Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2016] FCA 575

Appeal from: Singh v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 257
File number: QUD 157 of 2016
Judge: EDELMAN J
Date of judgment: 23 May 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION – finding by Federal Circuit Court of errors in Migration Review Tribunal’s factual findings – whether Tribunal made factual errors – whether any factual errors would be jurisdictional errors
Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 13(2)(d)

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 5(2)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 27

Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) s 50(4)

Legislation Act 2003 (Cth) s 13(1)(a)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5F, 5F(3), 31, 65

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 1.15A, 1.15A(3)(d)(iii), 1.15A(3)(d)(iv), 2.03, 2.03A, 2.03AA; Sch 2, cll 820.21, 820.211(2)(a)

Cases cited:

Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin [1990] HCA 21; (1990) 170 CLR 1

CDJ v VAJ (No 2) [1998] HCA 76; (1998) 197 CLR 172

Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd [1996] HCA 36; (1996) 186 CLR 389

Freeman v National Australia Bank Ltd [2003] FCAFC 200

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNPG [2010] FCAFC 51

Morgan Research Centre Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue [2001] HCA 49; (2001) 207 CLR 72

Osland v Secretary to the Department of Justice [2010] HCA 24; (2010) 241 CLR 320

Shaw v Yarranova Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 171

SFGB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 231; (2003) 77 ALD 402

SZRPT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 2

The Pilbara Infrastructure Pty Ltd v Economic Regulation Authority [2014] WASC 346

Waensila v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 32

Waterford v Commonwealth [1987] HCA 25; (1987) 163 CLR 54

S Gageler “The Master of Words: Who Chooses Statutory Meaning?” in A Connolly and D Stewart (eds) Public Law in the Age of Statutes: Essays in Honour of Dennis Pearce (Federation Press, Sydney, 2015)

Date of hearing: 23 May 2016
Registry: Queensland
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 66
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr B McGlade
Solicitor for the Appellant: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: The First Respondent appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

QUD 157 of 2016
BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Appellant

AND:

INDERJIT SINGH

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

EDELMAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

23 MAY 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia in proceeding no BRG 615 of 2015 made on 4 February 2016 be set aside and in lieu thereof order that:

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 575
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh, the Federal Court of Australia was called upon to review a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia which had set aside a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal. The central issue in dispute was whether the Tribunal had made any factual errors in its assessment of the applicant's visa application, and if so, whether such errors were of a jurisdictional nature. The applicant, Mr Singh, sought to adduce new evidence in support of his appeal, which the Court had to consider in light of statutory provisions and existing jurisprudence.

The legal issues before the court involved determining whether the Tribunal's factual findings were erroneous and, if so, whether these errors were jurisdictional. The court had to consider the criteria for admitting new evidence on appeal, particularly under section 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, and whether the new evidence could impact the outcome of the appeal. The court also needed to examine whether the primary judge had correctly interpreted the evidence and whether the Tribunal's errors, if any, were material to the decision.

In its reasoning, the court found that the primary judge had properly considered the evidence and identified inconsistencies in the Tribunal's findings. However, the court concluded that the Tribunal had not made any factual errors in interpreting the evidence. The court further determined that any such errors, if present, would not have been jurisdictional. The court also held that the new evidence Mr Singh sought to present was inadmissible because it did not relate to the grounds of appeal and post-dated the relevant application period. The court found that the appeal against the Federal Circuit Court's decision was well-founded, leading to the setting aside of the Circuit Court's orders and the dismissal of Mr Singh's application.

The final orders of the court were to allow the appeal, set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court, and dismiss Mr Singh's application to that court. Additionally, the court ordered that Mr Singh pay the appellant's costs of the Federal Circuit Court proceeding and the current appeal, to be taxed if not agreed. These orders reflect the court's determination on the jurisdictional nature of the alleged errors and the inadmissibility of the new evidence.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia in proceeding no BRG 615 of 2015 made on 4 February 2016 be set aside and in lieu thereof order that:

(a) the first respondent’s application to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia filed on 2 July 2015 be dismissed;

(b) the first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia proceeding no BRG 615 of 2015 to be taxed if not agreed.

3. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of this proceeding to be taxed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 8 November 2013, the delegate refused Mr Singh's visa application on the basis that the applicant and the sponsor were not in a spousal relationship at the time of the application or thereafter, and therefore did not meet the requirements of the Migration Regulations. Mr Singh applied to the Migration Review Tribunal for a review of the delegate's decision. The Tribunal conducted the review on 5 June 2015, assessing whether Mr Singh was in a spousal relationship with his sponsor by considering the financial aspects, social aspects, the nature of the commitment, and the nature of the household. The Tribunal found that Mr Singh had not established the requirements for a spousal relationship at the date of his application, 26 April 2012. The Tribunal concluded that their relationship lacked the commitment expected of persons in a married relationship, with Mr Singh's concern for his visa status being a significant motivation in the timing of the marriage.

Mr Singh's application to the Migration Review Tribunal for a review of the delegate's decision was heard on 5 June 2015. Following the Tribunal's decision, Mr Singh applied to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for a review of the Tribunal's decision. The Federal Circuit Court of Australia found errors in the Tribunal's factual findings and set aside the Tribunal's decision. Mr Singh then appealed to the High Court against the Federal Circuit Court's decision. The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court, and dismissed Mr Singh's application to the Federal Circuit Court.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Grounds 1(b), 1(c), 3 and 4 are also established. If there had been any factual error by the Tribunal as found by the primary judge, that factual error would not have been a jurisdictional error.Conclusion and the new evidence The primary judge carefully considered the Tribunal’s decision, and properly allowed considerable latitude for the fact that Mr Singh was not represented. The primary judge focused on the evidence and identified an inconsistency in the evidence concerning the two C2B letters before the Tribunal which he considered had led the Tribunal into error. However, I conclude that the Tribunal did not erroneously interpret the C2B letters and did not commit any error in its findings of fact. Further, any such error would not have been a jurisdictional error. I have addressed above the new evidence of the fourth C2B letter that Mr Singh sought to tender on this appeal. The other, wider ranging, evidence which Mr Singh sought to adduce on this appeal is also inadmissible. Section 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) provides a discretion for the court to receive further evidence on an appeal. The discretion is exercised in the interests of justice: CDJ v VAJ (No 2) [1998] HCA 76; (1998) 197 CLR 172, 202 [111] (McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ). Two relevant considerations are whether (i) the evidence could not with reasonable diligence have been adduced at the hearing below, and (ii) the likelihood that the result would be any different, it often being the case that the evidence will need to be potentially cogent: Shaw v Yarranova Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 171 [59] (the Court); Freeman v National Australia Bank Ltd [2003] FCAFC 200 [57] (the Court). I also take into account the fact that Mr Singh is an unrepresented litigant, and that some of the new evidence which he sought to rely upon involved matters that he said that he had provided to his representative prior to the Tribunal hearing. Nevertheless, I do not consider that the additional evidence is admissible for three reasons. First, this appeal is concerned only with whether the primary judge erred in relation to his conclusions about factual errors concerning the date when Mr Singh commenced cohabitation with his sponsor. I cannot see what notice of contention, or ground of cross-appeal, could reasonably be formulated which would make these new matters of evidence relevant to this appeal. Some of Mr Singh’s new evidence was directed to reagitating matters decided by the Tribunal. Other matters concerned evidence which post-dated his application as I explain below. None of the new evidence was concerned with identifying any error in the primary judge’s reasoning that would have allowed the appeal to be dismissed. Secondly, and in any event, much of the evidence was concerned with matters concerning Mr Singh’s relationship with his sponsor which post-dated 26 April 2012. That was the date of Mr Singh’s application. As I have explained, the Tribunal found that Mr Singh had not established the requirements for a spousal relationship at that date. Therefore, it did not need to consider whether the spousal relationship arose later. The new evidence threw very little light on the circumstances surrounding Mr Singh’s relationship with the sponsor at the date of application.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 8 November 2013, the delegate refused Mr Singh’s visa application. The delegate was not satisfied that the applicant and the sponsor were in a spousal relationship at the time of the application (on 26 April 2012) or thereafter, and therefore did not meet the requirements of the Migration Regulations. Mr Singh applied to the Tribunal for a review of the delegate’s decision.The decision of the Tribunal On 5 June 2015, the Tribunal conducted the review of the delegate’s decision to refuse to grant the visa. In assessing whether Mr Singh was in a spousal relationship with his sponsor, the Tribunal considered (i) the financial aspects of the relationship, (ii) the social aspects of the relationship, (iii) the nature of the commitment that Mr Singh and his sponsor had to each other, and (iv) the nature of the household.The financial and social aspects of the relationship and the parties’ commitment to each other As to the financial aspects of the relationship, the Tribunal observed that there was very limited evidence of joint financial arrangements or financial commitment between the parties, or of mingling of their financial affairs at the time of the application. The Tribunal considered a joint ANZ bank account and evidence concerning the account which was led by Mr Singh. The Tribunal also considered the purchase of a number of items (motor vehicle, television set and so on) by Mr Singh for his sponsor, after the application. As to the social aspects of the relationship, the Tribunal considered statements and photos provided by Mr Singh and his sponsor. The Tribunal concluded that the parties engaged in joint social activities, represented themselves to other people as being in a relationship, and that they were recognised as such by their friends. As to the nature of Mr Singh’s and his sponsor’s commitment to each other, the Tribunal considered Mr Singh’s evidence that he had known his sponsor from November 2011, started a relationship in January 2012, and married in April 2012. The Tribunal explained Mr Singh’s evidence that his father had cancelled the loan for his studies and Mr Singh’s sponsor had told him that he could stay in Australia if they got married. The Tribunal also considered Mr Singh’s evidence that (i) he was proud of his marriage and that his family was happy with the marriage, (ii) that he loved the sponsor a lot, and (iii) that his father had enough money for him to have extended his student visa for six months. The Tribunal also put to Mr Singh a record of a phone call to the Department from his sponsor on 12 February 2014:Stated that [Mr Singh] and herself married so that he could receive an Australian visa [but] they have broken up and [Mr Singh] is now making her life difficult. She wished to provide more information about the relationship. I explained the dob in line and GFU – call not suitable for either. In considering all of these matters concerning the nature of Mr Singh’s and his sponsor’s commitment to each other, the Tribunal concluded that their relationship lacked the commitment which would be expected of persons in a married relationship. The relationship had developed over a short period of time. Mr Singh’s concern for his visa status was a significant motivation in the timing of the marriage.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge had identified an inconsistency in the evidence concerning two C2B letters before the Tribunal, which led to the conclusion that the Tribunal had made an error. However, the court found that the Tribunal did not erroneously interpret the C2B letters and did not commit any factual errors. The court applied the principles set out in CDJ v VAJ (No 2) and other authorities to determine whether the new evidence presented by Mr Singh should be admitted. The court concluded that the new evidence was not admissible as it did not address the primary judge's conclusions about factual errors, involved matters that post-dated the application, and did not provide notice of contention relevant to the appeal. The court held that even if there had been any factual errors by the Tribunal, they would not constitute jurisdictional errors as they did not affect the outcome of the decision. The binding legal principle established by this decision is that factual errors made by the Migration Review Tribunal in a visa application review do not constitute jurisdictional errors if they do not affect the outcome of the decision.