FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BMG17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1281
Appeal from: BMG17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 3341 File number(s): VID 1463 of 2018 Judge(s): O'BRYAN J Date of judgment: 16 August 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where Immigration Assessment Authority affirmed decision of delegate refusing application for safe haven enterprise visa – meaning of the word speculation – whether authority failed to consider a claim or integer of a claim – appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(a), (2)(aa) Cases cited: AKH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 47
BIL17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 6
CGA15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 46
Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379
CSO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 260 FCR 134
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo Wei Rong (1997) 191 CLR 559
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476
Sharma v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 256 FCR 1
SZRPT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 24
VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588
Date of hearing: 8 May 2019 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 31 Counsel for the Appellant: Dr A McBeth Solicitor for the Appellant: Wimal & Associates Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms J Lucas Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs ORDERS
VID 1463 of 2018 BETWEEN: BMG17
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
O'BRYAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
16 AUGUST 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
O’BRYAN J:
Introduction
By notice of appeal filed on 20 November 2018, the appellant appeals from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 2 November 2018 in BMG17 v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCCA 3341. The appeal is brought under s 24 of the Federal Court of Australia Act1976 (Cth).
The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. He arrived in Australia by boat in September 2012 and subsequently lodged an application for a permanent Protection (Class XA) visa in August 2013. That application was deemed invalid under s 46A(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) because the appellant entered Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival. On 20 November 2015, the Minister notified the appellant in writing that the…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 1281
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues in the case were whether the IAA failed to properly assess the appellant's claims and whether the characterisation of the assessment as speculative constituted an error in law. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the assessment of the appellant's claims necessarily involved some degree of speculation, as contended by the appellant's counsel, and whether the IAA's conclusion that such speculation was determinative was correct.
The court examined the reasons provided by the IAA and noted that while the assessment of the appellant's claims did involve some degree of speculation, this was not necessarily an error. The court referenced several authorities, including CSO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, to highlight that assessments of refugee and complementary protection criteria inherently involve predictive elements. The court also referred to statements from AKH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to underline that while there must be some speculation in these assessments, the ultimate determination hinges on the reasonably foreseeable future as outlined in principles established in cases such as Chan and Guo. The court concluded that the IAA's characterisation of the assessment as speculative did not amount to an error, as the assessment was still grounded in factual and evidential considerations.
As a result, the court dismissed the appeal, affirming the IAA's decision. The appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal to the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Based on the foregoing, the IAA concluded that the appellant did not meet the requirements of the definition of refugee in s 5H(1) of the Act and therefore did not meet the criterion in s 36(2)(a) (Reasons [39]). For similar reasons, the IAA concluded that there are not substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that the appellant would suffer significant harm as a consequence of being returned to Sri Lanka and that the appellant did not, therefore, meet s 36(2)(aa) (Reasons [50]).Consideration of the appeal The appellant’s appeal is focussed on the following sentence in the IAA’s reasons at [16], noted above:Although the country information before the delegate indicates that the Sri Lankan authorities continue to search for former LTTE members, to assess the likelihood of the Sri Lankan authorities discovering the applicant’s past LTTE involvement is speculation. Counsel for the appellant submitted that, by characterising the assessment of the appellant’s claim (to fear harm) as involving speculation, and by treating that characterisation as determinative, the IAA failed to conduct the assessment required by s 473CC of the Act. It was submitted that the assessment of the refugee and complementary protection criteria in ss 36(2)(a) and (2)(aa) of the Act, which requires application of the “real chance” and “real risk” tests respectively, necessarily involves speculation about the likelihood of the feared events occurring in the future. In that respect, counsel for the appellant relied on the following summary of the applicable principles in CSO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 260 FCR 134 at [23] (CSO15):Both the refugee and complementary protection criteria, insofar as they require a focus on risk of harm (whether for specific reasons or not), require the decision-maker to engage in a predictive and therefore somewhat speculative task about what is likely to happen to a person in the reasonably foreseeable future on return to her or his country of nationality: see Minister forImmigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 277-279 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ); NAHI v Ministerfor Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [13] (Gray, Tamberlin and Lander JJ); Iyer v Minister for Immigration andMulticultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1788 at [27] (Heerey, Moore, Goldberg JJ); SZQXE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 134 ALD 495 at [7] (Flick J). These authorities were considered in CPE15 v Minister forImmigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 591 at [59]-[60]. Counsel for the appellant also relied on the recent statements of the Full Court in AKH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 47 at [48] and [63] (AKH16):[48]…the assessment of whether a person fears persecution on return to her or his country of nationality, must involve speculation about the future, and an assessment of the period of time to look into the future.[63]…As we have indicated above in dealing with the true enquiry, it may lead to error to focus on such notions as ‘speculative’ in this context. However, in considering an assessment of the future, there must be some degree of speculation (as distinct from guesswork) based upon present and past information. For instance, one is speculating in this sense about the future when one is considering and making a finding as to whether further sectarian violence may occur and if so, whether a particular individual is likely to be affected by or caught up in it. However, on the ultimate issue the question always remains that dictated by the principles outlined in Chan and Guo to which we have referred above. The inquiry being fact intensive, and involving assessment of evidence and material which is qualitative and may tend in different directions, it is also possible that different decision-makers may assess the material before them differently. The task for each decision-maker is, relevantly, to determine what she or he is satisfied the reasonably foreseeable future holds for the individual applicant on return to her or his country of nationality, in terms of her or his articulated fear of persecution.