SZRPT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZRPT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 24

Citation: SZRPT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 24
Appeal from: SZRPT v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCCA 398
Parties: SZRPT v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 1143 of 2013
Judge: KATZMANN J
Date of judgment: 3 February 2014
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Refugees – application for protection visa – jurisdictional error – procedural fairness – bias ‑ whether tribunal erred by failing to seek further information – whether findings of fact not supported by evidence amounted to or resulted in jurisdictional error  ‑ Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 424(1), 424A, 427(1)(d), 430(1).
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1)(d)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 424(1), 424A, 427(1)(d), 430(1)
Cases cited: Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321
Commissioner of Taxation v Pham (2013) 60 AAR 264; [2013] FCA 579
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 259 ALR 429; [2009] HCA 39
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNPG (2010 115 ALD 303; [2010] FCAFC 51
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2011) 206 CLR 323
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12; [2004 HCA 32
Minister for Immigration v Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507
Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship; Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 244 CLR 144
Plaintiff S157 v The Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476
SFGB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 77 ALD 402; [2003] FCAFC 231
SLMB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 129
WAJS v Minister for Immigration and Indigenous and Multicultural Affairs [2004] FCAFC 139
Date of hearing: 22 November 2013
Date of last submissions: 6 December 2013
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 50
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person.
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr Andras Markus of Australian Government Solicitor
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting appearance

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1143 of 2013

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZRPT
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

KATZMANN J

DATE OF ORDER:

3 FEBRUARY 2014

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the first respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Border Protection”.

2.The appeal be dismissed.

3.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1143 of 2013

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF…
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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 24
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SZRPT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involves an appellant who challenged a decision of the tribunal regarding her application for a protection visa. The Federal Circuit Court was tasked with determining whether the tribunal had erred in its handling of the application, specifically in relation to procedural fairness and potential bias. The appellant alleged two main issues: first, that she was not given the opportunity to respond to adverse evidence concerning her credibility, and second, that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias against her. The court needed to assess the validity of these claims and whether they warranted any legal remedy.

The court examined the first complaint, which centered around the appellant's contention that she was not given the opportunity to respond to adverse credibility evidence. The primary judge considered the tribunal's obligations under the Migration Act 1958 and found that the tribunal did not err by failing to invite the appellant to comment on certain pieces of information. The judge held that the tribunal was not required to notify the appellant of information that did not involve a rejection or denial of her claims. Furthermore, the court observed that the tribunal had, in fact, provided the appellant with the opportunity to address and explain the inconsistencies in her evidence, including the one inconsistency she particularly highlighted. The primary judge dismissed the complaint, noting that the tribunal had already given the appellant the chance to respond to the inconsistencies, and that any further notification would not have changed the outcome.

Regarding the second complaint, the court assessed whether the tribunal had made any errors that amounted to or resulted in a jurisdictional error. The tribunal had made certain factual errors, such as incorrectly stating the appellant's age at the time of her baptism. However, the court found that these errors were immaterial and did not impact the tribunal's consideration of the appellant's claim. The primary judge referenced previous cases to underscore that a misunderstanding of evidence, even if it leads to factual errors, does not constitute jurisdictional error unless it affects the tribunal's consideration of the applicant's claim. The court concluded that the tribunal's errors did not meet this threshold.

The court ultimately dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's complaints did not establish any grounds for legal intervention. The tribunal's decision was upheld, and the court ordered that the name of the respondent be amended to reflect the current Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. Additionally, the court ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The name of the first respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Border Protection”.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The application to the court below contained two grounds. Both grounds alleged (in fact or in substance) a denial of procedural fairness. First, the appellant complained that she had been denied the chance to respond to adverse evidence concerning her credibility (“the first complaint”). Secondly, the appellant complained that there was a reasonable apprehension that the tribunal was biased against her (“the second complaint”). The appeal raises different issues. I will come to them in due course.The judgment of the Federal Circuit Court The primary judge took a very broad view of the allegation made in the first complaint. No matter how it was characterised, however, he considered that the tribunal committed no error. His Honour said that there was no obligation on the tribunal to invite the appellant to comment on information she had provided the tribunal or on country information, referring to s 424A(3) of the Act. Nor, his Honour continued, was the tribunal obliged to invite the appellant to comment on information gleaned from the pastor of the Padstow Chinese Congregational Church with whom the tribunal communicated, as the information did not involve a rejection or denial of her claims or undermine them. And the tribunal’s adverse views about the appellant’s evidence, his Honour noted, did not constitute “information” for the purposes of s 424A(1) of the Act so as to engage the tribunal’s obligations. Furthermore, his Honour said that the tribunal’s account of the hearing which appears in the decision record and which was the only evidence before the court about what had transpired before the tribunal, showed that the appellant had been given the opportunity to address and explain the various inconsistencies. The focus of this complaint appears to be on one inconsistency in particular. That was an inconsistency in the appellant’s evidence about the number of people with whom she claimed to have been detained upon her arrest. His Honour noted that the tribunal’s decision record disclosed that the tribunal had invited the appellant to comment on the inconsistency and that, at her request, the member had also listened to the audio recording of the hearing, which, he said, confirmed the inconsistency he had put to her. Consequently, his Honour interpreted the complaint (or this aspect of it) as a failure by the tribunal to give the appellant the opportunity to further examine the evidence on which the tribunal relied to conclude that she was not a witness of truth. The primary judge dismissed the complaint for two reasons. First, his Honour noted that this particular inconsistency was only one of a number of inconsistencies on which the tribunal’s adverse credibility finding was based. Secondly, and more importantly, his Honour said that it was difficult to see what could be achieved by the tribunal notifying the appellant that it had listened to the audio recording and that it confirmed its understanding of the evidence. His Honour observed that an affidavit filed by the appellant disclosed that she was in possession of the recording. His Honour noted that it was open to her to put that evidence before the court but that she had not done so.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It is convenient at this point to reproduce in full the passage in para 95 of the tribunal’s decision in which the errors were found to have been made:The evidence she gave about her baptism was vague and lacked much detail. She stated that she undertook no preparation for the ceremony yet, because it is a rite of initiation into the Christian church, some form of preparation by an adult candidate will be required. She said that she had been given a baptism certificate and that it is at her parent’s (sic) home, but, despite all the years she had been in Australia and the importance to her protection visa claim of establishing that she was a member of a Christian church in China, she has not had her baptism certificate sent to her in Australia. (Emphasis added.) At the time she claimed to have been baptised, the appellant was not a young child. She was only a few months shy of her 18th birthday. The Minister submitted that the tribunal’s reference to “an adult candidate” was “clearly” intended to distinguish between “grown-ups” and young children and whether the appellant had reached the age of majority was neither here nor there. Consequently, the Minister contended that his Honour’s finding of error was “both unnecessary and irrelevant”. There is force in this submission. The tribunal was certainly aware of the appellant’s age. There is no particular reason why in this passage it should have been referring to the legal age of adulthood. Even so, if the tribunal did err as to the appellant’s age at the time of her alleged baptism, the error was immaterial. The primary judge referred to numerous decisions of this court and the High Court in his analysis. He emphasised in particular the observations of North and Lander JJ in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNPG (2010 115 ALD 303; [2010] FCAFC 51 at [27]‑[28] (with which I agreed at [35]) to the effect that an error of fact based on a misunderstanding of evidence would not give rise to jurisdictional error unless it meant that the tribunal had not considered an applicant’s claim. That is certainly not the case here. There is no doubt that the tribunal considered the appellant’s claim. At worst, the tribunal either overlooked or mistook the appellant’s age. As the primary judge held, that would not amount to jurisdictional error. At first blush, the second error is more troubling. In Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 (“Bond”) at 367 Deane J said that if a statutory tribunal is required to act judicially, it must act “rationally and reasonably”. He continued:When the process of decision-making is disclosed, there will be a discernible breach of the duty if findings of fact upon which a decision is based are unsupported by probative material and if inferences of fact upon which such a decision is based cannot reasonably be drawn from such findings of fact. Breach of a duty to act judicially constitutes an error of law which will vitiate the decision.