AMW15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AMW15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 118

Appeal from: Application for extension of time: AMW15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 1585
File number: VID 661 of 2016
Judge: PERRY J
Date of judgment: 20 February 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal – where written reasons not published by the Court below until after expiration of time within which to seek leave– where any appeal would not have reasonable prospects of success  
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 35.13

Cases cited:

ARO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1154

ATH15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1155

Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; (2009) 83 ALJR 1123

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 110

Re Refugee Review Tribunal; ex parte H [2001] HCA 28; (2001) 75 ALJR 982

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 195

SZRIQv Federal Magistrates Court of Australia [2013] FCA 1284; (2013) 236 FCR 442

SZSPR v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2013] FCA 1210; (2013) 139 ALD 109

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 69; (2016) 243 FCR 556

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 91 ALJR 936

SZTES v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 719

Date of hearing: 18 November 2016
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 31
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Solicitor for the Respondents: Ms N Milutinovic of Sparke Helmore Lawyers

ORDERS

VID 661 of 2016
BETWEEN:

AMW15

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 FEBRUARY 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court is dismissed.

2.The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

PERRY J:

1.               INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an application for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal a decision of the Federal Circuit Court (the Court below).  The Court below dismissed an application to reinstate the proceedings in which the…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 118
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of AMW15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, sought an extension of time to seek leave to appeal a decision of the Federal Circuit Court. The primary issue was whether the Court should grant an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal, given the applicant's failure to file the application within the prescribed time frame. The secondary issue was whether the applicant had reasonable prospects of success on appeal.

The Court held that the application for an extension of time should be dismissed. The applicant had filed the application 13 days out of time, and the Court found that the delay was not adequately explained. The Court also found that the applicant had not demonstrated that the appeal would have reasonable prospects of success, as the Tribunal's decision was based on a thorough assessment of the applicant's credibility and the evidence before it. The Court held that the Tribunal's decision was not flawed and that the applicant had not demonstrated any jurisdictional error or procedural unfairness.

The Court held that the delay in filing the application for leave to appeal was not adequately explained by the applicant. The Court also found that the applicant had not demonstrated that the appeal would have reasonable prospects of success, as the Tribunal's decision was based on a thorough assessment of the applicant's credibility and the evidence before it. The Court held that the Tribunal's decision was not flawed and that the applicant had not demonstrated any jurisdictional error or procedural unfairness. Accordingly, the application for an extension of time was dismissed with costs.

The Court ordered that the application for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court was dismissed. The applicant was to pay the first respondent's costs as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court is dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Minister appropriately indicated that he did not oppose the Court deferring the delivery of judgment pending the High Court’s decision on that appeal, as requested by the applicant. I therefore reserved judgment but indicated that I would not deliver judgment before the High Court’s decision in SZTAL was delivered. I also left open the possibility that, depending upon the outcome, it may become necessary to allow the appeal to be re-opened and to hear further submissions from the parties. The High Court delivered judgment in SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 91 ALJR 936 on 6 September 2017 upholding the Full Court’s decision and dismissing the appeal. In those circumstances, there was no reason to defer judgment any longer in order to hear further submissions. 3. BACKGROUND3.1 The applicant’s claims and the decision of the Tribunal The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. He applied for a protection visa on 20 December 2012. That application was refused by the delegate on 14 February 2014. The applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of that decision. Before the Tribunal, the applicant claimed protection on the ground that his former employer in Sri Lanka had threatened to kill him in relation to an unpaid debt incurred as a result of an incident in 2008 on his former employer’s boat. He further claimed to fear harm on the basis of his activities for the United National Party (UNP) as a result of which he said that the opposition party wished to harm him. The Tribunal had a number of concerns about the applicant’s credibility and disbelieved the account of events on which his protection claims were based. First, the Tribunal had difficulty accepting that the applicant would have undertaken political activities for the UNP in circumstances where he claimed his life was at risk and he was trying to evade his former employer who had threatened to kill him. All of the applicant’s evidence regarding his behaviour from November 2008 was found to be “unconvincing and not demonstrative of truthfulness” (at [16]). Secondly, the Tribunal considered that the applicant had given inconsistent evidence about events from June 2011. Before the Tribunal, the applicant claimed that he was attacked in 2011 by a group of men while waiting for a bus, including by a member of parliament from the opposition party, as a result of which he was hospitalised for five months. However, the Tribunal considered that this claim was inconsistent with the evidence given in his earlier written statement, and that he had not provided a satisfactory explanation for the discrepancies in his account. The Tribunal further disbelieved the applicant’s claims that he undertook activities for the UNP and held that there was no credible evidence before it in relation to the applicant’s political opinion. Thirdly, the Tribunal concluded on the issue of the applicant’s credibility that he was not a witness of truth and that the account of events on which his protection claims were made was false. Further, it disbelieved his claims that he undertook activities for the UNP and found that there was no credible evidence about the applicant’s political opinion (at [27]-[28]).

Decision

Reasons for decision

For the reasons that follow, the application must be dismissed with costs.2. PRELIMINARY ISSUE: DEFERRING OF JUDGMENT PENDING THE HIGH COURT’S DECISION IN SZTAL At the end of oral submissions, the Minister’s representative alerted the Court to the grant of special leave to appeal by the High Court two days earlier from the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 69; (2016) 243 FCR 556 (SZTAL). In SZTAL, the issue was whether, given the likelihood that the applicant would be held in remand for a short period if returned to Sri Lanka and the poor conditions in Sri Lankan prisons, the Sri Lankan officials could be said to intend to inflict severe pain or suffering so as to amount to “significant harm” and thereby engage Australia’s complementary protection obligations for the purposes of s 36(2A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). The Full Court held that actual, subjective intention to inflict significant harm was required and therefore proof of knowledge of the consequences of ordering that a person be detained without more did not suffice to attract complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. The Minister appropriately indicated that he did not oppose the Court deferring the delivery of judgment pending the High Court’s decision on that appeal, as requested by the applicant. I therefore reserved judgment but indicated that I would not deliver judgment before the High Court’s decision in SZTAL was delivered. I also left open the possibility that, depending upon the outcome, it may become necessary to allow the appeal to be re-opened and to hear further submissions from the parties. The High Court delivered judgment in SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 91 ALJR 936 on 6 September 2017 upholding the Full Court’s decision and dismissing the appeal. In those circumstances, there was no reason to defer judgment any longer in order to hear further submissions. 3. BACKGROUND3.1 The applicant’s claims and the decision of the Tribunal The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. He applied for a protection visa on 20 December 2012. That application was refused by the delegate on 14 February 2014. The applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of that decision. Before the Tribunal, the applicant claimed protection on the ground that his former employer in Sri Lanka had threatened to kill him in relation to an unpaid debt incurred as a result of an incident in 2008 on his former employer’s boat. He further claimed to fear harm on the basis of his activities for the United National Party (UNP) as a result of which he said that the opposition party wished to harm him. The Tribunal had a number of concerns about the applicant’s credibility and disbelieved the account of events on which his protection claims were based. First, the Tribunal had difficulty accepting that the applicant would have undertaken political activities for the UNP in circumstances where he claimed his life was at risk and he was trying to evade his former employer who had threatened to kill him. All of the applicant’s evidence regarding his behaviour from November 2008 was found to be “unconvincing and not demonstrative of truthfulness” (at [16]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge was “not entirely satisfied with the adequacy of the applicant’s explanation for his failure to attend” (at [17]) but considered in any event that the “more important question” was whether there were reasonable prospects of success of the substantive application (at [4]). The primary judge was “unable to detect any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s reasons or decision-making process” and therefore was unable to accept that the applicant had any reasonable prospect of success in the substantive application, and dismissed the application to reinstate the proceeding (at [16]-[17]). In this regard, her Honour noted that the grounds of review were devoid of any particulars, and that she could not detect any manner in which the applicant had been denied procedural fairness or any way in which the Tribunal may have applied the wrong legal test. 4. CONSIDERATION4.1 Relevant Principles Leave to appeal the decision of the Court below is required because that decision (an application for reinstatement) is interlocutory in nature: s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). Further, under r 35.13 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (FCR), the applicant was required to file any application for leave to appeal from the decision below within 14 days of the date on which judgment was pronounced below. As judgment was given on 24 May 2016, any such application was therefore required to be filed by 7 June 2016. However, the application was filed only on 20 June 2016, i.e., 13 days out of time. Accordingly, the applicant first requires an extension of time under r 35.14, FCR. The considerations relevant to determining whether to grant an extension of time include the length of the delay, the applicant’s explanation for the delay, any prejudice to the respondent, and the merits of the proposed appeal: SZSPR v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2013] FCA 1210; (2013) 139 ALD 109 at 113 [16] (Farrell J); Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348-349 (Wilcox J). Relevant considerations in deciding whether to grant leave to appeal include whether an appeal would have any reasonable prospects of success and whether the applicant would suffer substantial injustice if leave were refused, assuming the decision subject to appeal is wrong: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-399. As to the merits of the proposed appeal, as Mortimer J recently held in MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391 at [63] (upheld on appeal in MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 110), the correct approach to determining the merits of the proposed grounds of appeal in the context of an application to extend time (in that case, under s 477(2) of the Act) is whether the grounds of appeal are “arguable”, “reasonably arguable”, “sufficiently arguable” or have “reasonable prospects of success” (see also SZTES v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 719 at [48] (Wigney J); SZRIQv Federal Magistrates Court of Australia [2013] FCA 1284; (2013) 236 FCR 442 at [46]-[48] (Foster J)). It should not be transformed into a de facto full hearing, but rather the “certainty or confidence a judge may have about an unsuccessful outcome is because the grounds on their face, and without the detailed argument and development which attends a full hearing, are plainly hopeless” (at [62]). 4.2 Should an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal be granted?4.2.1Delay