FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Webb v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2022] FCA 89
File number: NSD 376 of 2021 Judgment of: ABRAHAM J Date of judgment: 11 February 2022 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for summary dismissal under r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) and, in the alternative, to strike out pleadings under r 16.21 – where the applicant’s original statement of claim was previously struck out – where the applicant was granted leave to replead – where proceedings have no reasonable prospects of success – where proceedings are frivolous or vexatious – where proceedings are likely to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay – consideration of absolute privilege under s 27 of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) – proceedings summarily dismissed Legislation: Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) ss 4, 27, 28
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 16.21, 26.01
Cases cited: AMF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 68; (2016) 241 FCR 30
Latoudis v Casey [1990] HCA 59; (1990) 170 CLR 534
Quail v Gibson [2021] FCA 1115
SZRUR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 146; (2013) 216 FCR 445
Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction Number of paragraphs: 23 Date of hearing: 1 February 2022 Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person. Counsel for the Respondent: Mr N Olson Solicitor for the Respondent: MinterEllison
ORDERS
NSD 376 of 2021 BETWEEN: GAYLE MAREE WEBB
Applicant
AND: COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
ABRAHAM J
DATE OF ORDER:
11 FEBRUARY 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicant’s originating application dated 29 April 2021 and amended statement of claim dated 4 November 2021 are summarily dismissed.
2.The applicant is to pay the costs of the respondent, to be agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ABRAHAM J:
On 28 April 2021, the applicant lodged an originating application and statement of claim (dated 29 April 2021) alleging that she had been defamed by the respondent. On 7 October 2021, that statement of claim was struck out pursuant to r 16.21 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (Rules): Webb v Commonwealth of Australia [2021] FCA 1215 (Webb (No 1)). The applicant was given leave to replead.
An amended statement of claim (ASOC) was filed on 4 November 2021.
The respondent seeks orders that the proceeding be summarily dismissed pursuant to r 26.01(1)(a)-(c) of the Rules, on the basis that no reasonable cause of action is disclosed, the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or the proceeding is frivolous or vexatious. In the alternative, the respondent seeks the ASOC be struck out pursuant to r 16.21(1)(a)-(e) on the basis that it fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action, is ambiguous, contains frivolous or vexatious material and is otherwise likely…
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- Case
- [2022] FCA 89
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues in this case were whether the applicant's amended statement of claim had any reasonable prospects of success, whether the proceedings were frivolous or vexatious, and whether they were likely to cause prejudice, embarrassment, or delay. The court applied the relevant statutory and rule provisions, including section 31A of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) and rule 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), to determine the outcome. The court considered the principles established in previous cases such as Quail v Gibson and Spencer v Commonwealth.
The court found that the proceedings were without merit and had no reasonable prospects of success. The proceedings were also deemed to be vexatious, causing prejudice, embarrassment, or delay. The court dismissed the application for summary judgment and, in the alternative, to strike out pleadings. The court emphasised that the power to dismiss an action summarily should not be exercised lightly, but the applicant had not provided sufficient grounds to warrant continued litigation. The court also noted the compensatory nature of a costs award, rejecting the applicant's argument that they should not be penalised for mistakes in the amended statement of claim.
The court ordered that the applicant's originating application and amended statement of claim be summarily dismissed and that the applicant pay the costs of the respondent, to be agreed or assessed. The orders were to be entered in accordance with rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant’s originating application dated 29 April 2021 and amended statement of claim dated 4 November 2021 are summarily dismissed.
2. The applicant is to pay the costs of the respondent, to be agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In respect to summary dismissal, I summarised the relevant principles in Quail v Gibson [2021] FCA 1115 (Quail) at [6]-[11] as follows:[6] Section 31A of the FCA Act relevantly provides: (1)The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:(a)the first party is prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and(b)the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.(2)The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:(a)the first party is defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and(b)the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.(3)For the purposes of this section, a defence or a proceeding or part of a proceeding need not be:(a)hopeless; or(b) bound to fail;for it to have no reasonable prospect of success.(4)This section does not limit any powers that the Court has apart from this section.(5)This section does not apply to criminal proceedings.[7]The power to dismiss an action summarily is not to be exercised lightly: Spencer v Commonwealth [2010] HCA 28; (2010) 241 CLR 118 (Spencer) at [60] and see [24], although it does not require that the proceedings to be seen as “frivolous”, “untenable” or “groundless”: Spencer at [24], [53]-[60]. The critical question is whether the moving party has persuaded the court that the opposing party has no reasonable prospect of success: Polar Aviation Pty Ltd v Civil Aviation Safety Authority (No 4) [2011] FCA 1126; (2011) 203 FCR 293 at [17].[8]The meaning of reasonable prospect of success in this provision was considered in Spencer with the plurality, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ observing at [59]-[60]:[59]In many cases where a plaintiff has no reasonable prospect of prosecuting a proceeding, the proceeding could be described (with or without the addition of intensifying epithets like "clearly", "manifestly" or "obviously") as "frivolous", "untenable", "groundless" or "faulty". But none of those expressions (alone or in combination) should be understood as providing a sufficient chart of the metes and bounds of the power given by s 31A. Nor can the content of the word "reasonable", in the phrase "no reasonable prospect", be sufficiently, let alone completely, illuminated by drawing some contrast with what would be a "frivolous", "untenable", "groundless" or "faulty" claim.[60]Rather, full weight must be given to the expression as a whole. The Federal Court may exercise power under s 31A if, and only if, satisfied that there is "no reasonable prospect" of success…[9]The inquiry required under s 31A is “not an enquiry directed to whether a certain and concluded determination could be made that the proceeding would necessarily fail”: Spencer at [52].[10]The assessment of whether a proceeding has no reasonable prospects of success necessitates the making of value judgments in the absence of a full and complete factual matrix and argument, with the result that the provision vests a discretion in the Court: Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 117; (2009) 178 FCR 401 at [28]. [11]Rule 26.01 provides for circumstances in which a party can make an application to the Court for summary judgment which relevantly includes where the applicant has no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceeding: r 26.01(a); where proceedings are vexatious or an abuse of process: r 26.01(b); and where no reasonable cause of action is disclosed: r 26.01(c).Consideration