FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Asaad v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 921
File number: QUD 182 of 2018 Judge: REEVES J Date of judgment: 14 June 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review of a decision of the Minister for Home Affairs to cancel the applicant’s Class BS Subclass 801 Partner (Residence) visa – whether the Minister’s decision is unlawful due to a failure to consider the legal and practical consequence of the decision arising from ss 189, 196 and 198 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the applicant may be stateless and it is not reasonably practical to remove him from Australia – whether the Minister’s decision was unreasonably harsh – whether the Minister’s decision was legally unreasonable – whether the Minister was estopped by an earlier decision not to cancel the applicant’s visa – application dismissed Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)
Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth)
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Nationality Act 1920 (Cth)
Cases cited: Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562; [2004] HCA 37
Attorney-General for the State of New South Wales v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1
Cotterill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 240 FCR 29; [2016] FCAFC 61
DFE16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 177
Kuligowski v Metrobus (2004) 220 CLR 363; [2004] HCA 34
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden (2016) 240 FCR 158; [2016] FCAFC 28
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1; [2016] FCAFC 11
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594; [2011] HCA 1
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Nystrom (2006) 228 CLR 566; [2006] HCA 50
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Huynh (2004) 139 FCR 505; [2004] FCAFC 256
Moana v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 230 FCR 367; [2015] FCAFC 54
NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 220 FCR 1; [2014] FCAFC 38
Parker v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 247 FCR 500; [2016] FCAFC 185
Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 258 CLR 173; [2015] HCA 50
Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 507; [2015] HCA 28
Date of hearing: 12 October 2018 Date of last submissions: 3 December 2018 Registry: Queensland Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 82 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Ms A Wheatley Solicitor for the Respondent: Clayton Utz ORDERS
QUD 182 of 2018 BETWEEN: MICHAEL BOGHDADI ASAAD
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
Respondent
JUDGE:
REEVES…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 921
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues that the court had to decide were primarily centred around the principles of legal unreasonableness and jurisdictional error in the decision-making process. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the Minister's decision was legally unreasonable and whether it fell outside the range of lawful outcomes. This involved assessing whether the decision was within the bounds of the decisional freedom afforded to the Minister and whether it was supported by an evident and intelligible justification.
The court reasoned that the decision to cancel Mr Asaad's visa was within the bounds of legal reasonableness. It found that the Minister had adequately considered the relevant statutory provisions and the applicant's personal circumstances, including his age, medical conditions, and the impact on his minor children. The court held that the Minister's decision did not exhibit any qualities of being plainly unjust, arbitrary, capricious, irrational, or lacking in evident or intelligible justification. Therefore, the court dismissed the application for judicial review and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The amended originating application filed on 27 July 2018 is dismissed.
2. The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs to be taxed failing agreement.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Even assuming that leave were to be granted, the Minister contended that “risk” to the community was not a mandatory relevant consideration. Nonetheless, he accepted that there was an “unresolved tension” (italics in original) on this point between the views expressed in Moana at [66] and those expressed in Huynh at [72] and [74]. Finally, he submitted that, even if risk to the community was such a mandatory consideration, he duly considered that matter in his Reasons. In this respect, he contended that the authorities do not require such risk to be considered in any particular way and, consequently, no jurisdictional error had been made out.CONSIDERATIONThe relevant principles The principles relating to legal unreasonableness which arise in grounds of review 2 and 3 are relatively well-established. As Mr Asaad has pointed out in his submissions, they are conveniently summarised in Eden at [58]–[65], as follows:58First, the concept of legal unreasonableness concerns the lawful exercise of power. Legal reasonableness, or an absence of legal unreasonableness, is an essential element in the lawfulness of decision-making: Li at [26] and [29] (French CJ), [63] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ) and [88] (Gageler J); Singh at [43]; Stretton at [4] (Allsop CJ) and [53] (Griffiths J).59Second, the Court’s task in determining whether a decision is vitiated for legal unreasonableness is strictly supervisory (Li at [66]). It does not involve the Court reviewing the merits of the decision under the guise of an evaluation of the decision’s reasonableness, or the Court substituting its own view as to how the decision should be exercised for that of the decision-maker: Li at [66] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Stretton at [12] (Allsop CJ) and [58] (Griffiths J); see also Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 90 ALJR 197 at [23]. Nor does it involve the Court remaking the decision according to its own view of reasonableness: Stretton at [8] (Allsop CJ).60Third, there are two contexts in which the concept of legal unreasonableness may be employed. The first involves a conclusion after the identification of a recognised species of jurisdictional error in the decision-making process, such as failing to have regard to a mandatory consideration, or having regard to an irrelevant consideration. The second involves an “outcome focused” conclusion without any specific jurisdictional error being identified: Li at [27]-[28] (French CJ), [72] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Singh at [44]; Stretton at [6] (Allsop CJ).61This appeal is primarily concerned with whether the outcome of the Minister’s exercise of power was legally unreasonable. That said, some of the primary judge’s reasons for concluding that the decision was unreasonable, and some of the appeal grounds and submissions, are directed at the Minister’s reasons and alleged errors in the decision-making process.62Fourth, in assessing whether a particular outcome is unreasonable, it is necessary to bear in mind that within the boundaries of power there is an area of “decisional freedom” within which a decision-maker has a genuinely free discretion: Li at [29] (French CJ), [66] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ). Within that area, reasonable minds might differ as to the correct decision or outcome, but any decision or outcome within that area is within the bounds of legal reasonableness: Li at [66] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Stretton at [7] (Allsop CJ). Such a decision falls within the range of possible lawful outcomes of the exercise of the power: Li at [105] (Gageler J); Stretton at [11] (Allsop CJ).63Fifth, in order to identify or define the width and boundaries of this area of decisional freedom and the bounds of legal reasonableness, it is necessary to construe the relevant statute: Li at [24] (French CJ), [67]-[67] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Stretton at [55] and [62] (Griffiths J). The task of determining whether a decision is legally reasonable or unreasonable involves the evaluation of the nature and quality of the decision by reference to the subject matter, scope and purpose of the relevant statutory power, together with the attendant principles and values of the common law concerning reasonableness in decision-making: Stretton at [7] and [11] (Allsop CJ). The evaluation is also likely to be fact dependant and to require careful attention to the evidence: Singh at [42].64Sixth, where reasons for the decision are available, the reasons are likely to provide the focus for the evaluation of whether the decision is legally unreasonable: Singh at [45]-[47]. Where the reasons provide an evident and intelligible justification for the decision, it is unlikely that the decision could be considered to be legally unreasonable: Singh at [47]. However, an inference or conclusion of legal unreasonableness may be drawn even if no error in the reasons can be identified. In such a case, the court may not be able to comprehend from the reasons how the decision was arrived at, or the justification in the reasons may not be sufficient to outweigh the inference that the decision is otherwise outside the bounds of legal reasonableness or outside the range of possible lawful outcomes: Li at [76] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Stretton at [13] (Allsop CJ).65Seventh, and perhaps most importantly, the evaluation of whether a decision is legally unreasonable should not be approached by way of the application of particular definitions, fixed formulae, categorisations or verbal descriptions. The concept of legal unreasonableness is not amenable to rigidly defined categorisation or precise textural formulary: Stretton at [2] and [10] (Allsop CJ) and [62] (Griffiths J). That said, the consideration of whether a decision is legally unreasonable may be assisted by reference to descriptive expressions that have been used in previous cases to describe the particular qualities of decisions that exceed the limits and boundaries of statutory power. A number of those cases, and the descriptive expressions used in them, are referred to in Li and in the judgment of Allsop CJ in Stretton (at [5]). The expressions that have been utilised include decisions which are “plainly unjust”, “arbitrary”, “capricious”, “irrational”, “lacking in evident or intelligible justification”, and “obviously disproportionate”. It must be emphasised again, however, that the task is not an a priori definitional exercise. Nor does it involve a “checklist” exercise: Singh at [42]. Rather, it involves the Court evaluating the decision with a view to determining whether, having regard to the terms, scope and purpose of the relevant statutory power, the decision possesses one or more of those sorts of qualities such that it falls outside the range of lawful outcomes.(Italics in original)