Commissioner of Taxation v Pham

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Commissioner of Taxation v Pham [2013] FCA 579

Citation: Commissioner of Taxation v Pham [2013] FCA 579
Parties: COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION v VAN QUAN PHAM, MAI THANH PHAM and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 436 of 2013
Judge: KATZMANN J
Date of judgment: 13 June 2013
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – judicial review –Administrative Appeals Tribunal granted non-publication order – application by Commissioner to quash order – whether discretion to grant order should be exercised when pending criminal proceedings related to the same subject matter – whether failed to take into account relevant considerations or took into account irrelevant considerations – whether Tribunal failed to take into account the applicants’ rights to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination – whether Tribunal required to consider whether order would prevent or hinder the Commissioner and officers of the ATO from performing their statutory obligations and if so, whether Tribunal failed to do so – whether no evidence to justify findings that applicants intended to adduce evidence which would tend to incriminate them, that the right to remain silent and the privilege against self incrimination would be effectively removed and that the defence in the criminal proceedings would be compromised – whether Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by making non-disclosure order – consideration of prejudice to applicant – jurisdictional error – no evidence – findings of fact not supported by the evidence.
Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 35, 35(2)(b)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 128
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) Pt IVC, Sch 1 Div 355
Cases cited:

Anderson v Director-General of the Department of Environment and Climate Change (2008) 163 LGERA 400; [2008] NSWCA 337
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v PTLZ (2008) 48 AAR 559; [2008] FCAFC 164
Buck v Bavone (1976) 135 CLR 110
Brown v Federal Commissioner [2001] FCA 276; 47 ATR 143
Caratti v Federal Commissioner (1999) 42 ATR 714; [1999] FCA 1296
Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280
HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 390
John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd v Police Tribunal of New South Wales (1986) 5 NSWLR 465
Khan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1987) 14 ALD 291

Logwon Pty Limited v Warringah Shire Council (1993) 33 NSWLR 13

McMahon v Gould (1982) 7 ACLR 202
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
National Companies & Securities Commission v Bankers Trust Australia Ltd 24 FCR 217
Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 152 CLR 328
R v Director of Serious Fraud Office; ex parte Smith [1993] AC 1
Re Applicant QT (2004) 81 ALD 473
Reece v Webber (2011) 192 FCR 254
Reid v Howard (1995) 184 CLR 1 Ministerfor Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24
SFGB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 579
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Commissioner of Taxation v Pham, the Federal Court was tasked with reviewing a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The Phams, Mr and Mrs, were facing criminal charges related to tax evasion and money laundering, and they sought a non-publication order from the AAT to prevent the disclosure of evidence from their tax review proceedings. This was to protect their rights to silence in the criminal proceedings. The Commissioner of Taxation argued that the AAT erred in making the non-publication order without considering certain relevant factors.

The court had to decide whether the AAT had failed to take into account relevant considerations when it made the non-publication order. The Commissioner argued that the AAT did not consider that the Phams could invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in the AAT proceedings, and that the order could hinder the Commissioner's ability to perform his statutory functions. The court found that the AAT had indeed failed to take into account these relevant considerations, leading to a jurisdictional error. Furthermore, the court found that the AAT had made findings without any evidence to support them, which was another ground for quashing the decision.

The court quashed the AAT's decision and remitted the matter back to the AAT for reconsideration. The court emphasised that on any redetermination, the AAT would need to consider the application and significance of the amendments to the Criminal Procedure Act. The Commissioner agreed to pay the Phams' costs. The court concluded that the AAT's errors could have affected the outcome, and therefore, it was not appropriate to exercise discretion to refuse relief.

Background

Background to the litigation

This application is concerned with the scope of the power to make non-publication orders conferred on the Administrative Appeals Tribunal by s 35(2)(b) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (“AAT Act”). The questions raised on the application arise in the context of a review of decisions made by the Commissioner of Taxation when the taxpayers seeking the review are facing criminal charges based on the same facts and when the hearing of the review is to be conducted in private.Background After an audit of their taxation affairs the Commissioner concluded that Mr and Mrs Pham had deliberately understated their taxable income in four financial years. Consequently, the Commissioner issued them with “notices of amended assessment” for each of those years together with “notices of assessment of shortfall penalty”. Mr and Mrs Pham objected to the assessments, but on 14 September 2012 the Commissioner disallowed all their objections. The Phams then sought review of the Commissioner’s decisions in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal pursuant to Pt IVC of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (“Administration Act”). Before the applications for review came on for hearing, Mr and Mrs Pham were committed to stand trial in the District Court of New South Wales on charges of obtaining a financial advantage by deception, contrary to s 134.2(1) of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth). The charges arise out of the Phams’ alleged involvement in a money laundering scheme. It is common ground that there is a substantial overlap between the facts giving rise to the charges and the “taxable facts” of the impugned taxation assessments, that is to say the facts that disclose a taxable income (Bailey v Federal Commissioner (1977) 136 CLR 214 at 217). Both the impugned taxation assessments and the criminal charges are concerned with the Phams’ roles in a company, D & S Clothing Manufacturers Pty Ltd (“D & S Clothing”), of which they were the sole directors and shareholders. According to a summary of the Crown case prepared by the Australian Federal Police, Mr and Mrs Pham were involved with the promoters of a false invoicing money laundering scheme which allowed legitimate business owners to make subcontracting deductions for work that did not take place. The Crown alleges that the scheme was devised for the sole purpose of facilitating the avoidance of tax. It claims that Mr and Mrs Pham made false declarations on the tax returns for D & S Clothing for the financial years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 by claiming income tax deductions and GST input tax credits on account of non-existent subcontracting expenses. It alleges that by those false declarations the Phams have defrauded the Commissioner of more than $2.2 million in tax. The subcontractors (so-called) are alleged to be “shell companies” used to channel profits from D & S Clothing to the Phams. In view of the pending criminal trial, Mr and Mrs Pham applied for orders that the Tribunal hearing take place in private, that the Tribunal not publish any of the evidence or documents lodged with the Tribunal or publish in its reasons for decision either their names or the names of their witnesses. The Phams did not suggest that they had any apprehension that the Commissioner might attempt to improperly publicise the Tribunal proceedings. Rather, they claimed that the orders were necessary to protect their rights to silence in the criminal proceedings. Their position was that, absent a prohibition or restriction on the publication of evidence in particular, their rights to remain silent would be “negated” because the Commissioner could pass on any information they might disclose to the Director of Public Prosecutions (“DPP”).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Tribunal’s summary did not accurately reflect the reasoning in Applicant QT but that is really beside the point. The Tribunal might also have expressed itself more clearly. Nevertheless, in my view, its reference in paragraph 24 to “difficulties” should not be read in such a narrow way as to pick up only or, indeed, at all (having regard to the way the case was argued), the reference to the difficulties of the Commissioner in preparing his case. The statement must be read in the context of the whole of the reasons as well as the submissions of the parties, and in accordance with the principles discussed in Wu Shan Liang and Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280 (at 287), that is, without concern for looseness of language or “unhappy phrasing”. In my view, on a fair reading of the Tribunal’s reasons, the statement that giving greater weight to the Phams’ interests “might cause [the Commissioner] difficulties” was intended to capture the difficulties a non-publication order might create for the Commissioner in carrying out his functions and responsibilities, including using the evidence in the performance of his duties. Consequently, I am not persuaded that the Tribunal failed to take into account that “the effect of the order sought was to prevent the Commissioner and officers of the Australian Taxation Office from performing their statutory obligations and related functions under the tax laws, or … to hinder their exercise”. Whether the Tribunal gave that factor sufficient weight is another matter (about which I express no opinion), but it is not a matter susceptible to review in an application of this nature.The no evidence ground That leaves the no evidence ground. This was the real substance of the Commissioner’s case. In paragraphs 12(a) to (d) of his statement of claim the Commissioner alleged that there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision because the Tribunal based its decision on certain facts that “did not exist”. In substance the allegation is that there was no evidence to support certain factual findings or assumptions and that the Tribunal based its decision on pure speculation or surmise. Those findings or assumptions were that:(a)the Phams intended to adduce evidence on their applications which would tend to incriminate them or give rise to such a risk;(b)if the order sought was not made, then the Phams intended to or would claim that evidence they intended to adduce in the proceedings would tend to incriminate them; (c)the Phams’ right to remain silent and their privilege against self-incrimination would effectively be removed by disclosures they might make in the civil proceedings in the Tribunal; and(d)the Phams would be prevented from properly pursuing the civil action in the Tribunal unless they compromised aspects of their defence in the criminal proceedings. Mr and Mrs Pham did not take issue with the Commissioner’s contention that these matters were either found or assumed. But as I said earlier, I can find no indication in the reasons for decision that the Tribunal took into account the proposition advanced in (b) above (which I would observe is inconsistent with the Commissioner’s claim that the Tribunal did not take into account the fact that the Phams could invoke the privilege against self-incrimination). For this reason I do not accept that the Tribunal made any such finding or assumption. Otherwise I accept that the Tribunal either expressly or impliedly made the relevant findings (set out in (a), (c) and (d) above) or proceeded on the basis of an assumption to the effect of that which was alleged.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Yet, the breadth of the order is such that the Phams’ concession may well be warranted. If the order is justified, then there is no reason why it should have extended beyond the conclusion of the criminal proceedings. I doubt that the inclusion of the words “until further order” is sufficient answer to this concern. In the light of the parties’ agreement, however, it is unnecessary to reach a concluded view on this question. I would simply discharge that part of the order that refers to disclosure. Having regard to the conclusions I have reached on the other grounds, the whole of the order must in any event be discharged.Conclusion The Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in failing to take into account that Mr and Mrs Pham were not compelled to answer questions or produce documents in the Pt IVC proceedings that could incriminate them, but could invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. It also fell into jurisdictional error by finding, in the absence of any evidence, that aspects of the Phams’ defence would be compromised unless a non-publication order were made. For these reasons the Tribunal’s decision should be quashed and the matter remitted to the Tribunal for determination according to law. I should point out that on any redetermination it will be necessary for the Tribunal to consider the application and significance of the amendments to the Criminal Procedure Act. Mr O’Brien urged that, if I were to find jurisdictional error, I should nevertheless exercise my discretion to refuse relief. I am not disposed to do so as I am not satisfied that the errors could not have affected the outcome (Peko-Wallsend at 40). I note the agreement between the parties that the Commissioner will pay the Phams’ costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The analogy with the stay cases is an imperfect one. The statutory task does not necessarily involve the same considerations. An irrelevant consideration in this context is one the decision-maker is obliged to disregard. Here, the Phams had argued (both orally and in writing) that the onus of proof in the Pt IVC proceedings could only be discharged if they were able to give evidence and they were not able to give evidence if to do so would effectively negate their rights to silence in the criminal proceedings. As s 35 requires the Tribunal to “pay due regard to any reasons given to [it]” in support of a non-publication order, it cannot be said any of the matters referred to by the Tribunal was irrelevant. Whether or not the Tribunal may have come to an erroneous conclusion about their impact is another question, but that is not a question for this court. The question of whether there is any evidence to support the impugned findings is the subject of a separate ground of review to which I will come in due course.Did the Tribunal fail to take into account relevant considerations? The Commissioner pleaded that the Tribunal’s decision was an improper exercise of its powers under s 35(2)(b) because it failed to take into account the following relevant considerations:(a)there was no evidence before the Tribunal that any evidence that the [Phams] intended to adduce on their applications to the Tribunal would tend to incriminate them, or give rise to a risk of self-incrimination;(b)the [Phams’] submission to the Tribunal was that the evidence that [they] intended to adduce in the Tribunal proceedings was wholly exculpatory and therefore there was (on [their own] case) no basis for any fear that evidence adduced [by them] would or might tend to incriminate them;(c)the [Phams] were entitled to claim the privilege against self-incrimination at any stage of the Tribunal proceedings and the failure to make the order sought would not in any way remove the [Phams’] right to silence or give rise to a risk or reasonable fear of self-incrimination; (d)the effect of the order sought would be to allow the [Phams] to give evidence in the Tribunal proceedings as if a certificate under s 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) had been given in circumstances where the Evidence Act does not apply to proceedings in the Tribunal and the AAT Act does not contain a provision similar or equivalent to s 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth);(e)the effect of the order sought was to prevent or hinder the [Commissioner] and his officers of the Australian Taxation Office from performing their statutory obligations and related functions under the tax laws including but not limited to:(i)making assessments of tax based on the information in the possession of the Commissioner;(ii)making referrals to the Australian Federal Police or the Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) for the investigation or prosecution of tax related offences;(iii)providing assistance to the Australian Federal Police or the Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) in relation to the investigation or prosecution of tax related offences;(iv)seeking advice from the Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) in relation to whether a referral ought to be made to the Australian Federal Police for the investigation of tax offences.