FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AOY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCA 261
Appeal from: AOY17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 1610 File number: NSD 1452 of 2018 Judge: DAVIES J Date of judgment: 5 March 2020 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court to dismiss appellant’s application for judicial review of Immigration Assessment Authority decision affirming delegate’s decision to refuse the appellant’s application for a temporary protection visa – where appellant sought to rely on amended notice of appeal raising entirely new grounds not argued before the Federal Circuit Court – Court’s jurisdiction to consider entirely new grounds when exercising appellate jurisdiction – consideration of whether this would subvert the statutory scheme provided for by s 476A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – consideration of merits may outweigh other considerations – proposed new grounds lacked merit – leave to rely on amended notice of appeal refused – appeal dismissed Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24(1)(d)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5J(3), 473CB, 473DB(1), 476A
Cases cited: AAM15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 804; 231 FCR 452
Applicant in WAD531/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 213
BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 34; 93 ALJR 1091
BZD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 94; 263 FCR 292
CWD16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 578
Hanv Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 331
Iyer v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1788
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS [2014] FCAFC 16
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; 212 FCR 99
Murad v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 73; 250 FCR 510
PXYJ v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCAFC 193
SZTIS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 545
SZUGL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 868
VAAD v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 117
VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; 238 FCR 588
Date of hearing: 21 February 2020 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 12 Counsel for the Appellant: Ms T Baw Solicitor for the Appellant: R & J Lawyers Pty Ltd Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms R Graycar Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
NSD 1452 of 2018 BETWEEN: AOY17
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
DAVIES J
DATE OF ORDER:
5 MARCH 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Leave to amend the notice of appeal be refused.
2.The appeal be dismissed.
3.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.
Note: Entry…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 261
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether it had the jurisdiction to consider entirely new grounds for appeal when exercising its appellate jurisdiction, and if doing so would subvert the statutory scheme provided by section 476A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The court was required to balance the consideration of whether the merits of the proposed new grounds outweighed other considerations, such as the structure and integrity of the appellate process.
The court held that the Federal Court is exercising appellate jurisdiction and has no original jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of the decision of the Authority, as per section 476A of the Migration Act. The court found that allowing a wholly new case to be advanced on appeal would subvert the statutory scheme and nature of the jurisdiction conferred upon and exercised by the court. The court noted that parties bringing applications to review decisions of tribunals such as the Refugee Review Tribunal must make clear from the outset what are the substantive grounds of review relied upon. The court also considered that permitting fresh grounds and a notice of contention would mean that the court performs the trial court’s entire function, which section 476A of the Act appears aimed at preventing. The proposed new grounds lacked merit.
Accordingly, the court refused leave to rely on the amended notice of appeal and dismissed the appeal. The court also ordered that the appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, to be taxed in default of agreement.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave to amend the notice of appeal be refused.
2. The appeal be dismissed.
3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
There is also substantial force in the submission for the Minister that to allow a wholly new case to be advanced on appeal would subvert the statutory scheme and nature of the jurisdiction conferred upon and exercised by this Court by s 24(1)(d) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). The Federal Court is exercising appellate jurisdiction and has no original jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of the decision of the Authority: s 476A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act). In Iyer v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1788 the Full Court said at [23]:Although it is in the interests of justice that decisions be made on the true merits of the case sought to be argued, the structure and integrity of the appellate process must also be taken into consideration. It is incumbent upon parties bringing applications to the Court to review decisions of tribunals such as the Refugee Review Tribunal to make it clear from the outset what are the substantive grounds of review relied upon. In an analogous context, Perram J in AAM15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 804; 231 FCR 452 at 455 [14] cautioned against the Federal Court, in the context of an appeal, exercising what is, in a practical sense, original jurisdiction:One is confronted, then, with the situation that this Court is being called upon in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to decide the entirety of the matters which were for trial, including two new grounds, in circumstances where none of the issues to be decided in this Court were ever decided in the Court below. Section 476A of the Act explicitly removes this Court’s original jurisdiction in cases of this kind. Of course, the ability of this Court to hear fresh grounds of appeal or to entertain a notice of contention is not circumscribed by s 476A as they are both aspects of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. But s 476A is, I think, relevant to whether I should, by leave, permit fresh grounds and a notice of contention when to do so will mean that this Court performs the trial court’s entire function. As a matter of substance, that is what s 476A appears aimed at preventing. There is this further matter, too: Pt 8 of the Act, which regulates judicial review of refugee determinations, ensures that there is one substantive trial in the Federal Circuit Court followed by one substantive appeal to this Court followed by a more cursory review by the High Court. If this Court, in substance, determines a case at first instance by entertaining fresh grounds and a notice of contention this structure is thwarted because no appeal lies to the High Court other than by special leave which is rarely granted and then only on the grounds set out in s 35A of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). If the matter is effectively tried in this Court then the appellant is denied a layer of appellate scrutiny.That caution has been repeated by a number of courts, including by the Full Court: see SZUGL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 868 at [18]; SZTIS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 545 at [40]–[41]; CWD16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 578 at [17]–[19]; Hanv Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 331 at [20]; BZD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 94; 263 FCR 292 at [28]; PXYJ v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCAFC 193 at [15]; Applicant in WAD531/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 213 at [11].