FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Thomson v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1615
File number(s): VID 444 of 2018 Judge(s): O'CALLAGHAN J Date of judgment: 24 October 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for review of decision by Minister for Home Affairs not to revoke the mandatory cancellation of the applicant’s Absorbed Person visa – whether Minister’s decision affected by jurisdictional error Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 197AB, 476A, 501(3A) Cases cited: Cotterill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 240 FCR 29
Elias v Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 123 FCR 499
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437
Date of hearing: 24 October 2018 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 20 Counsel for the Applicant: Ms S Kelly Solicitor for the Applicant: Victoria Legal Aid Counsel for the Respondent: Mr D Brown Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
VID 444 of 2018 BETWEEN: GRAHAM THOMSON
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
Respondent
JUDGE:
O'CALLAGHAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
24 OCTOBER 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicant have leave to rely on the amended originating application for review filed on 8 October 2018.
2.The decision of the respondent dated 6 February 2018 be quashed.
3.A writ of mandamus be issued directed to the respondent requiring him to determine the applicant’s application according to law.
4.The respondent pay the applicant’s costs in the amount of $7,000.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from transcript)O’CALLAGHAN J:
These reasons for judgment were made ex tempore in the hearing on 24 October 2018 and accompany the orders above.
This is an application made under section 476A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Migration Act) by which the applicant seeks an order that the decision of the respondent, the Minister for Home Affairs, (the Minister) dated 6 February 2018, be quashed, that a writ of mandamus be directed to the Minister requiring him to determine the applicant’s application according to law, and his costs.
The applicant was represented at the hearing by Ms S Kelly of counsel, who sought leave to rely upon an amended originating application. The Minister, who was represented by Mr D Brown, consented to such leave being granted.
This application is required to be determined immediately because the applicant has three months to live, something which Mr Brown properly accepted in light of the medical evidence adduced, in particular in a recent letter from the applicant’s consultant respiratory physician (Exhibit A1).
The applicant is now 76 years old, he suffers from advanced mesothelioma (among many other disabling conditions).
The applicant arrived in Australia in 1949, when he was seven years old. He has lived here continuously since that time. Indeed, he has never left Australia. The applicant never acquired Australian citizenship, and on 1 September 1994 was taken to…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1615
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was tasked with determining whether the Minister's decision was affected by a jurisdictional error, particularly focusing on whether the Minister gave proper or genuine consideration to the potential consequences of the decision, including the possibility of the applicant facing prolonged or indefinite detention. The applicant argued that the Minister failed to adequately consider the specific circumstances of his case, such as his terminal illness and the likelihood of dying in detention. This argument was centered around the Minister's failure to consider these unique factors when deciding not to revoke the visa cancellation.
The court found that the application should be allowed, primarily based on ground 5 of the amended originating application. This ground contended that the Minister did not give proper or genuine consideration to the possible consequences of his decision, particularly the prospect of indefinite detention. The court agreed with the applicant, noting that while the Minister mentioned the possibility of indefinite detention in his reasons, he did not adequately consider the specific circumstances of the applicant's case, such as his terminal illness and the likelihood of dying in detention. Consequently, the court quashed the Minister's decision and issued a writ of mandamus requiring the Minister to reconsider the applicant's application according to law. The respondent was also ordered to pay the applicant's costs in the amount of $7,000.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant have leave to rely on the amended originating application for review filed on 8 October 2018.
2. The decision of the respondent dated 6 February 2018 be quashed.
3. A writ of mandamus be issued directed to the respondent requiring him to determine the applicant’s application according to law.
4. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs in the amount of $7,000.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
This is an application made under section 476A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Migration Act) by which the applicant seeks an order that the decision of the respondent, the Minister for Home Affairs, (the Minister) dated 6 February 2018, be quashed, that a writ of mandamus be directed to the Minister requiring him to determine the applicant’s application according to law, and his costs. The applicant was represented at the hearing by Ms S Kelly of counsel, who sought leave to rely upon an amended originating application. The Minister, who was represented by Mr D Brown, consented to such leave being granted. This application is required to be determined immediately because the applicant has three months to live, something which Mr Brown properly accepted in light of the medical evidence adduced, in particular in a recent letter from the applicant’s consultant respiratory physician (Exhibit A1). The applicant is now 76 years old, he suffers from advanced mesothelioma (among many other disabling conditions). The applicant arrived in Australia in 1949, when he was seven years old. He has lived here continuously since that time. Indeed, he has never left Australia. The applicant never acquired Australian citizenship, and on 1 September 1994 was taken to have been granted an Absorbed Person visa by operation of law. Between 1987 and 1989 the applicant engaged in sexual offending against his stepdaughter when she was aged between 10 and 12. The offending ceased in 1989. In 2012, the applicant’s stepdaughter made a statement to police with respect to the offending. The applicant was interviewed by the police and made full admissions. Eleven charges were laid, being five charges of indecent assault, four charges of gross indecency, and two charges of incest. The applicant pleaded guilty before any committal hearing, and was given a total effective sentence of four years and six months imprisonment. He was declared to be eligible for parole after two years and six months imprisonment, and was released from prison about three weeks ago, whereupon he was placed in immigration detention in Melbourne, where he remains. He was placed in immigration detention because on 27 September 2016 his Absorbed Person visa was cancelled pursuant to s 501(3A) of the Migration Act (the cancellation decision). In October 2016, the applicant made an application for revocation of that cancellation decision and, in February 2018, the Minister refused to revoke the cancellation decision. The amended originating application contains five grounds. Ms Kelly did not press ground 3, for reasons that are immaterial. In my view, for the reasons that follow, the application should be allowed and the orders sought by the applicant made because grounds 1 and 5 are made out. It is therefore unnecessary to consider the remaining grounds. First, I turn to ground 5. That ground is that:The Minister failed to give proper or genuine consideration to the possible consequence of the decision [not to revoke the cancellation decision], being that the applicant might face prolonged and possibly indefinite detention.