether a decision is legally reasonable or unreasonable involves the evaluation of the nature and quality of the decision by reference to the subject matter, scope and purpose of the relevant statutory power, together with the attendant principles and values of the common law concerning reasonableness in decision-making. The evaluation is also likely to be fact dependant and to require careful attention to the evidence.[64]Sixth, where reasons for the decision are available, the reasons are likely to provide the focus for the evaluation of whether the decision is legally unreasonable. Where the reasons provide an evident and intelligible justification for the decision, it is unlikely that the decision could be considered to be legally unreasonable. However, an inference or conclusion of legal unreasonableness may be drawn even if no error in the reasons can be identified. In such a case, the court may not be able to comprehend from the reasons how the decision was arrived at, or the justification in the reasons may not be sufficient to outweigh the inference that the decision is otherwise outside the bounds of legal reasonableness or outside the range of possible lawful outcomes. [65]Seventh, and perhaps most importantly, the evaluation of whether a decision is legally unreasonable should not be approached by way of the application of particular definitions, fixed formulae, categorisations or verbal descriptions. The concept of legal unreasonableness is not amenable to rigidly defined categorisation or precise textural formulary. That said, the consideration of whether a decision is legally unreasonable may be assisted by reference to descriptive expressions that have been used in previous cases to describe the particular qualities of decisions that exceed the limits and boundaries of statutory power. A number of those cases, and the descriptive expressions used in them, are referred to in Li and in the judgment of Allsop CJ in Stretton (at [5]). The expressions that have been utilised include decisions which are “plainly unjust”, “arbitrary”, “capricious”, “irrational”, “lacking in evident or intelligible justification”, and “obviously disproportionate”. It must be emphasised again, however, that the task is not an a priori definitional exercise. Nor does it involve a “checklist” exercise. Rather, it involves the Court evaluating the decision with a view to determining whether, having regard to the terms, scope and purpose of the relevant statutory power, the decision possesses one or more of those sorts of qualities such that it falls outside the range of lawful outcomes.(Citations omitted.)Applying these principles in the present case, the matters raised by the applicant do not establish legal unreasonableness. Although other decision-makers may have taken a different view (taking into account, in particular, [13]-[17] of the 2 June 2016 statement), it was open to the Assistant Minister to form the view that he did, namely that the applicant had made “very limited mention of the victim” in the 2 June 2016 statement, and to rely on this matter in rejecting the applicant’s representative’s characterisation of the applicant’s remorse as “deep” (see the Statement of Reasons, [56]). Insofar as the applicant sought to rely on his recent apology to the victim by way of social media, this was not before the Assistant Minister and is therefore not relevant to the application for judicial review.