FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AKH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 47
Appeal from: AKH16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 3492 File number: VID 1201 of 2017 Judges: BESANKO, MIDDLETON AND MORTIMER JJ Date of judgment: 18 March 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – judicial review of decision to affirm decision of Minister to refuse grant of a protection visa – application of objective element of “well-founded fear” test – speculation as to future factual matters different from speculation as to whether there is a “real chance” that visa applicant will be harmed upon return to home area Legislation: Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137, [1954] ATS 5 (entered into force 22 April 1954)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 36
Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth)
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267, [1973] ATS 37 entered into force 4 October 1967)
Cases cited: AON15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 48
Buadromo v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1592
Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379
CPE15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 591
DG v Refugee Status Appeals Authority [2001] NZHC 443
DZADQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 754
Immigration and Naturalization Service v Cardoza-Fonseca 480 US 421 (1987)
Kwong Hung Chan v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1995] 3 SCR 593
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Sivakumaran [1988] AC 958
SRBB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1387
Date of hearing: 19 November 2018 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 68 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr NM Wood with Mr JE Hartley Solicitor for the Appellant: Esser Legal Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr R Knowles Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent entered a Submitting Notice, save as to costs ORDERS
VID 1201 of 2017 BETWEEN: AKH16
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGES:
BESANKO, MIDDLETON AND MORTIMER JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
18 MARCH 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BESANKO J:
I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment of Middleton and Mortimer JJ. I am in general agreement with their Honours’ reasons. However, I wish to add a few words of my own. For that…
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- Case
- [2019] FCAFC 47
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the Tribunal had not erred in its application of the “well-founded fear” test. The Tribunal had considered the totality of the circumstances, including the history of violence between Shias and Sunnis in the Upper Kurram Agency, and the recent bombing by anti-Shia insurgents that killed and injured many Shias in the appellant’s home area. The Tribunal had also considered the April 2015 and January 2016 DFAT reports, which indicated a reduction in the risk of harm in the region. The court held that the Tribunal had not misunderstood or misapplied the approach to whether the appellant’s fear was well-founded, nor did its statutory task miscarry because of its approach. The court emphasised that the decision-maker must look to the individual applicant’s circumstances to determine whether that applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution, and must consider the totality of the circumstances. The court found that the Tribunal had done so in this case, and accordingly dismissed the appeal with costs.
In conclusion, the court held that the Tribunal had not erred in its application of the “well-founded fear” test, and that the appellant was not entitled to a protection visa. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As we have said, there was no dispute as to these legal principles. The only questions to determine are how the Tribunal went about its task, and whether it fell into jurisdictional error. In considering whether objectively there is a well-founded fear, the decision-maker should not look to statistics or projections divorced from the fear as articulated by the applicant for a protection visa. At all times the decision-maker must look to the individual applicant’s circumstances to determine whether that applicant, in the circumstances to which she or he will return to her or his country of nationality, has a well-founded fear of persecution. Further, in considering whether the fear is well-founded, the Court must consider the totality of the circumstances. We do not think these matters are controversial in light of the authorities referred to above.CONSIDERATION It is true, as the appellant submitted, the Tribunal accepted the “history of violence between Sunnis and Shia in Kurram particularly since 2007” ([50]). The Tribunal accepted the April 2015 DFAT report but in particular between April 2007 and February 2012 indicated that there was still a “high degree of generalised violence in the FATA and a moderate risk of sectarian violence in some areas” ([50]). Then, on the basis of the January 2016 DFAT report, issued six months after the earlier DFAT report, the Tribunal had information that the risk of harm had “reduced” ([51]). It was submitted by the appellant that the Tribunal needed to consider whether in light of the new information, and in light of the recurring violence between Shias and Sunnis in the relevant area – albeit with a period of “relative calm” between 2013 to 2015 – there was a real and substantial basis for the appellant’s subjective fear of being harmed in his home area. The Tribunal was required to consider whether there was a real and substantial basis for fearing harm, even though the probability of that harm occurring might well be quite low. It was submitted that the Tribunal treated the period of relative calm (from 2013 to 2015) as the “norm” and did so despite the undisputed evidence of recurring violence over the decades, including but not limited to the period from 2007 to 2013. It was submitted that the Tribunal in considering that it would be “premature to conclude” that the recent attack “marks a definite change” from the norm, revealed a misunderstanding or misapplication of the real chance test. In our view, the Tribunal did not, on a fair reading of the whole of its decision, misunderstand or misapply the approach to whether the appellant’s fear was well-founded, nor did its statutory task miscarry because of its approach to whether the appellant’s fear of persecution in the Upper Kurram Agency was well-founded. We are mindful that in assessing the reasons for a decision of the Tribunal it is not appropriate for the Court to construe the reasons for the Tribunal’s decision minutely and with a mind keenly attuned to the perception of error, but rather those reasons should be read fairly and as a whole: see eg Wu Shan Liang at 271-272 (per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ) and 291 (per Kirby J). Having said that, the Court should not be hesitant to expose jurisdictional error where it truly exists: see eg Buadromo v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1592 at [27]-[29] (per Flick J). In this sense, there is no deference to the Tribunal, nor should any ambiguity necessarily be resolved in the Tribunal’s favour.