FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
CEV15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 976
Appeal from: CEV15 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2017] FCCA 739 File number(s): NSD 391 of 2017 Judge(s): PERRY J Date of judgment: 18 August 2017 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for an extension of time to appeal under rule 36.05 Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – where judgment of Federal Circuit Court delivered ex tempore and written reasons provided after expiry of appeal period – whether reasonable prospects of success if extension of time granted -application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 36
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), rr 16.02, 36.03, 36.05
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954)
Cases cited: BAO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 214
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344
Jamal v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2017] FCA 916
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 77 ALJR 1165
SZTQM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 952
Date of hearing: 18 August 2017 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 18 Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person. Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms C Saunders, DLA Piper Australia ORDERS
NSD 391 of 2017 BETWEEN: CEV15
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
PERRY J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 AUGUST 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for an extension of time is dismissed.
2.The applicant is to pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from Transcript)PERRY J:
1. INTRODUCTION
The applicant is a citizen of Bangladesh who arrived in Australia by boat in early 2012. He applied for a protection visa on 21 March 2013 under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). He claimed to fear an honour killing if returned to Bangladesh by reason of an affair he had with a young woman from a wealthy family in Bangladesh and to have been the subject of a number of incidents occasioned by her relatives.
The application for a protection visa was refused by a delegate of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the Minister), on 25 July 2014. The delegate relied upon discrepancies between the applicant’s written claims and his Departmental interview to reject his claims, finding that they had been fabricated. The…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 976
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the well-established principles governing the granting of an extension of time to appeal, which include the necessity for the court to be satisfied that it is proper to grant such an extension, the significance of the length of the delay, the requirement for an acceptable explanation for the delay, the fairness and equity of extending time, and the merits of the substantive appeal. The court held that while the applicant had provided an explanation for the delay, this alone was insufficient to justify an extension of time. Moreover, the court found that the applicant's appeal would have little or no prospects of success, given the additional resources that would be imposed on the parties and the court, and the impact on other court users. As such, the application for an extension of time was dismissed.
In reaching its decision, the court emphasised the importance of conducting a rough and ready assessment of the merits of the appeal at a reasonably impressionistic level, rather than delving into a fuller consideration of the arguments for and against each ground. The court also noted that the absence of prejudice to the respondent does not, without more, suffice to justify the grant of an extension of time. The applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or assessed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for an extension of time is dismissed.
2. The applicant is to pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court below carefully and comprehensively considered each of the grounds raised by the applicant, referring to the relevant principles and relevant judicial decisions, but found that the grounds of the application did not demonstrate any jurisdictional error. In essence, the Court below found that the applicant sought impermissibly to review the merits of his application for a protection visa. 3. CONSIDERATION3.1 Reason why an extension of time is required Pursuant to rule 36.03 of the FCR, a notice of appeal must be filed within 21 days after the date on which the judgment was pronounced or the orders made, or on or before a date fixed for that purpose by the court appealed from. The judgment and orders of the Federal Circuit Court were made on 13 February 2017. There having been no order by the Federal Circuit Court to the contrary, the notice of appeal was therefore required to be filed 21 days later on 6 March 2017. As the notice of appeal was not filed until 21 March 2017, an extension of time is therefore required. 3.2 Principles applicable to an extension of time The principles relevant to the exercise of discretion to grant an extension of time within which to appeal are well established (see e.g. BAO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 214 at [19]; Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348–349) and may be summarised as follows:(1)An extension of time will not be granted unless the Court is positively satisfied that it is proper to do so.(2)The length of the delay is a relevant factor. (3)The applicant must show an acceptable explanation for the delay, and that it is fair and equitable in the circumstances to extend time.(4)Any prejudice to the respondent is a material factor militating against the grant of an extension, although the absence of prejudice does not, without more, suffice to justify the grant of an extension of time.(5)The merits of the substantive appeal, if leave were granted, are properly to be taken into account. Further, as I recently stated in Jamal v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2017] FCA 916:12. As to the last of these matters [being the merits of any substantive appeal], it will seldom be in the interests of justice to grant an extension of time where an appeal would have little or no prospects of success, given the additional resources that would impose upon the parties and Court, and impact on other Court users: see by analogy in MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391 (MZABP (FCA)) at [62] (Mortimer J) (approved on appeal in MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 110 at [38]). In turn, in considering the applicant’s prospects of success on an appeal, the Court should not conduct a summary hearing of the appeal but is to “assess the merits in a fairly rough and ready way” (Jackamarra v Krakouer [1998] HCA 27; (1998) 195 CLR 516 at [9]). In other words, the grounds should be considered on their face and examined at a “reasonably impressionistic level”; the Court should not descend into a fuller consideration of the arguments for and against each ground (see MZABP (FCA) at [62]). 3.3 Has an adequate explanation being given for the delay?