SZTPM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTPM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 813

Citation: SZTPM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 813
Appeal from: SZTPM v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 754
Parties: SZTPM v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 285 of 2015
Judge: PERRY J
Date of judgment: 11 August 2015
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal against Federal Circuit Court decision refusing application for judicial review of decision by Refugee Review Tribunal – where Tribunal affirmed decision not to grant the appellant a protection visa –whether Tribunal properly applied “real chance” test in assessing whether appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution – whether Tribunal required to assess alternative scenario on assumption that its findings were wrong – whether Tribunal’s decision unreasonable or irrational – observations on the desirability of the Tribunal’s usual practice of summarising the Tribunal hearing in its reasons – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 36.75
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 65, 415, 430

Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954)
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967)  

Cases cited: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo [1997] HCA 22; (1997) 191 CLR 559
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam [1999] FCA 719; (1999) 93 FCR 220
Prashar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1573; (2001) 115 FCR 197
SZRPT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 24
SZTPM v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 754
Date of hearing: 5 August 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 36
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant did not appear
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms F Taah of Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent entered a submitting appearance

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 285 of 2015

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SZTPM
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 AUGUST 2015

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 285 of 2015

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SZTPM
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 813
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, a national of Nepal, sought a protection visa from Australia on the basis of her fear of persecution if she were to return to her home country due to her disassociation from the Maoist Party. After her application was refused by the Delegate, the appellant appealed to the Refugee Review Tribunal, which affirmed the Delegate's decision. The appellant then sought judicial review of the Tribunal's decision in the Federal Circuit Court, which was also unsuccessful. The appellant then appealed to the Federal Court.

The central issue before the court was whether the Tribunal properly applied the "real chance" test in assessing whether the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution. The appellant argued that the Tribunal failed to properly apply the test and therefore made a jurisdictional error. The appellant also argued that the Tribunal was required to assess an alternative scenario on the assumption that its findings were wrong, and that its decision was unreasonable or irrational. The court rejected these arguments.

The court found that the Tribunal's explanation and application of the "real chance" test was correct and that there was no error in its application to the appellant's claims. The court also found that there was no requirement for the Tribunal to assess an alternative scenario and that its decision was not unreasonable or irrational. The court noted that the Tribunal's usual practice of summarising the Tribunal hearing in its reasons was desirable.

The appeal was dismissed and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In the circumstances, while no formal application was made, the respondent pressed for the appeal to be dismissed (see r 36.75, Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (FCR)). I considered in the circumstances which I have outlined, that it was appropriate for the appeal to proceed in the appellant’s absence. In this regard, I have taken into account that under r 36.75, FCR, where a hearing proceeds in a party’s absence and an order is made, the party who was absent may apply to the Court for an order setting aside or varying the order, and for the further conduct of the hearing. I note that, in considering any such application, the Court will consider whether an acceptable explanation has been given for the party’s absence when the matter was called on and the strength of that party’s case on the appeal if the order dismissing the appeal were set aside: see by analogy Prashar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1573; (2001) 115 FCR 197 at 199 [11] (Katz J (with whose reasons Branson and Mansfield JJ agreed)).3. BACKGROUND3.1 The appellant’s application for a protection visa The appellant left the country of her nationality, Nepal, on 15 September 2010. The appellant alleges that she was abducted by the Maoists at 13 years of age and was forced to become a member of the Maoist Party. She claimed that she remained forcibly involved with the Maoists for seven years until her departure for Australia in 2010. The appellant applied for a protection visa on 3 May 2012 on the basis of her alleged fear of physical and mental harm from the Maoists if she returned to Nepal by reason of her disassociation from the Maoist Party, and by society and the other side for her prior association with the Maoists. Her application for a protection visa was refused by the Delegate on 23 August 2012 on the basis that the Delegate had serious concerns as to the appellant’s credibility and the truth of her claims.3.2 The decision of the Tribunal The appellant applied to the Tribunal for review of the Delegate’s decision on 27 September 2012. The Tribunal listened to the tape of an interview conducted by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (the Department) with the appellant on 20 August 2012. The appellant also appeared before the Tribunal on 14 October 2012 to give evidence and present arguments. Her claims can be summarised as follows.(1)The appellant was abducted by the Maoists in 2003 and forced to become a Maoist when she was 13 years old. She was unable to leave the Maoists until she secretly left for Australia in September 2010. (2)The appellant will be physically and mentally harmed by society, the government, the administration and the Maoists if returned to Nepal and may be subject to the death penalty because she disassociated from the Maoists without their permission. (3)As the appellant no longer wants to be part of the Maoist Party or involved with them, they will harm her. (4)The appellant has been listed as an enemy by the Maoists and if returned to Nepal will have no freedom and live in constant fear.(5)The appellant will be harmed by the other side or society because of her former Maoist association.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Her application for a protection visa was refused by the Delegate on 23 August 2012 on the basis that the Delegate had serious concerns as to the appellant’s credibility and the truth of her claims.3.2 The decision of the Tribunal The appellant applied to the Tribunal for review of the Delegate’s decision on 27 September 2012. The Tribunal listened to the tape of an interview conducted by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (the Department) with the appellant on 20 August 2012. The appellant also appeared before the Tribunal on 14 October 2012 to give evidence and present arguments. Her claims can be summarised as follows.(1)The appellant was abducted by the Maoists in 2003 and forced to become a Maoist when she was 13 years old. She was unable to leave the Maoists until she secretly left for Australia in September 2010. (2)The appellant will be physically and mentally harmed by society, the government, the administration and the Maoists if returned to Nepal and may be subject to the death penalty because she disassociated from the Maoists without their permission. (3)As the appellant no longer wants to be part of the Maoist Party or involved with them, they will harm her. (4)The appellant has been listed as an enemy by the Maoists and if returned to Nepal will have no freedom and live in constant fear.(5)The appellant will be harmed by the other side or society because of her former Maoist association. On 29 October 2013 the Tribunal affirmed the Delegate’s decision to refuse the grant of the protection visa. While, as mentioned, the appellant raised a fear of being subjected to the death penalty, she did not rely on any basis for that fear other than her involvement with and subsequent disassociation from the Maoist Party. The Tribunal accepted that the appellant was abducted by the Maoists while she was a child in 2003, the claim being supported by independent country information (at [25]). Nonetheless, the Tribunal did not accept that the appellant was truthful in claiming that she was held and monitored by the Maoists until her departure from Nepal in September 2010 or in her claim that she escaped Nepal to Australia to flee from the Maoists. The Tribunal’s finding in this regard was based upon country information indicating that all former child soldiers were released by March 2010 (at [27]-[28]). The appellant also agreed that she was of a low profile (at [28]). It followed, the Tribunal found, that it did not accept that the appellant is listed as an enemy of the Maoists because she left without their permission or will face any difficulty on return for leaving them without their permission (at [28]). The Tribunal considered that this finding was further supported by the appellant’s evidence that since her departure in 2010, the Maoists have not visited her family home searching for her. The Tribunal also found that the appellant’s inconsistent evidence before the Department and the Tribunal as to the time she spent at home in recent years until her departure added to the finding that she was not forcibly held until her departure (at [30]), as did her delay of approximately 18 months in applying for a protection visa after arriving in Australia (at [32]-[34]). The Tribunal also placed little weight on her Maoist Membership Certificate given that independent information indicated that document fraud in Nepal is widespread, and the existence of a discrepancy between the date on which the certificate stated that it was issued and the details completed, namely, 2008, and the appellant’s evidence that it was issued in 2004 (at [36]). Similarly, the Tribunal placed little weight on photographs and CDs provided by the appellant, finding nothing probative in that evidence to support her assertion that she was forced to stay with the Maoists against her will until September 2010. Given that the Tribunal did not accept that the appellant was credible on these claims, it did not accept that the appellant would be seriously harmed by the Maoists or seen as an enemy of the Maoists for these reasons.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge rejected each of these grounds, including the additional ground advanced at the hearing, and dismissed the appeal: at [15]-[28]. 4. CONSIDERATION4.1 Ground 1: the “real chance” test By the first ground of appeal, the appellant alleges that:The Federal Circuit Court erred by failing to find that the Tribunal Member made a legal mistake in making the finding that the Tribunal has addressed and made appropriate findings on my involvement with the Maoists. It is contended that the Tribunal Member failed to properly apply the real chance test in my circumstances. In this regard, the Tribunal was required in conducting its review to consider whether the appellant is “… a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the [Tribunal] is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol” (ss 36(2)(a) and 415 of the Act). This requires, subject to various qualifications in the Act, that the Tribunal be satisfied that an applicant is a refugee as defined in Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Refugee Convention), namely, a person who (relevantly):owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his [or her] nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself [or herself] of the protection of that country… (Emphasis added.) If so satisfied, the Tribunal must grant the visa under s 65 of the Act. The question raised by ground 1 of the appeal is whether the Tribunal was required, but failed, to assess whether there was a “well-founded fear” of persecution by reason of her imputed and actual political opinions. A determination of whether a (subjective) fear is (objectively) “well-founded” requires the Tribunal to assess what will occur in the future. A fear is “well-founded” when there is “a real substantial basis for it”, even where the chance of the object of the fear eventuating is less than 50 per cent, but is not well founded if it is merely assumed or speculative: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo [1997] HCA 22; (1997) 191 CLR 559 (Guo) at 572 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ). While the description should not be used in substitution for the terms of the Refugee Convention, this is commonly described as the “real chance” test. If the Tribunal failed properly to apply this test, the error would be jurisdictional in nature as it would constitute a failure to determine the appellant’s claims in accordance with the statutory criteria. However, the ground of appeal does not identify the respect in which it is alleged that the Tribunal misapplied the “real chance” test. Nor was this a ground raised below or developed by any submissions in this Court. I am unable in any event to discern any error in the Tribunal’s explanation of the “real chance” test at [14] of its reasons, nor in its application of the test to the appellant’s claims.