DG v Refugee Status Appeals Authority

[2001] NZHC 443

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
WELLINGTON REGISTRY CP213/00

BETWEEN DG of Wellington,Refugee Applicant
Plaintiff

AND REFUGEE STATUS APPEALS AUTHORITY
First Defendant

AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE, DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR
Second Defendant

Hearing: 8 May 2001

Counsel: J S Petris for Plaintiff
M Hodgen and BJR Keith for Second Defendant

Judgment: 5 June 2001

JUDGMENT OF CHISHOLM J

[1] The plaintiff is an Indonesian citizen of Chinese ethnic origin. She is single, 26 years of age. Upon arriving in New Zealand in 1998 she sought refugee status -

“ . . . owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, [or] membership of a particular social group . . . ” (Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention)

if she returned to Indonesia. Her application was declined by the New Zealand Immigration Service and her appeal to the Refugee Status Appeals Authority failed.

[2] This application for review of the Authority’s decision relies on two alleged errors of law on the part of the Authority. It is claimed that the Authority erred, first, in its approach to the meaning of the word “persecuted” in the Refugee Convention; and, secondly, in determining whether there was a “well founded fear” of being persecuted in terms of the Convention. To some extent these causes of action overlap. The first defendant abides the decision of the Court.

Background

[3] The plaintiff lived in Jakarta with her parents and her sister. Prior to the riots in May 1998 she encountered difficulties on account of Chinese ethnicity in connection with an identification card, her entry into university, and by virtue of insults shouted at her by Indonesians when she was walking along the street. During the May riots she was injured when she went outside the family home and a Molotov bomb dropped in front of her. Despite the injury she was able to flee with her family. As she was leaving the neighbourhood she saw a neighbouring home being ransacked by Indonesians and a neighbour’s daughter being abused (later she heard that this girl had been raped).

[4] On returning three days later the plaintiffs father found that both the family home and his electronic shop had been looted, the house having been partially destroyed and the shop totally destroyed. Once the home was repaired the plaintiffs parents were able to return to it, being joined later by the plaintiff and her sister. Since that time her parents have established a canteen outside their home. They are assisted in that business by the plaintiffs sister.

[5] Since the riots a number of events have occurred: the plaintiffs mother has been abused whenever she goes shopping; stones have been thrown at her father’s car; in June 1998 some Indonesian men shouted insults at the plaintiff, chased her, and when she fell one of them touched her buttocks but fortunately they fled after her cousin came to her rescue; stones have been thrown at Chinese homes in her neighbourhood; windows in her family home have been broken on two occasions; and although no-one in her family has been physically attacked, her family car has been stopped at traffic lights by Indonesians wanting jewellery and money. The plaintiff said that the police failed to take any action when she complained to them after she had been chased, after the family car had been held up at the traffic lights and after their home had been broken into on two occasions. She believes this was because her family is Chinese.

[6] The plaintiff is a Catholic. Although she did not experience any difficulties in practising her faith, she understood that a church near her family home had been burnt down. She also understood that someone had threatened to throw a bomb inside the church she liked to attend.

[7] Since arriving in New Zealand in September 1998 the plaintiff has remained in contact with her family through letters and telephone calls. These communications have led her to believe that although the situation in Indonesia remains unpredictable, her father’s business is “going well”. Her father has told her, however, that when he was in church he was approached for money and that he was struck on the head and chest when he refused the request. When he complained to the police they “took down a report”.

[8] According to an English translation of a letter of 19 February 2000 to the plaintiff from her mother, the plaintiff was encouraged by her mother to remain in New Zealand as the situation in Indonesia was not “stable or safe”. Her mother described fighting between Muslim and Christian people and commented that their target is mostly Chinese people. Reference was also made to widespread property destruction and to difficulty in securing employment except employment with people having a Chinese background.

[9] The plaintiff told the Authority of her understanding that three months prior to the appeal hearing (in May 2000) there had been further riots in Jakarta and that the house of an uncle had been burned because he was a Christian. This was the only occasion of which the plaintiff was aware on which a house in her neighbourhood had been attacked and burned since the riots in May 1998. She believed that her family had been lucky to avoid an attack on their home. She feared that if she returns to Indonesia it would not be possible for her to find employment.

[10] Evidence was also given by a person of Chinese ethnic origin who used to live in Jakarta but now lives in New Zealand (since 1995). He told the Authority that it was not safe for ethnic Chinese to live in Indonesia because Indonesians are jealous of them. He described various incidents and produced a range of country information. He acknowledged, however, that he did not encounter any difficulties when he visited Jakarta about a year before the appeal hearing. Additional country information was produced to the Authority by counsel for the plaintiff.

Authority’s Decision

[11] The Authority’s decision is comprehensive. Evidence of the plaintiff and her witness, which has been outlined under the previous heading, was accepted by the Authority.

[12] When considering whether there was a real chance that the plaintiff would be persecuted if she returned to her home country the Authority said:

“[32] The appellant’s representative submitted that the appellant’s fear of persecution was well founded because there was a remote, as opposed to a fanciful chance that she would suffer persecution if she returned to Indonesia. In support of this proposition: the appellant’s representative referred to the comment of Gallen J, in SHW v Refugee Status Appeals Authority & Anor (CP203/97) in which his Honour refers to a “real possibility of occurrence” of harm feared by an applicant as being sufficient to constitute a well founded fear of persecution. The appellant’s representative claimed support for his proposition could also be found in comments made by Kirby J, in Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v G (1997) 144 ALR 567, that in assessing whether a fear was well-founded, rational speculation was permitted and the necessity of the proof of affirmative certainty was not required. It is the Authority’s view that neither judgment contains any rejection of the real chance test, the test applicable in New Zealand in determining whether a fear of persecution is well founded. Furthermore, the Authority notes that in Refugee Appeal No. 71404/99 (29 October 1999) at page 15, the Authority states that the real chance test is more readily comprehended and applied because of its clarity in conveying the notion of a substantial, as distinct from a remote, chance of persecution occurring. Accordingly, the appellant’s representative’s submission that a remote chance can somehow be a real chance, is misconceived, incorrect and rejected.”

Mr Petris complained that these comments by the Authority did not accurately reflect his submissions and that in any event the Authority’s approach was erroneous in law.

[13] The Authority concluded that the appellant had not suffered persecution in Indonesia. While it accepted that prior to the 1998 riots she had encountered some “discriminatory harassment” and that there had been events involving the plaintiff and her family during and after the riots:

“[33] . . . considered cumulatively, all of these events do not amount to a sustained and systemic violation of core human rights entitlements of the standard regarded in refugee law as amounting to persecution (see Refugee Appeal No. 2093/9 [sic], [fn 1 In fact the correct reference to this decision is Refugee Appeal No. 22039/93.] 12 February 1996). As already stated, the appellant’s family remained relatively unharmed and after the May 1998 riots, were able to resume their life by living in their home and also conducting a restaurant business at the front of their home.”

Mr Petris claimed that these conclusions are also erroneous in law and reflect an incorrect application of the concept of persecution to the facts as found.

[14] With reference to its decision in Refugee Appeal No. 71404/99 the Authority accepted that “[a]t the very least . . . there must be a real possibility of further violence in Indonesia generally”. But it concluded that the risk faced by any individual Chinese is at its highest, a random risk, best expressed by the phrase of being “in the wrong place at the wrong time”. It considered that statistically the chance of any individual Chinese suffering harm was remote. It noted that since the attacks on ethnic Chinese in Lombok in January 2000 there had been no further attacks and that localised outbreaks of violence in Indonesia had not involved attacks on ethnic Chinese. The Authority also noted that since the riots in May 1998 the plaintiffs family had been able to resume their lives and had been able to conduct a business from their own home.

[15] Attention was also directed towards the implications of the plaintiffs Christianity. The Authority concluded that there was no evidence to indicate that inter religious violence had broken out in Jakarta and it construed the attack on the plaintiffs father in church and the burning of a Christian neighbour’s home as “isolated and random” incidents. It was not prepared to accept that there was a real chance that the plaintiff would be the victim of violence because of her religious beliefs if she returned to Jakarta.

[16] Finally the Authority addressed the plaintiffs claim that the family’s experiences during the riot coupled with absence of state protection was sufficient to establish that the appellant had a well founded fear of persecution. It responded:

“[43] . . . The appellant’s representative submitted that, on the basis of these incidents there was no need for the appellant to demonstrate that there was a real chance that she would suffer persecution in the future. To support this submission, the appellant’s representative referred to a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal of Canada in Rajudeen v Minister of Employment and Immigration, 4 July 1984 (1984) 55N.R.129. In this decision, the court held that a Sri Lankan Tamil’s fear of persecution was well founded as that person had been assaulted on a number of occasions in Sri Lanka without receiving protection from the police. However, in the present case, the appellant has not suffered persecution in the past in Indonesia. Furthermore, in Refugee Appeal No. 71404/99 (at page 12) the Authority stated that the inquiry into refugee status is concerned only with the prospective assessment of the risk of persecution.

[44] The appellant’s representative stated that the Canadian decision referred to had been adopted by Gallen J in D v Refugee Status Appeals Authority & Anor (11 August 1997). However, it is clear from His Honour’s judgement that he makes absolutely no such pronouncement and merely refers to the Canadian decision being put to him by the appellant’s representative (who was acting for the appellant in that case), and simply reiterates the decision made by the Canadian Court. His Honour, at no stage of his decision, makes any statement to the effect that it is unnecessary for an appellant to show a prospective risk of harm.

[45] The appellant’s representative further claimed that Gallen J in SWH v Refugee Status Appeals Authority & Anor again adopted the Canadian decision but it is clear from His Honour’s judgement in this latter decision, that he does no more than merely refer to this decision being put before him once again by the appellant’s representative (who also represented the appellant in that case) and at no stage in his judgement does he state that it is unnecessary for an appellant to demonstrate a prospective risk of harm. Although the appellant suffered harassment and her family attacks on her home and the family business, for which they did not receive protection from the police, this in no way demonstrates that there is a real chance that she will suffer persecution if she returns to Indonesia in the light of the analysis of the Authority in Refugee Appeal No. 71404/99 (29 October 1999).”

Again it is submitted by Mr Petris that the approach adopted by the Authority was erroneous in law. He maintained that if the Authority had applied the proper legal test it would have concluded that the plaintiff was a refugee within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention.

Scope of Review

[17] It is well settled that the specialist nature of the Authority’s jurisdiction imposes constraints on the scope of this Court’s power to review. The comments in R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, Ex Parte Syeda Khatoon Shah [1997] Imm AR 145 (CA) at page 153 are apposite:

“In this highly specialised field of adjudication, a great deal depends upon the expertise of the [Authority] itself. Its adjudication is not a conventional lawyer’s exercise of applying a legal litmus test to ascertain the facts; it is a global appraisal of an individual’s past and prospective situation in a particular cultural, social, political and legal milieu, judged by a test which, though it has legal and linguistic limits, has a broad humanitarian purpose.”

If there is an evidential basis on which the view reached by the Authority can be supported it is not for this Court to substitute its own assessment.

First Cause Of Action

[18] This cause of action revolves around the approach of the Authority to the concept of persecution. Mr Petris’s primary submission was that the Authority’s reasoning -

“. . . all of these events do not amount to a sustained and systemic [emphasis added] violation of core human rights entitlements of the standard regarded in refugee law as amounting to persecution (see Refugee Appeal 20[39]/93, 12 February 1996) . . .”

reflected an unduly narrow approach which was erroneous in law. He submitted that application of this erroneous test to the facts accepted by the Authority had produced an outcome which was not sustainable in law. He also relied on four subsidiary errors of law concerning the concept of persecution.

[19] Although the Authority made reference to its earlier decision in Refugee Appeal No. 2039/93 to support its test of a “sustained and systemic violation of core human rights”, it can be inferred that its approach actually derives from The Law of Refugee Status, Hathaway, 1991, which states at p104:

“. . . persecution may be defined as the sustained or systemic violation of basic human rights demonstrative of a failure of state protection.” (Emphasis added).

It can be seen immediately that the conjunctive approach used by the Authority does not replicate the disjunctive approach used by Professor Hathaway. This issue was not specifically addressed by Mr Petris, but Crown counsel argued that the Authority’s conjunctive approach was not significant because the words “sustained” and “systemic” are used as synonyms rather than alternatives.

[20] On my reading of his text, Professor Hathaway has carefully formulated his definition around the disjunctive approach. His chapter on persecution makes two other specific references to the definition of “persecution” and on each occasion the disjunctive “sustained or systemic” is utilised (see pp 102 and 112). The Professor’s approach has been endorsed at the highest level. See, for example, the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Attorney General) v Ward [1993] 2 SCR 689 at 733 and the House of Lords in Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] 3 All ER 577 at pp581 and 597. Equally significantly the Authority itself seems to have utilised Professor Hathaway’s approach in the past. Indeed, the earlier decision relied on by the Authority on this occasion specifically recognises that “the sustained or systemic denial of core human rights” represents the appropriate standard.

[21 ] There seems to have been a slip of the tongue by the Authority on this occasion. On the face of the decision there are no indications that the Authority was intending to depart from the traditional test. At the same time this does not seem to be a situation where this Court could deal with the matter by simply turning a blind eye to the error because, as noted by Toohey J in Chan v Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 (HCA) at p407:

“A plethora of tests, indeed what may amount to the same test though expressed in a variety of ways, can only lead to uncertainty and, all too likely, confusion in an area where the future of individuals is at stake.”

Compared with the traditional “sustained or systemic denial of basic human rights” approach which involves a relatively low threshold, the Authority’s “sustained and systemic denial of basic human rights” approach could carry the connotation that a higher threshold is to be applied. In my opinion the Crown’s submission that “sustained” and “systemic” have been used as synonyms is unrealistic.

[22] So I approach the matter on the basis that the Authority’s slip of the tongue on this occasion constitutes an error of law. Whether that error should prompt the Court to exercise its discretion in favour of granting relief and refer the matter back for reconsideration is another matter. That issue is best determined once the other alleged errors of law have been considered.

[23] The other errors of law relied on by the plaintiff in relation to this cause of action can be summarised: first, the specific hostile acts against the plaintiff and her family, which the Authority accepted had occurred, must have amounted to persecution; secondly, the destruction of the plaintiffs family home/business and threats, all of which were also accepted by the Authority, constituted “serious harm” and must also have amounted to persecution; thirdly, failure of the Indonesian police to provide protection to the appellant (also accepted) constituted persecution; and, finally, the Authority’s conclusion that the past acts of violence against the family did not amount to persecution constituted an incorrect application of the “persecution” concept to the facts as found by the Authority.

[24] The genesis of Mr Petris’s first and third alleged errors of law can be found in the following underlined passages in the judgment of McHugh J in Chan v Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 at p429:

“The term “persecuted” is not defined by the Convention . . . But not every threat of harm to a person or interference with his or her rights for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion constitutes “being persecuted”. The notion of persecution involves selective harassment. It is not necessary, however, that the conduct complained of should be directed against a person as an individual. He or she may be “persecuted” because he or she is a member of a group which is the subject of systemic harassment . . . Nor is it a necessary element of “persecution” that the individual should be the victim of a series of acts. A single act of oppression may suffice. As long as the person is threatened with harm and that harm can be seen as part of a course of systemic conduct directed for a Convention reason against that person as an individual or as a member of a class, he or she is “being persecuted” for the purposes of the Convention. The threat need not be the product of any policy of the government or of the person’s country of nationality. It may be enough, depending on the circumstances that the government has failed or is unable to protect the person in question from prosecution. . . ”. (Emphasis added).

However, when the comments of McHugh J are read as a whole it is clear that he was intending to convey that isolated incidents will only constitute persecution if they can be seen as part of systemic conduct directed against the person as an individual or member of a class for a Convention reason. That reasoning is, of course, entirely consistent with the traditional definition of persecution discussed earlier. Whether or not persecution is established in any particular case will be a matter of global judgment and so long as the Authority’s conclusion was open to it on the evidence, and I think that it was, the first point of law taken by the plaintiff cannot be made out. Similarly, as McHugh J specifically noted, while failure by a government to protect individuals or groups against serious harm can give rise to persecution, whether or not that outcome arises in any particular case will depend on the circumstances. In other words, failure of a government to protect individuals or groups does not automatically constitute persecution. Again no point of law arises provided, of course, the Authority’s conclusion was open to it on the evidence, and I think that it was.

[25] The second alleged error of law, to the effect that the persecution threshold must have been satisfied because the plaintiff and her family had suffered “serious harm” which the government had not prevented, relies on the following passage from The Law of Refugee Status at p105:

“A well-founded fear of persecution exists when one reasonably anticipates that remaining in the county may result in a form of serious harm which government cannot or will not prevent . . . “. (Emphasis added)

Mr Petris also noted that this approach had been endorsed by Lord Clyde in Horvath v Secretary of State. It is significant, however, that the quotation relied on by Mr Petris carries a footnote (after the words “serious harm”) to the effect that persecution is very much a question of degree and proportion. This again illustrates that we are in the realm of global factual assessment rather than issues of law. Moreover, even if past events could be construed as “serious harm”, it is still necessary to consider the prospective situation. Unless some form of serious harm can be reasonably anticipated in the future, the claim for refugee status will fail. This point of law has not been made out.

[26] Mr Petris’s fourth alleged error of law is in a similar category. His submission seems to come down to a proposition that the past acts of violence accepted by the Authority should have lead the Authority to the conclusion that persecution had been established. There are two flaws in that proposition. First, on the evidence before it the Authority was not bound to reach the conclusion that the past acts amounted to persecution. Secondly, even if those past acts amounted to persecution the Authority was still obliged to apply the words of Article 1A(2) which require a prospective appraisal. Either way the point of law could not be made out. Despite Mr Petris’s attempt to derive some support from Rajudeen v Minister of Employment & Immigration (1984) 55 NR 129, I do not think that decision can assist. In that case the evidence was so clear cut that the Federal Court of Appeal (Vancouver) came to the view that only one conclusion was open to the Board, namely, that the applicant qualified as a refugee. In other words, the Court was really dealing with a Wednesbury unreasonableness situation. This is not such a situation.

Second Cause Of Action

[27] This ground of review revolves around the requirement in the Refugee Convention that there be a “well founded fear” of being persecuted. Mr Petris is critical of the following comment of the Authority which, he said, did not reflect his submissions:

“The appellant’s representative submitted that the appellant’s fear of persecution was well-founded because there was a remote, as opposed to a fanciful chance that she would suffer persecution if she returned to Indonesia.”

He denied that he had attempted to argue before the Authority that a remote chance of harm could support a well-founded fear of persecution. He said that his submission to the Authority, which relied on SWH v Refugee Status Appeals Authority & Anor (Wellington Registry, CP203/97, 7 April 1998, Gallen J), was to the effect that a fear that is not fanciful, too remote or extreme could satisfy the required threshold.

[28] Mr Petris claimed that if the Authority had applied that test to its findings of fact it must have come to the conclusion that there was a well-founded fear. He emphasised the Authority’s acknowledgment that there was a real possibility of further violence in Indonesia. He argued that it had been deflected from arriving at the proper conclusion by its reliance on what he described as its “statistical analysis”. Mr Petris also submitted that if the plaintiff had suffered serious harm in the past and the authorities had failed to protect her, then in the absence of any substantial changes in Indonesia there was ample justification for concluding that the plaintiff was in terms of the Convention “unable or unwilling” to avail herself of the protection of her home country. He rounded off his submissions on this cause of action by contending that in the end result an overly scientific approach by the Authority had caused it to lose sight of the words used in the Convention.

[29] Given that the Authority rejected the submission it attributed to Mr Petris and that Mr Petris denied it was ever made, whether the submission was made in the first place really amounts of a non issue. Both the plaintiff and second defendant agree that a remote chance of harm is insufficient to establish a well-founded fear of persecution. That is the end of that particular issue. Now I move to the remaining issues raised in relation to this cause of action.

[30] The Courts developed the “real chance” test to assist in determining whether a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a Convention reason has been established in any given situation. After extensively reviewing the relevant authorities Gallen J concluded in SWH v Refugee Status Appeals Authority & Anor (supra) at p14:

“The cases establish that to qualify as a refugee, the plaintiff must establish that he has a well founded fear of persecution within the categories contemplated by the definition . . . the term “well-founded fear” incorporates both subjective and objective elements. Both are important and it is wrong to place too great an emphasis on the subjective aspects. Once it has been established that there is a genuine subjective fear, it is necessary to consider whether objectively there is a basis for that.

In determining the likelihood or otherwise of the factual material on which the applicant relies to establish the objective nature of the fears, all that is necessary for the applicant to establish is that there is a real possibility that what he or she fears will occur, will occur. It is wrong to consider that in terms of a balance of probabilities. In determining the question, the Authority is obliged to consider potentialities, but ought not to determine that out of a range of possibilities one is more likely than another. If one which justifies the concerns of the applicant has a real possibility of occurrence, then that is sufficient.”

Read as a whole the judgment does not indicate to me that Gallen J was attempting to draw a distinction between a “real chance” and a “real possibility” and I do not see any reason to disagree with his analysis.

[31] Whether the threshold has been satisfied in any particular case will call for the exercise of judgment by the adjudicating Authority. While those cases where there is no more than a remote chance that persecution will be suffered might be resolved with relative ease, it is much more difficult to arrive at a judgment in cases close to the borderline. Many judicial pronouncements have attempted to pin down where the line is to be drawn. I do not believe that this is the occasion to add to those pronouncements. Despite Mr Petris’s arguments I have not been persuaded that the Authority fell into error when it decided that the plaintiff had failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution. My reasons for having reached that conclusion can be summarised.

[32] In essence the plaintiffs appeal to the Authority failed because the Authority was not satisfied that the plaintiff had objectively established a well-founded fear in terms of the Convention. The Authority decided that the chance of the outcome feared by the plaintiff eventuating was so slight that it could be discounted. This is not inconsistent with the Authority’s conclusion that there was a real possibility of future violence in Indonesia generally which was only intended as a commentary on the Indonesian situation generally.

[33] Once the Authority specifically directed its attention to Convention reasons it found that there was only a remote risk of people with Chinese ethnicity being targeted and that there was no evidence to suggest that the plaintiff personally would be targeted. Adopting the reasoning in its earlier decision (Refugee Appeal No. 71404/99) the Authority decided:

“(a) That Chinese are not at risk of persecution per se because of their race or economic status;

(b) Chinese will, from time to time, be at such risk because of their race or economic status, but only if there is a break down of civil order and the perpetrators of the violence choose to direct their actions against the Chinese;

(c) The chance of this violence reaching a large scale either across Indonesia itself or city-wide in places like Jakarta is remote. The risk of harm faced by any individual Chinese is, at its highest, a random risk, best expressed by the phrase of being in the wrong place at the wrong time. Statistically, the chance of an individual Chinese suffering harm is remote.

I do not think that Mr Petris’s categorisation of the Authority’s reasoning as “statistical” or “scientific” is accurate. The Authority was only using this reference to statistics to illustrate its conclusion that the chance of individual Chinese suffering harm was remote. No error of law has been demonstrated.

[34] Mr Petris expressed his final point in relation to this cause of action in this way:

“If the Plaintiff has suffered serious harm in the past and the authorities have failed to protect the claimant then in the absence of any substantial changes in the person’s country of nationality there is ample basis to find that the Plaintiff is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of his county. This approach was approved by Gallen J in Dayal v Refugee Status Appeals Authority CP50/97 August 1997).”

The problem with this submission is that a finding that the plaintiff is unwilling to avail herself of the protection of her country of origin cannot avail her if she is unable to establish a well-founded fear of being persecuted. Both requirements have to be satisfied. I do not read Dayal v Refugee Status Appeals Authority as authority to the contrary. Again, no error of law has been demonstrated.

[35] This cause of action has not been made out.

Relief

[36] In the end result one error of law has been established, that error being more in the nature of a slip of the tongue. Having reflected on the matter I have come to the conclusion that the error did not materially affect the Authority’s decision. I agree with counsel for the second defendant that the Authority’s decision came down to three basic findings:

• While the harm suffered by the plaintiff and her family during the May 1998 riots was distressing, it was not sufficiently sustained or systemic to constitute persecution;

• Although there was a possibility of future violence in Indonesia, the risk of the plaintiff being affected by that violence was remote and unrelated to the plaintiffs ethnicity or religion; and,

• Given the country material relating to conditions in Indonesia, there was no real chance that the plaintiff would be at risk of persecution within the meaning of the Refugee Convention if she returned to Jakarta.

All those findings were open to the Authority on the evidence before it and were clearly arrived at after careful consideration. `While it is easy to feel sympathy for the plaintiff, I am afraid that intervention by this Court is not justified.

Outcome

[37] The application for review of the Authority’s decision is dismissed.