Webb v Commonwealth of Australia (No 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Webb v Commonwealth of Australia (No 3) [2023] FCA 558   

Appeal from:  Application for extension of time and leave to appeal from: Webb v Commonwealth of Australia [2021] FCA 1215
Webb v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2022] FCA 89
File number: NSD 922 of 2022
Judgment of: BROMWICH J
Date of judgment: 30 May 2023
Date of publication of reasons:  5 June 2023
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: application for extension of time and leave to appeal from interlocutory orders by a judge of this Court, pursuant to rule 35.14 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – where the applicant brought proceedings against the Commonwealth for defamation – where the primary judge struck out the applicant’s statement of claim, with costs, upon the basis that it failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action – where leave was granted to replead – where the primary judge summarily dismissed the proceeding with costs, upon the basis that the amended statement of claim, filed pursuant to the leave to replead, had no reasonable prospects of success – consideration whether the judgments below were attended with sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration by a Full Court – whether there is a sufficient basis for extension of time – held: the application for leave to appeal and extension of time be dismissed with costs
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 35.13(a)

Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 27(2)(b)

Cases cited:

Banque Commerciale SA (in liq) v Akhil Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279

Decor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397

EVA17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 214; 262 FCR 304

Webb v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2022] FCA 89, delivered 11 February 2022

Webb v Commonwealth of Australia [2021] FCA 1215

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction
Number of paragraphs: 18
Date of hearing: 30 May 2023
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr N Olson
Solicitor for the Respondent: Minter Ellison

ORDERS

NSD 922 of 2022
BETWEEN:

GAYLE MAREE WEBB

Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

BROMWICH J

DATE OF ORDER:

30 MAY 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time and leave to appeal be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs as assessed or agreed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered ex tempore and revised from transcript)

BROMWICH J:

  1. The applicant, Ms Gayle Webb, applies for an extension of time and leave to appeal from orders made by a judge of this Court in relation to allegations of defamation made against the respondent, the Commonwealth, by reason of conduct by its employees.  The primary judge, after considering the pleadings, statutory provisions and rules of the Court, and relevant well-established pleading,…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 558
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Webb v Commonwealth of Australia (No 3), the applicant, Ms Gayle Webb, sought an extension of time and leave to appeal against interlocutory orders made by a judge of this Court in defamation proceedings against the Commonwealth. The primary judge struck out Ms Webb’s statement of claim, finding it did not disclose a reasonable cause of action, but granted leave to amend. Upon re-pleading, the primary judge dismissed the proceeding summarily, finding the amended statement of claim had no reasonable prospect of success. The application for leave to appeal and an extension of time was filed well outside the statutory deadlines, over a year after the initial judgment and over eight months after the second.

The court was required to determine whether the judgments below were attended with sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration by a Full Court and if there was a sufficient basis for extending the time for appeal. The applicant needed to demonstrate that the proposed appeal had prospects of success to avoid the extension being an exercise in futility. The Commonwealth argued that the application was filed well beyond the statutory deadlines, and there was no basis for extending the time for appeal.

The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and an extension of time. It found that the primary judge’s reasoning in the first and second judgments was clear and well-reasoned, with no sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration by a Full Court. Furthermore, the court held that there was no sufficient basis for extending the time for appeal as the application was filed well outside the statutory deadlines and the appeal had no prospects of success. The court ordered that the application be dismissed and that the applicant pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time and leave to appeal be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs as assessed or agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The applicant, Ms Gayle Webb, applies for an extension of time and leave to appeal from orders made by a judge of this Court in relation to allegations of defamation made against the respondent, the Commonwealth, by reason of conduct by its employees. The primary judge, after considering the pleadings, statutory provisions and rules of the Court, and relevant well-established pleading, strike out and summary judgment principles:(a)struck out Ms Webb’s statement of claim with costs, upon the basis that it failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action, but granted leave to replead over the objection of the Commonwealth: Webb v Commonwealth of Australia [2021] FCA 1215, delivered 7 October 2021 (1st judgment); and(b)summarily dismissed the proceeding with costs, upon the basis that the amended statement of claim, filed purportedly in pursuance of the leave to replead granted on 7 October 2021, but which in fact pleaded an entirely new cause of action, had no reasonable prospect of success: Webb v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2022] FCA 89, delivered 11 February 2022 (2nd judgment). As each set of orders were interlocutory, leave is required to appeal from them: s 24(1A), Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). Additionally, an extension of time is required because the application was not filed until 24October 2022, over a year after the 1st judgment and over eight months after the 2nd judgment, in both cases a long time after the 14 days within which an application for leave to appeal is required to be filed: r 35.13(a), Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). The 1st judgment was solely concerned with the sufficiency of the pleading of the original statement of claim. In Banque Commerciale SA (in liq) v Akhil Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279, Mason CJ and Gaudron J said at 286-287:The function of pleadings is to state with sufficient clarity the case that must be met: Gould and Birbeck and Bacon v Mount Oxide Mines Ltd (In Liquidation) [(1916) 22 CLR 490], per Isaacs and Rich JJ at 517. In this way, pleadings serve to ensure the basic requirement of procedural fairness that a party should have the opportunity of meeting the case against him or her and, incidentally, to define the issues for decision. The rule that, in general, relief is confined to that available on the pleadings secures a party’s right to this basic requirement of procedural fairness. Accordingly, the circumstances in which a case may be decided on a basis different from that disclosed by the pleadings are limited to those in which the parties have deliberately chosen some different basis for the determination of their respective rights and liabilities. See, e.g., Browne v Dunn [(1893) 6 R 76]; Mount Oxide Mines [(1916) 22 CLR 490 at 517-518]. As correctly identified in the written submissions by the Commonwealth, Ms Webb needed to demonstrate:(a)in relation to the application for leave to appeal, whether the decision of the primary judge in the 1st judgment and/or the 2nd judgment is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by a Full Court; and whether substantial injustice would result if leave was refused, assuming the decision to be wrong: Decor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 per Sheppard, Burchett and Heerey JJ at 398-9.(b)in relation the application for an extension of time in relation to 1st judgment and/or the 2nd judgment, that the proposed appeal has such prospects of success as not to render that extension an exercise in futility: EVA17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 214; 262 FCR 304 per Perry, Derrington and Wheelahan JJ at [19], citing WAAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 399 at [9]. The 1st judgment (7 October 2021)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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