FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BOT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 654
Appeal from: BOT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 1266 File number: VID 740 of 2017 Judge: MARKOVIC J Date of judgment: 11 May 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether primary judge erred in failing to find that the second respondent had erred when it addressed the question of whether the appellant faced a real risk or chance of harm in the reasonably foreseeable future – appeal allowed. Cases cited: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Shrestha v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 251 FCR 143
SZGHS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1572
Date of hearing: 8 February 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 60 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr B Mostafa Solicitor for the Appellant: Fragomen Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr D Hughes Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs ORDERS
VID 740 of 2017 BETWEEN: BOT15
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MARKOVIC J
DATE OF ORDER:
11 MAY 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 15 June 2017 be set aside and in their place:
(a)order absolute in the first instance for a writ of certiorari to remove into the Court, for the purpose of it being quashed, the decision of the second respondent dated 6 July 2015 to affirm a decision of a delegate of the first respondent to refuse to grant a protection visa to the applicant;
(b)order absolute in the first instance for a writ of mandamus directing the second respondent to review, according to law, the decision of a delegate of the first respondent to refuse to grant a protection visa to the applicant; and
(c)the first respondent pay the applicant’s costs.
3.The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MARKOVIC J:
The appellant appeals from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Federal Circuit Court) dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (Tribunal): BOT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 1266 (BOT15). The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) refusing to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa (Visa).
The appellant’s notice of appeal raises a single ground of appeal by which he alleges that the primary judge erred in failing to find…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 654
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the Tribunal did not adequately consider the risk of harm the appellant might face due to the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. The Tribunal focused on the present security situation in Afghanistan and did not sufficiently address the potential future risks that the withdrawal of troops might bring, especially in Bamiyan. The court held that the Tribunal's decision was flawed as it did not fully consider the appellant's claims about the uncertain future security outlook in Bamiyan due to growing Taliban activity and the withdrawal of foreign troops. The Tribunal's focus on the present state of security did not adequately address the appellant's concerns about the reasonably foreseeable future.
As a result, the appeal was allowed, and the orders of the Federal Circuit Court were set aside. The court issued a writ of certiorari to quash the Tribunal's decision and a writ of mandamus to direct the Tribunal to review the delegate's decision according to law. Additionally, the Minister was ordered to pay the appellant's costs for both the original proceedings and the appeal. This decision underscores the importance of considering future risks when assessing claims for protection visas, particularly in situations where significant changes, such as the withdrawal of foreign troops, could impact the security of an applicant's home region.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 15 June 2017 be set aside and in their place:
(a) order absolute in the first instance for a writ of certiorari to remove into the Court, for the purpose of it being quashed, the decision of the second respondent dated 6 July 2015 to affirm a decision of a delegate of the first respondent to refuse to grant a protection visa to the applicant;
(b) order absolute in the first instance for a writ of mandamus directing the second respondent to review, according to law, the decision of a delegate of the first respondent to refuse to grant a protection visa to the applicant; and
(c) the first respondent pay the applicant’s costs.
3. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Thirdly, the appellant submitted that the primary judge erred in not finding that [89]-[96] of the Tribunal’s decision focused on the present rather than the future for the reasons set out at [22]-[23] above. In light of the Tribunal’s focus on whether the Afghan government had lost control of certain locations in Afghanistan, the appellant submitted that the primary judge’s reasons did not say much as to why the Tribunal had not erred in focusing on the present at the expense of the future. The appellant contended that the fact the government had not yet lost control of certain locations did not answer the questions of whether the government might lose control in the reasonably foreseeable future once the international troop withdrawal was finalised or whether a risk of harm might manifest after the withdrawal of the troops, even if government control was not completely lost.Consideration The appellant’s ground of appeal essentially raises two issues in relation to the claim to fear harm in Bamiyan following the withdrawal of foreign troops. The first concerns whether the Tribunal failed to consider Bamiyan and the second concerns whether the Tribunal failed to consider the risk of deterioration of the security situation following the withdrawal of foreign troops in the reasonably foreseeable future. It is in relation to the second aspect of the ground of appeal that the appellant has succeeded. In order to consider the first aspect of the appellant’s ground of appeal it is necessary to consider the detail of the Tribunal’s decision. At [46] of its decision record, because of evidence given by the appellant at his entry interview, the Tribunal rejected the appellant’s claim that he was harmed on his return to Bamiyan and thus rejected the appellant’s claim that he had damaged hearing as a result of beatings that occurred in Afghanistan. The Tribunal considered that the appellant had not been subjected to any personal harm when he resided in Afghanistan in 2012. At [47]-[66] of its decision record under the heading “Claims” the Tribunal then turned to consider what it described as “a number of claims” made by the appellant as to why he believed he could not return to Afghanistan, including because he claimed to fear harm as a Hazara Shia and because of his extended departure from Afghanistan while living in Iran (1993–2012) and more recently Australia (August 2012 onwards). The Tribunal also noted that the appellant feared harm “because of his extended period of time in Australia, which could provide him with a pro-West imputed political opinion and that he could be a spy”: at [47]. The Tribunal addressed the appellant’s home area – Bamiyan. At [53] of its decision record the Tribunal set out country information about the security situation in Bamiyan, which it had discussed with the appellant, and at [54] it referred to a European Asylum Support Office (EASO) report of February 2015 (February EASO Report), a more recent report to that referred to in the Pre-hearing Submission. Among other things, the February EASO Report stated:Bamyan is among the peaceful provinces in central Afghanistan where insurgent groups do not operate in any of its districts. Bamyan enjoys bolstered security. However, the province occasionally faces security challenges from the side of the province of Baghlan in the districts of Kihmard, Sayghan, and Shaiber, despite tight security.