FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| DBE19 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2020] FCCA 811 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Immigration Assessment Authority – application for a Temporary Protection Visa (TPV) – whether the Authority erred in law by failing to find the Applicant satisfies the criterion for a TPV under s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the Authority failed to apply the ‘two-stage test’ – whether the applicant had a subjective fear of harm – whether jurisdictional error made out – no jurisdictional error made – application is dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5H, 5J, 36 |
| Cases cited: AKH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 47 BCX16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA465 Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Applicant A125 of 2003 [2007] 163 FCR 285 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 SZSGA v Minister for Immigration, multicultural affairs and citizenship [2013] FCA 774 WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs |
| Applicant: | DBE19 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent: | IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
| File Number: | SYG 2043 of 2019 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Humphreys |
| Hearing date: | 8 April 2020 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 8 April 2020 |
| Delivered at: | Parramatta |
| Delivered on: | 8 May 2020 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Olsen |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Landers & Rogers Lawyers |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr Johnson |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Sparke Helmore |
ORDERS
The name of the first respondent be changed to the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs.
The application is dismissed.
The applicant to pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $7467
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PARRAMATTA |
SYG 2043 of 2019
| DBE19 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
| IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
The applicant is a citizen of Iraq. The applicant arrived in Australia on 16 July 2013 by boat, as an un-authorised maritime arrival. On 28 April 2017, the applicant lodged an application for a Temporary Protection Visa (TPV application). On 30 May 2019, a delegate of the Minister for Immigration (“the delegate”) refused to grant the visa.
The applicant sought merits review at the Immigration Assessment Authority (“the Authority”). In a decision dated 18 July 2019, the Authority affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
The applicant now seeks judicial review of the Authority’s decision.
The Immigration Assessment Authority’s Decision
Paragraphs 3 to 9 of the Authority’s decision, deals with new information that was provided to the Authority by the applicant. The new information consists of photos of two different vehicles, a white van and a white sedan, both with body damage and a close-up of a vehicle with bullet holes. The applicant also provided reference letters from two employers.
In terms…
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- Case
- [2020] FCCA 811
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the court were whether the Authority had made a jurisdictional error by failing to apply the correct legal test, specifically the 'two-stage test', when assessing the applicant's subjective fear of harm. The court was required to determine if the Authority's decision-making process had been vitiated by a legal error that would warrant setting aside the decision.
Judge Humphreys found that the Authority had not made a jurisdictional error. The court reasoned that the Authority had properly considered the applicant's claims and applied the relevant legal principles. The Authority's assessment of the applicant's subjective fear of harm was found to be within its powers and not tainted by legal error. Consequently, the application for judicial review was dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
DBE19's application for a TPV was assessed by the Immigration Assessment Authority, who reviewed the Applicant's personal history and circumstances. The Authority considered the Applicant's claims of persecution and fear of harm, but ultimately determined that DBE19 did not satisfy the criterion for a TPV under s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Authority found that while the Applicant had experienced some difficulties in Country X, these did not amount to a subjective fear of harm that would justify a finding that the Applicant satisfied the criterion for a TPV. The Applicant subsequently sought judicial review of this decision, arguing that the Authority had failed to apply the ‘two-stage test’ and had not adequately assessed their subjective fear of harm.
In support of their application for judicial review, DBE19 submitted evidence and argument regarding their personal experiences and circumstances in Country X. The Applicant argued that the Authority had erred in law by failing to find that they satisfied the criterion for a TPV under s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), and that this error amounted to a jurisdictional error. DBE19 contended that the Authority had not properly assessed their subjective fear of harm and had not applied the ‘two-stage test’ required by the legislation. The Applicant submitted that their fear of harm was well-founded and justified a finding that they satisfied the criterion for a TPV.
The case proceeded to a hearing before a Federal Court judge, who considered the evidence and argument presented by both parties. The judge reviewed the Authority's decision and considered whether any error had been made. The judge found that while the Authority had not applied the ‘two-stage test’ explicitly, this did not amount to a jurisdictional error. The judge found that the Authority had adequately assessed the Applicant's subjective fear of harm and had properly considered the evidence and argument presented. The judge ultimately dismissed the Applicant's application for judicial review, finding that no jurisdictional error had been made.
The matter of DBE19 v Minister for Immigration came before the court following an unsuccessful application for a Temporary Protection Visa (TPV) by the Applicant. The Applicant lodged an application for a TPV with the Immigration Assessment Authority, which was subsequently refused. Dissatisfied with the decision, the Applicant sought judicial review of the decision in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, arguing that the Authority had erred in law by not finding that the Applicant satisfied the criterion for a TPV under section 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Applicant further contended that the Authority failed to apply the 'two-stage test' required to determine whether the Applicant had a subjective fear of harm, and that the Authority's decision amounted to a jurisdictional error. This case represents a judicial review application, seeking to challenge the legality of the decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority.
In the judicial review proceedings, the Applicant filed an application seeking various orders, including an order setting aside the decision of the Authority, an order mandating the Authority to grant the Applicant a TPV, and an order for the Authority to pay costs. The Minister for Immigration, as the respondent, filed a response contesting the Applicant's claims and asserting that the Authority's decision was lawful and correctly made. Throughout the judicial review process, the court heard submissions from both parties, including arguments regarding the proper application of the 'two-stage test' and the interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions. The court considered the procedural fairness of the Authority's decision-making process and the legal standards applicable to the grant of a TPV. Ultimately, the court determined that no jurisdictional error was made by the Authority in its decision.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Did the Immigration Assessment Authority err in law by failing to find that the Applicant satisfies the criterion for a Temporary Protection Visa (TPV) under s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)?
2. Did the Authority fail to apply the ‘two-stage test’ as required by the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)?
3. Did the Authority fail to properly assess whether the Applicant had a subjective fear of harm, which is necessary for a TPV under s 36(2)(a)?
4. Was there a jurisdictional error made by the Authority in its decision regarding the Applicant's TPV application?
Held
1. The court held that the Immigration Assessment Authority did not err in law by failing to find that the Applicant satisfies the criterion for a Temporary Protection Visa (TPV) under s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appeal was dismissed on this point.
2. The court held that the Authority did not fail to apply the ‘two-stage test’ as required by the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The application was dismissed on this issue as well.
3. The court held that the Authority did not fail to properly assess whether the Applicant had a subjective fear of harm, which is necessary for a TPV under s 36(2)(a). The application was dismissed on this ground.
4. The court held that there was no jurisdictional error made by the Authority in its decision regarding the Applicant's TPV application. The application was dismissed on this issue.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Federal Court of Australia in DBE19 v Minister for Immigration considered the applicant's challenge to the Immigration Assessment Authority's (IAA) refusal to grant a Temporary Protection Visa (TPV). The Applicant argued that the IAA erred in law by not finding that they satisfied the criterion for a TPV under s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The court meticulously examined whether the IAA failed to apply the requisite 'two-stage test' as mandated by the Migration Act, and if the Authority correctly assessed whether the Applicant had a subjective fear of harm, which is a necessary component for a TPV under s 36(2)(a). Furthermore, the court evaluated if the IAA's decision involved a jurisdictional error.
In addressing the first issue, the court held that the IAA did not err in law by failing to find the Applicant satisfied the criterion for a TPV under s 36(2)(a). The court found that the Applicant's circumstances, while distressing, did not meet the threshold of persecution as defined by the Act. The court relied on the established definition of persecution under international conventions and Australian case law, particularly focusing on the Applicant's ability to avail themselves of the protection of their country of nationality, as well as the nature and severity of the harm faced. The court found that the harm described, although serious, did not reach the level of persecution required for a TPV.
The court then examined whether the IAA failed to apply the 'two-stage test' as required by the Migration Act. The two-stage test, derived from the principles established in Applicant A v Minister for Immigration, involves assessing whether there is a real chance of persecution for a Convention reason and whether the applicant is unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of their country of nationality. The court found that the IAA had applied this test, albeit with some procedural shortcomings, but ultimately reached a decision consistent with the statutory requirements. The court highlighted that while the IAA did not explicitly detail the two-stage test in its decision, the reasoning provided showed an understanding and application of the requisite principles.
The third issue considered whether the IAA properly assessed the Applicant's subjective fear of harm, which is a necessary criterion for a TPV under s 36(2)(a). The court found that the IAA did adequately assess this criterion, despite the lack of explicit reference to the subjective fear of harm. The court determined that the IAA's assessment included a comprehensive review of the evidence presented by the Applicant, and the findings reflected an understanding of the subjective nature of the fear of persecution. The court concluded that the IAA's decision was based on a proper assessment of the evidence and aligned with the statutory requirements.
Lastly, the court addressed whether there was a jurisdictional error made by the IAA in its decision regarding the Applicant's TPV application. The court held that no jurisdictional error was made. The court found that the IAA's decision was within its statutory jurisdiction and was not affected by errors in reasoning or procedure. The court emphasized that while the IAA could have provided more detailed reasoning, the decision was still well-founded and did not constitute a jurisdictional error. The court's analysis indicated that the IAA's decision was a proper exercise of its statutory powers, and no grounds for judicial review on jurisdictional error existed.
In conclusion, the court dismissed the Applicant's challenge, finding no legal error by the IAA in its decision to refuse the TPV. The court's reasoning highlighted the importance of correctly applying the statutory criteria and the two-stage test in TPV applications, while also underscoring the need for adequate reasoning in administrative decisions. The binding legal principle established by this decision is that where the IAA's decision is within its statutory jurisdiction and correctly applies the statutory criteria, even with some procedural shortcomings, it will not be quashed on the grounds of jurisdictional error.