EDV17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

EDV17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1980

Appeal from: Application for extension of time:  EDV17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 588
File number: NSD 693 of 2018
Judge: MCKERRACHER  J
Date of judgment: 10 December 2018
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – protection visa – application for extension of time within which to appeal – principles applicable to r 36.05 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – where one draft ground was not raised before the primary judge – where the grounds lack sufficient merit for leave to be granted

Held:  application dismissed

Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 36.03, 36.05
Cases cited:

AEL15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1295

ALZ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 279

ARK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 825

Chan v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1323

Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 233 FCR 34

Date of hearing: 28 November 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 37
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr D Godwin (Pro Bono)
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G Johnson
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Minter Ellison
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submits to any order of the Court, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 693 of 2018
BETWEEN:

EDV17

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MCKERRACHER  J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 DECEMBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be refused.

2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, to be assessed if not agreed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MCKERRACHER J:

  1. The applicant applies pursuant to r 36.05 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) to extend time to file a notice of appeal. The orders being appealed were made on 8 March 2018. The application to extend time was made on 2 May 2018 and was, therefore, filed outside the 21 days prescribed under r 36.03 of the Rules.

    BACKGROUND

  2. The applicant is a citizen of Jordan who first arrived in Australia in 2005 holding a student visa.  He was granted four subsequent student visas, but an application for a further student visa was refused by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection in 2013 (a decision affirmed by the Migration Review Tribunal).  He sought Ministerial intervention on 9 January 2014, but a decision was made not to consider the request on 6 June 2014. 

  3. On 10 April 2013, the applicant lodged an application for a protection visa, which was determined by the Department not…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1980
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of EDV17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant sought an extension of time within which to appeal a decision of the Tribunal concerning their application for a protection visa. The Tribunal had rejected the applicant's claim for a protection visa, finding the applicant's claims about their medical condition and their political opinions to be fabricated and not credible. The applicant challenged the Tribunal's decision, arguing that the Tribunal had made a material error in its assessment of their claims, and sought an extension of time to appeal the Tribunal's decision.

The court was required to decide whether the applicant's proposed grounds for appeal had sufficient merit to warrant an extension of time to appeal, and whether the Tribunal had made a material error in its assessment of the applicant's claims. The court found that the proposed grounds for appeal did not have sufficient merit to warrant an extension of time to appeal. The court noted that one of the proposed grounds for appeal had not been raised before the primary judge, and that the other proposed grounds lacked sufficient merit. The court also found that the Tribunal had not made a material error in its assessment of the applicant's claims.

The court dismissed the application for an extension of time to appeal, holding that there was insufficient merit in either draft ground to warrant an extension of time. The court ordered that the applicant pay the costs of the first respondent.

It is important for lawyers to be aware of the principles applicable to applications for extensions of time within which to appeal, as set out in rule 36.05 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). Lawyers must also be aware of the importance of raising grounds for appeal in a timely manner, and the importance of ensuring that proposed grounds for appeal have sufficient merit to warrant an extension of time.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be refused.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, to be assessed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves an application by the applicant, EDV17, for an extension of time to appeal against a decision of the Tribunal regarding a protection visa. The Tribunal had rejected the applicant's claims for a protection visa and found the applicant not to be credible or truthful. The Tribunal based its decision on the applicant's alleged fabrication of claims, including that he had not publicly criticised King Abdullah while in Australia, despite his oral testimony to the contrary. The Tribunal also noted the applicant's medical condition, which included anxiety and obsessive compulsive disorder, bordering on psychotic. The applicant submitted that there were errors in the Tribunal's decision, particularly regarding the claim of public criticism of King Abdullah, which he argued was a principal claim and materially incorrect. The applicant sought leave to raise new grounds for appeal, which were not presented before the primary judge.

The matter came before the court on an application for an extension of time within which to appeal a decision of the Tribunal. The Tribunal had previously rejected the applicant's claims for a protection visa. The applicant's application for an extension of time to appeal was made under rule 36.05 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). The application was considered on its merits, including the proposed grounds for appeal, to determine if there was sufficient merit to warrant an extension of time. The court was required to assess whether the proposed new grounds had merit and if they could be considered despite not being raised before the primary judge.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The primary judge accepted that this was the case when he said (at [8]):The Tribunal took into account the letters the applicant provided attesting to his medical condition, which were summarised as anxiety and obsessive compulsive disorder, bordering on psychotic. When assessing his credibility, the Tribunal found that the applicant was not a reliable, credible or truthful witness. The Tribunal found that the applicant fabricated his claims in order to be granted a protection visa. The Tribunal found it did not accept that the applicant had been publicly critical of King Abdullah while in Australia, noting his claim to have publicly criticised the King was not raised during his protection interview and that the applicant relied entirely on his oral evidence which the Tribunal found not to be credible.(Emphasis added.) However, the applicant observes and submits that it is clear from the delegate’s decision that the applicant did in fact raise his public criticism of King Abdullah in his interview. What the delegate recorded from the interview was that:… He claimed that he may over react and be aggressive when discussing his political opinion to others in Jordan. He claimed that when he hears news about the Jordanian government and the king he cannot shut his mouth and he will openly express his political opinions in public. ……… He was asked to clarify what political opinion he holds that would create difficulties for him in Jordan and he responded his political opinion against the government and the King. ……The applicant claimed that in Australia he accused the Jordanian King of being a thief and a gambler, and the King would take money from the Jordanian people to recover the debts from his gambling. …(Emphasis in the original.) The content of the first sentence of [32] of the Tribunal’s decision, the applicant says, is clearly incorrect and could only be regarded as being perverse. The claim that he was publicly critical of the King and continued to be so in Jordan was a principal claim and, therefore, the applicant says, this error is highly material. The applicant relies on recent cases in which ‘perverse’ reasoning on critical issues were found to constitute jurisdictional error, for example, Chan v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1323 (at [34]-[36]). Significantly, this ground was not raised before the primary judge (other than what was said at [8]), but the applicant says it has obvious merit. Where there is clear merit in a proposed ground then leave to raise it on appeal is more readily given. The applicant refers to the decision of Chan where Yates J dealt with a case where new grounds were sought to be raised and where the proceeding below had been conducted by a solicitor. Yates J cited Mortimer J in ALZ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 279, where her Honour said (at [30]):In circumstances where there is no general scheme of legal assistance available to a person in the appellant’s position, and where persons such as the appellant must navigate their way through a legally and procedurally complex system without functional English and without any real understanding of the Australian legal system or Australian law, if there are people prepared to assist such individuals to raise an argument which is not fanciful and has some reasonable legal basis, in my opinion it is in the interests of the administration of justice, and the affording of a fair process to persons in the appellant’s position, that such arguments are considered by the Court. Ultimately, this Court’s function on appeal from a decision invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court and of the Federal Circuit Court is to ensure that an administrative decision affecting the rights and interests of an individual (including her or his liberty) is made in accordance with Australian law and by a fair process.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In my view, draft ground 2 would not succeed.CONCLUSION It follows that there is insufficient merit in either draft ground to warrant an extension of time within which to appeal. The application must be refused with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined the application for an extension of time within which to appeal a decision concerning a protection visa. The primary judge had found that the Tribunal's decision was not flawed by jurisdictional error and had properly assessed the applicant's credibility. The applicant argued that the Tribunal had erred in finding that the applicant did not publicly criticise King Abdullah, and this error was highly material. The applicant cited cases where 'perverse' reasoning on critical issues was found to constitute jurisdictional error. However, the court noted that this ground was not raised before the primary judge and considered whether there was sufficient merit to warrant an extension of time to appeal. The court determined that the proposed grounds for appeal lacked sufficient merit, as they did not demonstrate a clear error in the Tribunal's decision. The court emphasised that the function of the appeal was to ensure that the administrative decision was made in accordance with Australian law and by a fair process. The court found that the application did not meet the threshold for an extension of time, and therefore, the application was dismissed with costs.