FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AJB18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 381
Appeal from: AJB18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCCA 607 File number: WAD 178 of 2019 Judge: BANKS-SMITH J Date of judgment: 24 March 2020 Catchwords: MIGRATION - appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court to dismiss application for judicial review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal - protection visa - where child a citizen of Nepal by descent - where parents not married - where child unable to obtain evidence of citizenship - effect of absence of evidence on child's access to support and services in Nepal - Tribunal's application of test for serious harm - whether parents can mitigate harm - appeal allowed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5H, 36, 48A, 91R
Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth) Schedule 5, Item 12
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) Schedule 2, Part 866
Cases cited: AKH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 47
AMA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1424; (2015) 244 FCR 131
BMG17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1281
CFB16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1415
CGA15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 46
Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1989] HCA 62; (1989) 169 CLR 379
Chen Shi Hai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] HCA 19; (2000) 201 CLR 293
CPE15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 591
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33; (2013) 210 FCR 505
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Singh (1997) 72 FCR 288
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259
Date of hearing: 15 August 2019 Registry: Western Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 86 Counsel for the Appellants: Mr D Blades Solicitor for the Appellants: Gilbert + Tobin Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr PR MacLiver Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs ORDERS
WAD 178 of 2019 BETWEEN: AJB18
First Appellant
AJC18
Second Appellant
AJD18
Third Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
BANKS-SMITH J
DATE OF ORDER:
24 MARCH 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.The order made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 13 March 2019 be set aside and in place of that order, it be ordered that:
(a)the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be set aside;
(b)the matter be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to be heard and determined according to law.
3.The first respondent pay the costs of the appellants,…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 381
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the AAT had failed to properly consider the cumulative impact of the deprivation of rights and access to support and services, and whether the parents could mitigate the harm. The court examined the AAT's reasons to determine whether it had properly considered the relevant materials and applied the correct legal principles. The court held that the AAT had failed to properly consider the cumulative impact of the deprivation of rights and access to support and services, and whether the parents could mitigate the harm.
The court found that the AAT's reasons were relatively detailed, but did not sufficiently disclose the reasoning or foundation for the reasoning. The Tribunal had acknowledged the significance of considering the reasonably foreseeable future, but had failed to properly consider each of the fears raised on behalf of the child, the materials before it, the impact of the feared deprivation on the child in his particular circumstances, and whether and how that impact might be alleviated. The court held that the AAT had failed to properly consider the cumulative impact of the deprivation of rights and access to support and services, and whether the parents could mitigate the harm.
The appeal was allowed, and the order of the Federal Circuit Court was set aside. The decision of the AAT was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the AAT to be heard and determined according to law. The Minister for Home Affairs was ordered to pay the costs of the applicant, to be assessed if not agreed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The order made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 13 March 2019 be set aside and in place of that order, it be ordered that:
(a) the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be set aside;
(b) the matter be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to be heard and determined according to law.
3. The first respondent pay the costs of the appellants, to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As Mortimer J stated in CPE15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 591:[60]The 'reasonably foreseeable future' is something of an ambulatory period of time, but the use of reasonable foreseeability as the benchmark concept indicates that the assessment is intended to be one which can be made on the basis of probative material, without extending into guesswork. It is also intended to preclude predictions of the future that are so far removed in point of time from the life of the person concerned at the time the person is returned to her or his country of nationality as to bear insufficient connection to the reality of what that person may experience. The purpose of the 'well-founded' aspect of the Art 1A test is, after all, to be an objective but realistic and accurate assessment of what risks a person may face in the practical 'on the ground' circumstances she or he will be living in. Using 'reasonably foreseeable' also carries with it a rejection of an assessment which becomes too remote from a person's expected life circumstances. These are not matters which can be expressed sensibly with any more precision.Consideration - ground 1(a) It is clear from the text of the Tribunal's reason at [40] that it was well aware that the question for it was the level and nature of the risk to the child in assessing whether fears the subject of his claims were well-founded. It is also clear that the Tribunal was aware of the significance of considering the 'reasonably foreseeable future'. That is an expression used on numerous occasions in its reasons. It is one thing to be aware of the task to be undertaken and another to carry it out. The Tribunal's reasons are relatively detailed and it is to be acknowledged that the Member seems to have gone to some trouble to accommodate a number of hearings with the appellants. However, I do not consider that [40] of the reasons discloses proper consideration of each of the fears raised on behalf of the child, the materials before it, the impact of the feared deprivation on the child in his particular circumstances and whether and how that impact might be alleviated. Such consideration was required so that the Tribunal could properly assess whether cumulatively or separately the fears were such as to satisfy it that there was a well-founded fear of serious harm. The issue is dealt with in [40] with a level of brevity and ambiguous language that does not sufficiently disclose the reasoning or foundation for the reasoning. The Tribunal commences its reasons at [40] by noting the appellants' argument that the absence of citizenship documentation would lead to the deprivation of identified rights such as the right to vote, obtain a drivers' licence, access health services, access higher education, own property, file a court application, or travel overseas for employment. The Tribunal then states the extent to which it accepts the child will be affected by the absence of citizenship documentation. It does not address the particular claims as to deprivation but instead makes the general statement that it accepts that without citizenship documentation the child will not be able to receive or access 'a number of government services', or have the same 'opportunities and rights' in Nepal as citizens who have evidence of their citizenship. The Tribunal does not specify the relevant government services or the relevant opportunities that it considers might be denied or the harm that might flow from such deprivation.