AKH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AKH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 47

Appeal from: AKH16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 3492
File number: VID 1201 of 2017
Judges: BESANKO, MIDDLETON AND MORTIMER  JJ
Date of judgment: 18 March 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – judicial review of decision to affirm decision of Minister to refuse grant of a protection visa – application of objective element of “well-founded fear” test – speculation as to future factual matters different from speculation as to whether there is a “real chance” that visa applicant will be harmed upon return to home area
Legislation:

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137, [1954] ATS 5 (entered into force 22 April 1954)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 36

Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth)

Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267, [1973] ATS 37 entered into force 4 October 1967)

Cases cited:

AON15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 48

Buadromo v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1592

Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379

CPE15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 591

DG v Refugee Status Appeals Authority [2001] NZHC 443

DZADQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 754

Immigration and Naturalization Service v Cardoza-Fonseca 480 US 421 (1987)

Kwong Hung Chan v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1995] 3 SCR 593

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Sivakumaran [1988] AC 958

SRBB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1387

Date of hearing: 19 November 2018
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 68
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr NM Wood with Mr JE Hartley
Solicitor for the Appellant: Esser Legal
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr R Knowles
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent entered a Submitting Notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 1201 of 2017
BETWEEN:

AKH16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGES:

BESANKO, MIDDLETON AND MORTIMER  JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

18 MARCH 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BESANKO J:

  1. I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment of Middleton and Mortimer JJ.  I am in general agreement with their Honours’ reasons.  However, I wish to add a few words of my own.  For that…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCAFC 47
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

AKH16 sought judicial review of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection's decision to refuse a grant of a protection visa. The key issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had erred in its application of the objective element of the “well-founded fear” test in determining whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to his home area. Specifically, the court examined whether the Tribunal had correctly applied the distinction between speculation as to future factual matters, which is permissible, and speculation as to whether there is a “real chance” that the applicant will be harmed upon return to his home area, which is not.

The court found that the Tribunal had not erred in its application of the “well-founded fear” test. The Tribunal had considered the totality of the circumstances, including the history of violence between Shias and Sunnis in the Upper Kurram Agency, and the recent bombing by anti-Shia insurgents that killed and injured many Shias in the appellant’s home area. The Tribunal had also considered the April 2015 and January 2016 DFAT reports, which indicated a reduction in the risk of harm in the region. The court held that the Tribunal had not misunderstood or misapplied the approach to whether the appellant’s fear was well-founded, nor did its statutory task miscarry because of its approach. The court emphasised that the decision-maker must look to the individual applicant’s circumstances to determine whether that applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution, and must consider the totality of the circumstances. The court found that the Tribunal had done so in this case, and accordingly dismissed the appeal with costs.

In conclusion, the court held that the Tribunal had not erred in its application of the “well-founded fear” test, and that the appellant was not entitled to a protection visa. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Finally, Gaudron J at 415 said:The definition of “refugee” looks to the mental and emotional state of the applicant as well as to the objective facts. It is a commonplace, encapsulated in the expression "once bitten, twice shy", that circumstances which are insufficient to engender fear may also be insufficient to allay a fear grounded in past experience. Although the definition requires that there be “well-founded fear” at the time of determination it would be to ignore the nature of fear and to ignore ordinary human experience to evaluate a fear as well-founded or otherwise without due regard being had to the applicant's own past experiences. (Emphasis added, citations omitted) In Guo, the High Court emphasised that the definition of “refugee” in the Convention used the expression “well-founded fear”, not the expression “real chance of harm”. The High Court explained that to use a “real chance” test as a substitute for the Convention test is to invite error. Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ commented (at 572-573):Chan is an important decision of this Court because it establishes that a person can have a well-founded fear of persecution even though the possibility of the persecution occurring is well below 50 per cent. But to use the real chance test as a substitute for the Convention “well-founded fear” is to invite error.No doubt in most, perhaps all, cases ... the application of the real chance test, properly understood as a clarification of the phrase “well-founded”, leads to the same result as the direct application of that phrase. Wu Shan Liang is an example. Nevertheless, it is always dangerous to treat a particular word or phrase as synonymous with a statutory term, no matter how helpful the use of that word or phrase may be in understanding the statutory term. Einfeld J thought that the “real chance” test invited speculation and that the Tribunal had erred because it “has shunned speculation”. If, by speculation, his Honour meant making a finding as to whether or not an event might or might not occur in the future, no criticism can be made of his use of the term. But it seems likely ... that he was using the word in its primary dictionary definition of conjecture or surmise. If he was, he fell into error. Conjecture or surmise has no part to play in determining whether a fear is well-founded. A fear is “well-founded” when there is a real substantial basis for it. As Chan shows, a substantial basis for a fear may exist even though there is far less than a 50 per cent chance that the object of the fear may eventuate. But no fear can be well-founded for the purpose of the Convention unless the evidence indicates a real ground for believing that the applicant for refugee status is at risk of persecution. A fear of persecution is not well-founded if it is merely assumed or it is mere speculation. In this and other cases, the Tribunal and the Federal Court have used the term “real chance” not as epexegetic of “well-founded”, but as a replacement or substitution for it. Those tribunals will be on safer ground, however, and less likely to fall into error if in future they apply the language of the Convention while bearing in mind that a fear of persecution may be well-founded even though the evidence does not show that persecution is more likely than not to eventuate. (Emphasis added, citations omitted)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In Guo, the High Court emphasised that the definition of “refugee” in the Convention used the expression “well-founded fear”, not the expression “real chance of harm”. The High Court explained that to use a “real chance” test as a substitute for the Convention test is to invite error. Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ commented (at 572-573):Chan is an important decision of this Court because it establishes that a person can have a well-founded fear of persecution even though the possibility of the persecution occurring is well below 50 per cent. But to use the real chance test as a substitute for the Convention “well-founded fear” is to invite error.No doubt in most, perhaps all, cases ... the application of the real chance test, properly understood as a clarification of the phrase “well-founded”, leads to the same result as the direct application of that phrase. Wu Shan Liang is an example. Nevertheless, it is always dangerous to treat a particular word or phrase as synonymous with a statutory term, no matter how helpful the use of that word or phrase may be in understanding the statutory term. Einfeld J thought that the “real chance” test invited speculation and that the Tribunal had erred because it “has shunned speculation”. If, by speculation, his Honour meant making a finding as to whether or not an event might or might not occur in the future, no criticism can be made of his use of the term. But it seems likely ... that he was using the word in its primary dictionary definition of conjecture or surmise. If he was, he fell into error. Conjecture or surmise has no part to play in determining whether a fear is well-founded. A fear is “well-founded” when there is a real substantial basis for it. As Chan shows, a substantial basis for a fear may exist even though there is far less than a 50 per cent chance that the object of the fear may eventuate. But no fear can be well-founded for the purpose of the Convention unless the evidence indicates a real ground for believing that the applicant for refugee status is at risk of persecution. A fear of persecution is not well-founded if it is merely assumed or it is mere speculation. In this and other cases, the Tribunal and the Federal Court have used the term “real chance” not as epexegetic of “well-founded”, but as a replacement or substitution for it. Those tribunals will be on safer ground, however, and less likely to fall into error if in future they apply the language of the Convention while bearing in mind that a fear of persecution may be well-founded even though the evidence does not show that persecution is more likely than not to eventuate. (Emphasis added, citations omitted) Despite the caution in Guo, it is still common for decision-makers (and courts) to move into the language of “real chance” of harm, and to use in contradistinction to that term the words “remote” or “insubstantial”. That is what the Tribunal did in this case. We observe that, at a day-to-day level in a busy administrative tribunal, it may be useful for a decision-maker to contrast in her or his own mind whether, on the material, the harm feared by a person is “remote” with whether there is a “real chance” the person may experience the harm she or he fears. Nevertheless, these are not the words of the Convention and the issues on this appeal illustrate how substitution of that kind can lead to difficulties.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant made various claims to fear harm. One claim was to the effect that the appellant faced a real chance of suffering serious or significant harm (including death) in his home area as a result of general and sectarian violence affecting that region. He claimed that Bangash Shias were targeted by the Taliban and other anti-Shia insurgents, including because they would not let the Taliban through their area to fight in Afghanistan. He also claimed that there was a recurring pattern of violence in the area.Tribunal’s decision The appellant appeared at a hearing before the Tribunal on 21 July 2015. However, the Tribunal did not make its decision until 21 January 2016. New information came into existence after the hearing and shortly before the Tribunal’s decision about a recent bombing by anti-Shia insurgents that killed and injured many Shias in the appellant’s home area. The Tribunal dealt with the relevant claim in a section of its written statement under the heading “The situation in Parachinar” ([49]-[86]). All of the detail and information contained in those paragraphs is important to give context to the various paragraphs that were focused upon by the appellant in this appeal. After briefly reciting the appellant’s relevant claim at [49], the Tribunal commenced at [50] by recording recent country information from a DFAT report (published in April 2015). Relevantly, that included the following information:(1)“The current conflict in Kurram can be traced to the 1980s when the Turis refused to provide support to the Mujahideen and later the al-Qaeda and Taliban forces fleeing Afghanistan. There has been a history of violence between Shias and Sunnis in Kurram particularly since 2007.”(2)“DFAT understands that a 2013 truce … between the Shia Turi and mostly Sunni Bangash communities in Kurram Agency is still in place (as of November 2014). ... This has resulted in an improved security situation in Kurram Agency.”(3)Nevertheless, despite the 2013 truce, “[o]verall DFAT assesses that there is a high degree of generalised violence in the FATA and a moderate risk of sectarian violence in some areas”. “[T]he situation in the FATA remains volatile due to ongoing counterinsurgency operations by the Pakistani security services.” The Tribunal then referred to a more recent report from DFAT (published in January 2016), and noted that it had discussed this report with the appellant at the hearing. According to the Tribunal, the more recent report “has lowered the assessment of harm and violence, consistent with the view expressed by the Tribunal at the hearing that the risk of being harmed in this region of Pakistan was reducing” ([51]). The Tribunal found that “there have not been the repeat of significant targeted events that have caused multiple casualties that were common in the period between 2007 and 2012” ([52]). Then at [55] the Tribunal noted that, since the hearing (on 21 July 2015), “a further act of violence has taken place. On 13 December 2015, at least 25 people had been killed and over 70 injured in a bomb explosion in the Eid Gah clothes market in Parachinar. Lashkar e Jhangvi … claimed responsibility for this attack ‘in retaliation for Shia support of Iran and Bashar al Assad’”. The January 2016 DFAT report was not in evidence, and it is not possible to make a finding as to whether it included the 13 December 2015 incident. The structure of the Tribunal’s reasons, and its separate consideration of the 13 December 2015 incident, may suggest it was not included.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As we have said, there was no dispute as to these legal principles. The only questions to determine are how the Tribunal went about its task, and whether it fell into jurisdictional error. In considering whether objectively there is a well-founded fear, the decision-maker should not look to statistics or projections divorced from the fear as articulated by the applicant for a protection visa. At all times the decision-maker must look to the individual applicant’s circumstances to determine whether that applicant, in the circumstances to which she or he will return to her or his country of nationality, has a well-founded fear of persecution. Further, in considering whether the fear is well-founded, the Court must consider the totality of the circumstances. We do not think these matters are controversial in light of the authorities referred to above.CONSIDERATION It is true, as the appellant submitted, the Tribunal accepted the “history of violence between Sunnis and Shia in Kurram particularly since 2007” ([50]). The Tribunal accepted the April 2015 DFAT report but in particular between April 2007 and February 2012 indicated that there was still a “high degree of generalised violence in the FATA and a moderate risk of sectarian violence in some areas” ([50]). Then, on the basis of the January 2016 DFAT report, issued six months after the earlier DFAT report, the Tribunal had information that the risk of harm had “reduced” ([51]). It was submitted by the appellant that the Tribunal needed to consider whether in light of the new information, and in light of the recurring violence between Shias and Sunnis in the relevant area – albeit with a period of “relative calm” between 2013 to 2015 – there was a real and substantial basis for the appellant’s subjective fear of being harmed in his home area. The Tribunal was required to consider whether there was a real and substantial basis for fearing harm, even though the probability of that harm occurring might well be quite low. It was submitted that the Tribunal treated the period of relative calm (from 2013 to 2015) as the “norm” and did so despite the undisputed evidence of recurring violence over the decades, including but not limited to the period from 2007 to 2013. It was submitted that the Tribunal in considering that it would be “premature to conclude” that the recent attack “marks a definite change” from the norm, revealed a misunderstanding or misapplication of the real chance test. In our view, the Tribunal did not, on a fair reading of the whole of its decision, misunderstand or misapply the approach to whether the appellant’s fear was well-founded, nor did its statutory task miscarry because of its approach to whether the appellant’s fear of persecution in the Upper Kurram Agency was well-founded. We are mindful that in assessing the reasons for a decision of the Tribunal it is not appropriate for the Court to construe the reasons for the Tribunal’s decision minutely and with a mind keenly attuned to the perception of error, but rather those reasons should be read fairly and as a whole: see eg Wu Shan Liang at 271-272 (per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ) and 291 (per Kirby J). Having said that, the Court should not be hesitant to expose jurisdictional error where it truly exists: see eg Buadromo v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1592 at [27]-[29] (per Flick J). In this sense, there is no deference to the Tribunal, nor should any ambiguity necessarily be resolved in the Tribunal’s favour.