DBE19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DBE19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 779   

Appeal from: DBE19 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2020] FCCA 811
File number(s): NSD 604 of 2020
Judgment of: PERRY J
Date of judgment: 7 July 2023
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal against Federal Circuit Court decision refusing application for judicial review of decision by Immigration Assessment Authority – whether Authority failed to have regard to the appellant’s subjective fear of harm – whether Authority permitted to consider the fact that the appellant had not been personally targeted by militia or political groups in past employment – whether Authority permitted to have regard to findings made under s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) for the purposes of s 36(2)(aa) of the Act – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5H(1)(a); 5J;36(2)(a); 36(2)(aa); 36(2A)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) sch 3

Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137

Cases cited:

BCX16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 465

Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163

DBE19 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2020] FCCA 811

DQU16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] HCA 10; (2021) 273 CLR 1

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33; (2013) 210 FCR 505

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo [1997] HCA 22; (1997) 191 CLR 559

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam [1999] FCA 719; (1999) 93 FCR 220

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 77 ALJR 1165

SZSGA v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCA 774

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 51
Date of last submission/s: 6 June 2023
Date of hearing: 7 July 2023
Counsel for the Appellant The appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent Mr Greg Johnson
Solicitor for the First Respondent Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Second Respondent The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 604 of 2020
BETWEEN:

DBE19

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSEMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

PERRY J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 JULY 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the first respondent is changed to Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs.

2.The appeal is dismissed.

3.The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or taxed.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

4.The first respondent has indicated that it does not anticipate that costs will exceed the short form bill amount prescribed in Item 15.2 of Schedule 3 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Delivered ex…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 779
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of DBE19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs, the Federal Circuit Court dismissed an appeal against a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) to refuse the applicant's application for a judicial review. The applicant, an Iraqi national, had applied for a protection visa, claiming that he faced a real chance of significant harm if returned to Iraq, and that he was therefore owed complementary protection obligations. The IAA found that the applicant did not meet the criteria for a protection visa, and the applicant sought judicial review of that decision.

The court had to determine whether the IAA failed to properly consider the applicant's subjective fear of harm, and whether it was permissible for the IAA to consider the fact that the applicant had not been personally targeted by militia or political groups in past employment. The court also had to determine whether the IAA was permitted to have regard to findings made under s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) for the purposes of s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.

The court found that the IAA had considered the applicant's claims and the evidence presented to it, and had made findings that were open on the material before it. The court held that the IAA was entitled to have regard to the fact that the applicant had not been personally targeted by militia or political groups in past employment, and that the IAA was also entitled to have regard to findings made under s 36(2)(a) of the Act for the purposes of s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. The court held that the IAA's decision was not flawed, and that the appeal should be dismissed.

The court ordered that the name of the first respondent be changed to Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs, that the appeal be dismissed, and that the applicant pay the first respondent's costs, as agreed or taxed. The court also noted that the first respondent had indicated that it did not anticipate that costs would exceed the short form bill amount prescribed in Item 15.2 of Schedule 3 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The name of the first respondent is changed to Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs.

2. The appeal is dismissed.

3. The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or taxed.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

4. The first respondent has indicated that it does not anticipate that costs will exceed the short form bill amount prescribed in Item 15.2 of Schedule 3 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

A determination of whether there is a real risk for the purposes of the complementary protection criterion requires a consideration of whether there is a “real chance” that an applicant will suffer “significant harm” if returned to her or his country of origin: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33; (2013) 210 FCR 505 at 551 [242]-[246] (Lander and Gordon JJ) (with whom Besanko and Jagot JJ at 557-558 [297] and Flick J at 565 [342] relevantly agreed). The level of risk of harm under the s 36(2)(aa) complementary protection criterion is therefore the same as the level of risk required under the s 36(2)(a) refugee criterion. 3. THE AUTHORITY’S DECISION On 18 July 2019, the Authority affirmed the decision of the delegate of the first respondent to refuse to grant the appellant a protection visa. In summary, the Authority was not satisfied that the appellant was owed protection obligations for the purposes of the refugee criterion. The Authority also did not accept that the appellant met the complementary protection criterion for the grant of a protection visa. The Authority considered the submissions, as well as certain new information, presented by the appellant (at [4]-[10]). It is not necessary to repeat all of the detail of the Authority’s decision. For present purposes, it suffices to observe that, before the Authority, the appellant made a number of claims, including that (at [10]):1)several of his family and friends had been killed in Iraq, and that he believed some of these killings were perpetrated by Shia militias;2)whilst working for an international company, the appellant received indirect threats from unknown people (which he believed to be militia or political groups) who requested that he leave the company and join the militia or a political group, and that following these events, he was seized with fear and fled Iraq;3)after leaving Iraq, a further family member was shot; and4)he believes he will be targeted by extremists if returned to Iraq. In response to those claims, the Authority made various factual findings (at [11]-[18]). I will refer to those relevant findings in greater detail shortly. Importantly, while accepting certain of the appellant’s claims including that he had worked for an international company and his claims as to the killings of family and friends, the Authority did not accept that the appellant faces a real chance of harm on account of his faith, his profile, or his or his family’s past experiences in Iraq. At the risk of oversimplification, the Authority found that:1)the appellant was not personally targeted, threatened or harmed by any groups in Iraq, and was not wanted by any group when he left Iraq (at [21]);2)whilst several of the appellant’s family and friends had been injured or killed, the Authority did not accept that these events were linked to the appellant (at [21]);3)since the appellant left Iraq in 2013, the security situation in that country has improved, although there is still intra-group violence which affects the country (at [22]); 4)whilst the appellant fears harm from forcible recruitment by militia and political groups, the “country information before me overwhelmingly indicates recruitment to these groups is on a voluntary basis and while forced recruitment is not unheard of it affects individuals with different profiles to that of the applicant” (at [26]);5)whilst the appellant may obtain difficulties finding employment, this would not threaten his capacity to subsist or otherwise amount to serious harm (at [27]); and6)subject to certain exceptions, the evidence does not indicate that involuntary returnees are not accepted back into Iraq or are otherwise harmed (at [28]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established