FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AMW15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 118
ORDERS
VID 661 of 2016 BETWEEN: AMW15
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
PERRY J
DATE OF ORDER:
20 FEBRUARY 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court is dismissed.
2.The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
PERRY J:
1. INTRODUCTION
This is an application for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal a decision of the Federal Circuit Court (the Court below). The Court below dismissed an application to reinstate the proceedings in which the…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 118
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court held that the application for an extension of time should be dismissed. The applicant had filed the application 13 days out of time, and the Court found that the delay was not adequately explained. The Court also found that the applicant had not demonstrated that the appeal would have reasonable prospects of success, as the Tribunal's decision was based on a thorough assessment of the applicant's credibility and the evidence before it. The Court held that the Tribunal's decision was not flawed and that the applicant had not demonstrated any jurisdictional error or procedural unfairness.
The Court held that the delay in filing the application for leave to appeal was not adequately explained by the applicant. The Court also found that the applicant had not demonstrated that the appeal would have reasonable prospects of success, as the Tribunal's decision was based on a thorough assessment of the applicant's credibility and the evidence before it. The Court held that the Tribunal's decision was not flawed and that the applicant had not demonstrated any jurisdictional error or procedural unfairness. Accordingly, the application for an extension of time was dismissed with costs.
The Court ordered that the application for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court was dismissed. The applicant was to pay the first respondent's costs as agreed or assessed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court is dismissed.
2. The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The primary judge was “not entirely satisfied with the adequacy of the applicant’s explanation for his failure to attend” (at [17]) but considered in any event that the “more important question” was whether there were reasonable prospects of success of the substantive application (at [4]). The primary judge was “unable to detect any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s reasons or decision-making process” and therefore was unable to accept that the applicant had any reasonable prospect of success in the substantive application, and dismissed the application to reinstate the proceeding (at [16]-[17]). In this regard, her Honour noted that the grounds of review were devoid of any particulars, and that she could not detect any manner in which the applicant had been denied procedural fairness or any way in which the Tribunal may have applied the wrong legal test. 4. CONSIDERATION4.1 Relevant Principles Leave to appeal the decision of the Court below is required because that decision (an application for reinstatement) is interlocutory in nature: s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). Further, under r 35.13 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (FCR), the applicant was required to file any application for leave to appeal from the decision below within 14 days of the date on which judgment was pronounced below. As judgment was given on 24 May 2016, any such application was therefore required to be filed by 7 June 2016. However, the application was filed only on 20 June 2016, i.e., 13 days out of time. Accordingly, the applicant first requires an extension of time under r 35.14, FCR. The considerations relevant to determining whether to grant an extension of time include the length of the delay, the applicant’s explanation for the delay, any prejudice to the respondent, and the merits of the proposed appeal: SZSPR v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2013] FCA 1210; (2013) 139 ALD 109 at 113 [16] (Farrell J); Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348-349 (Wilcox J). Relevant considerations in deciding whether to grant leave to appeal include whether an appeal would have any reasonable prospects of success and whether the applicant would suffer substantial injustice if leave were refused, assuming the decision subject to appeal is wrong: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-399. As to the merits of the proposed appeal, as Mortimer J recently held in MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391 at [63] (upheld on appeal in MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 110), the correct approach to determining the merits of the proposed grounds of appeal in the context of an application to extend time (in that case, under s 477(2) of the Act) is whether the grounds of appeal are “arguable”, “reasonably arguable”, “sufficiently arguable” or have “reasonable prospects of success” (see also SZTES v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 719 at [48] (Wigney J); SZRIQv Federal Magistrates Court of Australia [2013] FCA 1284; (2013) 236 FCR 442 at [46]-[48] (Foster J)). It should not be transformed into a de facto full hearing, but rather the “certainty or confidence a judge may have about an unsuccessful outcome is because the grounds on their face, and without the detailed argument and development which attends a full hearing, are plainly hopeless” (at [62]). 4.2 Should an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal be granted?4.2.1Delay