Shastri and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship)

[2020] AATA 1928

Shastri and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2020] AATA 1928 (26 June 2020)

Division:GENERAL DIVISION

File Number(s):      2019/5650

Re:Prashant Shastri

APPLICANT

AndMinister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member

Date:26 June 2020

Place:Sydney

The decision under review is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Respondent with the direction that the Applicant satisfies the requirement in section 21(2)(h) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth).

...............................[sgd]...............................

Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member

CATCHWORDS

CITIZENSHIP – application for Australian citizenship by conferral – refusal of citizenship application – whether Applicant has satisfied section 21(2)(h) – good character requirement – Citizenship Policy – meaning of ‘good character’ – enduring moral qualities – common assault – domestic violence – the weight to be given to references – decision under review set aside and remitted

LEGISLATION

Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) ss 11A, 12, 13, 14, 15, 15A, 16, 17, 18, 19, 19A, 19G, 20, 21, 22, 22A, 22B, 22C, 23, 23A, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 10

CASES

AFY18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1566

Ahori and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Citizenship) [2017] AATA 601

Al-Boushama and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] AATA 5

Contreras v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 47

Fenn and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] AATA 931

Irving v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1996) 68 FCR 422

Kakar and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] AATA 132

Mendoza and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Citizenship) [2018] AATA 686

Prasad and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Citizenship) [2017] AATA 1506

Ragni Mala Prasad and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1994] AATA 326

Sharma and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Citizenship) [2015] AATA 608

Umer and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Citizenship) [2018] AATA 1630

Zheng and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] AATA 304

SECONDARY MATERIALS

Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Citizenship Policy, 1 June 2016

REASONS FOR DECISION

Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member

26 June 2020

THE APPLICATION

1. Mr Prashant Shastri (Applicant) has applied to this Tribunal to review a decision made by a delegate of the Minister (Respondent) refusing his application for citizenship by conferral.

2. The Applicant is an Indian national who first arrived in Australia on 26 October 2013 and was granted a subclass BB-155 Resident Return visa on 17 August 2018. Prior to that grant the Applicant had lodged an application for citizenship by conferral on 30 June 2018.

3. An initial assessment of his application led the Respondent to consider details of a charge of common assault (domestic violence) which had been pressed against the Applicant on 22 January 2016. He was given the opportunity to make submissions to the Respondent on this matter and, after consideration of those representations, the Respondent decided, on 12 August 2019, to refuse the citizenship application (citizenship refusal decision).

4. On 9 September 2019 the Applicant lodged an application with this Tribunal for a review of that citizenship refusal decision and his matter was heard on 20 May 2020. At that time, the Tribunal was operating under procedures established in response to the COVID-19 pandemic designed to ensure the safety of all parties. As a result, the hearing was conducted by use of the Microsoft Teams audio-visual platform. The Tribunal is satisfied that procedural fairness was accorded to all parties through use of this platform.

   BECOMING AN AUSTRALIAN CITIZEN

5. The Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) (Act) provides that there are a number of ways in which a person may become an Australian citizen.

6. Part 2, Division 1 (sections 11A to 15) deals with the matter of automatic acquisition of citizenship: by birth, by adoption, by being a specific category of abandoned child or where a territory is incorporated into and becomes part of Australia.

7. Part 2, Division 2, Subdivision A (sections 15A to 19A) deals with citizenship by descent and sets out qualifications for the grant of such citizenship dealing, inter alia, with matters of identity, parentage, residency, place of birth, etc. Citizenship by descent requires an applicant to establish certain facts about their lineal descent, especially about their qualifying parentage. Even when all such matters of identity and qualifying parentage are met, such an application may still be refused (section 17).

8. Part 2, Division 2, Subdivision B (sections 19G to 28) deals with citizenship by conferral and sets out a series of requirements which must be met, to the satisfaction of the Minister, before such citizenship can be granted.

9. In this case the Applicant has applied for citizenship by conferral.

   CITIZENSHIP BY CONFERRAL

10. In order to qualify for citizenship by conferral an applicant must satisfy a number of requirements which are set out in section 21(2) of the Act. The qualifying conditions are enumerated from paragraphs (a) to (h). Each of them must be satisfied.

11. In the citizenship refusal decision, the delegate assessed that paragraphs (a) to (f) were satisfied by the Applicant. The delegate did not, at that stage, assess section 21(2)(g) which requires consideration of whether or not the Applicant is likely to reside, or to continue to reside, in Australia and maintain a close and continuing relationship with Australia.[1] However, the Tribunal notes that the Applicant has stated that he intends to remain resident in Australia. His wife is here, as is his adult Australian citizen daughter.[2]

    [1] Section 37 documents (T documents) at 8.

    [2] In oral evidence Mr Shastri told the Tribunal that the original citizenship application covered himself, his wife and his daughter and that his daughter was granted citizenship but his wife was not because she failed to satisfy the requirements of the Citizenship Test.

12. Section 21(2)(h) requires that an applicant be “of good character at the time of the Minister’s decision on the application”. In the citizenship refusal decision the delegate found that he/ she was not satisfied the Applicant was of good character and this was, of the criteria that were assessed, the sole identified basis for the refusal of his application.

    Good character

13. The term “good character” is, unhelpfully, not defined in the Act and so the Tribunal must place reliance upon the definitions developed by the Courts and supported by the provisions of the Australian Citizenship Policy (Policy) issued to assist decision makers.

14. In Irving v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs, the Full Court of the Federal Court stated:

    Unless the terms of the Act and Regulations require some other meaning be applied, the words “good character” should be taken to be used in their ordinary sense, namely, a reference to the enduring moral qualities of a person, and not to the good standing, fame or repute of that person in the community.[3]

    [3] Irving v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1996) 68 FCR 422, 431.

15. The Tribunal has further found that evidence of what a person says, does or what they are heard to say or seen to do should be taken as indication of their acceptance of the values and norms to which they are expected to adhere and be loyal.[4]

    [4] Zheng and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] AATA 304, [120].

16. The Policy itself outlines what the characteristics of good character might amount to. These are set out, at some length, as expecting that applicants would (inter alia):

    (a)respect and abide by the law in Australia and other countries.

    (b)be truthful and not practise deception or fraud in their dealings with the Australian Government, or other governments and organisations.

    (c)not be violent, involved in drugs or unlawful sexual activity, and not cause harm to others through their conduct (for example recklessness exhibited by negligent or drink driving, excessive speeding or driving without licence or insurance).

    (d)not be associated with others who are involved in anti-social or criminal behaviour, or others who do not uphold and obey the laws of Australia.[5]

    [5] Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Citizenship Policy, 1 June 2016 (Policy) at 147.

17. The Policy elaborates, by attaching to the phrase “enduring moral qualities”, further qualifications, namely:

    (a)characteristics which have been demonstrated over a very long period of time.

    (b)distinguishing right from wrong.

    (c)behaving in an ethical manner, conforming to the rules and values of Australian society.[6]

    [6] Ibid at 145.

18. It is equally important to note that, in reference to the phrase in question, the Policy also states that “[i]n this context, ‘moral’ does not have any religious connotations”.[7]

    [7] Ibid.

19. The Tribunal notes that the role of the Policy is defined as being:

    …to support the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (the Act). Citizenship Policy provides guidance on the interpretation of, and the exercise of powers under, the Act and the Australian Citizenship Regulations 2007 (the Regulations). Policy cannot constrain the exercise of delegated powers under the Act or the Regulations.[8]

    [8] Policy at 1.

20. In addition, the Tribunal, standing as it does in the shoes of the original decision maker but making a de novo assessment of the evidence,[9] may take into account any other relevant factors. These include the gravity of any offences, the particular abhorrence of crimes committed against vulnerable people (including women, children and the elderly), the frequency of offending, the length of time since an offence was committed and the degree of remorse or rehabilitation demonstrated by the Applicant.[10]

    [9] AFY18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1566, [9] per Charlesworth J.

    [10] Kakar and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] AATA 132.

    THE OFFENCE IN QUESTION

21. The evidence before the Tribunal is that, on 22 January 2016, the Applicant appeared before the Parramatta Local Court where he was found guilty of the offence of “Common Assault (Domestic Violence)”.[11] He pleaded guilty.[12] The charges against the Applicant were dismissed without conviction under section 10(1)(b) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), as a first offender, on condition of his entering a good behaviour bond for a period of 18 months.[13] In addition, a Provisional Apprehended Violence Order (AVO) was issued by the NSW Police whilst the Applicant was in police custody[14] and a Final AVO was made by the Local Court on 22 January 2016 for a period of 12 months in relation to the victim of the assault.[15]

    [11] National Police Certificate dated 27 August 2019.

    [12] T documents at 85.

    [13] Ibid at 83-84.

    [14] NSW Police Facts Sheet dated 12 October 2015 and printed on 22 January 2016 (Police Facts Sheet) at 3.

    [15] T documents at 81-82.

22. An associated charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm was withdrawn.[16]

    [16] Court Attendance Notice (defendant copy) dated 22 January 2016.

23. In the absence of any sentencing remarks from the Bench, the Tribunal turns to the Facts Sheet presented to the Court by the NSW Police.

24. That Police Facts Sheet records details of an incident which occurred on 12 October 2015 when the Police were called to the grounds of Westmead Hospital by a witness who had observed “a verbal argument between the Accused, Prashant SHASTRI and the Victim, Alpa PATEL”.[17]

    [17] Police Facts Sheet at 2.

25. The Facts Sheet continues:

    Police attended the location and spoke with the Witness. The Witness advised that about 9.45am, he was patrolling the car park of Westmead Hospital and observed three people to be arguing. [Deleted material[18]]. When the Witness enquired as to what had occurred, the husband of the Victim stated that the Victim and the Accused had been involved in a disagreement but everything was fine.

    The Witness has taken details and tried to make further enquiries with the Victim [deleted material]. The Victim refused to give the Witness any details.

    The Accused has approached Security and advised him that he had had an argument with the Victim and during the argument, the Accused has hit the Victim.

    Whilst talking to the Witness and obtaining his details and details of the event, Police were advised that the Accused had returned. The Accused wished to apologise to the Witness for what had happened.

    Police approached the Accused and he advised Police that the Victim was with him. The Accused exited the Security office and pointed out the Victim to Police.

    Police have escorted the Accused and the Victim to a private room and separated them. [Deleted material].

    [Deleted material] The Victim declined to provide Police with any information other than the Accused hit her whilst they were discussing a personal matter.

    Police, away from the Victim, cautioned and questioned the Accused about what had occurred earlier in the day. The Accused stated that he and the Victim were arguing and during the argument, the Accused got angry and hit the Victim across her face. The Accused said “I got angry and I didn’t intend on hitting her. I swung my arm whilst asking ‘why are you doing this?’ and my hand hit her face as she moved her head.”

    The Accused stated he and the Victim were arguing as the Accused believes the Victim is cheating on him with her ex boyfriend.

    [18] The Police Facts Sheet contains several deletions of text. The Tribunal put it to the Respondent that the most likely explanation for this was that these comments were included when a charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm was being contemplated, but when this charge was withdrawn the deletions were made and the amended statement tendered to the Court. The Respondent accepted that this proposition was probably correct.

26. All this must be understood against the background of the fact that both the Accused and the Victim (that is, the Applicant and Ms Patel) were married people who were having an affair with each other. According to the Applicant’s statement provided to the Department:

    We were in a relationship outside of our marriage as she is also married. This relation was known to my wife and her husband as well. Later on, around the time of [the] incident, it was revealed she was in contact with her ex-boyfriend…[19]

    [19] T documents at 85.

27. The third person in the incident described by the Police was Ms Patel’s husband. Thus, we have a situation of the Applicant and Ms Patel in an extra-marital relationship, known to both of the respective spouses, and there is an argument about Ms Patel’s further relationship with an ex-boyfriend.

28. When asked by the Tribunal if the cause of the argument was that the Applicant was accusing his girlfriend of cheating on him at the time he was cheating on his wife, he replied, nonchalantly:

    Yes, everybody was cheating.

    Domestic violence

29. The Tribunal has taken a particular attitude towards matters of domestic violence, identifying them as matters which it will always take as ones of the utmost seriousness.

30. In Al-Boushama the Tribunal stated:

    It was argued on behalf of the Applicant that his conviction of a domestic violence offence was a minor matter, however, I regard domestic violence offences as serious offences.[20]

    [20] Al-Boushama and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] AATA 5, [22].

31. In Sharma:

    …The Australian Citizenship Instructions provide that crimes of violence are to be regarded as serious offences. This is particularly so in the case of domestic violence. Such conduct is fundamentally inconsistent with the standard of behaviour expected by the Australian community and usually weighs heavily against an individual being of good character.[21]

    [21] Sharma and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Citizenship) [2015] AATA 608, [37].

32. In Ahori:

    Domestic violence is a very serious matter. In no way can violence in a domestic situation by one partner against another be trivialised or downplayed. The implications of such violence on the children, broader family and friends of the parties involved can be serious and long lasting.

    The fact that the Applicant breached the Protection Order of itself is sufficiently serious to make a prima facie finding of lack of good character. There would need to be compelling evidence and extremely good reasons to negate the presumption that a person convicted of a domestic violence offence is not a person of good character and not a person who deserves the conferral of Australian citizenship.

    That said, the test of good character enunciated by Lee J is comprehensive and not unilateral. The Tribunal would be in error if it automatically reached a conclusion based purely on a conviction for domestic violence, or other serious offence, without considering and evaluating all the evidence presented.[22]

    [22] Ahori and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Citizenship) [2017] AATA 601, [53]-[55].

33. In Umer:

    The Applicant’s conviction for a domestic violence offence is not consistent with the requirement in the Citizenship Policy that an applicant not be violent and not cause harm to others (page 147). Domestic violence offences are serious offences involving, by definition, vulnerable persons over which the offender exercises power and control. The Australian community has zero tolerance for crimes of domestic violence…

    Applicants for citizenship who have been convicted of domestic violence offences face a high bar in establishing that they are a person of ‘good character’…

    …there is a presumption that a person is not of good character in circumstances where the applicant for citizenship has been convicted of a domestic violence offence, and that this presumption is only negated in the face of compelling evidence and persuasive reasons which support a contrary finding. This approach does not, as Senior Member Sosso noted, allow the Tribunal to automatically reach a conclusion that an applicant is not of good character purely on the basis of a conviction for domestic violence - it must consider and evaluate all the evidence presented.[23]

    [23] Umer and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Citizenship) [2018] AATA 1630, [51]-[52] and [54].

34. In Prasad:

    Domestic violence, in any form and in any circumstances, is fundamentally inconsistent with the standard of behaviour expected by the Australian community.[24]

    [24] Prasad and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Citizenship) [2017] AATA 1506, [32].

35. In Mendoza, I stated:

    The Australian community, rightly, professes zero tolerance for violence against women. There is zero tolerance for domestic violence perpetrated against any woman, man or child. Such forms of violence are unacceptable at any time – in any place – in any circumstances – and whether manifest physically, emotionally or psychologically.[25]

    [25] Mendoza and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Citizenship) [2018] AATA 686, [48].

36. While the principle of the non-tolerance of any form of domestic violence is well established, the qualification stated in Ahori and referenced in Umer that all cases require the Tribunal to consider and evaluate all the evidence presented, cannot be ignored.

    Consideration of the incident

37. In oral evidence the Applicant maintained his description of the incident, namely that an argument about a personal matter was underway when the Applicant started swinging his arm about and in the process this caused Ms Patel to be hit in the face, and that the event was non-intentional and hence accidental.

38. The Tribunal notes certain aspects of this narrative:

    (a)the Witness is reported as having observed three people arguing. There is no suggestion that he witnessed any physical confrontation.

    (b)the Victim’s husband was present during the argument and he does not appear to have made any statement to the Police about the assault on his wife or to have taken an action in relation to that matter.

    (c)Ms Patel declined to give any further details to the Police about the incident.

    (d)the Applicant apparently “returned” to the scene ostensibly to apologise to the Witness and he made no effort to avoid the Police, indeed he pointed out Ms Patel to them.

    (e)Ms Patel was escorted with the Applicant to the meeting with the Police.

1. In oral testimony the Applicant advised the Tribunal that he and Ms Patel continued to be friends and that while they had been in a sexual relationship, this was no longer the case.

2. It is unfortunate that the Tribunal did not have the benefit of any evidence, by way of statement or appearance, from Ms Patel. The Applicant was asked about this but suggested that Ms Patel’s husband was not in favour of her having any further involvement with the authorities – a position which is not difficult to understand.

3. In the absence of any contradicting evidence, and given that the Applicant was giving sworn evidence, the Tribunal finds no basis other than to accept the evidence that the incident which occurred did so in the manner the Applicant describes.

   Immediate aftermath

4. The Applicant informed the Tribunal that after he had been charged, he accepted that he needed some form of professional assistance focused upon the management of anger and stress. In his statement to the Department he characterised his approach as needing “to find out how that happened and how I can prevent this in [the] future”.[26] He sought help from Ms Amanda Nassif, a registered psychologist. In a report from her dated 19 November 2019 she writes that by the use of cognitive behavioural therapy, the Applicant had demonstrated “[c]onsiderable signs of improvement and change in character”.[27]

   [26] T documents at 85.

   [27] Letter from Amanda Nassif dated 19 November 2019.

5. The Respondent, rightly, made the point that it would be difficult for the psychologist to comment on any “change” in behaviour if she had not had the opportunity to observe the Applicant both before and after treatment or counselling.

6. Nevertheless, it is to the Applicant’s credit that he sought professional advice and assistance,[28] and Ms Nassif’s report casts him in a positive light with its reference to his expressed sense of remorse for his actions.

   [28] Dr Poorna Lingamaneni has provided a statement to the effect that the Applicant undertook 10 sessions of treatment: T documents at 98.

   WITNESSES

7. The Applicant submitted a number of statements of support from several friends, workmates and acquaintances. These included letters from Samir Vyas (Head Priest at the Shree Sai Baba Sansthan Temple), Lara Herve and James Lees.[29] While each of these attests to the Applicant’s good character, the Applicant agreed when pressed by the Respondent’s representatives that none of them had been made aware of his offending behaviour before the references were given. The Applicant explained this in terms of not wanting “to put everybody in a bad light” and no doubt because he was embarrassed about the nature of the extra-marital affairs being engaged in by several parties.

   [29] T documents at 101, 94 and 93, respectively.

8. However, the Tribunal notes that the Policy states quite clearly that:

   (a)more weight should be given to references made as statutory declarations than those which are not.

   (b)decision makers should give very little weight to references which do not acknowledge the offence or incident.[30]

   [30] Policy at 155.

9. None of the references meet either of these criteria and hence the Tribunal feels it is appropriate to accord them little weight.

10. On the other hand, Mr Wassef Kalajieh provided a reference that both is made as a statutory declaration[31] and also acknowledges the offence, and Mr Kalajieh also appeared before the Tribunal to give oral evidence. He was fully aware of the Applicant’s history, circumstances and offending behaviour. Mr Kalajieh spoke very positively about the Applicant who he has known since February 2014, and told the Tribunal that he regarded acts of domestic violence as serious offences and that he was convinced the Applicant held the same view and was deeply ashamed of, and remorseful for, his behaviour. He also spoke of the Applicant’s helpful and respectful attitude to women in the workplace where they had worked together. The Tribunal found Mr Kalajieh to be a credible witness and gives considerable weight to his testimony in favour of the Applicant.

    [31] T documents at 99-100.

    CONTENTIONS BY THE RESPONDENT

11. In essence, the Respondent opposes the grant of citizenship on several grounds.

12. In the first instance, the Respondent points to the penalty imposed by the Court for the common assault offence. The Respondent claims that the 18 month good behaviour bond was indicative of the seriousness with which the Court viewed the offence. The Tribunal does not view the penalty in the same light especially in association with the decision of the Court to grant a section 10(1)(b) bond and not proceed to conviction.

13. Secondly, the Respondent, in final oral submissions suggested that the existence of an AVO against the Applicant indicated that Ms Patel was, and remained, in fear of him at and after the incident. Again, the Tribunal does not accept this. It is clear that the AVO was issued by the Police and extended in the Court. There is no evidence that Ms Patel applied for it and in any event, after its expiry, she and the Applicant resumed their friendship.

14. Thirdly, and most significantly, the Respondent contends that the Applicant has never admitted to the seriousness of the offence, he has consistently attempted to minimise its significance and has failed to express remorse for his behaviour. In particular the Respondent draws attention to the Applicant’s own words where, in his stated reasons for applying to the Tribunal for a review of the citizenship refusal decision, he wrote:

    If I was given an opportunity to provide a police fact sheet to find out the nature of the offence, I would have submitted happily as I have had nothing to hide. And, that would have helped the officer to look at the trivial nature of the offence and circumstances around it.[32]

    [32] T documents at 5.

15. The statement itself does not actually make much sense and the Applicant tended to be overly loquacious and unfocussed in his replies. However, on numerous occasions he stated that he regarded the offence in question as serious, his behaviour as wrong and he expressed apologies, regret and remorse in relation to the incident.

16. The Tribunal accepts that it is possible to characterise the event, where a person waves his/ her arms about and another person is accidentally struck as a result, as being thought of by him/ her as “trivial” without at the same time downplaying or denying that an assault is a serious offence.

    CONSIDERATIONS

17. The Tribunal notes the comments in Ahori (above) to the effect that while domestic violence offences are very serious, it is necessary to consider all the relevant circumstances and not come to any automatic conclusions specifically adverse to a determination of whether the Applicant is of good character.

18. The Applicant had no blemishes on his character prior to the event and appears to have had none since. In this regard, the Tribunal is not concerned with, and makes no moral judgement about, the nature of the Applicant’s personal relationships. There is evidence that the Applicant has undertaken charity work in association with the Temple, and his friends and acquaintances speak well of him. He took the initiative to seek professional counselling after the traumatic experiences of being arrested, charged and brought before the Court. These are all positive attributes to be counted in favour of the Applicant.

19. The Tribunal accepts the Applicant’s evidence about his sense of shame, embarrassment and remorse, and accepts that he understands the gravity of domestic violence offences.

20. In weighing up matters concerning good character the Policy states:

    Essentially, the question for decision makers is whether any mitigating circumstances and/or explanation provided by the applicant outweigh the behaviour in question. The assessment about whether an applicant is of ‘good character’ requires the consideration of an aggregate of qualities.[33]

    [33] Policy at 149.

21. In Prasad the Tribunal said “[a] decision about whether a person is of good character requires a consideration of an aggregate of qualities”[34] and in Contreras the Full Court of the Federal Court spoke of making decisions where character grounds were concerned as involving consideration of a “calculus”[35] of all relevant factors.

    [34] Ragni Mala Prasad and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1994] AATA 326, [7]

    [35] Contreras v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 47, [52].

22. Deputy President Breen in Fenn made it very clear that:

    The grant of Australian citizenship is a privilege not bestowed lightly. It is given to those who uphold the values of the Australian community and who are willing to make a positive contribution to the country they want to call home.[36]

    [36] Fenn and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] AATA 931, [8].

23. Equally it should not be denied lightly. A decision one way or another is always a significant one. A decision maker must be conscious of the fact that citizenship is a cornerstone of Australian society. In Mr Shastri’s case, he committed a serious offence; it was not without consequences but the Tribunal does not believe that it alone denies the Applicant the possibility of being characterised, at this point in time, as being of good character or that it should deprive him of the opportunity to become a good and contributing citizen. The Act (section 21(2)(h)) requires that character assessment to be made at the time of the decision-making itself which, in this instance, means as he presents in June 2020.

    DECISION

24. The decision under review is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Respondent with the direction that the Applicant satisfies the requirement in section 21(2)(h) of the Act.

    CONFIDENTIALITY

25. The Applicant, at the conclusion of the hearing, asked the Tribunal to make a confidentiality order to provide him with a pseudonym in this matter. After receipt of instructions the representative for the Respondent opposed the making of such an order. The Tribunal perceives no compelling reason to depart from normal practice in relation to the publication of its decisions in full and the application for a confidentiality order is denied.

I certify that the preceding 63 (sixty-three) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member

...............................[sgd]...............................

Associate

Dated: 26 June 2020

Date(s) of hearing:	20 May 2020
Date final submissions received:	21 May 2020
Applicant:	In person (by video)
Solicitors for the Respondent:	Ms K Gawidziel, Australian Government Solicitor