BMG17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BMG17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1281

Appeal from: BMG17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 3341
File number(s): VID 1463 of 2018
Judge(s): O'BRYAN J
Date of judgment: 16 August 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where Immigration Assessment Authority affirmed decision of delegate refusing application for safe haven enterprise visa – meaning of the word speculation – whether authority failed to consider a claim or integer of a claim – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(a), (2)(aa)
Cases cited:

AKH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 47

BIL17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 6

CGA15  v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 46

Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379

CSO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 260 FCR 134

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo Wei Rong (1997) 191 CLR 559

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476

Sharma v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 256 FCR 1

SZRPT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 24

VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588

Date of hearing: 8 May 2019
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 31
Counsel for the Appellant: Dr A McBeth
Solicitor for the Appellant: Wimal & Associates
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms J Lucas
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 1463 of 2018
BETWEEN:

BMG17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

O'BRYAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

16 AUGUST 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

O’BRYAN J:

Introduction

  1. By notice of appeal filed on 20 November 2018, the appellant appeals from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 2 November 2018 in BMG17 v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCCA 3341. The appeal is brought under s 24 of the Federal Court of Australia Act1976 (Cth).

  2. The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. He arrived in Australia by boat in September 2012 and subsequently lodged an application for a permanent Protection (Class XA) visa in August 2013. That application was deemed invalid under s 46A(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) because the appellant entered Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival.  On 20 November 2015, the Minister notified the appellant in writing that the…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1281
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of BMG17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved the appellant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, appealing against the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) to affirm the delegate's refusal of his application for a safe haven enterprise visa. The appellant argued that the IAA erred in characterising the assessment of his claims as speculative and that this led to an improper assessment of the likelihood of him suffering harm if returned to Sri Lanka. The appeal was heard in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.

The central legal issues in the case were whether the IAA failed to properly assess the appellant's claims and whether the characterisation of the assessment as speculative constituted an error in law. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the assessment of the appellant's claims necessarily involved some degree of speculation, as contended by the appellant's counsel, and whether the IAA's conclusion that such speculation was determinative was correct.

The court examined the reasons provided by the IAA and noted that while the assessment of the appellant's claims did involve some degree of speculation, this was not necessarily an error. The court referenced several authorities, including CSO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, to highlight that assessments of refugee and complementary protection criteria inherently involve predictive elements. The court also referred to statements from AKH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to underline that while there must be some speculation in these assessments, the ultimate determination hinges on the reasonably foreseeable future as outlined in principles established in cases such as Chan and Guo. The court concluded that the IAA's characterisation of the assessment as speculative did not amount to an error, as the assessment was still grounded in factual and evidential considerations.

As a result, the court dismissed the appeal, affirming the IAA's decision. The appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal to the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

As the new ground of appeal was not raised before the primary judge, it is unnecessary to refer to the reasons of the primary judge. I record for completeness that no error in the primary judge’s reasons has been shown. I therefore turn to the reasons for decision of the IAA.Reasons for decision of the IAA The IAA summarised the appellant’s claims for protection as follows, about which no complaint is made (Reasons [4]):•He is a citizen of Sri Lanka and is of Tamil ethnicity and Hindu faith.•He was born on 2 March 1992 in Jaffna, Sri Lanka. He grew up in Irupalai, Kopay, Sri Lanka with his parents and seven siblings, four sisters and three brothers. His father was a farmer and his mother a house maker. He used to travel between Jaffna and Kilinochchi where his father worked.•His maternal uncle from Kilinochchi was a member of the LTTE and has been missing since the last part of the war. He assumes he was abducted by the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) because of his involvement with the LTTE and because people in his village told him that. The Criminal Investigation Department (CID) have come to his home and questioned him about his uncle’s whereabouts and threatened him to take him to their camp for questioning on several occasions. Based on his uncle's affiliation with the LTTE, the SLA believes the applicant is connected with the LTTE. He was under strict controls and could not go out after 8pm and if he was picked up he would be heavily questioned and they would be suspicious about what he was doing. Due to his uncle’s membership in the LTTE, this caused the CID to treat him with suspicion. Ever since he left Sri Lanka the CID have come to his home looking for him.•He moved often between Jaffna and Kilinochchi. When the CID or the SLA showed up in Kilinochchi looking for him, he would flee to Jaffna.•When he was living in Kilinochchi he was coerced under duress to join the LTTE at or around March 2007. He fought for a period of over one month with the LTTE and sustained an injury in April 2007 to his left hip after he was struck with a shell fragment. He was treated by LTTE operatives who took him to their medical facility where he stayed at this facility for about 10 to 15 days before he left and returned home. He eventually had the fragment removed from his body on 17 March 2016 in Australia. He has scarring on his left hip.•In or about May 2009 he was detained by the Sri Lankan government in a refugee camp for a period of six months. The camp was in Chettikulam, Vavuniya. The SLA questioned him as to how he sustained his hip injury and he said he was injured in the war fighting for the LTTE under compulsion. The SLA then suspected he was voluntarily involved in the LTTE movement. The SLA suspected he was affiliated with the LTTE or sympathising with their agenda because he lived in a former LTTE controlled area.•He fled Sri Lanka in 2012 because of threats against his life by the SLA and the CID, on the assumption that he was associated with, or a sympathiser of, the LTTE.•He had a telephone conversation with his brother, [redacted], in late 2013 who told him that the SLA had visited him and asked as to his whereabouts and was questioned and threatened. He did not disclose the applicant’s whereabouts. His parents then lodged a complaint with the Sri Lankan Human Rights Commission on the basis that his brother is being persecuted by the SLA and the CID of Sri Lanka because of his brother’s alleged affiliation with the LTTE. His parents have since made arrangements for his brother to flee Sri Lanka and his brother is now living in Malaysia.•As a young Tamil from northern Sri Lanka (Jaffna and Kilinochchi), he is at great risk. The Sri Lankan authorities believe that all Tamils in Sri Lanka are associated with the LTTE. He also has family members who were with the LTTE and he is scared of being sent to prison because he thinks his life will be in danger there. He thinks he will be held in prison because of his background.•He has an injury which will cause the authorities to believe he was fighting for the LTTE.•He left the country illegally and will be detained and punished because of this. He also fled Sri Lanka and asked for asylum here in Australia which will raise further suspicion. The CID will also accuse him of being a LTTE member because he has been away for a long time.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Based on the foregoing, the IAA concluded that the appellant did not meet the requirements of the definition of refugee in s 5H(1) of the Act and therefore did not meet the criterion in s 36(2)(a) (Reasons [39]). For similar reasons, the IAA concluded that there are not substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that the appellant would suffer significant harm as a consequence of being returned to Sri Lanka and that the appellant did not, therefore, meet s 36(2)(aa) (Reasons [50]).Consideration of the appeal The appellant’s appeal is focussed on the following sentence in the IAA’s reasons at [16], noted above:Although the country information before the delegate indicates that the Sri Lankan authorities continue to search for former LTTE members, to assess the likelihood of the Sri Lankan authorities discovering the applicant’s past LTTE involvement is speculation. Counsel for the appellant submitted that, by characterising the assessment of the appellant’s claim (to fear harm) as involving speculation, and by treating that characterisation as determinative, the IAA failed to conduct the assessment required by s 473CC of the Act. It was submitted that the assessment of the refugee and complementary protection criteria in ss 36(2)(a) and (2)(aa) of the Act, which requires application of the “real chance” and “real risk” tests respectively, necessarily involves speculation about the likelihood of the feared events occurring in the future. In that respect, counsel for the appellant relied on the following summary of the applicable principles in CSO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 260 FCR 134 at [23] (CSO15):Both the refugee and complementary protection criteria, insofar as they require a focus on risk of harm (whether for specific reasons or not), require the decision-maker to engage in a predictive and therefore somewhat speculative task about what is likely to happen to a person in the reasonably foreseeable future on return to her or his country of nationality: see Minister forImmigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 277-279 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ); NAHI v Ministerfor Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [13] (Gray, Tamberlin and Lander JJ); Iyer v Minister for Immigration andMulticultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1788 at [27] (Heerey, Moore, Goldberg JJ); SZQXE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 134 ALD 495 at [7] (Flick J). These authorities were considered in CPE15 v Minister forImmigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 591 at [59]-[60]. Counsel for the appellant also relied on the recent statements of the Full Court in AKH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 47 at [48] and [63] (AKH16):[48]…the assessment of whether a person fears persecution on return to her or his country of nationality, must involve speculation about the future, and an assessment of the period of time to look into the future.[63]…As we have indicated above in dealing with the true enquiry, it may lead to error to focus on such notions as ‘speculative’ in this context. However, in considering an assessment of the future, there must be some degree of speculation (as distinct from guesswork) based upon present and past information. For instance, one is speculating in this sense about the future when one is considering and making a finding as to whether further sectarian violence may occur and if so, whether a particular individual is likely to be affected by or caught up in it. However, on the ultimate issue the question always remains that dictated by the principles outlined in Chan and Guo to which we have referred above. The inquiry being fact intensive, and involving assessment of evidence and material which is qualitative and may tend in different directions, it is also possible that different decision-makers may assess the material before them differently. The task for each decision-maker is, relevantly, to determine what she or he is satisfied the reasonably foreseeable future holds for the individual applicant on return to her or his country of nationality, in terms of her or his articulated fear of persecution.