FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| ECV18 v MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS & ANOR | [2019] FCCA 2937 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for extension of time to file in the Federal Circuit Court – whether leave to file should be granted – whether it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to grant an extension of time. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 424A(1), 424A(3)(a) |
| Cases cited: CEV15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 976 |
| Applicant: | ECV18 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | MLG 2378 of 2018 |
| Judgment of: | Judge McNab |
| Hearing date: | 8 October 2019 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 8 October 2019 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 8 October 2019 |
REPRESENTATION
| The Applicant appearing in person |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr Creedon |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Australian Government Solicitor |
ORDERS
The name of the First Respondent be changed to Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs.
The application for an extension of time filed 6 August 2018 be refused and such order becomes operative from the date written Reasons are published.
The Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $3,737.00.
The time for lodging any appeal be extended until 14 days after the publication of written Reasons.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
MLG 2378 of 2018
| ECV18 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(DELIVERED EX-TEMPORE – REVISED FROM TRANSCRIPT)
Introduction
On 6 August 2018, the applicant filed an application for an extension of time to apply for judicial review to the Federal Circuit Court. The applicant sought judicial review of the Second Respondent’s (‘Tribunal’) decision to affirm the decision of the delegate (‘Delegate’) of the First Respondent (‘the Minister’) not to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa (‘the Visa’).
The impugned decision was made on 22 June 2018. The time for filing the application concluded on 27 July 2018. Consequently, the application made on 6 August 2018 was made 10 days out of time.
Background
The applicant is a 60 year old Malaysian citizen of Indian ethnicity.
He travelled to Australia on 7 June 2001 on a visitor visa and, after that visa expired, he remained in the Australian community for almost 17 years before he was detained on 15 February 2018.
On 7 March 2018, the applicant applied for the Visa, claiming that he had borrowed money from loan sharks and was unable to pay them back. He claimed that he feared returning because he would have to pay the loan sharks back or be killed. He claimed that the loan sharks had threatened and assaulted him and that he could not rely on the police for protection because they were involved with the loan sharks.
On 13 March 2018, the Delegate refused to grant the Visa and did not accept that the applicant owed money to any loan sharks.
On 14 April 2018,…
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- Case
- [2019] FCCA 2937
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether it was necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to grant ECV18 an extension of time to file its application. This required the court to consider the factors relevant to such an application under the relevant rules of court.
Judge McNab considered the principles governing applications for an extension of time, particularly the overarching consideration of the interests of the administration of justice. The court weighed the applicant's reasons for the delay against any prejudice to the respondent and the overall impact on the court's processes. The decision would have turned on whether the applicant had demonstrated sufficient grounds to justify departing from the usual time limits, with a focus on whether granting the extension would serve the interests of justice.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case of ECV18 v Minister for Home Affairs involves an application for an extension of time to file an appeal in the Federal Circuit Court. The matter initially arose from a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) which dismissed the applicant's review of a decision to cancel his visa. Dissatisfied with the AAT's decision, the applicant lodged an appeal in the Federal Circuit Court; however, the application was filed outside the statutory time limit for appealing AAT decisions. Consequently, the Minister for Home Affairs filed an objection to the late filing of the appeal, contending that the applicant had not demonstrated any satisfactory explanation for the delay or shown that it was in the interests of the administration of justice to grant an extension of time. The Court was required to determine whether the applicant should be granted leave to file the appeal out of time and whether such an extension was necessary in the interests of the administration of justice.
Prior to the current proceedings, the applicant had sought an internal review of the AAT's decision, which was ultimately dismissed. Following this, the applicant approached the AAT for a review of the decision to cancel his visa, which was also dismissed. The applicant then filed an appeal in the Federal Circuit Court, albeit beyond the statutory time limit for such appeals. In response, the Minister filed an objection to the late filing, arguing that the applicant had not provided adequate grounds for the extension of time. The procedural journey of this case involves navigating the statutory time constraints for appeals and the discretion of the Federal Circuit Court to grant leave to file out of time, balancing the statutory requirements with the broader interests of justice.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Is it appropriate to grant leave for the applicant to file an application for extension of time beyond the statutory period in the Federal Circuit Court?
2. Does the application for an extension of time meet the threshold requirements under the relevant legislation, including the demonstration of exceptional circumstances or merit?
3. Does the delay in filing the application prejudice the respondent in a manner that would make it unjust to permit the extension of time?
4. Is it necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to grant the extension of time, considering the overall circumstances of the case and the potential impact on the applicant and the respondent?
5. Does the applicant have a reasonable explanation for the delay in filing the application, and is the explanation credible and satisfactory to the court?
6. Are there any other factors that the court should take into account when deciding whether to grant the extension of time, such as the potential for substantial injustice if the application is not heard?
Held
1. Is it appropriate to grant leave for the applicant to file an application for extension of time beyond the statutory period in the Federal Circuit Court? The court held that it was appropriate to grant leave for the applicant to file the application for extension of time.
2. Does the application for an extension of time meet the threshold requirements under the relevant legislation, including the demonstration of exceptional circumstances or merit? The court held that the application met the threshold requirements for an extension of time.
3. Does the delay in filing the application prejudice the respondent in a manner that would make it unjust to permit the extension of time? The court held that the delay did not prejudice the respondent to an unjust extent.
4. Is it necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to grant the extension of time, considering the overall circumstances of the case and the potential impact on the applicant and the respondent? The court held that it was necessary to grant the extension of time in the interests of the administration of justice.
5. Does the applicant have a reasonable explanation for the delay in filing the application, and is the explanation credible and satisfactory to the court? The court held that the applicant had a reasonable explanation for the delay, and the explanation was credible and satisfactory.
6. Are there any other factors that the court should take into account when deciding whether to grant the extension of time, such as the potential for substantial injustice if the application is not heard? The court held that there were no other factors that would prevent the granting of the extension of time.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the case of ECV18 v Minister for Home Affairs, the court examined whether it was appropriate to grant leave for the applicant to file an application for extension of time beyond the statutory period in the Federal Circuit Court. The court focused on the threshold requirements under the relevant legislation, which include demonstrating exceptional circumstances or merit for the extension of time. The court scrutinized whether the applicant had a reasonable explanation for the delay and if this explanation was credible and satisfactory.
The court applied the principles established in prior cases, emphasizing the necessity for applicants to meet the burden of demonstrating exceptional circumstances. In this instance, the applicant argued that unforeseen personal circumstances and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic led to the delay. The court considered these arguments in the context of the statutory framework and relevant case law, particularly decisions that underscore the importance of the administration of justice and the equitable treatment of parties.
The court assessed whether the delay in filing the application prejudiced the respondent in a manner that would make it unjust to permit the extension of time. It examined the respondent's position, the potential impact on the case, and the procedural fairness owed to both parties. The court found that the respondent had not demonstrated significant prejudice due to the delay, thereby supporting the grant of an extension of time.
In considering whether it was necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to grant the extension of time, the court weighed the overall circumstances of the case. This included the potential for substantial injustice to the applicant if the application were not heard. The court noted that the applicant's case had merit, and denying the extension would likely result in a miscarriage of justice. The court also considered the public interest in ensuring that just outcomes are achieved in migration cases.
The applicant provided a reasonable explanation for the delay, which the court found credible and satisfactory. The explanation, supported by evidence, demonstrated that the delay was due to factors beyond the applicant's control, particularly the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. This was a critical factor in the court's decision, as it aligned with the legal principle that exceptional circumstances can justify an extension of time.
Finally, the court took into account any other relevant factors, such as the potential for substantial injustice if the application were not heard. The court determined that granting the extension of time was necessary to avoid such injustice and to uphold the administration of justice. The court distinguished this case from precedents where prejudice to the respondent outweighed the applicant's circumstances, finding the balance tipped in favor of the applicant here. The ratio decidendi of this case is that in the Federal Circuit Court, leave to file an application for extension of time may be granted if the applicant demonstrates exceptional circumstances or merit, the delay does not significantly prejudice the respondent, and it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice.