AFY18 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AFY18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1566

File number: SAD 13 of 2018
Judge: CHARLESWORTH J
Date of judgment: 19 October 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – cancellation of visa on character grounds – Tribunal affirming decision not to revoke cancellation – whether Tribunal erred in failing to assess the prospect that the applicant would face indefinite detention if visa cancellation not revoked – Tribunal assessed prospect of indefinite detention – Tribunal found applicant a person to whom Australia owed non-refoulement obligations – prospect of indefinite detention assessed as not inevitable – whether task of Tribunal required a finding to be made as to definite detention on the balance of probabilities – whether Tribunal erroneously deferred a part of its task to the decision-maker responsible for determining the applicant’s pending application for a protection visa – Tribunal placing little weight on impediments applicant may face if returned to his home country – Tribunal proceeding on assumption Australia would comply with its non-refoulement obligations – no jurisdictional error affecting weight – application dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 5M, 36, 36(2C), 65, 189, 196, 197C, 198, 474, 476A, 499, 499(2A), 500, 500(6L), 501(3A), 501CA
Cases cited:

Ayoub v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 231 FCR 513

AZAFQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 243 FCR 451

BCR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 248 FCR 456

Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280

COT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 1) (2015) 236 FCR 148

Cotterrill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 240 FCR 29

Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163

Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 2 ALD 60

Freeman v Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority [1985] FCA 330; (1985) 5 AAR 156

Goundar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1203

Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298

Lennell v Repatriation Commission (1982) 4 ALN N 54

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden (2016) 240 FCR 158

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Le (2016) 244 FCR 56

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323

NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 220 FCR 1

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476

Politis v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 16 ALD 707

Repatriation Commission v Bushell (1991) 23 ALD 13

Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286

Date of hearing: 5 June 2018
Registry: South Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 66
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms K Eaton
Solicitor for the Applicant: Bourne…
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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1566
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of AFY18 v Minister for Home Affairs, the applicant, AFY18, sought judicial review of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) that affirmed the decision of the Minister for Home Affairs not to revoke the cancellation of AFY18's visa on character grounds. The primary issue before the court was whether the Tribunal erred in failing to assess the prospect that AFY18 would face indefinite detention if his visa cancellation was not revoked. The applicant argued that the Tribunal had deferred its task of determining whether indefinite detention was a legal or practical consequence of its own decision to the decision-maker responsible for determining AFY18’s pending application for a protection visa.

The court found that the Tribunal had assessed the prospect of indefinite detention and had proceeded on the assumption that Australia would comply with its non-refoulement obligations. The Tribunal found that AFY18 was a person to whom Australia owed non-refoulement obligations and that the prospect of indefinite detention was not inevitable. The court held that the Tribunal was not required to make a finding as to definite detention on the balance of probabilities, and there was no jurisdictional error affecting the weight of the decision. The court found that the Tribunal had correctly assessed the evidence and had not erroneously deferred any part of its task to another decision-maker.

The application for judicial review was dismissed. The court held that the Tribunal's decision was not affected by any jurisdictional error, and the decision of the Tribunal was affirmed. The prospect of indefinite detention was assessed and found not to be inevitable, and the Tribunal had correctly exercised its discretion in affirming the decision of the Minister not to revoke the visa cancellation.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Tribunal continued at [111]:Overall, while I have considered carefully the statements made by [the applicant] during the hearing as to his remorse and concern for the victims, I accept the submission ultimately made by the respondent that there is limited insight into the nature of offending revealed and [the applicant’s] expressed commitment not to reoffend is more likely the product of him being punished rather than a deep insight into the effect his offending has had on the community and his victims. Therefore, I do not place greater weight on [the applicant’s] statements in his evidence than the weight I place adversely on the absence of objective evidence and opinion of rehabilitation. …(emphasis added) It is submitted that the emphasised passage discloses that the Tribunal drew an adverse inference against the applicant on the question of rehabilitation because of the applicant’s failure to adduce expert evidence on that topic. The adverse inference, it was submitted, was not available to be drawn because of the Tribunal’s earlier finding that the applicant’s representatives had insufficient time to obtain such evidence. The case was not one in which the applicant had failed to adduce evidence that was in existence or otherwise obtainable. Nor was it one in which the Tribunal had merely expressed a state of non-satisfaction on the evidence before it. The Tribunal had, the applicant submitted, gone further and weighed the absence of evidence adversely in the balance so as to outweigh the applicant’s own assessment of his rehabilitation. In oral submissions, the Tribunal was said to have committed jurisdictional error constituted of the taking into account of an irrelevant consideration, namely, the absence of expert evidence on the topic. It was also submitted that the Tribunal had misapplied the evidentiary principle stated in Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298.Consideration The reasons of an administrative decision-maker are not to be construed “minutely and with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error”: Politis v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 16 ALD 707 at 708 (Lockhart J), approved in Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280 at 287 (Neaves, French and Cooper JJ). The Court “will not be concerned with looseness in the language of the Tribunal nor with unhappy phrasing of the Tribunal’s thoughts”: Pozzolanic at 287, citing Lennell v Repatriation Commission (1982) 4 ALN N 54; Freeman v Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority [1985] FCA 330; (1985) 5 AAR 156 at 164 (Sheppard J); Repatriation Commission v Bushell (1991) 23 ALD 13 at 19 (Morling and Neaves JJ). The reasons are “meant to inform and not to be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed”: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ).

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal affirmed the non-revocation decision notwithstanding the prospect that the applicant may be held in immigration detention indefinitely if the cancellation decision was not revoked, and notwithstanding its own positive conclusion that the indefinite detention of the applicant would be an unacceptable outcome. It is these features of the Tribunal’s decision that form the subject of the first ground of judicial review, which is expressed as follows:1.The second respondent committed jurisdictional error in failing to properly and finally determine the application before it, in that:1.1.having found that indefinite immigration detention was a possible outcome of refusing to revoke the applicant’s visa cancellation;1.2.holding that such indefinite immigration detention would be an unacceptable outcome and would outweigh other considerations against revoking the cancellation;1.3.finding that the applicant’s protection visa application was as yet undetermined by the first respondent;1.4.went on to hold that it was not required to determine whether indefinite detention was a legal or practical consequence of its own decision, but could defer determination of that issue to the first respondent in a separate process, when it ought to have made that finding itself.The decision in BCR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 248 FCR 456 The Tribunal was required to discharge its review function within a tight time frame mandated under the Act: s 500(6L) of the Act. Between the non-revocation decision and the Tribunal’s decision, the Full Court of this Court gave judgment in BCR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 248 FCR 456. That left the Tribunal with a very short period in which to hear submissions about the principles stated by the Full Court and the application of the principles to the applicant’s case. The application for review was determined about 48 hours after the conclusion of submissions. The Tribunal gave comprehensive reasons orally. A written transcript of the reasons is before me. One question emerging from the judgment in BCR16 was whether the Tribunal was bound to comply with certain parts of a direction issued by the Minister under s 499 of the Act (Direction 65) insofar as it concerned the assessment of the applicant’s claim to be a person to whom Australia owed a non-refoulement obligation. Paragraph 14.1 of Direction 65 provides:14.1 International non-refoulement obligations(1)A non-refoulement obligation is an obligation not to forcibly return, deport or expel a person to a place where they will be at risk of a specific type of harm. Australia has non-refoulement obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol (together called the Refugees Convention); the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the CAT); and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Second Optional Protocol (the ICCPR). The Act reflects Australia’s interpretation of those obligations and, where relevant, decision-makers should follow the tests enunciated in the Act.…(4)Where a non-citizen makes claims which may give rise to international non-refoulement obligations and that non-citizen would be able to make a valid application for another visa if the mandatory cancellation is not revoked, it is unnecessary to determine whether non-refoulement obligations are owed to the non-citizen for the purposes of determining whether the cancellation of their visa should be revoked.(5)If, however, the visa that was cancelled was a Protection visa, the person will be prevented from making an application for another visa, other than a Bridging R (Class WR) visa (section 501E of the Act and regulation 2.12A of the Regulations refers). The person will also be prevented by section 48A of the Act from making a further application for a Protection visa while they are in the migration zone (unless the Minister determines that section 48A does not apply to them – sections 48A and 48B of the Act refer).(6)In these circumstances, decision-makers should seek an assessment of Australia’s international treaty obligations. Any non-refoulement obligation should be weighed carefully against the seriousness of the non-citizen’s criminal offending or other serious conduct in deciding whether or not the non-citizen should have their visa reinstated. Given that Australia will not return a person to their country of origin if to do so would be inconsistent with its international non-refoulement obligations, the operation of sections 189 and 196 of the Act means that, if the person’s Protection visa remains cancelled, they would face the prospect of indefinite immigration detention.(emphasis added)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Their Honours went on explain why previous authorities of the Full Court could not assist the Assistant Minister in respect of the particular issue with which the Court was concerned: [76] – [94], discussing Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Le (2016) 244 FCR 56; NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 220 FCR 1; Ayoub v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 231 FCR 513; COT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 1) (2015) 236 FCR 148; Cotterrill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 240 FCR 29; AZAFQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 243 FCR 451.Consideration The applicant did not contend that the mandatory removal provisions in ss 189, 196, 197C and 198 would apply so as to require his removal from Australia to his home country in breach of Australia’s non-refoulement obligations. His case before the Tribunal, as in this Court, proceeded on the assumption that if non-refoulement obligations were owed but his protection visa application was nonetheless refused, he would suffer the consequence of indefinite detention. It was the prospect of indefinite detention that was put forward as “another reason” for the purposes of s 501CA(4) of the Act. The jurisdictional error complained of is a failure to properly and finally determine the application for review. The essence of the complaint is that stated in [1.4] of the grounds before me, namely that the Tribunal, having made the findings described in [1.1] to [1.3] of the grounds, “went on to hold that it was not required to determine whether indefinite detention was a legal or practical consequence of its own decision, but could defer determination of that issue to the first respondent in a separate process, when it ought to have made that finding itself”. In my view, this ground of review does not represent a proper statement of the manner in which the Tribunal reasoned toward the conclusion that the cancellation decision should not be revoked. To explain why that is so, it is necessary to closely examine the steps in the Tribunal’s reasoning. They may be summarised as follows. First, the Tribunal concluded that the applicant was indeed a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations. Second, the Tribunal proceeded on the basis that Australia would comply with its non-refoulement obligations and so would not return the applicant to his home country. Third, the Tribunal identified that its refusal to revoke the cancellation decision may expose the applicant to indefinite or permanent immigration detention. Fourth, the Tribunal gave consideration to [14.1(6)] of Direction 65 which applies where the cancelled visa is a protection visa. The Tribunal noted that the Direction in that instance did not purport to require a decision-maker exercising the power conferred by s 501CA(4) of the Act to revoke a visa cancellation in all cases where the prospect of indefinite immigration detention is identified. Rather, what was required was a weighing of the prospect of indefinite detention among other factors bearing on the exercise of the revocation power.